[501a]
not an art but a habitude, unlike medicine, which, I argued, has investigated the nature of the person whom she treats and the cause of her proceedings, and has some account to give of each of these things; so much for medicine: whereas the other, in respect of the pleasure to which her whole ministration is given, goes to work there in an utterly inartistic manner, without having investigated at all either the nature or the cause of pleasure, and altogether irrationally—with no thought, one may say, of differentiation, relying on routine and habitude for merely preserving a memory of what is wont to result; and that is how she is enabled to provide her pleasures.
[501b]
Now consider first whether you think that this account is satisfactory, and that there are certain other such occupations likewise, having to do with the soul; some artistic, with forethought for what is to the soul's best advantage, and others making light of this, but again, as in the former case, considering merely the soul's pleasure and how it may be contrived for her, neither inquiring which of the pleasures is a better or a worse one, nor caring for aught but mere gratification,
[501c]
whether for better or worse. For I, Callicles, hold that there are such, and for my part I call this sort of thing flattery, whether in relation to the body or to the soul or to anything else, whenever anyone ministers to its pleasure without regard for the better and the worse; and you now, do you support us with the same opinion on this matter, or do you gainsay us?Callicles
Not I; I agree with you, in order that your argument may reach a conclusion, and that I may gratify Gorgias here. [501d] Socrates
And is this the case with only one soul, and not with two or many?Callicles
No, it is also the case with two or many.Socrates
Then is it possible also to gratify them all at once, collectively, with no consideration of what is best?Callicles
I should think it is.Socrates
Then can you say what are the pursuits which effect this? Or rather, if you like, when I ask you, and one of them seems to you to be of this class, say yes, and when one does not, say no. And first let us consider flute-playing. Does it not seem to you one of this sort, [501e] Callicles, aiming only at our pleasure, and caring for naught else ?Callicles
It does seem so to me.Socrates
And so too with all similar pursuits, such as harp-playing in the contests?Callicles
Yes.Socrates
And what of choral productions and dithyrambic compositions? Are they not manifestly, in your view, of the same kind? Or do you suppose Cinesias,1 son of Meles, cares a jot about trying to say things of a sort that might be improving to his audience,
Not I; I agree with you, in order that your argument may reach a conclusion, and that I may gratify Gorgias here. [501d] Socrates
And is this the case with only one soul, and not with two or many?Callicles
No, it is also the case with two or many.Socrates
Then is it possible also to gratify them all at once, collectively, with no consideration of what is best?Callicles
I should think it is.Socrates
Then can you say what are the pursuits which effect this? Or rather, if you like, when I ask you, and one of them seems to you to be of this class, say yes, and when one does not, say no. And first let us consider flute-playing. Does it not seem to you one of this sort, [501e] Callicles, aiming only at our pleasure, and caring for naught else ?Callicles
It does seem so to me.Socrates
And so too with all similar pursuits, such as harp-playing in the contests?Callicles
Yes.Socrates
And what of choral productions and dithyrambic compositions? Are they not manifestly, in your view, of the same kind? Or do you suppose Cinesias,1 son of Meles, cares a jot about trying to say things of a sort that might be improving to his audience,