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justice and injustice always necessarily imply more than one person. [5] Again (b) an act of injustice must be voluntary and done from choice, and also unprovoked; we do not think that a man acts unjustly if having suffered he retaliates, and gives what he got. But when a man injures himself, he both does and suffers the same thing at the same time. Again (c) if a man could act unjustly towards himself, it would be possible to suffer injustice voluntarily. [6] Furthermore (d) no one is guilty of injustice without committing some particular unjust act; but a man cannot commit adultery with his own wife, or burglary on his own premises, or theft of his own property.

(3) And generally, the question, Can a man act unjustly towards himself? is solved by our decision upon the question, Can a man suffer injustice voluntarily? [7]

(It is further manifest that, though both to suffer and to do injustice are evils—for the former is to have less and the latter to have more than the mean, corresponding1 to what is health-giving in medicine and conducive to fitness in athletic training—nevertheless to do injustice is the worse evil, for it is reprehensible, implying vice in the agent, and vice utter and absolute—or nearly so, for it is true that not every unjust act voluntarily committed implies vice—, whereas to suffer injustice does not necessarily imply vice or injustice in the victim. [8] Thus in itself to suffer injustice is the lesser evil,

1 This clause has no grammatical connection with the rest of the sentence; Ramsauer brackets it, Rassow supplies before it τὸ δὲ δικαιοπραγεῖν μέσον, ‘whereas just conduct is a mean.’

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