previous next



But still he does not cease to have the good and bad at the same time, as you agreed; and now, you do not agree?

I do; and what then?

Only that we get the result, my friend, that the good things are not the same as the pleasant, nor the bad as the painful. For with the one pair the cessation is of both at once, but with the other two it is not, since they are distinct. How then can pleasant things be the same as good, or painful things as bad? Or if you like, consider it another way—for I fancy that even after that you do not admit it. Just observe: do you not call good people good owing to the presence of good things,

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.

An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.

load focus Notes (Gonzalez Lodge, 1891)
load focus Greek (1903)
hide Places (automatically extracted)

View a map of the most frequently mentioned places in this document.

Download Pleiades ancient places geospacial dataset for this text.

hide References (2 total)
  • Commentary references to this page (2):
    • Gonzalez Lodge, Commentary on Plato: Gorgias, 495d
    • Gonzalez Lodge, Commentary on Plato: Gorgias, 515e
hide Display Preferences
Greek Display:
Arabic Display:
View by Default:
Browse Bar: