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[442a] and fostering the one with fair words and teachings and relaxing and soothing and making gentle the other by harmony and rhythm?” “Quite so,” said he. “And these two thus reared and having learned and been educated to do their own work in the true sense of the phrase,1 will preside over the appetitive part which is the mass2 of the soul in each of us and the most insatiate by nature of wealth. They will keep watch upon it, lest, by being filled and infected with the so-called pleasures associated with the body3 and so waxing big and strong, it may not keep to4 its own work [442b] but may undertake to enslave and rule over the classes which it is not fitting5 that it should, and so overturn6 the entire life of all.” “By all means,” he said. “Would not these two, then, best keep guard against enemies from without7 also in behalf of the entire soul and body, the one taking counsel,8 the other giving battle, attending upon the ruler, and by its courage executing the ruler's designs?” “That is so.” “Brave, too, then, I take it, we call [442c] each individual by virtue of this part in him, when, namely, his high spirit preserves in the midst of pains and pleasures9 the rule handed down by the reason as to what is or is not to be feared.” “Right,” he said. “But wise by that small part that10 ruled in him and handed down these commands, by its possession11 in turn within it of the knowledge of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three.” “By all means.” “And again, was he not sober [442d] by reason of the friendship and concord of these same parts, when, namely, the ruling principle and its two subjects are at one in the belief that the reason ought to rule, and do not raise faction against it?” “The virtue of soberness certainly,” said he, “is nothing else than this, whether in a city or an individual.” “But surely, now, a man is just by that which and in the way we have so often12 described.” “That is altogether necessary.” “Well then,” said I, “has our idea of justice in any way lost the edge13 of its contour so as to look like anything else than precisely what it showed itself to be in the state?” “I think not,” he said. [442e] “We might,” I said, “completely confirm your reply and our own conviction thus, if anything in our minds still disputes our definition—by applying commonplace and vulgar14 tests to it.” “What are these?” “For example, if an answer were demanded to the question concerning that city and the man whose birth and breeding was in harmony with it, whether we believe that such a man, entrusted with a deposit15 of gold or silver, would withhold it and embezzle it, who do you suppose would think that he would be more likely so to act

1 Cf. on 433 B-E, 443 D, and Charmides 161 B.

2 Cf. on 431 A-B, Laws 689 A-B.

3 Strictly speaking, pleasure is in the mind, not in the body. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 330.καλουμένων implies the doctrine of the Gorgias 493 E, 494 C, Philebus 42 C, Phaedrus 258 E, and 583 B-584 A, that the pleasures of appetite are not pure or real. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 152. Cf. on λεγομένων431 C.

4 Cf. on 426 E, 606 B.

5 προσῆκον: sc.ἐστὶν ἄρχειν. γένει, by affinity, birth or nature. Cf. 444 B. q reads γενῶν.

6 Cf. 389 D.

7 Cf. 415 E.

8 Cf. Isocrates xii. 138αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν βουλευομένη περὶ ἁπάντων.

9 Cf. 429 C-D

10 Cf. Goodwin's Greek Grammar, 1027.

11 ἔχον: anacoluthic epexegesis, corresponding to ὅταν . . . διασώζῃ. αὖ probably marks the correspondence.

12 πολλάκις: that is, by the principle of τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

13 ἀπαμβλύνεται: is the edge or outline of the definition blunted or dimmed when we transfer it to the individual?

14 The transcendental or philosophical definition is confirmed by vulgar tests. The man who is just in Plato's sense will not steal or betray or fail in ordinary duties. Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1178 b 16 φορτικὸς ἔπαινος. . . to say that the gods are σώφρονες. Similarly Plato feels that there is a certain vulgarity in applying the cheap tests of prudential morality (Cf. Phaedo 68 C-D) to intrinsic virtue. “Be this,” is the highest expression of the moral law. “Do this,” eventually follows. Cf. Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, pp. 376 and 385, and Emerson, Self-Reliance: “But I may also neglect the reflex standard, and absolve me to myself . . . If anyone imagines that this law is lax, let him keep its commandment one day.” The Xenophontic Socrates (Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 4. 10-11 and iv. 4. 17) relies on these vulgar tests.

15 Cf. on 332 A and Aristotle Rhet. 1383 b 21.

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