Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 2.
Henry Coppee , LL.D., Ed.

We have entered into some details for the purpose of showing all the difficulties which, especially at that period, embarrassed the movements of the Federal armies. As we observed in the beginning of this work, some of these difficulties were peculiar to the very nature of the country, but they were increased by the defects of organization and the want of experience in the supply departments. We have already remarked that sufficient advantage had not been taken of the vast number of horses with which the farms of Pennsylvania were stocked. In the same way, instead of collecting around the cantonments of the army of the Potomac the provisions required for its consumption by a system of regular requisitions, they were forwarded from Washington by rail, which encumbered the track, delaying the arrival of the materiel and equipments asked for by McClellan. In short, it is impossible to conceive how cavalry campaigning in a country which is certainly not a wilderness, but is covered with farms and interspersed by vast pasture-lands, should be obliged to carry its own forage along, and that five thousand horses should occupy a number of draft animals nearly equal to their own for the performance of this service. Nor was Lee's army free from these difficulties; and a Prussian officer, M. de Borcke, who was then serving with distinction on Stuart's staff, also complains, in an interesting work he has published on these campaigns, that the largest portion of the provisions was brought with much trouble from Richmond, whilst the counties adjacent to the encampments of the Confederate army abounded in resources which they did not know how to employ.

The task that McClellan had undertaken was far from being completed on the 25th of October, when he put his army in motion. Many articles were delivered to the soldiers during the first few days of the march, but a large number had to be left behind