Plato, Parmenides

[140a] “But if the one were affected in any way apart from being one, it would be so affected as to be more than one, and that is impossible.” “Yes.” “Then the one cannot possibly be affected in the same way as another or as itself.” “Evidently not.” “Then it cannot be like another or itself.” “No, so it appears.” “Nor can the one be so affected as to be other; for in that case it would be so affected as to be more than one.” “Yes, it would be more.” “But that which is affected in a way other than itself or other, [140b] would be unlike itself or other, if that which is affected in the same way is like.” “Right.” “But the one, as it appears, being never affected in a way other than itself or other, is never unlike either itself or other.” “Evidently not.” “Then the one will be neither like nor unlike either other or itself.” “So it seems.”

“Since, then, it is of such a nature, it can be neither equal nor unequal to itself or other.” “Why not?” “If it is equal, it is of the same measures as that to which it is equal.” “Yes.” “And if it is greater or less than things [140c] with which it is commensurate, it will have more measures than the things which are less and less measures than the things which are greater.” “Yes.” “And in the case of things with which it is not commensurate, it will have smaller measures than some and greater measures than others.” “Of course.” “Is it not impossible for that which does not participate in sameness to have either the same measures or anything else the same?” “Impossible.” “Then not having the same measures, it cannot be equal either to itself or to anything else.” “No, apparently not.” “But whether it have more measures or less, [140d] it will have as many parts as measures and thus one will be no longer one, but will be as many as are its measures.” “Right.” “But if it were of one measure, it would be equal to the measure; but we have seen that it cannot be equal to anything.” “Yes, so we have.” “Then it will partake neither of one measure, nor of many, nor of few; nor will it partake at all of the same, nor will it ever, apparently, be equal to itself or to anything else; nor will it be greater or less than itself or another.” “Perfectly true.” [140e] “Well, does anyone believe that the one can be older or younger or of the same age?” “Why not?” “Because if it has the same age as itself or as anything else, it will partake of equality and likeness of time, and we said the one had no part in likeness or equality.” “Yes, we said that.” “And we said also that it does not partake of unlikeness or inequality.” “Certainly.” “How, then, being of such a nature,