[1284b]
[1]
and the king of
the Persians frequently used to cut down the numbers of the Medes and
Babylonians and the other races that had waxed proud because they had once been
head of an empire. And the problem
applies universally to all the forms of constitution, even the right forms; for
while the divergent forms of government do this because their regard is fixed on
their private advantage, nevertheless with the constitutions directed to the
common good the same is the case. And this is also clear in the field of the
other arts and sciences; a painter would not let his animal have its foot of
disproportionately large size, even though it was an exceptionally beautiful
foot, nor would a shipbuilder make the stern or some other part of a ship
disproportionately big, nor yet will a trainer of choruses allow a man who sings
louder and more beautifully than the whole band to be a member of it. Hence as far as this practice goes nothing
prevents monarchs from being in harmony with the cities they rule, if they
resort to it when their own personal rule is beneficial to the cities. Therefore
in relation to acknowledged superiorities the argument for ostracism has a
certain element of political justice. True, it is better for the lawgiver so to
constitute the state at the outset that it does not need this medicine; but the
next best course to steer, if occasion arises, is to endeavor to
correct
[20]
the constitution by some
such method of rectification. But this was not what happened with the states,
for they were not looking at what was advantageous for their proper
constitution, but their acts of ostracism were done in a revolutionary spirit.
In the divergent forms of constitution therefore it is evident that ostracism is
advantageous and just under the special constitution, though perhaps it is also
evident that it is not1 just absolutely; but in the case of the best constitution there is
much doubt as to what ought to be done, not as regards superiority in the other
things of value, such as strength and wealth and popularity, but in the case of
a person becoming exceptionally distinguished for virtue. It certainly would not
be said that such a man must be banished and got out of the way; yet
nevertheless no doubt men would not think that they ought to rule over such a
man, for that would be the same as if they claimed to rule over Zeus, dividing
up his spheres of government. It remains therefore, and this seems to be the
natural course, for all to obey such a man gladly, so that men of this sort may
be kings in the cities for all time.And perhaps it is well after the subjects
that have been discussed to pass over to consider royal government; for we
pronounce this to be one of the correct constitutions. And it has to be
considered whether it is advantageous for a city or a country that is to be well
administered to be ruled by a king, or whether it is not so but some other
constitution is more expedient, or whether royal rule is expedient for some
states and not for others. But it is needful to decide first whether there is
only one sort of kingship or whether it has several varieties.
1 Perhaps ‘not’ should be struck out; but if it stands, the clause refers to 8.5 init.—in these cases ostracism is practiced only in the interest of those in power.
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