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[524b] “Yes, indeed,” he said, “these communications1 to the soul are strange and invite reconsideration.” “Naturally, then,” said I, “it is in such cases as these that the soul first summons to its aid the calculating reason2 and tries to consider whether each of the things reported to it is one or two.3” “Of course.” “And if it appears to be two, each of the two is a distinct unit.4” “Yes.” “If, then, each is one and both two, the very meaning5 of ‘two’ is that the soul will conceive them as distinct.6 For if they were not separable,

1 For ἑρμηνεῖαι Cf. Theaet. 209 A.

2 Cf. Parmen. 130 Aτοῖς λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις.

3 Cf. Theaet. 185 B, Laws 963 C, Sophist 254 D, Hipp. Major 301 D-E, and, for the dialectic here, Parmen. 143 D.

4 Or, as the Greek puts it, “both ‘one’ and ‘other.'” Cf. Vol. 1. p. 516, note f on 416 A. For ἕτερον Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 522, 580, 587-588.

5 γε “vi termini” Cf. 379 B, 576 C, Parmen. 145 A, Protag. 358 C.

6 κεχωρισμένα and ἀχώριστα suggest the terminology of Aristotle in dealing with the problem of abstraction.

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