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they are just and temperate already, just as, if they spell correctly or play in tune, they are scholars or musicians.  But perhaps this is not the case even with the arts. It is possible to spell a word correctly by chance, or because some one else prompts you; hence you will be a scholar only if you spell correctly in the scholar's way, that is, in virtue of the scholarly knowledge which you yourself possess.  Moreover the case of the arts is not really analogous to that of the virtues. Works of art have their merit in themselves, so that it is enough if they are produced having a certain quality of their own; but acts done in conformity with the virtues are not done justly or temperately if they themselves are of a certain sort, but only if the agent also is in a certain state of mind when he does them: first he must act with knowledge1; secondly he must deliberately choose the act, and choose it for its own sake; and thirdly the act must spring from a fixed and permanent disposition of character.
1 See Bk. 3.1, where this is interpreted as meaning both knowledge of what he is doing （the act must not be unconscious or accidental）, and knowledge of moral principle （he must know that the act is a right one）.