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1 The writer here examines the operation of the Will, which is regarded as essentially an act of choosing between alternatives of conduct. The technical term employed, ‘choice’ or ‘preference,’ has appeared in the formal definition of virtue （2.6.15）. In the present passage, cf. 2.9, it is viewed as directed to means: at the moment of action we select from among the alternative acts possible （or expressing it more loosely, among the various things here and now obtainable by our action） the one which we think will conduce to the end we wish. Elsewhere however （3.1.15 and 6.12.8） it is used of the selection of ends, and it is almost equivalent to ‘purpose’; while at 6.13.8 it includes both ends and means （see also 7.9.1）. The writer returns to the subject in Bk. 6.2.
2 i.e., you cannot feel two contradictory desires at once （though you can of course desire two incompatible things: you may want to eat your cake and have it; but you cannot strictly speaking at the same time both desire to eat the cake and desire not to eat it）. But you can desire to do a thing and choose not to do it.
3 But as good or bad.