[329d] or whether the qualities I have just mentioned are all names of the same single thing. This is what I am still hankering after.Why, the answer to that is easy, Socrates, he replied: it is that virtue is a single thing and the qualities in question are parts of it.Do you mean parts, I asked, in the sense of the parts of a face, as mouth, nose, eyes, and ears; or, as in the parts of gold, is there no difference among the pieces, either between the parts or between a part and the whole, except in greatness and smallness?In the former sense, I think, Socrates; as the parts of the face
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