Chapter 11. PYRRHO
(c. 360-270 b.c.)
[
61]
Pyrrho of Elis was the son of
Pleistarchus, as Diocles relates. According to Apollodorus in his
Chronology, he was first a painter ; then he
studied under Stilpo's son Bryson
1: thus Alexander in his
Successions of
Philosophers. Afterwards he joined Anaxarchus, whom he
accompanied on his travels everywhere so that he even forgathered
with the Indian Gymnosophists and with the Magi. This led him to
adopt a most noble philosophy, to quote Ascanius of Abdera, taking
the form of agnosticism and suspension of judgement. He denied that
anything was honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust.
2 And so, universally, he held that there is
nothing really existent, but custom and convention govern human
action ; for no single thing is in itself any more this than
that.
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62]
He led a life consistent with this doctrine, going out
of his way for nothing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks
as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs or what not, and,
generally, leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses ; but he
was kept out of harm's way by his friends who, as Antigonus of
Carystus tells us, used to follow close after him. But Aenesidemus
says that it was only his philosophy that was based upon suspension
of judgement, and that he did not lack foresight in his everyday
acts. He lived to be nearly ninety.
This is what Antigonus of
Carystus says of Pyrrho in his book upon him. At first he was a poor
and unknown painter, and there are still some indifferent
torch-racers of his in the gymnasium at Elis.
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63]
He would
withdraw from the world and live in solitude, rarely showing himself
to his relatives ; this he did because he had heard an Indian
reproach Anaxarchus, telling him that he would never be able to
teach others what is good while he himself danced attendance on
kings in their courts. He would maintain the same composure at all
times, so that, even if you left him when he was in the middle of a
speech, he would finish what he had to say with no audience but
himself, although in his youth he had been hasty.
3 Often, our informant adds, he would leave his home
and, telling no one, would go roaming about with whomsoever he
chanced to meet. And once, when Anaxarchus fell into a slough, he
passed by without giving him any help, and, while others blamed him,
Anaxarchus himself praised his indifference and
sang-froid.
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64]
On being discovered once talking
to himself, he answered, when asked the reason, that he was training
to be good. In debate he was looked down upon by no one, for he
could both discourse at length and also sustain a cross-examination,
so that even Nausiphanes when a young man was captivated by him : at
all events he used to say that we should follow Pyrrho in
disposition but himself in doctrine ; and he would often remark that
Epicurus, greatly admiring Pyrrho's way of life, regularly asked him
for information about Pyrrho ; and that he was so respected by his
native city that they made him high priest, and on his account they
voted that all philosophers should be exempt from taxation.
Moreover, there were many who emulated his
abstention from affairs, so that Timon in his
Pytho4 and in his
Silli5 says
6 :
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O Pyrrho, O aged Pyrrho, whence and
how
Found'st thou escape from servitude to sophists,
Their dreams and vanities ; how didst thou loose
The bonds
of trickery and specious craft ?
Nor reck'st thou to inquire
such things as these,
What breezes circle Hellas, to what
end,
And from what quarter each may chance to blow.
And again in the
Conceits7 :
This, Pyrrho, this my heart is fain to know,
Whence peace of mind to thee doth freely flow,
Why among
men thou like a god dost show ?
Athens honoured him with her
citizenship, says Diocles, for having slain the Thracian Cotys.
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He
lived in fraternal piety with his sister, a midwife, so says
Eratosthenes in his essay
On Wealth and
Poverty, now and then even taking things for sale to market,
poultry perchance or pigs, and he would dust the things in the
house, quite indifferent as to what he did. They say he showed his
indifference by washing a porker. Once he got enraged in his
sister's cause (her name was Philista), and he told the man who
blamed him that it was not over a weak woman that one should display
indifference. When a cur rushed at him and terrified him, he
answered his critic that it was not easy entirely to strip oneself
of human weakness ; but one should strive with all one's might
against facts, by deeds if possible, and if not, in word.
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They say that, when septic salves and surgical and caustic
remedies were applied to a wound he had sustained, he did not so
much as frown. Timon
also portrays his
disposition in the full account which he gives of him to Pytho.
Philo of Athens, a friend of his, used to say that he was most fond
of Democritus, and then of Homer, admiring him and continually
repeating the line
As leaves on trees, such
is the life of man.Il. vi.
146.
He also admired Homer because he likened men
to wasps, flies, and birds, and would quote these verses as well
:
Ay, friend, die thou ; why thus thy fate deplore ?
Patroclus too, thy better, is no more,
9
and all the passages
which dwell on the unstable purpose, vain pursuits, and childish
folly of man.
10
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Posidonius, too, relates of
him a story of this sort. When his fellow-passengers on board a ship
were all unnerved by a storm, he kept calm and confident, pointing
to a little pig in the ship that went on eating, and telling them
that such was the unperturbed state in which the wise man should
keep himself. Numenius alone attributes to him positive tenets. He
had pupils of repute, in particular one Eurylochus, who fell short
of his professions ; for they say that he was once so angry that he
seized the spit with the meat on it and chased his cook right into
the market-place.
[
69]
Once in Elis he was so hard pressed by his pupils'
questions that he stripped
and swam across the
Alpheus. Now he was, as Timon too says, most hostile to
Sophists.
Philo, again, who had a habit of very often talking
to himself, is also referred to in the lines
11:
Yea, him that is
far away from men, at leisure to himself,
Philo, who recks
not of opinion or of wrangling.
Besides these, Pyrrho's
pupils included Hecataeus of Abdera, Timon of Phlius, author of the
Silli, of whom more anon, and also Nausiphanes
of Teos, said by some to have been a teacher of Epicurus. All these
were called Pyrrhoneans after the name of their master, but
Aporetics, Sceptics, Ephectics, and even Zetetics, from their
principles, if we may call them such--
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Zetetics or seekers because
they were ever seeking truth, Sceptics or inquirers because they
were always looking for a solution and never finding one, Ephectics
or doubters because of the state of mind which followed their
inquiry, I mean, suspense of judgement, and finally Aporetics or
those in perplexity, for not only they but even the dogmatic
philosophers themselves in their turn were often perplexed.
Pyrrhoneans, of course, they were called from Pyrrho. Theodosius in
his
Sceptic Chapters denies that Scepticism
should be called Pyrrhonism ; for if the movement of the mind in
either direction is unattainable by us, we shall never know for
certain what Pyrrho really intended, and without knowing that, we
cannot be called Pyrrhoneans. Besides this (he says), there is the
fact that Pyrrho was not the founder of Scepticism ; nor had he any
positive tenet ; but a Pyrrhonean is one who in manners and life
resembles Pyrrho.
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Some call Homer the founder of this school,
for to the same questions he more than anyone else is
always giving different answers at different times, and
is never definite or dogmatic about the answer. The maxims of the
Seven Wise Men, too, they call sceptical ; for instance, "Observe
the Golden Mean," and "A pledge is a curse at one's elbow," meaning
that whoever plights his troth steadfastly and trustfully brings a
curse on his own head. Sceptically minded, again, were Archilochus
and Euripides, for Archilochus says
12
:
Man's soul, O Glaucus, son of Leptines,
Is but as
one short day that Zeus sends down.
And Euripides
13 :
Great
God ! how can they say poor mortal men
Have minds and think?
Hang we not on thy will ?
Do we not what it pleaseth thee to
wish ?
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Furthermore, they find Xenophanes, Zeno of Elea, and
Democritus to be sceptics : Xenophanes because he says,
14
Clear truth hath no man seen nor e'er
shall know ;
and Zeno because he would destroy motion,
saying, "A moving body moves neither where it is nor where it is
not"; Democritus because he rejects qualities, saying, "Opinion says
hot or cold, but the reality is atoms and empty space," and again,
"Of a truth we know nothing, for truth is in a well."
15 Plato, too, leaves the truth to gods and sons of
gods, and seeks after the probable explanation.
16 Euripides says
17 :
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Who knoweth if to die be but to
live,
And that called life by mortals be but death ?
So too Empedocles
18 :
So to
these mortal may not list nor look
Nor yet conceive them in
his mind ;
and before that
19 :
Each
believes naught but his experience.
And even Heraclitus
: "Let us not conjecture on deepest questions what is likely."
20 Then again Hippocrates showed himself
two-sided and but human. And before them all Homer
21 :
Pliant is the
tongue of mortals ; numberless the tales within it ;
and
Ample is of words the pasture, hither thither widely ranging
;
and
And the saying which thou sayest, back it cometh
later on thee,
where he is speaking of the equal value of
contradictory sayings.
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The Sceptics, then, were constantly
engaged
22 in overthrowing the dogmas of all schools, but
enuntiated none themselves ; and though they would go so far as to
bring forward and expound the dogmas of the others, they themselves
laid down nothing definitely, not even the laying down of nothing.
So much so that they even refuted their laying down of nothing,
saying, for instance, "We determine nothing," since otherwise they
would have been betrayed into determining
23; but we put forward, say they,
all
the theories for the purpose of indicating
our unprecipitate attitude, precisely as we might have done if we
had actually assented to them. Thus by the expression "We determine
nothing" is indicated their state of even balance; which is
similarly indicated by the other expressions, "Not more (one thing
than another)," "Every saying has its corresponding opposite," and
the like.
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But "Not more (one thing than another)" can also be taken
positively, indicating that two things are alike ; for example, "The
pirate is no more wicked than the liar." But the Sceptics meant it
not positively but negatively, as when, in refuting an argument, one
says, "Neither had more existence, Scylla or the Chimaera." And
"More so" itself is sometimes comparative, as when we say that
"Honey is more sweet than grapes" ; sometimes both positive and
negative, as when we say, "Virtue profits more than it harms," for
in this phrase we indicate that virtue profits and does not harm.
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But the Sceptics even refute the statement "Not more (one thing than
another)." For, as forethought is no more existent than
non-existent, so "Not more (one thing than another)" is no more
existent than not. Thus, as Timon says in the
Pytho, the statement means just absence of all
determination and withholding of assent. The other statement, "Every
saying, etc.,"
24 equally compels suspension of judgement; when facts
disagree, but the contradictory statements have exactly the same
weight, ignorance of the truth is the necessary consequence. But
even this statement has its corresponding antithesis, so that after
destroying others it turns round and destroys itself, like a purge
which drives the substance
out and then in its
turn is itself eliminated and destroyed.
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This the dogmatists
answer by saying that they do [not merely] not deny the statement,
but even plainly assert it. So they were merely using the words as
servants, as it was not possible not to refute one statement by
another ; just as we
25 are accustomed to say
there is no such thing as space, and yet we have no alternative but
to speak of space for the purpose of argument, though not of
positive doctrine, and just as we say nothing comes about by
necessity and yet have to speak of necessity. This was the sort of
interpretation they used to give ; though things appear to be such
and such, they are not such in reality but only appear such. And
they would say that they sought, not thoughts, since thoughts are
evidently thought, but the things in which sensation plays a
part.
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Thus the Pyrrhonean principle, as Aenesidemus says in
the introduction to his
Pyrrhonics, is but a
report on phenomena or on any kind of judgement, a report in which
all things are brought to bear on one another, and in the comparison
are found to present much anomaly and confusion. As to the
contradictions in their doubts, they would first show the ways in
which things gain credence, and then by the same methods they would
destroy belief in them ; for they say those things gain credence
which either the senses are agreed upon or which never or at least
rarely change, as well as things which become habitual or are
determined by law and those which please or excite wonder.
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They
showed, then, on the basis of that which is contrary to what induces
belief, that the probabilities on both sides are equal.
Perplexities arise from the agreements
26 between appearances or
judgements, and these perplexities they distinguished under ten
different modes in which the subjects in question appeared to vary.
The following are the ten modes laid down.
27
The
first mode relates to
the differences between living creatures in respect of those things
which give them pleasure or pain, or are useful or harmful to them.
By this it is inferred that they do not receive the same impressions
from the same things, with the result that such a conflict
necessarily leads to suspension of judgement. For some creatures
multiply without intercourse, for example, creatures that live in
fire, the Arabian phoenix and worms ; others by union, such as man
and the rest.
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Some are distinguished in one way, some in another,
and for this reason they differ in their senses also, hawks for
instance being most keen-sighted, and dogs having a most acute sense
of smell. It is natural that if the senses,
e.g. eyes, of animals differ, so also will the
impressions produced upon them; so to the goat vine-shoots are good
to eat, to man they are bitter ; the quail thrives on hemlock, which
is fatal to man ; the pig will eat ordure, the horse will not.
The
second mode has reference to the natures
and idiosyncrasies of men; for instance, Demophon, Alexander's
butler, used to get warm in the shade and shiver in the sun.
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Andron
of Argos is reported by Aristotle
28 to
have travelled across the waterless deserts of Libya without
drinking. Moreover, one man fancies the profession of medicine,
another
farming, and another commerce; and the
same ways of life are injurious to one man but beneficial to
another; from which it follows that judgement must be suspended.
The
third mode depends on the differences
between the sense-channels in different cases, for an apple gives
the impression of being pale yellow in colour to the sight, sweet in
taste and fragrant in smell. An object of the same shape is made to
appear different by differences in the mirrors reflecting it. Thus
it follows that what appears is no more such and such a thing than
something different.
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The
fourth mode is
that due to differences of condition and to changes in general ; for
instance, health, illness, sleep, waking, joy, sorrow, youth, old
age, courage, fear, want, fullness, hate, love, heat, cold, to say
nothing of breathing freely and having the passages obstructed. The
impressions received thus appear to vary according to the nature of
the conditions. Nay, even the state of madmen is not contrary to
nature; for why should their state be so more than ours? Even to our
view the sun has the appearance of standing still. And Theon of
Tithorea used to go to bed and walk in his sleep, while Pericles'
slave did the same on the housetop.
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The
fifth mode is derived from customs, laws, belief in
myths, compacts between nations and dogmatic assumptions. This class
includes considerations with regard to things beautiful and ugly,
true and false, good and bad, with regard to the gods, and with
regard to the coming into being and the passing away of the world of
phenomena. Obviously the same thing is regarded by some as just and
by others as unjust, or as good by some and
bad
by others. Persians think it not unnatural for a man to marry his
daughter; to Greeks it is unlawful. The Massagetae, acording to
Eudoxus in the first book of his
Voyage round the
World, have their wives in common ; the Greeks have not. The
Cilicians used to delight in piracy ; not so the Greeks.
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Different
people believe in different gods ; some in providence, others not.
In burying their dead, the Egyptians embalm them; the Romans burn
them ; the Paeonians throw them into lakes. As to what is true,
then, let suspension of judgement be our practice.
The
sixth mode relates to mixtures and participations, by virtue of which nothing appears pure in and by itself, but
only in combination with air, light, moisture, solidity, heat, cold,
movement, exhalations and other forces. For purple shows different
tints in sunlight, moonlight, and lamplight ; and our own
complexion does not appear the same at noon and when the sun is low.
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Again, a rock which in air takes two men to lift is easily moved
about in water, either because, being in reality heavy, it is lifted
by the water or because, being light, it is made heavy by the air.
Of its own inherent property we know nothing, any more than of the
constituent oils in an ointment.
The
seventh mode has reference to distances, positions,
places and the occupants of the places. In this mode things which
are thought to be large appear small, square things round ; flat
things appear to have projections, straight things to be bent, and
colourless coloured. So the sun, on account of its distance, appears
small, mountains when far away appear misty and smooth, but when
near at hand
rugged.
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Furthermore, the sun at
its rising has a certain appearance, but has a dissimilar appearance
when in mid-heaven, and the same body one appearance in a wood and
another in open country. The image again varies according to the
position of the object, and a dove's neck according to the way it is
turned. Since, then, it is not possible to observe these things
apart from places and positions, their real nature is
unknowable.
The
eighth mode is concerned
with quantities and qualities of things, say heat or cold, swiftness
or slowness, colourlessness or variety of colours. Thus wine taken
in moderation strengthens the body, but too much of it is weakening
; and so with food and other things.
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The
ninth mode has to do with perpetuity, strangeness, or rarity. Thus earthquakes are no surprise to those among
whom they constantly take place ; nor is the sun, for it is seen
every day.
29 This ninth mode is put eighth by Favorinus
and tenth by Sextus and Aenesidemus; moreover the tenth is put
eighth by Sextus and ninth by Favorinus.
The
tenth mode rests on inter-relation,
e.g. between light and heavy, strong and weak,
greater and less, up and down. Thus that which is on the right is
not so by nature, but is so understood in virtue of its position
with respect to something else ; for, if that change its position,
the thing is no longer on the right.
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Similarly father and brother
are relative terms, day is relative to the sun, and all things
relative to our mind. Thus relative terms are in and by themselves
unknowable. These, then, are the ten modes of perplexity.
But Agrippa and his school add to them
30 five
other modes, resulting respectively from disagreement, extension
ad infinitum, relativity, hypothesis and
reciprocal inference. The mode arising from disagreement proves,
with regard to any inquiry whether in philosophy or in everyday
life, that it is full of the utmost contentiousness and confusion.
The mode which involves extension
ad infinitum
refuses to admit that what is sought to be proved is firmly
established, because one thing furnishes the ground for belief in
another, and so on
ad infinitum.
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The mode
derived from relativity declares that a thing can never be
apprehended in and by itself, but only in connexion with something
else. Hence all things are unknowable. The mode resulting from
hypothesis arises when people suppose that you must take the most
elementary of things as of themselves entitled to credence, instead
of postulating them : which is useless, because some one else will
adopt the contrary hypothesis. The mode arising from reciprocal
inference is found whenever that which should be confirmatory of the
thing requiring to be proved itself has to borrow credit from the
latter, as, for example, if anyone seeking to establish the
existence of pores on the ground that emanations take place should
take this (the existence of pores) as proof that there are
emanations.
31
[
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They would deny all demonstration, criterion,
sign, cause, motion, the process of learning, coming into being, or
that there is anything good or bad by nature. For all demonstration,
say they, is constructed out of things either already proved or
indemonstrable. If out of things already proved, those things too
will require some demonstration,
and so on
ad infinitum ; if out of things indemonstrable,
then, whether all or some or only a single one of the steps are the
subject of doubt, the whole is indemonstrable.
32 If you think, they add,
that there are some things which need no demonstration, yours must
be a rare intellect, not to see that you must first have
demonstration of the very fact that the things you refer to carry
conviction in themselves.
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Nor must we prove that the elements are
four from the fact that the elements are four. Besides, if we
discredit particular demonstrations, we cannot accept the
generalization from them. And in order that we may know that an
argument constitutes a demonstration, we require a criterion ; but
again, in order that we may know that it is a criterion we require a
demonstration ; hence both the one and the other are
incomprehensible, since each is referred to the other. How then are
we to grasp the things which are uncertain, seeing that we know no
demonstration ? For what we wish to ascertain is not whether
things appear to be such and such, but whether they are so in their
essence.
They declared the dogmatic philosophers to be fools,
observing that what is concluded
ex hypothesi
is properly described not as inquiry but assumption, and by
reasoning of this kind one may even argue for impossibilities. As
for those who think that
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we should not judge of truth from
surrounding circumstances or legislate on the basis of what is
found in nature, these men, they used to say, made themselves the
measure of all things, and did not see that every phenomenon appears
in a certain disposition and in a certain reciprocal relation to
surrounding circumstances. Therefore we must affirm either that
all
things are true or that all things are
false. For if certain things only are true [and others are false],
how are we to distinguish them ? Not by the senses, where things in
the field of sense are in question, since all these things appear to
sense to be on an equal footing; nor by the mind, for the same
reason. Yet apart from these faculties there is no other, so far as
we can see, to help us to a judgement. Whoever therefore, they say,
would be firmly assured about anything sensible or intelligible must
first establish the received opinions about it ; for some have
refuted one doctrine, others another. But things must be judged
either by the sensible or by the intelligible,
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93]
and both are
disputed. Therefore it is impossible to pronounce judgement on
opinions about sensibles or intelligibles ; and if the conflict in
our thoughts compels us to disbelieve every one, the standard or
measure, by which it is held that all things are exactly determined,
will be destroyed, and we must deem every statement of equal value.
Further, say they, our partner in an inquiry into a phenomenon is
either to be trusted or not. If he is, he will have nothing to reply
to the man to whom it appears to be the opposite
33 ; for just as our friend who describes what appears to
him is to be trusted, so is his opponent. If he is not to be
trusted, he will actually be disbelieved when he describes what
appears to him.
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94]
We must not assume that what convinces us is
actually true. For the same thing does not convince every one, nor
even the same people always. Persuasiveness sometimes depends on
external circumstances, on the reputation of the speaker,
on his ability as a thinker or his artfulness, on the
familiarity or the pleasantness of the topic.
Again, they
would destroy the criterion by reasoning of this kind. Even the
criterion has either been critically determined or not. If it has
not, it is definitely untrustworthy, and in its purpose of
distinguishing is no more true than false. If it has, it will belong
to the class of particular judgements, so that one and the same
thing determines and is determined, and the criterion which has
determined will have to be determined by another, that other by
another, and so on
ad infinitum.
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In addition to
this there is disagreement as to the criterion, some holding that
man is the criterion, while for some it is the senses, for others
reason, for others the apprehensive presentation. Now man disagrees
with man and with himself, as is shown by differences of laws and
customs. The senses deceive, and reason says different things.
Finally, the apprehensive presentation is judged by the mind, and
the mind itself changes in various ways. Hence the criterion is
unknowable, and consequently truth also.
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96]
They deny, too, that
there is such a thing as a sign. If there is, they say, it must
either be sensible or intelligible. Now it is not sensible, because
what is sensible is a common attribute, whereas a sign is a
particular thing. Again, the sensible is one of the things which
exist by way of difference, while the sign belongs to the category
of relative. Nor is a sign an object of thought, for objects of
thought are of four kinds, apparent judgements on things apparent,
non-apparent judgements on things nonapparent, non-apparent on
apparent, or apparent on non-apparent ; and a sign is none of these,
so
that there is no such thing as a sign. A
sign is not "apparent on apparent," for what is apparent needs no
sign ; nor is it non-apparent on non-apparent, for what is revealed
by something must needs appear ; nor is it non-apparent on apparent,
for that which is to afford the means of apprehending something
else must itself be apparent ;
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97]
nor, lastly, is it apparent on
non-apparent, because the sign, being relative, must be apprehended
along with that of which it is the sign, which is not here the case.
It follows that nothing uncertain can be apprehended ; for it is
through signs that uncertain things are said to be apprehended.
34.
Causes, too, they
destroy in this way. A cause is something relative ; for it is
relative to what can be caused, namely, the effect. But things which
are relative are merely objects of thought and have no substantial
existence.
[
98]
Therefore a cause can only be an object of thought ;
inasmuch as, if it be a cause, it must bring with it that of which
it is said to be the cause, otherwise it will not be a cause. Just
as a father, in the absence of that in relation to which he is
called father, will not be a father, so too with a cause. But that
in relation to which the cause is thought of, namely the effect, is
not present ; for there is no coming into being or passing away or
any other process : therefore there is no such thing as cause.
Furthermore, if there is a cause, either bodies are the cause of
bodies, or things incorporeal of things incorporeal ; but neither is
the case ; therefore there is no such thing as cause. Body in fact
could not be the cause of body, inasmuch as both have the same
nature. And if either is
called a cause in so
far as it is a body, the other, being a body, will become a cause.
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But if both be alike causes, there will be nothing to be acted upon
Nor can an incorporeal thing be the cause of an incorporeal thing,
for the same reason. And a thing incorporeal cannot be the cause of
a body, since nothing incorporeal creates anything corporeal. And,
lastly, a body cannot be the cause of anything incorporeal, because
what is produced must be of the material operated upon ; but if it
is not operated upon because it is incorporeal, it cannot be
produced by anything whatever. Therefore there is no such thing as a
cause. A corollary to this is their statement that the first
principles of the universe have no real existence ; for in that case
something must have been there to create and act.
Furthermore
there is no motion ; for that which moves moves either in the place
where it is or in a place where it is not. But it cannot move in the
place where it is, still less in any place where it is not.
Therefore there is no such thing as motion.
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100]
They used also to
deny the possibility of learning. If anything is taught, they say,
either the existent is taught through its existence or the
non-existent through its non-existence. But the existent is not
taught through its existence, for the nature of existing things is
apparent to and recognized by all ; nor is the non-existent taught
through the nonexistent, for with the non-existent nothing is ever
done, so that it cannot be taught to anyone.
Nor, say they,
is there any coming into being. For that which is does not come into
being, since it
is ; nor yet that which is not,
for it has no sub-
stantial existence, and that
which is neither substantial nor existent cannot have had the
chance of coming into being either.
[
101]
There is nothing good or
bad by nature, for if there is anything good or bad by nature, it
must be good or bad for all persons alike, just as snow is cold to
all. But there is no good or bad which is such to all persons in
common ; therefore there is no such thing as good or bad by nature.
For either all that is thought good by anyone whatever must be
called good, or not all. Certainly all cannot be so called ; since
one and the same thing is thought good by one person and bad by
another ; for instance, Epicurus thought pleasure good and
Antisthenes thought it bad ; thus on our supposition it will follow
that the same thing is both good and bad. But if we say that not all
that anyone thinks good is good, we shall have to judge the
different opinions ; and this is impossible because of the equal
validity of opposing arguments. Therefore the good by nature is
unknowable.
[
102]
The whole of their mode of inference can be
gathered from their extant treatises. Pyrrho himself, indeed, left
no writings, but his associates Timon, Aenesidemus, Numenius and
Nausiphanes did ; and others as well.
The dogmatists answer
them by declaring that the Sceptics themselves do apprehend and
dogmatize; for when they are thought to be refuting their hardest
they do apprehend, for at the very same time they are asseverating
and dogmatizing. Thus even when they declare that they determine
nothing, and that to every argument there is an opposite argument,
they are actually determining these very points and
dogmatizing.
[
103]
35The others reply, "We
confess to human weaknesses ; for we recognize that it
is day and that we are alive, and many other apparent facts in life
; but with regard to the things about which our opponents argue so
positively, claiming to have definitely apprehended them, we suspend
our judgement because they are not certain, and confine knowledge to
our impressions.
36 For we
admit that we see, and we recognize that we think this or that, but
how we see or how we think we know not. And we say in conversation
that a certain thing appears white, but we are not positive that it
really is white. As to our `We determine nothing' and the like,
37 we use the expressions in an undogmatic sense,
[
104]
for
they are not like the assertion that the world is spherical. Indeed
the latter statement is not certain, but the others are mere
admissions. Thus in saying `We determine nothing,' we are
not determining even that."
Again, the
dogmatic philosophers maintain that the Sceptics do away with life
itself, in that they reject all that life consists in. The others
say this is false, for they do not deny that we see ; they only say
that they do not know how we see. "We admit the apparent fact," say
they, "without admitting that it really is what it appears to be."
We also perceive that fire burns ; as to whether it is its nature to
burn, we suspend our judgement.
[
105]
We see that a man moves, and that he
perishes ; how it happens we do not know. We merely object to
accepting the unknown substance behind phenomena. When we say a
picture has projections, we are describing what is apparent ; but if
we say that it has no projections, we are then speaking, not of what
is apparent, but of something else. This is
what makes Timon say in his
Python that he
has not gone outside what is customary. And again in the
Conceits he says
38 :
But the apparent is omnipotent wherever it goes
;
and in his work
On the Senses, "I
do not lay it down that honey is sweet, but I admit that it appears
to be so."
[
106]
Aenesidemus too in the first book of his
Pyrrhonean Discourses says that Pyrrho determines
nothing dogmatically, because of the possibility of contradiction,
but guides himself by apparent facts. Aenesidemus says the same in
his works
Against Wisdom and
On
Inquiry. Furthermore Zeuxis, the friend of Aenesidemus, in his
work
On Two-sided Arguments, Antiochus of
Laodicea, and Apellas in his
Agrippa all hold
to phenomena alone. Therefore the apparent is the Sceptic's
criterion, as indeed Aenesidemus says ; and so does Epicurus. Democritus, however, denied that any apparent fact could be a criterion,
indeed he denied the very existence of the apparent.
[
107]
Against this
criterion of appearances the dogmatic philosophers urge that, when
the same appearances produce in us different impressions,
e.g. a round or square tower, the Sceptic, unless
he gives the preference to one or other, will be unable to take any
course ; if on the other hand, say they, he follows either view, he
is then no longer allowing equal value to all apparent facts. The
Sceptics reply that, when different impressions are produced, they
must both be said to appear
39 ; for things which are apparent are so called because
they appear. The end to be realized they hold to be suspension of
judgement, which brings with it
tranquillity
like its shadow : so Timon and Aenesidemus declare.
[
108]
For in matters
which are for us to decide we shall neither choose this nor shrink
from that ; and things which are not for us to decide but happen of
necessity, such as hunger, thirst and pain, we cannot escape,
40 for they are not to be removed by force of reason. And
when the dogmatists argue that he may thus live in such a frame of
mind that he would not shrink from killing and eating his own father
if ordered to do so, the Sceptic replies that he will be able so to
live as to suspend his judgement in cases where it is a question of
arriving at the truth, but not in matters of life and the taking of
precautions. Accordingly we may choose a thing or shrink from a
thing by habit and may observe rules and customs. According to some
authorities the end proposed by the Sceptics is insensibility ;
according to others, gentleness.
41