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1 The writer here strains the meaning of words by connecting under one sense （1） γνώμη, judgement in general or good judgement in particular, and its derivatives （2） εὐγνώμων, ‘well-judging’ in the sense of considerate and kindly, and （3） συγγνώμη, literally ‘judgement with’ or on the side of others, and hence, sympathy, lenience, forgiveness.
2 i.e., ‘have reached years of discretion’; cf. 11.6 and 8.12.2.
3 This has been proved for ‘understanding’ and ‘the sensible man’ in chap. 10; it is extended to ‘considerateness’ in the words that follow: considerateness judges correctly what is equitable, equity is an element in all virtuous conduct towards others, and all virtuous conduct is determined by Prudence.
4 i.e., the possessors of each of the moral virtues.
5 See 8.9.
6 The substantive to be understood may be προτάσεσι, ‘propositions’; but the reference seems to be not to the practical syllogism in the ordinary sense （see 7.3.9）, but to the establishment of ethical ἀρχαί by induction, which is the proper method of Ethics （1.4.5-7）. This induction is conceived as a syllogism （cf. Aristot. Pr. Anal. 2.23.）: Actions A, B, C . . . are desirable; Actions A, B, C . . .possess the quality Z; therefore all actions possessing the quality Z are desirable. Here both the major and the minor premise are sets of particular propositions intuitively seen to be true: νοῦς is τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα.
7 Here the intuitive element in Prudence, as well as in Wisdom （chaps. 5, 6.）, is termed Intelligence: at 8.9 it was called merely Prudence, in contrast with Intelligence, which was limited to intuition of the first principles of science. Here then νοῦς approximates to its popular sense （see 12.3, note）.
8 This sentence seems irrelevant here. It might come in after 11.4.
9 This addition is auspicious: no one can become prudent merely by getting old （ Burnet）.