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is slight and contempt;  anyhow, we show no respect for those for whom we entertain a profound contempt. Men also are mild towards those who humble themselves before them and do not contradict them, for they seem to recognize that they are inferior; now, those who are inferior are afraid, and no one who is afraid slights another. Even the behavior of dogs proves that anger ceases towards those who humble themselves, for they do not bite those who sit down.1  And men are mild towards those who are serious with them when they are serious, for they think they are being treated seriously, not with contempt.  And towards those who have rendered them greater services.2 And towards those who want something and deprecate their anger, for they are humbler.  And towards those who refrain from insulting, mocking, or slighting anyone, or any virtuous man, or those who resemble themselves.  And generally speaking, one can determine the reasons that make for mildness by their opposites. Thus, men are mild towards those whom they fear or respect, as long as they feel so towards them, for it is impossible to be afraid and angry at the same time.  And against those who have acted in anger they either feel no anger or in a less degree, for they do not seem to have acted from a desire to slight. For no one slights another when angry, since slight is free from pain,
but anger is accompanied by it.  And men are not angry with those who usually show respect for them.3 It is also evident that those are mild whose condition is contrary to that which excites anger, as when laughing, in sport, at a feast, in prosperity, in success, in abundance,4 and, in general, in freedom from pain, in pleasure which does not imply insult, or in virtuous hope. Further, those whose anger is of long standing and not in its full flush, for time appeases anger.  Again, vengeance previously taken upon one person appeases anger against another, even though it be greater. Wherefore Philocrates,5 when someone asked him why he did not justify himself when the people were angry with him, made the judicious reply, “Not yet.” “When then?” “When I see someone accused of the same offence”; for men grow mild when they have exhausted their anger upon another, as happened in the case of Ergophilus.6 For although the Athenians were more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, they acquitted him, because they had condemned CalIicrates to death on the previous day.  Men also grow mild towards those whom they pity7; and if an offender has suffered greater evil than those who are angry would have inflicted, for they have an idea that they have as it were obtained reparation.  And if they think that they themselves are wrong and deserve what they suffer, for anger is not aroused against what is just; they no longer think that they are being treated otherwise than they should be, which, as we have said, is the essence of anger. Wherefore we should inflict a preliminary verbal chastisement, for even slaves are less indignant at punishment
of this kind.  And men are milder if they think that those punished will never know that the punishment comes from them in requital for their own wrongs; for anger has to do with the individual, as is clear from our definition.8 Wherefore it is justly said by the poet: “ Tell him that it is Odysseus, sacker of cities,9
” as if Polyphemus would not have been punished,10 had he remained ignorant who had blinded him and for what. So that men are not angry either with any others who cannot know who punishes them,11 or with the dead, since they have paid the last penalty and can feel neither pain nor anything else, which is the aim of those who are angry.12 So then, in regard to Hector, Homer, when desirous of restraining the anger of Achilles against a dead man, well says: “ For it is senseless clay that he outrages in his wrath.13
”  It is evident, then, that men must have recourse to these topics when they desire to appease their audience, putting them into the frame of mind required and representing those with whom they are angry as either formidable or deserving of respect, or as having rendered them great services, or acted involuntarily, or as exceedingly grieved at what they have done.
2 That is, greater than their present disservices.
3 They regard the disrespectful treatment as merely a temporary lapse.
4 πλήρωσις: lit. “filling up.” The reference may be to the “fulfillment” of one's desires, or to “repletion” in the matter of food （L. and S.）, which seems less likely; “in fulness of content” （Jebb）.
5 Opponent of Demosthenes, and one of the pro-Macedonian party. Impeached for his share in the disastrous “Peace of Philocrates,” he went into exile and was condemned to death during his absence.
7 Another reading is ἐὰν ἕλωσι, “if they have convicted him.” This is adopted by Roemer, who refers to Plat. Rep. 558a, where, in speaking of the freedom allowed to all who live under a democracy, it is remarked that, even if a man is convicted by a court of justice, he takes no heed of the sentence, which is very often not enforced.
8 Therefore, if you think that a man will never learn who took vengeance on him, you will be less cruel; for anger is personal, and so Odysseus, because he was angry, inflicted a savage punishment, and wished Polyphemus to know it.
10 Or, “as if Odysseus would not have considered himself avenged, had P. remained ignorant . . .”
11 Or, “with any who can no longer feel their anger.” Cope translates: “with all the rest （besides those actually within reach） who are out of sight.”
12 To make the offender feel pain as part of the punishment.
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