of the campaign, or even the leading points of it, must have known that the three corps of the army were never “concentrated at Chambersburg
” at all; second, it is well known that any organization upon sixty-seven thousand bayonets would have involved an infantry force alone of “over seventy thousand,” and thus have left no margin in the estimate that Mr. Swinton
ascribes to me for the other arms of the service.
If General Dawes
had followed Swinton
's narrative closely, he must have discovered that (page 365) he says: “General Lee
's aggregate force present for duty on the 31st of May, 1863, was sixty-eight thousand three hundred and fifty-two.”
These are the precise figures that he gives, on page 310, as the aggregate of the infantry alone.
My information upon this subject was taken from General Lee
's own lips.
He estimated his force to be, including the detachments that would join him on the march, a trifle over seventy thousand.
On the 30th of June, or the 1st of July, he estimated his infantry at fifty-two thousand bayonets.
If Mr. Swinton
received any information from me on the subject, he received this, for it was all that I had. Since I have read the report of the Adjutant General
of the Army of Northern Virginia, lately published, I am inclined to believe that General Lee
included in his estimate two brigades of Pickett
's Division (Jenkins
' and Corse
's) which were left in Virginia
, or some other detachments made during the march.
If this surmise is correct, it would make the total figures considerably less than I gave them.
I am certain the real strength of his army cannot go above the number given in my first article.
As to the strength of General Meade
's army, I take his own statement for that.
In his evidence taken before the Committee
on the Conduct of the War
(page 337 of their report), he says: “My strength was a little under one hundred thousand-probably ninety-five thousand men.”
I used, in my narrative, the lowest figures that he gave.
In printing the article, it is made to appear that Meade
had ninety-five thousand infantry.
It should have been ninety-five thousand men. This much as to the comparative strength of the two armies.
It is the truth, and will stand as history that Meade
's army was nearly double that of Lee
In my first article, I claimed that my troops fought an extraordinary battle on the 2d.
I asserted that my thirteen thousand men virtually charged against the whole Federal army, encountered nearly sixty-five thousand of the enemy, and broke line after line of fresh troops, until at length, after three hours of the best fighting ever done, they found themselves, in a single line of battle, charging