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[1088b]
[1]
Moreover, the matter of every
thing, and therefore of substance, must be that which is potentially
of that nature; but the relative is neither potentially substance nor
actually. It is absurd, then, or rather
impossible, to represent non-substance as an element of substance and
prior to it; for all the other categories are posterior to substance.
And further, the elements are not predicated of those things of which
they are elements; yet "many" and "few" are predicated, both
separately and together, of number; and "long" and "short" are
predicated of the line, and the Plane is both broad and
narrow.If, then,
there is a plurality of which one term, viz. "few," is always
predicable, e.g. 2 (for if 2 is many, 1 will be few1), then there will be an absolute
"many"; e.g., 10 will be many (if there is nothing more than 102), or 10,000. How, then, in this
light, can number be derived from Few and Many? Either both ought to
be predicated of it, or neither; but according to this view only one
or the other is predicated. But we must inquire in general
whether eternal things can be composed of elements. If so, they will
have matter; for everything which consists of elements is
composite.Assuming,
then, that that which consists of anything, whether it has always
existed or it came into being, must come into being <if at
all> out of that of which it consists; and that everything
comes to be that which it comes to be out of that which is it
potentially (for it could not have come to be out of that which was
not potentially such, nor could it have consisted of it); and that the
potential can either be actualized or not;
[20]
then however everlasting number or
anything else which has matter may be, it would be possible for it not
to exist, just as that which is any number of years old is as capable
of not existing as that which is one day old. And if this is so, that
which has existed for so long a time that there is no limit to it may
also not exist.Therefore
things which contain matter cannot be eternal, that is, if that which
is capable of not existing is not eternal, as we have had occasion to
say elsewhere.3 Now if what we have just been
saying—that no substance is eternal unless it is
actuality—is true universally, and the elements are the
matter of substance, an eternal substance can have no elements of
which, as inherent in it, it consists. There are some
who, while making the element which acts conjointly with unity the
indeterminate dyad, object to "the unequal," quite reasonably, on the
score of the difficulties which it involves. But they are rid only of
those difficulties4 which necessarily attend the theory of those who
make the unequal, i.e. the relative, an element; all the difficulties
which are independent of this view must apply to their theories also,
whether it is Ideal or mathematical number that they construct out of
these elements. There are many causes for their
resorting to these explanations,
1 Cf. Aristot. Met. 10.6.1-3.
2 Cf. Aristot. Met. 13.8.17.
3 Aristot. Met. 9.8.15-17, Aristot. De Caelo 1.12.
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