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a change of
conviction might have caused him to desist; but as it is he is convinced that he ought to
do one thing and nevertheless does another thing.1
2.
[11]
Again (f) if Self-restraint and Unrestraint can be displayed with
reference to anything, what is the meaning of the epithet
‘unrestrained’ without qualification? No one has every form of
unrestraint, yet we speak of some men as simply ‘unrestrained.’
2.
[12]
Such, more or less, are the difficulties that arise. Part of the conflicting opinions we
have to clear out of the way, but part to leave standing; for to solve a difficulty is to
find the answer to a problem.2
3.
We have then to consider, first (i) whether men fail in self-restraint
knowing what they do is wrong, or not knowing, and if knowing, knowing in what sense; and
next (ii) what are to be set down as the objects with which
Self-restraint and Unrestraint are concerned: I mean, are they concerned with pleasure and
pain of all sorts, or only with certain special pleasures and pains? and
(iii) is Self-restraint the same as Endurance or distinct from it? and
so on with (iv) the other questions akin to this subject.3.
[2]
A starting-point for our investigation is to ask3 whether the differentia4 of the
self-restrained man and the unrestrained is constituted by their objects, or by their
dispositions: I mean, whether a man is called unrestrained solely because he fails to
restrain himself with reference to certain things, or rather because he has a certain
disposition, or rather for both reasons combined. A second question is, can Self-restraint
and Unrestraint be displayed in regard to everything, or not? When a man is said to be
‘unrestrained’ without further qualification, it does not mean that he
is so in relation to everything, but to those
things in regard to which a man can be profligate; and also it does not mean merely that
he is concerned with these things (for in that case Unrestraint would be the same
thing as Profligacy), but that he is concerned with them in a particular manner.
The profligate yields to his appetites from choice, considering it right always to pursue
the pleasure that offers, whereas the man of defective self-restraint does not think so,
but pursues it all the same.3.
[3]
(i) Now the suggestion that it is not Knowledge, but True Opinion,
against which unrestrained men act, is of no importance for our argument. Some men hold
their opinions with absolute certainty, and take them for positive knowledge; 3.
[4]
so that if weakness of conviction
be the criterion for deciding that men who act against their conception of what is right
must be said to opine rather than to know the right, there will really be no difference in
this respect between Opinion and Knowledge; since some men are just as firmly convinced of
what they opine as others are of what they know: witness Heracleitus.5
3.
[5]
(1) But the word know is used in two senses. A man who has
knowledge but is not exercising it is said to know, and so is a man who is actually
exercising his knowledge. It will make a difference whether a man does wrong having the
knowledge that it is wrong but not consciously thinking of his knowledge, or with the
knowledge consciously present to his mind. The latter would be felt to be surprising; but
it is not surprising that a man should do what he knows to be wrong if he is not conscious
of the knowledge at the time.
1 A variant οὐ πεπεισμένος . . . [ἀλλὰ] gives ‘but as it is he is convinced it is wrong but nevertheless does it.’
2 See 1.5, note.
3 This question is not pursued below; indeed the contents of the following chapters are correctly outlined in 3.1, and 3.2 is superfluous.
4 Not the difference between the two, since of course they are concerned with the same objects, but the difference between both of them and other similar characters; see 1.4.
5 This seems to refer to the dogmatic tone of Heracleitus's teaching in general.