rode with me twice over the lines to see that everything was arranged according to his wishes.
He was told that we had been more particular in giving the orders than ever before; that the commanders had been sent for, and the point of attack had been carefully designated, and that the commanders had been directed to communicate to their subordinates, and through them to every soldier in the command, the work that was before them, so that they should nerve themselves for the attack, and fully understand it. After leaving me, he again rode over the field once, if not twice, so that there was really no room for misconstruction or misunderstanding of his wishes.
He could not have thought of giving any such an order.
were confronted by a largely superior force of the enemy on the right of Pickett
To have moved them to Pickett
's support, would have disengaged treble their number of Federals, who would have swooped down from their rocky fastnesses against the flank of our attacking column, and swept our army from the field.
A reference to any of the maps of Gettysburg
will show from the position of the troops that this would have been the inevitable result.
and myself never had any deliberate conversation about Gettysburg
The subject was never broached by either of us to the other.
On one occasion it came up casually, and he said to me (alluding to the charge of Pickett
, on the 3d), “General, why didn't you stop all that thing that day?”
I replied that I could not, under the circumstances, assume such a responsibility, as no discretion had been left me.
Before discussing the weak points of the campaign of