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the passions are related to our composite nature; now the virtues of our composite nature are purely human; so therefore also is the life that manifests these virtues, and the happiness that belongs to it. Whereas the happiness that belongs to the intellect is separate1: so much may be said about it here, for a full discussion of the matter is beyond the scope of our present purpose. [4] And such happiness would appear to need but little external equipment, or less than the happiness based on moral virtue.2 Both, it may be granted, require the mere necessaries of life, and that in an equal degree (though the politician does as a matter of fact take more trouble about bodily requirements and so forth than the philosopher) ; for in this respect there may be little difference between them. But for the purpose of their special activities their requirements will differ widely. The liberal man will need wealth in order to do liberal actions, and so indeed will the just man in order to discharge his obligations (since mere intentions are invisible, and even the unjust pretend to wish to act justly); and the brave man will need strength if he is to perform any action displaying his virtue; and the temperate man opportunity for indulgence: otherwise how can he, or the possessor of any other virtue, show that he is virtuous? [5] It is disputed also whether purpose or performance is the more important factor in virtue, as it is alleged to depend on both;

1 In Aristot. De anima 3.5 Aristotle distinguishes the active from the passive intellect, and pronounces the former to be ‘separate or separable (from matter, or the body), unmixed and impassible.’

2 Cf. 7.4, 8.9, 10, and 1.8.15-17.

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