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You are right: let us do as you say.Athenian
First of all, since we have started on it, we must examine closely the law about temple-robbers and all forms of thieving and wrongdoing; nor should we be vexed by the fact that, although we enacted some points while legislating, [859c] there are some points still under consideration: for we are in process of becoming lawgivers, and may perhaps become so, but we are not lawgivers as yet. So if we agree to consider the matters I have mentioned in the way I have mentioned, let us so consider them.Clinias
In respect of goodness and justice as a whole, let us try to discern this,—how far we now agree with ourselves, and how far we differ (for we should certainly say that we desire, if nothing else, [859d] to differ at least from the majority of men), and how far also the majority agree or differ among themselves.Clinias
What differences of ours have you in mind?Athenian
I will try to explain. Concerning justice in general, and men, things, or actions that are just, we all agree that these are all beautiful, so that no one would be regarded as saying what was wrong even if he should maintain that just men, however ugly in body, [859e] are quite beautiful in respect of their very just character.Clinias
Would not that be right?Athenian
Perhaps; but let us observe this,—that if all things which belong to justice are beautiful, that “all” includes for us passions1 nearly as much as actions.Clinias
Well, what then?Athenian
Every just action, in so far as it shares in justice, practically in the same degree partakes of beauty.Clinias
It is agreed also—if our argument is to be consistent—
1 i.e. “sufferings.”
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