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 And disasters that have just happened or are soon about to happen excite more pity for the same reason.  Pity is also aroused by signs and actions, such as the dress of those who have suffered, and all such objects, and the words and everything else that concerns those who are actually suffering, for instance, at the point of death. And when men show themselves undaunted1 at such critical times it is specially pitiable; for all these things,2 because they come immediately under our observation, increase the feeling of pity, both because the sufferer does not seem to deserve his fate, and because the suffering is before our eyes. 9. Now what is called indignation3 is the antithesis to pity; for the being pained at undeserved good fortune is in a manner contrary to being pained at undeserved bad fortune and arises from the same character. And both emotions show good character,  for if we sympathize with and pity those who suffer undeservedly, we ought to be indignant with those who prosper undeservedly; for that which happens beyond a man's deserts is unjust, wherefore we attribute this feeling even to gods.  It would seem that envy also is similarly opposed to pity, as being akin to or identical with indignation, although it is really different; envy also is indeed a disturbing pain and directed against good fortune, but not that of one who does not deserve it, but of one who is our equal and
like. Now, all who feel envy and indignation must have this in common, that they are disturbed, not because they think that any harm will happen to themselves, but on account of their neighbor; for it will cease to be indignation and envy, but will be fear, if the pain and disturbance arise from the idea that harm may come to themselves from another's good fortune.  And it is evident that these feelings will be accompanied by opposite feelings; for he who is pained at the sight of those who are undeservedly unfortunate will rejoice or will at least not be pained at the sight of those who are deservedly so; for instance, no good man would be pained at seeing parricides or assassins punished; we should rather rejoice at their lot, and at that of men who are deservedly fortunate; for both these4 are just and cause the worthy man to rejoice, because he cannot help hoping that what has happened to his like may also happen to himself.  And all these feelings arise from the same character and their contraries from the contrary; for he who is malicious is also envious,
1 “When the men, who are in such crises, are good men” （Jebb）. If they were not, their misfortune would appear deserved.
2 The signs and actions, and the demeanor of the sufferer.
4 There is justice both in the punishment of the parricide and in the deserved good fortune of others. The conclusion must refer to the latter; if his like is fortunate, he hopes he may be.
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