[37a]
Protarchus
I should say we ought to consider that.Socrates
Then let us analyze still more clearly what we were just now saying about pleasure and opinion. There is a faculty of having an opinion, is there not?Protarchus
Yes.Socrates
And of feeling pleasure?Protarchus
Yes.Socrates
And there is an object of opinion?Protarchus
Of course.Socrates
And something by which that which feels pleasure is pleased?Protarchus
Certainly.Socrates
And that which has opinion, whether right or wrong, never loses its function of really having opinion? [37b] Protarchus
Of course not.Socrates
And that which feels pleasure, whether rightly or wrongly, will clearly never lose its function of really feeling pleasure?Protarchus
Yes, that is true, too.Socrates
Then we must consider how it is that opinion is both true and false and pleasure only true, though the holding of opinion and the feeling of pleasure are equally real.Protarchus
Yes, so we must.Socrates
You mean that we must consider this question because falsehood and truth are added as attributes to opinion, [37c] and thereby it becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality in each instance?Protarchus
Yes.Socrates
And furthermore, we must reach an agreement on the question whether, even if some things have qualities, pleasure and pain are not merely what they are, without qualities or attributes.Protarchus
Evidently we must.Socrates
But it is easy enough to see that they have qualities. For we said a long time ago that both pains and pleasures [37d] are great and small and intense.Protarchus
Yes, certainly.Socrates
And if badness becomes an attribute of any of these, Protarchus, shall we say that the opinion or the pleasure thereby becomes bad?Protarchus
Why certainly, Socrates.Socrates
And what if rightness or its opposite becomes an attribute of one of them? Shall we not say that the opinion is right, if it has rightness, and the pleasure likewise?Protarchus
Obviously. [37e] Socrates
And if that which is opined is mistaken, must we not agree that the opinion, since it is at the moment making a mistake, is not right or rightly opining?Protarchus
Of course.Socrates
And what if we see a pain or a pleasure making a mistake in respect of that by which the pain or pleasure is caused? Shall we give it the attribute of right or good or any of the words which denote excellence?Protarchus
That is impossible if the pleasure is mistaken.Socrates
And certainly pleasure often seems to come to us in connection with false, not true, opinion.Protarchus
Of course it does; and in such a case, Socrates,
I should say we ought to consider that.Socrates
Then let us analyze still more clearly what we were just now saying about pleasure and opinion. There is a faculty of having an opinion, is there not?Protarchus
Yes.Socrates
And of feeling pleasure?Protarchus
Yes.Socrates
And there is an object of opinion?Protarchus
Of course.Socrates
And something by which that which feels pleasure is pleased?Protarchus
Certainly.Socrates
And that which has opinion, whether right or wrong, never loses its function of really having opinion? [37b] Protarchus
Of course not.Socrates
And that which feels pleasure, whether rightly or wrongly, will clearly never lose its function of really feeling pleasure?Protarchus
Yes, that is true, too.Socrates
Then we must consider how it is that opinion is both true and false and pleasure only true, though the holding of opinion and the feeling of pleasure are equally real.Protarchus
Yes, so we must.Socrates
You mean that we must consider this question because falsehood and truth are added as attributes to opinion, [37c] and thereby it becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality in each instance?Protarchus
Yes.Socrates
And furthermore, we must reach an agreement on the question whether, even if some things have qualities, pleasure and pain are not merely what they are, without qualities or attributes.Protarchus
Evidently we must.Socrates
But it is easy enough to see that they have qualities. For we said a long time ago that both pains and pleasures [37d] are great and small and intense.Protarchus
Yes, certainly.Socrates
And if badness becomes an attribute of any of these, Protarchus, shall we say that the opinion or the pleasure thereby becomes bad?Protarchus
Why certainly, Socrates.Socrates
And what if rightness or its opposite becomes an attribute of one of them? Shall we not say that the opinion is right, if it has rightness, and the pleasure likewise?Protarchus
Obviously. [37e] Socrates
And if that which is opined is mistaken, must we not agree that the opinion, since it is at the moment making a mistake, is not right or rightly opining?Protarchus
Of course.Socrates
And what if we see a pain or a pleasure making a mistake in respect of that by which the pain or pleasure is caused? Shall we give it the attribute of right or good or any of the words which denote excellence?Protarchus
That is impossible if the pleasure is mistaken.Socrates
And certainly pleasure often seems to come to us in connection with false, not true, opinion.Protarchus
Of course it does; and in such a case, Socrates,
