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and also we think that the irrational feelings
are just as much a part of human nature as the reason, so that the actions done from anger
or desire also belong to the human being who does them. It is therefore strange to class
these actions as involuntary.2.
Having defined voluntary and involuntary action, we next have to examine the nature of
Choice.1 For this appears to be intimately connected
with virtue, and to afford a surer test of character than do our actions.2.
[2]
Choice is manifestly a voluntary act. But the two terms are not synonymous, the latter
being the wider. Children and the lower animals as well as men are capable of voluntary
action, but not of choice. Also sudden acts may be termed voluntary, but they cannot be
said to be done by choice.2.
[3]
Some identify Choice with （1） Desire, or （2） Passion,
or （3） Wish, or （4） some form of Opinion. These views
however appear to be mistaken.
（1） The irrational animals do not exercise choice, but they do feel
desire, and also passion. 2.
[4]
Also a man of defective self-restraint acts from desire but not from choice; and on the
contrary a self-restrained man acts from choice and not from desire. 2.
[5]
Again, desire can run counter to
choice, but not desire to desire.2 And
desire has regard to an object as pleasant or painful, choice has not.3
2.
[6]
（2） Still less is choice the same as passion. Acts done from passion
seem very far from being done of deliberate choice. 2.
[7]
（3） Again, choice is certainly not a wish,
1 The writer here examines the operation of the Will, which is regarded as essentially an act of choosing between alternatives of conduct. The technical term employed, ‘choice’ or ‘preference,’ has appeared in the formal definition of virtue （2.6.15）. In the present passage, cf. 2.9, it is viewed as directed to means: at the moment of action we select from among the alternative acts possible （or expressing it more loosely, among the various things here and now obtainable by our action） the one which we think will conduce to the end we wish. Elsewhere however （3.1.15 and 6.12.8） it is used of the selection of ends, and it is almost equivalent to ‘purpose’; while at 6.13.8 it includes both ends and means （see also 7.9.1）. The writer returns to the subject in Bk. 6.2.
2 i.e., you cannot feel two contradictory desires at once （though you can of course desire two incompatible things: you may want to eat your cake and have it; but you cannot strictly speaking at the same time both desire to eat the cake and desire not to eat it）. But you can desire to do a thing and choose not to do it.
3 But as good or bad.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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