[504c]
to the rest of the company.” “Nay,
my friend,” said I, “a measure of such things that in
the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For
nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything,1 though some
people sometimes think that they have already done enough2 and that there is no need of further inquiry.”
“Yes, indeed,” he said, “many experience this
because of their sloth.” “An experience,” said
I, “that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its
laws.” “That seems likely,” he said.
“Then,” said I, “such a one must go
around3
1 Cf. Cic.De fin. i. 1 “nec modus est ullus investigandi veri nisi inveneris.” Note not only the edifying tone and the unction of the style but the definite suggestion of Plato's distaste for relativity and imperfection which finds expression in the criticism of the homo mensura in the Theaetetus, in the statement of the Laws 716 C, that God is the measure of all things (What Plato Said, p. 631), and in the contrast in the Politicus 283-294 between measuring things against one another and measuring them by an idea. Cf. 531 A.
2 Cf. Menex. 234 A, Charm. 158 C, Symp. 204 A, Epist. vii. 341 A. From here to the end of this Book the notes are to be used in connection with the Introduction, pp. xxiii-xxxvi, where the idea of good and the divided line are discussed.
3 Cf. Phaedr. 274 A.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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