previous next

[313b] or between stone and stone, in point of being gold or stone; and so neither does law differ at all from law, I suppose, but they are all the same thing. For each of them is law alike, not one more so, and another less. That is the particular point of my question—what is law as a whole? So if you are ready, tell me.

Well, what else should law be, Socrates, but things loyally accepted?1

And so speech, you think, is the things that are spoken, or sight the things seen, or hearing the things heard? Or is speech

1 νομιζόμενα in ordinary speech meant “accepted by custom” : “loyally” here attempts to preserve the connection with νόμος ( “law” in this context, though sometimes “custom,” as below, 315 D).

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.

An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.

load focus Greek (1903)
hide Places (automatically extracted)

View a map of the most frequently mentioned places in this document.

Download Pleiades ancient places geospacial dataset for this text.

hide References (1 total)
hide Display Preferences
Greek Display:
Arabic Display:
View by Default:
Browse Bar: