Plato, Protagoras

So much, then, being granted, Prodicus and Hippias, I said, let our friend Protagoras vindicate the correctness of the answer he made at first—not that which he made at the very beginning,¹ when he said that, while there were five parts of virtue, none of them was like any other, but each had its particular function: I do not refer to that, but the statement he made afterwards,² when he proceeded to say that four of them had a considerable resemblance to each other, [359b] but one was quite different from the rest—courage; and he told me I should perceive this by the following token: You will find, Socrates, said he, that men may be most unholy, most unjust, most dissolute, and most ignorant, yet most courageous; whence you may judge that courage is very different from the other parts of virtue. His answer caused me great surprise at the moment, and still more when I went into the matter with your help. But anyhow, I asked him whether by the brave he meant “bold.” Yes, he replied, and impetuous. [359c] Protagoras, I said, do you remember making this answer?

He admitted he did.

Well now, I said, tell us, towards what do you mean they are impetuous when they are courageous? Towards the same things as cowards?

No, he said.

Then towards other things?

Yes, he said.

Do cowards go after things that allow boldness, and the courageous after dreadful things?

So people say, Socrates.

Quite true, I said. But my point is rather, [359d] towards what, according to you, are the brave impetuous? Dreadful things, in the belief that they are dreadful, or towards what is not dreadful?

No, he said; the former has just been shown, by the arguments you put forward, to be impossible.

Quite true again, I said; so that if this proof was correct, no one goes to meet what he regards as dreadful, since to be overcome by oneself was found to be ignorance.

He admitted this.

And yet all men go also to meet what they can face boldly, whether cowardly or brave, and in this respect cowardly and brave [359e] go to meet the same things.

But still, Socrates, he said, what cowards go to meet is the very opposite of what the courageous go to meet. For instance, the latter are willing to go to war, but the former are not.

Is going to war an honorable thing, I asked, or a base thing?

Honorable, he replied.

Then if it is honorable, we have admitted, by our former argument, that it is also good for we agreed that all honorable actions were good.

True, and I abide by that decision.

You are right to do so, I said.