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[220b] for the sake of some other friend, we find ourselves uttering a mere phrase; whereas in reality “friend” appears to be simply and solely the thing in which all these so-called friendships terminate. So it appears, he said. Then the real friend is a friend for the sake of nothing else that is a friend? True.

So we have got rid of this, and it is not for the sake of some friendly thing that the friend is friendly. But now, is the good a friend? I should say so. And further, it is because of the bad that the good is loved1;

1 Socrates here strangely confuses the cause (τὸ διά τι) with the object in view (τὸ ἕνεκά του), which he carefully distinguished in the case of medicine (219 A).

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