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and so he ought to pay back as much as he has got out of it; or even more, for that will be more noble. In friendships based on virtue, complaints do not arise, but the measure of the benefit seems to be the intention1 of the giver; for intention is the predominant factor in virtue and in character. 14. Differences also arise in friendships where there is disparity between the parties. Each claims to get more than the other, and this inevitably leads to a rupture. If one is a better man than the other, he thinks he has a right to more, for goodness deserves the larger share. And similarly when one is more useful than the other: if a man is of no use, they say, he ought not to have an equal share, for it becomes a charity and not a friendship at all, if what one gets out of it is not enough to repay one's trouble. For men think that it ought to be in a friendship as it is in a business partnership, where those who contribute more capital take more of the profits. On the other hand the needy or inferior person takes the opposite view: he maintains that it is the part of a good friend to assist those in need; what is the use （he argues） of being friends with the good and great if one is to get nothing out of it?
1 Lit., ‘choice’ in Aristotle's technical sense.