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[1247b]
[1]
for the fortunate are those for
whom good fortune is a cause of good things.But if so, shall we say that there is no such thing as
fortune at all, or that it does exist but is not a cause? No, it must
both exist and be a cause. Consequently it will furthermore be a cause of goods or evils to
certain persons; whereas if fortune is to be eliminated altogether,
then nothing must be said to come about from fortune, in spite of the
fact that, although there is another cause, because we do not see it
we say that fortune is a cause—owing to which people give it
as a definition of fortune that it is a cause incalculable to human
reasoning, implying that it is a real natural principle. This, then,
would be a matter for another inquiry. But since we see that some
people have good fortune on one occasion, why should they not succeed
a second time too owing to the same cause? and a third time? and a
fourth? for the same cause produces the same effect. Therefore this will not be a
matter of fortune; but when the same result follows from indeterminate
and in definite antecedents, it will be good or bad for somebody, but
there will not be the knowledge of it that comes by experience, since,
if there were, some fortunate persons would learn it, or indeed all
branches of knowledge would, as Socrates said,1 be
forms of good fortune.
What, then, prevents such things from happening to somebody a number
of times running not because he has a certain character, but in the
way in which for instance it would be possible to make the highest
throw at dice every time? And what then? are there not some impulses
in the spirit that arise from reasoning and others from irrational
appetition? and are not the latter prior?
[20]
because if the impulse caused by desire for
what is pleasant exists by nature, appetition also would merely by
nature proceed towards what is good in every case. If, therefore, some men have
good natures—just as musical people though they have not
learnt to sing2 have a natural aptitude for it—and
without the aid of reason have an impulse in the direction of the
natural order of things and desire the right thing in the right way at
the right time, these men will succeed even although they are in fact
foolish and irrational, just as the others will sing well although
unable to teach singing. And men of this sort obviously are
fortunate—men who without the aid of reason are usually
successful. Hence it will follow that the fortunate are so by
nature.Or has the term 'good fortune' more than one
meaning? For some things are done from impulse and as a result of the
agents' purposive choice, other things not so but on the contrary; and
if in the former cases when the agents succeed they seem to have
reasoned badly, we say that in fact they have had good fortune; and
again in the latter cases, if they wished for a different good or less
good than they have got.
The former persons then may possibly owe their good fortune to nature,
for their impulse and appetition, being for the right object,
succeeded, but their reasoning was foolish; and in their case, when it
happens that their reasoning seems to be incorrect but that impulse is
the cause of it, this impulse being right has saved them; although
sometimes on the contrary owing to appetite they have reasoned in this
way and come to misfortune. But in the case of the others,3 then, how will good fortune be due
to natural goodness of appetition and desire?
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