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but anger is accompanied by it. [12] And men are not angry with those who usually show respect for them.1 It is also evident that those are mild whose condition is contrary to that which excites anger, as when laughing, in sport, at a feast, in prosperity, in success, in abundance,2 and, in general, in freedom from pain, in pleasure which does not imply insult, or in virtuous hope. Further, those whose anger is of long standing and not in its full flush, for time appeases anger. [13] Again, vengeance previously taken upon one person appeases anger against another, even though it be greater. Wherefore Philocrates,3 when someone asked him why he did not justify himself when the people were angry with him, made the judicious reply, “Not yet.” “When then?” “When I see someone accused of the same offence”; for men grow mild when they have exhausted their anger upon another, as happened in the case of Ergophilus.4 For although the Athenians were more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, they acquitted him, because they had condemned CalIicrates to death on the previous day. [14] Men also grow mild towards those whom they pity5; and if an offender has suffered greater evil than those who are angry would have inflicted, for they have an idea that they have as it were obtained reparation. [15] And if they think that they themselves are wrong and deserve what they suffer, for anger is not aroused against what is just; they no longer think that they are being treated otherwise than they should be, which, as we have said, is the essence of anger. Wherefore we should inflict a preliminary verbal chastisement, for even slaves are less indignant at punishment
of this kind. [16] And men are milder if they think that those punished will never know that the punishment comes from them in requital for their own wrongs; for anger has to do with the individual, as is clear from our definition.6 Wherefore it is justly said by the poet: “ Tell him that it is Odysseus, sacker of cities,7
” as if Polyphemus would not have been punished,8 had he remained ignorant who had blinded him and for what. So that men are not angry either with any others who cannot know who punishes them,9 or with the dead, since they have paid the last penalty and can feel neither pain nor anything else, which is the aim of those who are angry.10 So then, in regard to Hector, Homer, when desirous of restraining the anger of Achilles against a dead man, well says: “ For it is senseless clay that he outrages in his wrath.11
” [17] It is evident, then, that men must have recourse to these topics when they desire to appease their audience, putting them into the frame of mind required and representing those with whom they are angry as either formidable or deserving of respect, or as having rendered them great services, or acted involuntarily, or as exceedingly grieved at what they have done. 4. Let us now state who are the persons that men love12 or hate, and why, after we have defined love and loving. [2] Let loving, then, be defined as wishing for anyone the things which we believe to be good, for his sake but not for our own,
1 They regard the disrespectful treatment as merely a temporary lapse.
2 πλήρωσις: lit. “filling up.” The reference may be to the “fulfillment” of one's desires, or to “repletion” in the matter of food （L. and S.）, which seems less likely; “in fulness of content” （Jebb）.
3 Opponent of Demosthenes, and one of the pro-Macedonian party. Impeached for his share in the disastrous “Peace of Philocrates,” he went into exile and was condemned to death during his absence.
4 Ergophilus failed in an attack on Cotys, king of Thrace, while Callisthenes concluded a premature peace with Perdiccas, king of Macedonia.
5 Another reading is ἐὰν ἕλωσι, “if they have convicted him.” This is adopted by Roemer, who refers to Plat. Rep. 558a, where, in speaking of the freedom allowed to all who live under a democracy, it is remarked that, even if a man is convicted by a court of justice, he takes no heed of the sentence, which is very often not enforced.
6 Therefore, if you think that a man will never learn who took vengeance on him, you will be less cruel; for anger is personal, and so Odysseus, because he was angry, inflicted a savage punishment, and wished Polyphemus to know it.
8 Or, “as if Odysseus would not have considered himself avenged, had P. remained ignorant . . .”
9 Or, “with any who can no longer feel their anger.” Cope translates: “with all the rest （besides those actually within reach） who are out of sight.”
10 To make the offender feel pain as part of the punishment.
12 φιλεῖν may be translated “to love” or “to like”; φιλία by “love,” “liking,” or “friendship”; for φίλος “friend” alone is suitable. For the two meanings cp. the use of aimer in French, and lieben in German.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
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