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1 See 6.18 （and note）: there envy and ‘rejoicing-in-evil’ come in a list of emotions in which a due mean is impossible; and in Aristot. Rh. 1386b 34 they are said to be two sides of the same character. The present attempt to force them into the scheme as opposite extremes is not very successful, and it is noteworthy that this group of qualities is omitted in Bk. 4.
2 It is difficult not to think that some words have been lost here, such as ‘and the righteously indignant man is pained by the undeserved misfortune of others.’
3 Bk. 6
4 Grant rightly rejects this sentence, since the intellectual virtues are nowhere else thus designated by Aristotle, nor does he regard them as modes of observing a mean.