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of the acts
themselves.
[8]
Now rightness in our choice of an end is
secured by Virtue1; but to do
the actions that must in the nature of things be done in order to attain the end we have
chosen, is not a matter for Virtue but for a different faculty.
We must dwell on this point to make it more clear.
[9]
There
is a certain faculty called Cleverness, which is the capacity for doing the things
aforesaid that conduce to the aim we propose, and so attaining that aim. If the aim is
noble, this is a praiseworthy faculty: if base, it is mere knavery; this is how we come to
speak of both prudent men and knaves as clever.
[10]
Now this
faculty is not identical with Prudence, but Prudence implies it. But that eye of the soul
of which we spoke2
cannot acquire the quality of Prudence without possessing Virtue. This we have said
before, and it is manifestly true. For deductive inferences about matters of conduct
always have a major premise of the form ‘Since the End or Supreme Good is so and
so’ (whatever it may be, since we may take it as anything we like for
the sake of the argument); but the Supreme Good only appears good to the good
man: vice perverts the mind and causes it to hold false views about the first principles
of conduct. Hence it is clear that we cannot be prudent without being good.