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[1048a]
[1]
Since anything
which is possible is something possible at some time and in some way,
and with any other qualifications which are necessarily included in
the definition; and since some things can set up processes rationally
and have rational potencies, while others are irrational and have
irrational potencies; and since the former class can only belong to a
living thing, whereas the latter can belong both to living and to
inanimate things: it follows that as for potencies of the latter kind,
when the agent and the patient meet in accordance with the potency in
question, the one must act and the other be acted upon; but in the
former kind of potency this is not necessary, for whereas each single
potency of the latter kind is productive of a single effect, those of
the former kind are productive of contrary effects,1 so that one potency will produce
at the same time contrary effects.2But this is impossible. Therefore there must
be some other deciding factor, by which I mean desire or
conscious choice. For whichever of two things an
animal desires decisively it will do, when it is in circumstances
appropriate to the potency and meets with that which admits of being
acted upon. Therefore everything which is rationally capable, when it
desires something of which it has the capability, and in the
circumstances in which it has the capability, must do that
thing.Now it has the
capability when that which admits of being acted upon is present and
is in a certain state; otherwise it will not be able to act. (To add
the qualification "if nothing external prevents it" is no longer
necessary; because the agent has the capability in so far as it is a
capability of acting; and this is not in all, but in certain
circumstances, in which external hindrances will be
excluded;
[20]
for they are
precluded by some of the positive qualifications in the
definition.)Hence
even if it wishes or desires to do two things or contrary things
simultaneously, it will not do them, for it has not the capability to
do them under these conditions, nor has it the capability of doing
things simultaneously, since it will only do the things to which the
capability applies and under the appropriate conditions.Since we have now dealt with the kind of potency which is related to
motion, let us now discuss actuality; what it is, and what its
qualities are. For as we continue our analysis it will also become
clear with regard to the potential that we apply the name not only to
that whose nature it is to move or be moved by something else, either
without qualification or in some definite way, but also in other
senses; and it is on this account that in the course of our inquiry we
have discussed these as well."Actuality" means the presence
of the thing, not in the sense which we mean by "potentially." We say
that a thing is present potentially as Hermes is present in the wood,
or the half-line in the whole, because it can be separated from it;
and as we call even a man who is not studying "a scholar" if he is
capable of studying. That which is present in the opposite sense to
this is present actually.What we mean can be plainly seen in the particular cases by
induction; we need not seek a definition for every term, but must
comprehend the analogy: that as that which is actually building is to
that which is capable of building,
1 Cf. Aristot. Met. 9.2.4, 5.
2 sc., if every potency must act automatically whenever agent and patient meet.
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