1.
The same winter the Athenians resolved to
sail again to Sicily, with a greater armament than that under Laches and
Eurymedon, and, if possible, to conquer the island; most of them being ignorant of its size and of the number of its
inhabitants, Hellenic and barbarian, and of the fact that they were
undertaking a war not much inferior to that against the Peloponnesians.
[2]
For the voyage round Sicily in a merchantman is not far short of eight
days; and yet, large as the island is, there are only two miles of sea to prevent
its being mainland.
2.
It was settled originally as follows, and the
peoples that occupied it are these.
The earliest inhabitants spoken of in any part of the country are the
Cyclopes and Laestrygones; but I cannot tell of what race they were, or whence they came or whither
they went, and must leave my readers to what the poets have said of them and
to what may be generally known concerning them.
[2]
The Sicanians appear to have been the next settlers, although they pretend
to have been the first of all and aborigines; but the facts show that they were Iberians, driven by the Ligurians from
the river Sicanus in Iberia.
It was from them that the island, before called Trinacaria, took its name
of Sicania, and to the present day they inhabit the west of Sicily.
[3]
On the fall of Ilium, some of the Trojans escaped from the Achaeans, came
in ships to Sicily, and settled next to the Sicanians under the general name
of Elymi; their towns being called Eryx and Egesta.
With them settled some of the Phocians carried on their way from Troy by a
storm, first to Libya, and afterwards from thence to Sicily.
[4]
The Sicels crossed over to Sicily from their first home Italy, flying from
the Opicans, as tradition says and as seems not unlikely, upon rafts, having
watched till the wind set down the strait to effect the passage; although perhaps they may have sailed over in some other way.
Even at the present day there are still Sicels in Italy; and the country got its name of Italy from Italus, a king of the Sicels, so
called.
[5]
These went with a great host to Sicily, defeated the Sicanians in battle
and forced them to remove to the south and west of the island, which thus
came to be called Sicily instead of Sicania, and after they crossed over
continued to enjoy the richest parts of the country for near three hundred
years before any Hellenes came to Sicily; indeed they still hold the centre and north of the island.
[6]
There were also Phoenicians living all round Sicily, who had occupied
promontories upon the sea coasts and the islets adjacent for the purpose of
trading with the Sicels.
But when the Hellenes began to arrive in considerable numbers by sea, the
Phoenicians abandoned most of their stations, and drawing together took up
their abode in Motye, Soloeis, and Panormus, near the Elymi, partly because
they confided in their alliance, and also because these are the nearest
points, for the voyage between Carthage and Sicily.
3.
These were the barbarians in Sicily, settled
as I have said.
Of the Hellenes, the first to arrive were Chalcidians from Euboea with
Thucles, their founder.
They founded Naxos and built the altar to Apollo Archegetes, which now
stands outside the town, and upon which the deputies for the games sacrifice
before sailing from Sicily.
[2]
Syracuse was founded the year afterwards by Archias, one of the Heraclids
from Corinth, who began by driving out the Sicels from the island upon which
the inner city now stands, though it is no longer surrounded by water: in
process of time the outer town also was taken within the walls and became
populous.
[3]
Meanwhile Thucles and the Chalcidians set out from Naxos in the fifth year
after the foundation of Syracuse, and drove out the Sicels by arms and
founded Leontini and afterwards Catana; the Catanians themselves choosing Evarchus as their founder.
4.
About the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily
with a colony from Megara, and after founding a place called Trotilus beyond
the river Pantacyas, and afterwards leaving it and for a short while joining
the Chalcidians at Leontini, was driven out by them and founded Thapsus.
After his death his companions were driven out of Thapsus, and founded a
place called the Hyblaean Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel king, having given up the place and inviting them thither.
[2]
Here they lived two hundred and forty-five years; after which they were expelled from the city and the country by the
Syracusan tyrant Gelo.
Before their expulsion, however, a hundred years after they had settled
there, they sent out Pamillus and founded Selinus; he having come from their mother country Megara to join them in its
foundation.
[3]
Gela was founded by Antiphemus from Rhodes and Entimus from Crete, who
joined in leading a colony thither, in the forty-fifth year after the
foundation of Syracuse.
The town took its name from the river Gelas, the place where the citadel
now stands, and which was first fortified, being called Lindii.
The institutions which they adopted were Dorian.
[4]
Near one hundred and eight years after the foundation of Gela, the Geloans
founded Acragas (Agrigentum), so called from the river of
that name, and made Aristonous and Pystilus their founders; giving their own institutions to the colony.
[5]
Zancle was originally founded by pirates from Cuma, the Chalcidian town in
the country of the Opicans: afterwards, however, large numbers came from
Chalcis and the rest of Euboea, and helped to people the place; the founders being Perieres and Crataemenes from Cuma and Chalcis
respectively.
It first had the name of Zancle given it by the Sicels, because the place
is shaped like a sickle, which the Sicels call Zanclon; but upon the original settlers being afterwards expelled by some Samians
and other Ionians who landed in Sicily flying from the Medes,
[6]
and the Samians in their turn not long afterwards by Anaxilas, tyrant of
Rhegium, the town was by him colonised with a mixed population, and its name
changed to Messina, after his old country.
5.
Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides,
Simus, and Sacon, most of those who went to the colony being Chalcidians; though they were joined by some exiles from Syracuse, defeated in a civil
war, called the Myletidae.
The language was a mixture of Chalcidian and Doric, but the institutions
which prevailed were the Chalcidian.
[2]
Acrae and Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans; Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, Casmenae nearly twenty after Acrae.
[3]
Camarina was first founded by the Syracusans, close upon a hundred and
thirty-five years after the building of Syracuse; its founders being Daxon and Menecolus.
But the Camarinaeans being expelled by arms by the Syracusans for having
revolted, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, some time later receiving their land
in ransom for some Syracusan prisoners, resettled Camarina, himself acting
as its founder.
Lastly, it was again depopulated by Gelo, and settled once more for the
third time by the Geloans.
6.
Such is the list of the peoples, Hellenic and
barbarian, inhabiting Sicily, and such the magnitude of the island which the
Athenians were now bent upon invading; being ambitious in real truth of conquering the whole, although they had
also the specious design of succouring their kindred and other allies in the
island.
[2]
But they were especially incited by envoys from Egesta, who had come to
Athens and invoked their aid more urgently than ever.
The Egestaeans had gone to war with their neighbours the Selinuntines upon
questions of marriage and disputed territory, and the Selinuntines had
procured the alliance of the Syracusans, and pressed Egesta hard by land and
sea.
The Egestaeans now reminded the Athenians of the alliance made in the time
of Laches, during the former Leontine war, and begged them to send a fleet
to their aid, and among a number of other considerations urged as a capital
argument, that if the Syracusans were allowed to go unpunished for their
depopulation of Leontini, to ruin the allies still left to Athens in Sicily,
and to get the whole power of the island into their hands, there would be a
danger of their one day coming with a large force, as Dorians, to the aid of
their Dorian brethren, and as colonists, to the aid of the Peloponnesians
who had sent them out, and joining these in pulling down the Athenian
empire.
The Athenians would, therefore, do well to unite with the allies still left
to them, and to make a stand against the Syracusans; especially as they, the Egestaeans, were prepared to furnish money
sufficient for the war.
[3]
The Athenians, hearing these arguments constantly repeated in their
assemblies by the Egestaeans and their supporters, voted first to send
envoys to Egesta, to see if there was really the money that they talked of
in the treasury and temples, and at the same time to ascertain in what
posture was the war with the Selinuntines.
7.
The envoys of the Athenians were accordingly
despatched to Sicily.
The same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, the Corinthians
expected, marched into the Argive territory, and ravaged a small part of the
land, and took some yokes of oxen and carried off some corn.
They also settled the Argive exiles at Orneae, and left them a few soldiers
taken from the rest of the army; and after making a truce for a certain while, according to which neither
Orneatae nor Argives were to injure each other's territory, returned home
with the army.
[2]
Not long afterwards the Athenians came with thirty ships and six hundred
heavy infantry, and the Argives joining them with all their forces, marched
out and besieged the men in Orneae for one day; but the garrison escaped by night, the besiegers having bivouacked some way
off.
The next day the Argives, discovering it, razed Orneae to the ground, and
went back again; after which the Athenians went home in their ships.
[3]
Meanwhile the Athenians took by sea to Methone on the Macedonian border
some cavalry of their own and the Macedonian exiles that were at Athens, and
plundered the country of Perdiccas.
[4]
Upon this the Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian Chalcidians, who had a
truce with Athens from one ten days to another, urging them to join
Perdiccas in the war, which they refused to do.
And the winter ended, and with it ended the sixteenth year of this war of
which Thucydides is the historian.
8.
Early in the spring of the following summer
the Athenian envoys arrived from Sicily, and the Egestaeans with them,
bringing sixty talents of uncoined silver, as a month's pay for sixty ships,
which they were to ask to have sent them.
[2]
The Athenians held an assembly, and after hearing from the Egestaeans and
their own envoys a report, as attractive as it was untrue, upon the state of
affairs generally, and in particular as to the money, of which, it was said,
there was abundance in the temples and the treasury, voted to send sixty
ships to Sicily, under the command of Alcibiades, son of Clinias, Nicias,
son of Niceratus, and Lamachus, son of Xenophanes, who were appointed with
full powers; they were to help the Egestaeans against the Selinuntines, to restore
Leontini upon gaining any advantage in the war, and to order all other
matters in Sicily as they should deem best for the interests of Athens.
[3]
Five days after this a second assembly was held, to consider the speediest
means of equipping the ships, and to vote whatever else might be required by
the generals for the expedition;
[4]
and Nicias, who had been chosen to the command against his will, and who
thought that the state was not well advised, but upon a slight and specious
pretext was aspiring to the conquest of the whole of Sicily, a great matter
to achieve, came forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the
enterprise, and gave them the following counsel:—
9.
‘Although this assembly was
convened to consider the preparations to be made for sailing to Sicily, I
think, notwithstanding, that we have still this question to examine, whether
it be better to send out the ships at all, and that we ought not to give so
little consideration to a matter of such moment, or let ourselves be
persuaded by foreigners into undertaking a war with which we have nothing to
do.
[2]
And yet, individually, I gain in honour by such a course, and fear as
little as other men for my person—not that I think a man need be
any the worse citizen for taking some thought for his person and estate; on the contrary, such a man would for his own sake desire the prosperity of
his country more than others—nevertheless, as I have never spoken
against my convictions to gain honour, I shall not begin to do so now, but
shall say what I think best.
[3]
Against your character any words of mine would be weak enough; if I were to advise your keeping what you have got and not risking what is
actually yours for advantages which are dubious in themselves, and which you
may or may not attain.
I will, therefore, content myself with showing that your ardour is out of
season, and your ambition not easy of accomplishment.
10.
I affirm, then, that you leave many enemies
behind you here to go yonder and bring more back with you.
[2]
You imagine, perhaps, that the treaty which you have made can be trusted; a treaty that will continue to exist nominally, as long as you keep
quiet—for nominal it has become, owing to the practices of certain
men here and at Sparta—but which in the event of a serious reverse
in any quarter would not delay our enemies a moment in attacking us; first, because the convention was forced upon them by disaster and was less
honourable to them than to us; and secondly, because in this very convention there are many points that
are still disputed.
[3]
Again, some of the most powerful states have never yet accepted the
arrangement at all.
Some of these are at open war with us; others (as the Lacedaemonians do not yet move) are restrained by truces renewed every ten days,
[4]
and it is only too probable that if they found our power divided, as we are
hurrying to divide it, they would attack us vigorously with the Siceliots,
whose alliance they would have in the past valued as they would that of few
others.
[5]
A man ought, therefore, to consider these points, and not to think of
running risks with a country placed so critically, or of grasping at another
empire before we have secured the one we have already; for in fact the Thracian Chalcidians have been all these years in revolt
from us without being yet subdued, and others on the continents yield us but
a doubtful obedience.
Meanwhile the Egestaeans, our allies, have been wronged, and we run to help
them, while the rebels who have so long wronged us still wait for
punishment.
11.
And yet the latter, if brought under, might
be kept under; while the Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far off and too numerous to
be ruled without difficulty.
Now it is folly to go against men who could not be kept under even if
conquered, while failure would leave us in a very different position from
that which we occupied before the enterprise.
[2]
The Siceliots, again, to take them as they are at present, in the event of
a Syracusan conquest (the favourite bugbear of the
Egestaeans), would to my thinking be even less dangerous to us than
before.
[3]
At present they might possibly come here as separate states for love of
Lacedaemon; in the other case one empire would scarcely attack another; for after joining the Peloponnesians to overthrow ours, they could only
expect to see the same hands overthrow their own in the same way.
[4]
The Hellenes in Sicily would fear us most if we never went there at all,
and next to this, if after displaying our power we went away again as soon
as possible.
We all know that that which is farthest off and the reputation of which can
least be tested, is the object of admiration; at the least reverse they would at once begin to look down upon us, and
would join our enemies here against us.
[5]
You have yourselves experienced this with regard to the Lacedaemonians and
their allies, whom your unexpected success, as compared with what you feared
at first, has made you suddenly despise, tempting you further to aspire to
the conquest of Sicily.
[6]
Instead, however, of being puffed up by the misfortunes of your
adversaries, you ought to think of breaking their spirit before giving
yourselves up to confidence, and to understand that the one thought awakened
in the Lacedaemonians by their disgrace is how they may even now, if
possible, overthrow us and repair their dishonour; inasmuch as military reputation is their oldest and chiefest study.
[7]
Our struggle, therefore, if we are wise, will not be for the barbarian
Egestaeans in Sicily, but how to defend ourselves most effectually against
the oligarchical machinations of Lacedaemon.
12.
We should also remember that we are but now
enjoying some respite from a great pestilence and from war, to the no small
benefit of our estates and persons, and that it is right to employ these at
home on our own behalf, instead of using them on behalf of these exiles
whose interest it is to lie as fairly as they can, who do nothing but talk
themselves and leave the danger to others, and who if they succeed will show
no proper gratitude, and if they fail will drag down their friends with
them.
[2]
And if there be any man here, overjoyed at being chosen to command, who
urges you to make the expedition, merely for ends of his
own—especially if he be still too young to command—who
seeks to be admired for his stud of horses, but on account of its heavy
expenses hopes for some profit from his appointment, do not allow such an
one to maintain his private splendour at his country's risk, but remember
that such persons injure the public fortune while they squander their own,
and that this is a matter of importance, and not for a young man to decide
or hastily to take in hand.
13.
When I see such persons now sitting here at
the side of that same individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn, summon any of the older men that may have such a person
sitting next him, not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of being
thought a coward if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how rarely
success is got by wishing and how often by forecast, to leave to them the
mad dream of conquest, and as a true lover of his country, now threatened by
the greatest danger in its history, to hold up his hand on the other side; to vote that the Siceliots be left in the limits now existing between us,
limits of which no one can complain (the Ionian sea for the
coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across the open main), to enjoy
their own possessions and to settle their own quarrels;
[2]
that the Egestaeans, for their part, be told to end by themselves with the
Selinuntines the war which they began without consulting the Athenians; and that for the future we do not enter into alliance, as we have been used
to do, with people whom we must help in their need, and who can never help
us in ours.
14.
And you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty
to care for the commonwealth, and if you wish to show yourself a good
citizen, put the question to the vote, and take a second time the opinions
of the Athenians.
If you are afraid to move the question again, consider that a violation of
the law cannot carry any prejudice with so many abettors, that you will be
the physician of your misguided city, and that the virtue of men in office
is briefly this, to do their country as much good as they can, or in any
case no harm that they can avoid.’
15.
Such were the words of Nicias.
Most of the Athenians that came forward spoke in favour of the expedition,
and of not annulling what had been voted, although some spoke on the other
side.
[2]
By far the warmest advocate of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades, son
of Clinias, who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent and
also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and who was,
besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce
Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by
means of his successes.
[3]
For the position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes
beyond what his real means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the
rest of his expenditure; and this later on had not a little to do with the ruin of the Athenian
state.
[4]
Alarmed at the greatness of his license in his own life and habits, and of
the ambition which he showed in all things soever that he undertook, the
mass of the people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny, and became
his enemies; and although publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be
desired individually, his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them
to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city.
[5]
Meanwhile he now came forward and gave the following advice to the
Athenians:—
16.
‘Athenians, I have a better right
to command than others—I must begin with this as Nicias has
attacked me—and at the same time I believe myself to be worthy of
it.
The things for which I am abused, bring fame to my ancestors and to myself,
and to the country profit besides.
[2]
The Hellenes, after expecting to see our city ruined by the war, concluded
it to be even greater than it really is, by reason of the magnificence with
which I represented it at the Olympic games, when I sent into the lists
seven chariots, a number never before entered by any private person, and won
the first prize, and was second and fourth, and took care to have everything
else in a style worthy of my victory.
Custom regards such displays as honourable, and they cannot be made without
leaving behind them an impression of power.
[3]
Again, any splendour that I may have exhibited at home in providing
choruses or otherwise, is naturally envied by my fellow-citizens, but in the
eyes of foreigners has an air of strength as in the other instance.
And this is no useless folly, when a man at his own private cost benefits
not himself only, but his city:
[4]
nor is it unfair that he who prides himself on his position should refuse
to be upon an equality with the rest.
He who is badly off has his misfortunes all to himself, and as we do not
see men courted in adversity, on the like principle a man ought to accept
the insolence of prosperity; or else, let him first mete out equal measure to all, and then demand to
have it meted out to him.
[5]
What I know is that persons of this kind and all others that have attained
to any distinction, although they may be unpopular in their lifetime in
their relations with their fellow-men and especially with their equals,
leave to posterity the desire of claiming connection with them even without
any ground, and are vaunted by the country to which they belonged, not as
strangers or ill-doers, but as fellow-countrymen and heroes.
[6]
Such are my aspirations, and however I am abused for them in private, the
question is whether any one manages public affairs better than I do.
Having united the most powerful states of Peloponnese, without great danger
or expense to you, I compelled the Lacedaemonians to stake their all upon
the issue of a single day at Mantinea; and although victorious in the battle, they have never since fully
recovered confidence.
17.
Thus did my youth and so-called monstrous
folly find fitting arguments to deal with the power of the Peloponnesians,
and by its ardour win their confidence and prevail.
And do not be afraid of my youth now, but while I am still in its flower,
and Nicias appears fortunate, avail yourselves to the utmost of the services
of us both.
[2]
Neither rescind your resolution to sail to Sicily, on the ground that you
would be going to attack a great power.
The cities in Sicily are peopled by motley rabbles, and easily change their
institutions and adopt new ones in their stead;
[3]
and consequently the inhabitants, being without any feeling of patriotism,
are not provided with arms for their persons, and have not regularly
established themselves on the land; every man thinks that either by fair words or by party strife he can obtain
something at the public expense, and then in the event of a catastrophe
settle in some other country, and makes his preparations accordingly.
[4]
From a mob like this you need not look for either unanimity in counsel or
concert in action; but they will probably one by one come in as they get a fair offer,
especially if they are torn by civil strife as we are told.
[5]
Moreover, the Siceliots have not so many heavy infantry as they boast; just as the Hellenes generally did not prove so numerous as each state
reckoned itself, but Hellas greatly over-estimated their numbers, and has
hardly had an adequate force of heavy infantry throughout this war.
[6]
The states in Sicily, therefore, from all that I can hear, will be found as
I say, and I have not pointed out all our advantages, for we shall have the
help of many barbarians, who from their hatred of the Syracusans will join
us in attacking them; nor will the powers at home prove any hindrance, if you judge rightly.
[7]
Our fathers with these very adversaries, which it is said we shall now
leave behind us when we sail, and the Mede as their enemy as well, were able
to win the empire, depending solely on their superiority at sea.
[8]
The Peloponnesians had never so little hope against us at present; and let them be ever so sanguine, although strong enough to invade our
country even if we stay at home, they can never hurt us with their navy, as
we leave one of our own behind us that is a match for them.
18.
In this state of things what reason can we
give to ourselves for holding back, or what excuse can we offer to our
allies in Sicily for not helping them?
They are our confederates, and we are bound to assist them, without
objecting that they have not assisted us.
We did not take them into alliance to have them to help us in Hellas, but
that they might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to prevent them from
coming over here and attacking us.
[2]
It is thus that empire has been won, both by us and by all others that have
held it, by a constant readiness to support all, whether barbarians or
Hellenes, that invite assistance; since if all were to keep quiet or to pick and choose whom they ought to
assist, we should make but few new conquests, and should imperil those we
have already won.
Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks of a superior, but often
strike the first blow to prevent the attack being made.
[3]
And we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining
but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in
danger of being ruled ourselves.
Nor can you look at inaction from the same point of view as others, unless
you are prepared to change your habits and make them like theirs.
[4]
Be convinced then that we shall augment our
power at home by this adventure abroad, and let us make the expedition, and
so humble the pride of the Peloponnesians by sailing off to Sicily, and
letting them see how little we care for the peace that we are now enjoying; and at the same time we shall either become masters, as we very easily may,
of the whole of Hellas through the accession of the Sicilian Hellenes, or in
any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no small advantage of ourselves and our
allies.
[5]
The faculty of staying if successful, or of returning, will be secured to
us by our navy, as we shall be superior at sea to all the Siceliots put
together.
[6]
And do not let the do-nothing policy which Nicias advocates, or his setting
of the young against the old, turn you from your purpose, but in the good
old fashion by which our fathers, old and young together, by their united
counsels brought our affairs to their present height, do you endeavour still
to advance them; understanding that neither youth nor old age can do anything the one
without the other, but that levity, sobriety, and deliberate judgment are
strongest when united, and that, by sinking into inaction, the city, like
everything else, will wear itself out, and its skill in everything decay; while each fresh struggle will give it fresh experience, and make it more
used to defend itself not in word but in deed.
[7]
In short, my conviction is that a city not inactive by nature could not
choose a quicker way to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting such a policy,
and that the safest rule of life is to take one's character and institutions
for better and for worse, and to live up to them as closely as one
can.’
19.
Such were the words of Alcibiades.
After hearing him and the Egestaeans and some Leontine exiles, who came
forward reminding them of their oaths and imploring their assistance, the
Athenians became more eager for the expedition than before.
[2]
Nicias, perceiving that it would be now useless to try to deter them by the
old line of argument, but thinking that he might perhaps alter their
resolution by the extravagance of his estimates, came forward a second time
and spoke as follows:—
20.
‘I see, Athenians, that you are
thoroughly bent upon the expedition, and therefore hope that all will turn
out as we wish, and proceed to give you my opinion at the present juncture.
[2]
From all that I hear we are going against cities that are great and not
subject to one another, or in need of change, so as to be glad to pass from
enforced servitude to an easier condition, or in the least likely to accept
our rule in exchange for freedom; and, to take only the Hellenic towns, they are very numerous for one
island.
[3]
Besides Naxos and Catana, which I expect to join us from their connection
with Leontini, there are seven others armed at all points just like our own
power, particularly Selinus and Syracuse, the chief objects of our
expedition.
[4]
These are full of heavy infantry, archers, and darters, have galleys in
abundance and crowds to man them; they have also money, partly in the hands of private persons, partly in the
temples at Selinus, and at Syracuse first-fruits from some of the barbarians
as well.
But their chief advantage over us lies in the number of their horses, and
in the fact that they grow their corn at home instead of importing it.
21.
Against a power of this kind it will not do
to have merely a weak naval armament, but we shall want also a large land
army to sail with us, if we are to do anything worthy of our ambition, and
are not to be shut out from the country by a numerous cavalry; especially if the cities should take alarm and combine, and we should be
left without friends (except the Egestaeans) to furnish us with horse to defend ourselves with.
[2]
It would be disgraceful to have to retire under compulsion, or to send back
for reinforcements, owing to want of reflection at first: we must therefore
start from home with a competent force, seeing that we are going to sail far
from our country, and upon an expedition not like any which you may have
undertaken in the quality of allies, among your subject states here in
Hellas, where any additional supplies needed were easily drawn from the
friendly territory; but we are cutting ourselves off, and going to a land entirely strange,
from which during four months in winter it is not even easy for a messenger
to get to Athens.
22.
I think, therefore, that we ought to take
great numbers of heavy infantry, both from Athens and from our allies, and
not merely from our subjects, but also any we may be able to get for love or
for money in Peloponnese, and great numbers also of archers and slingers, to
make head against the Sicilian horse.
Meanwhile we must have an overwhelming superiority at sea, to enable us the
more easily to carry in what we want; and we must take our own corn in merchant vessels, that is to say, wheat
and parched barley, and bakers from the mills compelled to serve for pay in
the proper proportion; in order that in case of our being weather-bound the armament may not want
provisions, as it is not every city that will be able to entertain numbers
like ours.
We must also provide ourselves with everything else as far as we can, so as
not to be dependent upon others; and above all we must take with us from home as much money as possible, as
the sums talked of as ready at Egesta are readier, you may be sure, in talk
than in any other way.
23.
Indeed, even if we leave Athens with a force
not only equal to that of the enemy except in the number of heavy infantry
in the field, but even at all points superior to him, we shall still find it
difficult to conquer Sicily or save ourselves.
[2]
We must not disguise from ourselves that we go to found a city among
strangers and enemies, and that he who undertakes such an enterprise should
be prepared to become master of the country the first day he lands, or
failing in this to find everything hostile to him.
[3]
Fearing this, and knowing that we shall have need of much good counsel and
more good fortune—a hard matter for mortal men to aspire
to—I wish as far as may be to make myself independent of fortune
before sailing, and when I do sail, to be as safe as a strong force can make
me.
[4]
This I believe to be surest for the country at large, and safest for us who
are to go on the expedition.
If any one thinks differently I resign to him my command.’
24.
With this Nicias concluded, thinking that he
should either disgust the Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking, or,
if obliged to sail on the expedition, would thus do so in the safest way
possible.
[2]
The Athenians, however, far from having their taste for the voyage taken
away by the burdensomeness of the preparations, became more eager for it
than ever; and just the contrary took place of what Nicias had thought, as it was held
that he had given good advice, and that the expedition would be the safest
in the world.
[3]
All alike fell in love with the enterprise.
The older men thought that they would either subdue the places against
which they were to sail, or at all events, with so large a force, meet with
no disaster; those in the prime of life felt a longing for foreign sights and
spectacles, and had no doubt that they should come safe home again; while the idea of the common people and the soldiery was to earn wages at
the moment, and make conquests that would supply a never-ending fund of pay
for the future.
[4]
With this enthusiasm of the majority, the few that liked it not, feared to
appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against it, and so kept quiet.
25.
At last one of the Athenians came forward and
called upon Nicias and told him that he ought not to make excuses or put
them off, but say at once before them all what forces the Athenians should
vote him.
[2]
Upon this he said, not without reluctance, that he would advise upon that
matter more at leisure with his colleagues; as far however as he could see at present, they must sail with at least one
hundred galleys—the Athenians providing as many transports as they
might determine, and sending for others from the allies—not less
than five thousand heavy infantry in all, Athenian and allied, and if
possible more; and the rest of the armament in proportion; archers from home and from Crete, and slingers, and whatever else might
seem desirable, being got ready by the generals and taken with them.
26.
Upon hearing this the Athenians at once voted that the generals should have
full powers in the matter of the numbers of the army and of the expedition
generally, to do as they judged best for the interests of Athens.
[2]
After this the preparations began; messages being sent to the allies and the rolls drawn up at home.
And as the city had just recovered from the plague and the long war, and a
number of young men had grown up and capital had accumulated by reason of
the truce, everything was the more easily provided.
27.
In the midst of these preparations all the
stone Hermae in the city of Athens, that is to say the customary square
figures so common in the doorways of private houses and temples, had in one
night most of them their faces mutilated.
[2]
No one knew who had done it, but large public rewards were offered to find
the authors; and it was further voted that any one who knew of any other act of impiety
having been committed should come and give information without fear of
consequences, whether he were citizen, alien, or slave.
[3]
The matter was taken up the more seriously, as it was thought to be ominous
for the expedition, and part of a conspiracy to bring about a revolution and
to upset the democracy.
28.
Information was given accordingly by some
resident aliens and body servants, not about the Hermae but about some
previous mutilations of other images perpetrated by young men in a drunken
frolic, and of mock celebrations of the mysteries, averred to take place in
private houses.
[2]
Alcibiades being implicated in this charge, it was taken hold of by those
who could least endure him, because he stood in the way of their obtaining
the undisturbed direction of the people, and who thought that if he were
once removed the first place would be theirs.
These accordingly magnified the manner and loudly proclaimed that the
affair of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae were part and
parcel of a scheme to overthrow the democracy, and that nothing of all this
had been done without Alcibiades; the proofs alleged being the general and undemocratic license of his life
and habits.
29.
Alcibiades repelled on the spot the charges
in question, and also before going on the expedition, the preparations for
which were now complete, offered to stand his trial, that it might be seen
whether he was guilty of the acts imputed to him; desiring to be punished if found guilty, but, if acquitted, to take the
command.
[2]
Meanwhile he protested against their receiving slanders against him in his
absence, and begged them rather to put him to death at once if he were
guilty, and pointed out the imprudence of sending him out at the head of so
large an army, with so serious a charge still undecided.
[3]
But his enemies feared that he would have the army for him if he were tried
immediately, and that the people might relent in favour of the man whom they
already caressed as the cause of the Argives and some of the Mantineans
joining in the expedition, and did their utmost to get this proposition
rejected, putting forward other orators who said that he ought at present to
sail and not delay the departure of the army, and be tried on his return
within a fixed number of days; their plan being to have him sent for and brought home for trial upon some
graver charge, which they would the more easily get up in his absence.
Accordingly it was decreed that he should sail.
30.
After this the departure for Sicily took
place, it being now about midsummer.
Most of the allies, with the corn transports and the smaller craft and the
rest of the expedition, had already received orders to muster at Corcyra, to
cross the Ionian sea from thence in a body to the Iapygian promontory.
But the Athenians themselves, and such of their allies as happened to be
with them, went down to Piraeus upon a day appointed at daybreak, and began
to man the ships for putting out to sea.
[2]
With them also went down the whole population, one may say, of the city,
both citizens and foreigners; the inhabitants of the country each escorting those that belonged to them,
their friends, their relatives, or their sons, with hope and lamentation
upon their way, as they thought of the conquests which they hoped to make,
or of the friends whom they might never see again, considering the long
voyage which they were going to make from their country.
31.
Indeed, at this moment, when they were now upon the point of parting from
one another, the danger came more home to them than when they voted for the
expedition; although the strength of the armament, and the profuse provision which they
remarked in every department, was a sight that could not but comfort them.
As for the foreigners and the rest of the crowd, they simply went to see a
sight worth looking at and passing all belief.Indeed this armament that first sailed out was by far the most costly and
splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a single city up to
that time.
[2]
In mere number of ships and heavy infantry that against Epidaurus under
Pericles, and the same when going against Potidaea under Hagnon, was not
inferior; containing as it did four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, three hundred
horse, and one hundred galleys accompanied by fifty Lesbian and Chian
vessels and many allies besides.
[3]
But these were sent upon a short voyage and with a scanty equipment.
The present expedition was formed in contemplation of a long term of
service by land and sea alike, and was furnished with ships and troops so as
to be ready for either as required.
The fleet had been elaborately equipped at great cost to the captains and
the state; the treasury giving a drachma a day to each seaman, and providing empty
ships, sixty men of war and forty transports, and manning these with the
best crews obtainable; while the captains gave a bounty in addition to the pay from the treasury
to the thranitae and crews generally, besides spending lavishly upon
figure-heads and equipments, and one and all making the utmost exertions to
enable their own ships to excel in beauty and fast sailing.
Meanwhile the land forces had been picked from the best muster-rolls, and
vied with each other in paying great attention to their arms and personal
accoutrements.
[4]
From this resulted not only a rivalry among themselves in their different
departments, but an idea among the rest of the Hellenes that it was more a
display of power and resources than an armament against an enemy.
[5]
For if any one had counted up the public expenditure of the state, and the
private outlay of individuals—that is to say, the sums which the
state had already spent upon the expedition and was sending out in the hands
of the generals, and those which individuals had expended upon their
personal outfit, or as captains of galleys had laid out and were still to
lay out upon their vessels; and if he had added to this the journey money which each was likely to have
provided himself with, independently of the pay from the treasury, for a
voyage of such length, and what the soldiers or traders took with them for
the purpose of exchange—it would have been found that many talents
in all were being taken out of the city.
[6]
Indeed the expedition became not less famous for its wonderful boldness and
for the splendour of its appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as
compared with the peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact
that this was the longest passage from home hitherto attempted, and the most
ambitious in its objects considering the resources of those who undertook
it.
32.
The ships being now manned, and everything
put on board with which they meant to sail, the trumpet commanded silence,
and the prayers customary before putting out to sea were offered, not in
each ship by itself, but by all together to the voice of a herald; and bowls of wine were mixed through all the armament, and libations made
by the soldiers and their officers in gold and silver goblets.
[2]
In their prayers joined also the crowds on shore, the citizens and all
others that wished them well.
The hymn sung and the libations finished, they put out to sea, and first
sailing out in column then raced each other as far as Aegina, and so
hastened to reach Corcyra where the rest of the allied forces were also
assembling.
[3]
Meanwhile at Syracuse news came in from many
quarters of the expedition, but for a long while met with no credence
whatever.
Indeed, an assembly was held in which speeches, as will be seen, were
delivered by different orators, believing or contradicting the report of the
Athenian expedition; among whom Hermocrates, son of Hermon, came forward, being persuaded that
he knew the truth of the matter, and gave the following
counsel:—
33.
‘Although I shall perhaps be no
better believed than others have been when I speak upon the reality of the
expedition, and although I know that those who either make or repeat
statements thought not worthy of belief not only gain no converts, but are
thought fools for their pains, I shall certainly not be frightened into
holding my tongue when the state is in danger, and when I am persuaded that
I can speak with more authority on the matter than other persons.
[2]
Much as you wonder at it, the Athenians nevertheless have set out against
us with a large force, naval and military, professedly to help the
Egestaeans and to restore Leontini, but really to conquer Sicily, and above
all our city, which once gained, the rest, they think, will easily follow.
[3]
Make up your minds, therefore, to see them speedily here, and see how you
can best repel them with the means under your hands, and do not be taken off
your guard through despising the news, or neglect the common weal through
disbelieving it.
[4]
Meanwhile those who believe me need not be dismayed at the force or daring
of the enemy.
They will not be able to do us more hurt than we shall do them; nor is the greatness of their armament altogether without advantage to us.
Indeed, the greater it is the better, with regard to the rest of the
Siceliots, whom dismay will make more ready to join us; and if we defeat or drive them away, disappointed of the objects of their
ambition (for I do not fear for a moment that they will get what
they want), it will be a most glorious exploit for us, and in my
judgment by no means an unlikely one.
[5]
Few indeed have been the large armaments, either Hellenic or barbarian,
that have gone far from home and been successful.
They cannot be more numerous than the people of the country and their
neighbours, all of whom fear leagues together; and if they miscarry for want of supplies in a foreign land, to those
against whom their plans were laid none the less they leave renown, although
they may themselves have been the main cause of their own discomfort.
[6]
Thus these very Athenians rose by the defeat of the Mede, in a great
measure due to accidental causes, from the mere fact that Athens had been
the object of his attack; and this may very well be the case with us also.
34.
Let us, therefore, confidently begin
preparations here; let us send and confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and
alliance of others, and despatch envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that
the danger is common to all, and to Italy to get them to become our allies,
or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians.
[2]
I also think that it would be best to send to Carthage as well; they are by no means there without apprehension, but it is their constant
fear that the Athenians may one day attack their city, and they may perhaps
think that they might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be sacrificed, and
be willing to help us secretly if not openly, in one way if not in another.
They are the best able to do so, if they will, of any of the present day,
as they possess most gold and silver, by which war, like everything else,
flourishes.
[3]
Let us also send to Lacedaemon and Corinth, and ask them to come here and
help us as soon as possible, and to keep alive the war in Hellas.
[4]
But the true thing of all others, in my opinion, to do at the present
moment, is what you, with your constitutional love of quiet, will be slow to
see, and what I must nevertheless mention.
If we Siceliots, all together, or at least as many as possible besides
ourselves, would only launch the whole of our actual navy with two months'
provisions, and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory,
and show them that before fighting for Sicily they must first fight for
their passage across the Ionian sea, we should strike dismay into their
army, and set them on thinking that we have a base for our
defensive—for Tarentum is ready to receive us—while they
have a wide sea to cross with all their armament, which could with
difficulty keep its order through so long a voyage, and would be easy for us
to attack as it came on slowly and in small detachments.
[5]
On the other hand, if they were to lighten their vessels, and draw together
their fast sailors and with these attack us, we could either fall upon them
when they were wearied with rowing, or if we did not choose to do so, we
could retire to Tarentum; while they, having crossed with few provisions just to give battle, would
be hard put to it in desolate places, and would either have to remain and be
blockaded, or to try to sail along the coast, abandoning the rest of their
armament, and being further discouraged by not knowing for certain whether
the cities would receive them.
[6]
In my opinion this consideration alone would be sufficient to deter them
from putting out from Corcyra; and what with deliberating and reconnoitring our numbers and whereabouts,
they would let the season go on until winter was upon them, or, confounded
by so unexpected a circumstance, would break up the expedition, especially
as their most experienced general has, as I hear, taken the command against
his will, and would grasp at the first excuse offered by any serious
demonstration of ours.
[7]
We should also be reported, I am certain, as more numerous than we really
are, and men's minds are affected by what they hear, and besides the first
to attack, or to show that they mean to defend themselves against an attack,
inspire greater fear because men see that they are ready for the emergency.
[8]
This would just be the case with the Athenians at present.
They are now attacking us in the belief that we shall not resist, having a
right to judge us severely because we did not help the Lacedaemonians in
crushing them; but if they were to see us showing a courage for which they are not
prepared, they would be more dismayed by the surprise than they could ever
be by our actual power.
[9]
I could wish to persuade you to show this courage; but if this cannot be, at all events lose not a moment in preparing
generally for the war; and remember all of you that contempt for an assailant is best shown by
bravery in action, but that for the present the best course is to accept the
preparations which fear inspires as giving the surest promise of safety, and
to act as if the danger was real.
That the Athenians are coming to attack us, and are already upon the
voyage, and all but here—this is what I am sure
of.’
35.
Thus far spoke Hermocrates.
Meanwhile the people of Syracuse were at great strife among themselves; some contending that the Athenians had no idea of coming and that there was
no truth in what he said; some asking if they did come what harm they could do that would not be
repaid them tenfold in return; while others made light of the whole affair and turned it into ridicule.
In short, there were few that believed Hermocrates and feared for the
future.
[2]
Meanwhile Athenagoras, the leader of the people and very powerful at that
time with the masses, came forward and spoke as follows:—
36.
‘For the Athenians, he who does not
wish that they may be as misguided as they are supposed to be, and that they
may come here to become our subjects, is either a coward or a traitor to his
country; while as for those who carry such tidings and fill you with so much alarm,
I wonder less at their audacity than at their folly if they flatter
themselves that we do not see through them.
[2]
The fact is that they have their private reasons to be afraid, and wish to
throw the city into consternation to have their own terrors cast into the
shade by the public alarm.
In short, this is what these reports are worth; they do not arise of themselves, but are concocted by men who are always
causing agitation here in Sicily.
[3]
However, if you are well advised, you will not be guided in your
calculation of probabilities by what these persons tell you, but by what
shrewd men and of large experience, as I esteem the Athenians to be, would
be likely to do.
[4]
Now it is not likely that they would leave the Peloponnesians behind them,
and before they have well ended the war in Hellas wantonly come in quest of
a new war quite as arduous, in Sicily; indeed, in my judgment, they are only too glad that we do not go and attack
them, being so many and so great cities as we are.
37.
However, if they should come as is reported,
I consider Sicily better able to go through with the war than Peloponnese,
as being at all points better prepared, and our city by itself far more than
a match for this pretended army of invasion, even were it twice as large
again.
I know that they will not have horses with them, or get any here, except a
few perhaps from the Egestaeans; or be able to bring a force of heavy infantry equal in number to our own,
in ships which will already have enough to do to come all this distance,
however lightly laden, not to speak of the transport of the other stores
required against a city of this magnitude, which will be no slight quantity.
[2]
In fact, so strong is my opinion upon the subject, that I do not well see
how they could avoid annihilation if they brought with them another city as
large as Syracuse, and settled down and carried on war from our frontier; much less can they hope to succeed with all Sicily hostile to them, as all
Sicily will be, and with only a camp pitched from the ships, and composed of
tents and bare necessaries, from which they would not be able to stir far
for fear of our cavalry.
38.
But the Athenians see this as I tell you, and
as I have reason to know are looking after their possessions at home, while
persons here invent stories that neither are true nor ever will be.
[2]
Nor is this the first time that I see these persons, when they cannot
resort to deeds, trying by such stories and by others even more abominable
to frighten your people and get into their hands the government: it is what
I see always.
And I cannot help fearing that trying so often they may one day succeed,
and that we, as long as we do not feel the smart, may prove too weak for the
task of prevention, or, when the offenders are known, of pursuit.
[3]
The result is that our city is rarely at rest, but is subject to constant
troubles and to contests as frequent against herself as against the enemy,
not to speak of occasional tyrannies and infamous cabals.
[4]
However, I will try, if you will support me, to let nothing of this happen
in our time, by gaining you, the many, and by chastising the authors of such
machinations, not merely when they are caught in the act—a
difficult feat to accomplish—but also for what they have the wish
though not the power to do; as is necessary to punish an enemy not only for what he does, but also
beforehand for what he intends to do, if the first to relax precaution would
not be also the first to suffer.
I shall also reprove, watch, and on occasion warn the few—the
most effectual way, in my opinion, of turning them from their evil courses.
[5]
And after all, as I have often asked—What would you have, young
men?
Would you hold office at once?
The law forbids it, a law enacted rather because you are not competent than
to disgrace you when competent.
Meanwhile you would not be on a legal equality with the many!
But how can it be right that citizens of the same state should be held
unworthy of the same privileges?
39.
It will be said, perhaps, that democracy is
neither wise nor equitable, but that the holders of property are also the
best fitted to rule.
I say, on the contrary, first, that the word “demos,” or people, includes the whole state, oligarchy only a part; next, that if the best guardians of property are the rich, and the best
counsellors the wise, none can hear and decide so well as the many; and that all these talents, severally and collectively, have their just
place in a democracy.
[2]
But an oligarchy gives the many their share of the danger, and not content
with the largest part takes and keeps the whole of the profit; and this is what the powerful and young among you aspire to, but in a great
city cannot possibly obtain.
40.
But even now, foolish men, most senseless of
all the Hellenes that I know, if you have no sense of the wickedness of your
designs, or most criminal if you have that sense and still dare to pursue
them,—even now, if it is not a case for repentance, you may still
learn wisdom, and thus advance the interest of the country, the common
interest of us all.
Reflect that in the country's prosperity the men of merit in your ranks
will have a share and a larger share than the great mass of your
fellow-countrymen, but that if you have other designs you run a risk of
being deprived of all; and desist from reports like these, as the people know your object and will
not put up with it.
[2]
If the Athenians arrive, this city will repulse them in a manner worthy of
itself; we have, moreover, generals who will see to this matter.
And if nothing of this be true, as I incline to believe, the city will not
be thrown into a panic by your intelligence, or impose upon itself a
self-chosen servitude by choosing you for its rulers; the city itself will look into the matter, and will judge your words as if
they were acts, and instead of allowing itself to be deprived of its liberty
by listening to you, will strive to preserve that liberty, by taking care to
have always at hand the means of making itself respected.’
41.
Such were the words of Athenagoras.
One of the generals now stood up and stopped any other speakers coming
forward, adding these words of his own with reference to the matter in
hand:—
[2]
‘It is not well for speakers to utter calumnies against one
another, or for their hearers to entertain them; we ought rather to look to the intelligence that we have received, and see
how each man by himself and the city as a whole may best prepare to repel
the invaders.
[3]
Even if there be no need, there is no harm in the state being furnished
with horses and arms and all other insignia of war;
[4]
and we will undertake to see to and order this, and to send round to the
cities to reconnoitre and do all else that may appear desirable.
Part of this we have seen to already, and whatever we discover shall be
laid before you.’After these words from the general, the
Syracusans departed from the assembly.
42.
In the meantime the Athenians with all their
allies had now arrived at Corcyra.
Here the generals began by again reviewing the armament, and made
arrangements as to the order in which they were to anchor and encamp, and
dividing the whole fleet into three divisions, allotted one to each of their
number, to avoid sailing all together and being thus embarrassed for water,
harbourage, or provisions at the stations which they might touch at, and at
the same time to be generally better ordered and easier to handle, by each
squadron having its own commander.
[2]
Next they sent on three ships to Italy and Sicily to find out which of the
cities would receive them, with instructions to meet them on the way and let
them know before they put in to land.
43.
After this the Athenians weighed from
Corcyra, and proceeded to cross to Sicily with an armament now consisting of
one hundred and thirty-four galleys in all (besides two Rhodian
fifty-oars) of which one hundred were Athenian vessels—sixty men-of-war, and
forty troopships—and the remainder from Chios and the other
allies; five thousand and one hundred heavy infantry in all, that is to say,
fifteen hundred Athenian citizens from the rolls at Athens and seven hundred
Thetes shipped as marines, and the rest allied troops, some of them Athenian
subjects, and besides these five hundred Argives, and two hundred and fifty
Mantineans serving for hire; four hundred and eighty archers in all, eighty of whom were Cretans, seven
hundred slingers from Rhodes, one hundred and twenty light-armed exiles from
Megara, and one horse-transport carrying thirty horses.
44.
Such was the strength of the first armament
that sailed over for the war.
The supplies for this force were carried by thirty ships of burden laden
with corn, which conveyed the bakers, stone-masons and carpenters, and the
tools for raising fortifications, accompanied by one hundred boats, like the
former pressed into the service, besides many other boats and ships of
burden which followed the armament voluntarily for purposes of trade; all of which now left Corcyra and struck across the Ionian sea together.
[2]
The whole force making land at the Iapygian promontory and Tarentum, with
more or less good fortune, coasted along the shores of Italy, the cities
shutting their markets and gates against them, and according them nothing
but water and liberty to anchor, and Tarentum and Locri not even that, until
they arrived at Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy.
[3]
Here at length they reunited, and not gaining admission within the walls
pitched a camp outside the city in the precinct of Artemis, where a market
was also provided for them, and drew their ships on shore and kept quiet.
Meanwhile they opened negotiations with the Rhegians, and called upon them
as Chalcidians to assist their Leontine kinsmen; to which the Rhegians replied that they would not side with either party,
but should await the decision of the rest of the Italiots, and do as they
did.
[4]
Upon this the Athenians now began to consider what would be the best action
to take in the affairs of Sicily, and meanwhile waited for the ships sent on
to come back from Egesta, in order to know whether there was really there
the money mentioned by the messengers at Athens.
45.
In the meantime came in from all quarters to
the Syracusans, as well as from their own officers sent to reconnoitre, the
positive tidings that the fleet was at Rhegium; upon which they laid aside their incredulity and threw themselves heart and
soul into the work of preparation.
Guards or envoys, as the case might be, were sent round to the Sicels,
garrisons put into the posts of the Peripoli in the country, horses and arms
reviewed in the city to see that nothing was wanting, and all other steps
taken to prepare for a war which might be upon them at any moment.
46.
Meanwhile the three ships that had been sent
on came from Egesta to the Athenians at Rhegium, with the news that so far
from there being the sums promised, all that could be produced was thirty
talents.
[2]
The generals were not a little disheartened at being thus disappointed at
the outset, and by the refusal to join in the expedition of the Rhegians,
the people they had first tried to gain and had had most reason to count
upon, from their relationship to the Leontines and constant friendship for
Athens.
If Nicias was prepared for the news from Egesta, his two colleagues were
taken completely by surprise.
[3]
The Egestaeans had had recourse to the following stratagem, when the first
envoys from Athens came to inspect their resources.
They took the envoys in question to the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx and
showed them the treasures deposited there; bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and a large number of other pieces of plate,
which from being in silver gave an impression of wealth quite out of
proportion to their really small value.
They also privately entertained the ships' crews, and collected all the
cups of gold and silver that they could find in Egesta itself or could
borrow in the neighbouring Phoenician and Hellenic towns, and each brought
them to the banquets as their own;
[4]
and as all used pretty nearly the same, and everywhere a great quantity of
plate was shown, the effect was most dazzling upon the Athenian sailors, and
made them talk loudly of the riches they had seen when they got back to
Athens.
[5]
The dupes in question—who had in their turn persuaded the
rest—when the news got abroad that there was not the money
supposed at Egesta, were much blamed by the soldiers.
47.
Meanwhile the generals consulted upon what
was to be done.
The opinion of Nicias was to sail with all the armament to Selinus, the
main object of the expedition, and if the Egestaeans could provide money for
the whole force, to advise accordingly; but if they could not, to require them to supply provisions for the sixty
ships that they had asked for, to stay and settle matters between them and
the Selinuntines either by force or by agreement, and then to coast past the
other cities, and after displaying the power of Athens and proving their
zeal for their friends and allies, to sail home again (unless they
should have some sudden and unexpected opportunity of serving the Leontines,
or of bringing over some of the other cities), and not to endanger
the state by wasting its home resources.
48.
Alcibiades said that a great expedition like
the present must not disgrace itself by going away without having done
anything; heralds must be sent to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and
efforts be made to make some of the Sicels revolt from the Syracusans, and
to obtain the friendship of others, in order to have corn and troops; and first of all to gain the Messinese, who lay right in the passage and
entrance to Sicily, and would afford an excellent harbour and base for the
army.
Thus, after bringing over the towns and knowing who would be their allies
in the war, they might at length attack Syracuse and Selinus; unless the latter came to terms with Egesta and the former ceased to oppose
the restoration of Leontini.
49.
Lamachus, on the other hand, said that they
ought to sail straight to Syracuse, and fight their battle at once under the
walls of the town while the people were still unprepared, and the panic at
its height.
[2]
Every armament was most terrible at first; if it allowed time to run on without showing itself, men's courage revived,
and they saw it appear at last almost with indifference.
By attacking suddenly, while Syracuse still trembled at their coming, they
would have the best chance of gaining a victory for themselves and of
striking a complete panic into the enemy by the aspect of their
numbers—which would never appear so considerable as at
present—by the anticipation of coming disaster, and above all by
the immediate danger of the engagement.
[3]
They might also count upon surprising many in the fields outside,
incredulous of their coming; and at the moment that the enemy was carrying in his property the army
would not want for booty if it sat down in force before the city.
[4]
The rest of the Siceliots would thus be immediately less disposed to enter
into alliance with the Syracusans, and would join the Athenians, without
waiting to see which were the strongest.
They must make Megara their naval station as a place to retreat to and a
base from which to attack: it was an uninhabited place at no great distance
from Syracuse either by land or by sea.
50.
After speaking to this effect, Lamachus
nevertheless gave his support to the opinion of Alcibiades.
After this Alcibiades sailed in his own vessel across to Messina with
proposals of alliance, but met with no success, the inhabitants answering
that they could not receive him within their walls, though they would
provide him with a market outside.
Upon this he sailed back to Rhegium.
[2]
Immediately upon his return the generals manned and victualled sixty ships
out of the whole fleet and coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the
armament behind them at Rhegium with one of their number.
[3]
Received by the Naxians, they then coasted on to Catana, and being refused
admittance by the inhabitants, there being a Syracusan party in the town,
went on to the river Terias.
[4]
Here they bivouacked, and the next day sailed in single file to Syracuse
with all their ships except ten which they sent on in front to sail into the
great harbour and see if there was any fleet launched, and to proclaim by
herald from shipboard that the Athenians were come to restore the Leontines
to their country, as being their allies and kinsmen, and that such of them,
therefore, as were in Syracuse should leave it without fear and join their
friends and benefactors the Athenians.
[5]
After making this proclamation and reconnoitring the city and the harbours,
and the features of the country which they would have to make their base of
operations in the war, they sailed back to Catana.
51.
An assembly being held here, the inhabitants
refused to received the armament, but invited the generals to come in and
say what they desired; and while Alcibiades was speaking and the citizens were intent on the
assembly, the soldiers broke down an ill-walled-up postern-gate without
being observed, and getting inside the town, flocked into the marketplace.
[2]
The Syracusan party in the town no sooner saw the army inside than they
became frightened and withdrew, not being at all numerous; while the rest voted for an alliance with the Athenians and invited them to
fetch the rest of their forces from Rhegium.
[3]
After this the Athenians sailed to Rhegium, and put off, this time with all
the armament, for Catana, and fell to work at their camp immediately upon
their arrival.
52.
Meanwhile word was brought them from Camarina
that if they went there the town would go over to them, and also that the
Syracusans were manning a fleet.
The Athenians accordingly sailed along shore with all their armament, first
to Syracuse, where they found no fleet manning, and so always along the
coast to Camarina, where they brought to at the beach, and sent a herald to
the people, who, however, refused to receive them, saying that their oaths
bound them to receive the Athenians only with a single vessel, unless they
themselves sent for more.
[2]
Disappointed here, the Athenians now sailed back again, and after landing
and plundering on Syracusan territory and losing some stragglers from their
light infantry through the coming up of the Syracusan horse, so got back to
Catana.
53.
There they found the Salaminia come from
Athens for Alcibiades, with orders for him to sail home to answer the
charges which the state brought against him, and for certain others of the
soldiers who with him were accused of sacrilege in the matter of the
mysteries and of the Hermae.
[2]
For the Athenians, after the departure of the expedition, had continued as
active as ever in investigating the facts of the mysteries and of the
Hermae, and, instead of testing the informers, in their suspicious temper
welcomed all indifferently, arresting and imprisoning the best citizens upon
the evidence of rascals, and preferring to sift the matter to the bottom
sooner than to let an accused person of good character pass unquestioned,
owing to the rascality of the informer.
[3]
The commons had heard how oppressive the tyranny of Pisistratus and his
sons had become before it ended, and further that that tyranny had been put
down at last, not by themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians,
and so were always in fear and took everything suspiciously.
54.
Indeed, the daring action of Aristogiton and
Harmodius was undertaken in consequence of a love affair, which I shall
relate at some length, to show that the Athenians are not more accurate than
the rest of the world in their accounts of their own tyrants and of the
facts of their own history.
[2]
Pisistratus dying at an advanced age in possession of the tyranny, was
succeeded by his eldest son, Hippias, and not Hipparchus, as is vulgarly
believed.
Harmodius was then in the flower of youthful beauty, and Aristogiton, a
citizen in the middle rank of life, was his lover and possessed him.
[3]
Solicited without success by Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus, Harmodius told
Aristogiton, and the enraged lover, afraid that the powerful Hipparchus
might take Harmodius by force, immediately formed a design, such as his
condition in life permitted, for overthrowing the tyranny.
[4]
In the meantime Hipparchus, after a second solicitation of Harmodius,
attended with no better success, unwilling to use violence, arranged to
insult him in some covert way.
[5]
Indeed, generally their government was not grievous to the multitude, or in
any way odious in practice; and these tyrants cultivated wisdom and virtue as much as any, and without
exacting from the Athenians more than a twentieth of their income,
splendidly adorned their city, and carried on their wars, and provided
sacrifices for the temples.
[6]
For the rest, the city was left in full enjoyment of its existing laws,
except that care was always taken to have the offices in the hands of some
one of the family.
Among those of them that held the yearly archonship at Athens was
Pisistratus, son of the tyrant Hippias, and named after his grandfather, who
dedicated during his term of office the altar to the twelve gods in the
market-place, and that of Apollo in the Pythian precinct.
[7]
The Athenian people afterwards built on to and lengthened the altar in the
market-place, and obliterated the inscription; but that in the Pythian precinct can still be seen, though in faded
letters, and is to the following effect:—“
Pisistratus, the son of Hippias,
Set up this record of his archonship
In precinct of Apollo Pythias.
”
55.
That Hippias was the eldest son and succeeded
to the government, is what I positively assert as a fact upon which I have
had more exact accounts than others, and may be also ascertained by the
following circumstance.
He is the only one of the legitimate brothers that appears to have had
children; as the altar shows, and the pillar placed in the Athenian Acropolis,
commemorating the crime of the tyrants, which mentions no child of Thessalus
or of Hipparchus, but five of Hippias, which he had by Myrrhine, daughter of
Callias, son of Hyperechides; and naturally the eldest would have married first.
[2]
Again, his name comes first on the pillar after that of his father, and
this too is quite natural, as he was the eldest after him, and the reigning
tyrant.
[3]
Nor can I ever believe that Hippias would have obtained the tyranny so
easily, if Hipparchus had been in power when he was killed, and he, Hippias,
had had to establish himself upon the same day; but he had no doubt been long accustomed to over-awe the citizens, and to
be obeyed by his mercenaries, and thus not only conquered, but conquered
with ease, without experiencing any of the embarrassment of a younger
brother unused to the exercise of authority.
[4]
It was the sad fate which made Hipparchus famous that got him also the
credit with posterity of having been tyrant.
56.
To return to Harmodius; Hipparchus having been repulsed in his solicitations insulted him as he had
resolved, by first inviting a sister of his, a young girl, to come and bear
a basket in a certain procession, and then rejecting her, on the plea that
she had never been invited at all owing to her unworthiness.
[2]
If Harmodius was indignant at this, Aristogiton for his sake now became
more exasperated than ever; and having arranged everything with those who were to join them in the
enterprise, they only waited for the great feast of the Panathenaea, the
sole day upon which the citizens forming part of the procession could meet
together in arms without suspicion.
Aristogiton and Harmodius were to begin, but were to be supported
immediately by their accomplices against the bodyguard.
[3]
The conspirators were not many, for better security, besides which they
hoped that those not in the plot would be carried away by the example of a
few daring spirits, and use the arms in their hands to recover their
liberty.
57.
At last the festival arrived; and Hippias with his bodyguard was outside the city in the Ceramicus,
arranging how the different parts of the procession were to proceed.
Harmodius and Aristogiton had already their daggers and were getting ready
to act,
[2]
when seeing one of their accomplices talking familiarly with Hippias, who
was easy of access to every one, they took fright, and concluded that they
were discovered and on the point of being taken;
[3]
and eager if possible to be revenged first upon the man who had wronged
them and for whom they had undertaken all this risk, they rushed, as they
were, within the gates, and meeting with Hipparchus by the Leocorium
recklessly fell upon him at once, infuriated, Aristogiton by love, and
Harmodius by insult, and smote him and slew him.
[4]
Aristogiton escaped the guards at the moment, through the crowd running up,
but was afterwards taken and dispatched in no merciful way: Harmodius was
killed on the spot.
58.
When the news was brought to Hippias in the
Ceramicus, he at once proceeded not to the scene of action, but to the armed
men in the procession, before they, being some distance away, knew anything
of the matter, and composing his features for the occasion, so as not to
betray himself, pointed to a certain spot, and bade them repair thither
without their arms.
[2]
They withdrew accordingly, fancying he had something to say; upon which he told the mercenaries to remove the arms, and there and then
picked out the men he thought guilty and all found with daggers, the shield
and spear being the usual weapons for a procession.
59.
In this way offended love first led Harmodius
and Aristogiton to conspire, and the alarm of the moment to commit the rash
action recounted.
[2]
After this the tyranny pressed harder on the Athenians, and Hippias, now
grown more fearful, put to death many of the citizens, and at the same time
began to turn his eyes abroad for a refuge in case of revolution.
[3]
Thus, although an Athenian, he gave his daughter, Archedice, to a
Lampsacene, Aeantides, son of the tyrant of Lampsacus, seeing that they had
great influence with Darius.
And there is her tomb in Lampsacus with this inscription:—“
Archedice lies buried in this earth,
Hippias her sire, and Athens gave her birth;
Unto her bosom pride was never known,
Though daughter, wife, and sister to the throne.
”
[4]
Hippias, after reigning three years longer over the Athenians was deposed
in the fourth by the Lacedaemonians and the banished Alcmaeonidae, and went
with a safe conduct to Sigeum, and to Aeantides at Lampsacus, and from
thence to King Darius; from whose court he set out twenty years after, in his old age, and came
with the Medes to Marathon.
60.
With these events in their minds, and
recalling everything they knew by hearsay on the subject, the Athenian
people grew difficult of humour and suspicious of the persons charged in the
affair of the mysteries, and persuaded that all that had taken place was
part of an oligarchical and monarchical conspiracy.
[2]
In the state of irritation thus produced, many persons of consideration had
been already thrown into prison, and far from showing any signs of abating,
public feeling grew daily more savage, and more arrests were made; until at last one of those in custody, thought to be the most guilty of
all, was induced by a fellow-prisoner to make a revelation, whether true or
not is a matter on which there are two opinions, no one having been able,
either then or since, to say for certain who did the deed.
[3]
However this may be, the other found arguments to persuade him, that even
if he had not done it, he ought to save himself by gaining a promise of
impunity, and free the state of its present suspicions; as he would be surer of safety if he confessed after promise of impunity
than if he denied and were brought to trial.
[4]
He accordingly made a revelation, affecting himself and others in the
affair of the Hermae; and the Athenian people, glad at last, as they supposed, to get at the
truth, and furious until then at not being able to discover those who had
conspired against the commons, at once let go the informer and all the rest
whom he had not denounced, and bringing the accused to trial executed as
many as were apprehended, and condemned to death such as had fled and set a
price upon their heads.
[5]
In this it was, after all, not clear whether the sufferers had been
punished unjustly, while in any case the rest of the city received immediate
and manifest relief.
61.
To return to Alcibiades: public feeling was
very hostile to him, being worked on by the same enemies who had attacked
him before he went out; and now that the Athenians fancied that they had got at the truth of the
matter of the Hermae, they believed more firmly than ever that the affair of
the mysteries also, in which he was implicated, had been contrived by him in
the same intention and was connected with the plot against the democracy.
[2]
Meanwhile it so happened that, just at the time of this agitation, a small
force of Lacedaemonians had advanced as far as the Isthmus, in pursuance of
some scheme with the Boeotians.
It was now thought that this had come by appointment, at his instigation,
and not on account of the Boeotians, and that if the citizens had not acted
on the information received, and forestalled them by arresting the
prisoners, the city would have been betrayed.
The citizens went so far as to sleep one night armed in the temple of
Theseus within the walls.
[3]
The friends also of Alcibiades at Argos were just at this time suspected of
a design to attack the commons; and the Argive hostages deposited in the islands were given up by the
Athenians to the Argive people to be put to death upon that account:
[4]
in short, everywhere something was found to create suspicion against
Alcibiades.
It was therefore decided to bring him to trial and execute him, and the
Salaminia was sent to Sicily for him and the others named in the
information, with instructions to order him to come and answer the charges
against him,
[5]
but not to arrest him, because they wished to avoid causing any agitation
in the army or among the enemy in Sicily, and above all to retain the
services of the Mantineans and Argives, who, it was thought, had been
induced to join by his influence.
[6]
Alcibiades, with his own ship and his fellow-accused, accordingly sailed
off with the Salaminia from Sicily, as though to return to Athens, and went
with her as far as Thurii, and there they left the ship and disappeared,
being afraid to go home for trial with such a prejudice existing against
them.
[7]
The crew of the Salaminia stayed some time looking for Alcibiades and his
companions, and at length, as they were nowhere to be found, set sail and
departed.
Alcibiades, now an outlaw, crossed in a boat not long after from Thurii to
Peloponnese; and the Athenians passed sentence of death by default upon him and those in
his company.
62.
The Athenian generals left in Sicily now
divided the armament into two parts, and each taking one by lot, sailed with
the whole for Selinus and Egesta, wishing to know whether the Egestaeans
would give the money, and to look into the question of Selinus and ascertain
the state of the quarrel between her and Egesta.
[2]
Coasting along Sicily, with the shore on their left, on the side towards
the Tyrrhene Gulf, they touched at Himera, the only Hellenic city in that
part of the island, and being refused admission resumed their voyage.
[3]
On their way they took Hyccara, a petty Sicanian seaport, nevertheless at
war with Egesta, and making slaves of the inhabitants gave up the town to
the Egestaeans, some of whose horse had joined them; after which the army proceeded through the territory of the Sicels until it
reached Catana, while the fleet sailed along the coast with the slaves on
board.
[4]
Meanwhile Nicias sailed straight from Hyccara along the coast and went to
Egesta, and after transacting his other business and receiving thirty
talents, rejoined the forces.
They now sold their slaves for the sum of one hundred and twenty talents,
[5]
and sailed round to their Sicel allies to urge them to send troops; and meanwhile went with half their own force to the hostile town of Hybla
in the territory of Gela, but did not succeed in taking it.
63.
Summer was now over.
The winter following, the Athenians at once began to prepare for moving on
Syracuse, and the Syracusans on their side for marching against them.
[2]
From the moment when the Athenians failed to attack them instantly as they
at first feared and expected, every day that passed did something to revive
their courage; and when they saw them sailing far away from them on the other side of
Sicily, and going to Hybla only to fail in their attempts to storm it, they
thought less of them than ever, and called upon their generals, as the
multitude is apt to do in its moments of confidence, to lead them to Catana,
since the enemy would not come to them.
[3]
Parties also of the Syracusan horse employed in reconnoitring constantly
rode up to the Athenian armament, and among other insults asked them whether
they had not really come to settle with the Syracusans in a foreign country
rather than to resettle the Leontines in their own.
64.
Aware of this, the Athenian generals
determined to draw them out in mass as far as possible from the city, and
themselves in the meantime to sail by night along shore, and take up at
their leisure a convenient position.
This they knew they could not so well do, if they had to disembark from
their ships in front of a force prepared for them, or to go by land openly.
The numerous cavalry of the Syracusans (a force which they were
themselves without), would then be able to do the greatest mischief
to their light troops and the crowd that followed them; but this plan would enable them to take up a position in which the horse
could do them no hurt worth speaking of, some Syracusan exiles with the army
having told them of the spot near the Olympieum, which they afterwards
occupied.
In pursuance of their idea, the generals imagined the following stratagem.
[2]
They sent to Syracuse a man devoted to them, and by the Syracusan generals
thought to be no less in their interest; he was a native of Catana, and said he came from persons in that place,
whose names the Syracusan generals were acquainted with, and whom they knew
to be among the members of their party still left in the city.
[3]
He told them that the Athenians passed the night in the town, at some
distance from their arms, and that if the Syracusans would name a day and
come with all their people at daybreak to attack the armament, they, their
friends, would close the gates upon the troops in the city, and set fire to
the vessels, while the Syracusans would easily take the camp by an attack
upon the stockade.
In this they would be aided by many of the Catanians, who were already
prepared to act, and from whom he himself came.
65.
The generals of the Syracusans, who did not
want confidence, and who had intended even without this to march on Catana,
believed the man without any sufficient inquiry, fixed at once a day upon
which they would be there, and dismissed him, and the Selinuntines and
others of their allies having now arrived, gave orders for all the
Syracusans to march out in mass.
Their preparations completed, and the time fixed for their arrival being at
hand, they set out for Catana, and passed the night upon the river
Symaethus, in the Leontine territory.
[2]
Meanwhile the Athenians no sooner knew of their approach than they took all
their forces and such of the Sicels or others as had joined them, put them
on board their ships and boats, and sailed by night to Syracuse.
[3]
Thus, when morning broke the Athenians were landing opposite the Olympieum
ready to seize their camping ground, and the Syracusan horse having ridden
up first to Catana and found that all the armament had put to sea, turned
back and told the infantry, and then all turned back together, and went to
the relief of the city.
66.
In the meantime, as the march before the
Syracusans was a long one, the Athenians quietly sate down their army in a
convenient position, where they could begin an engagement when they pleased,
and where the Syracusan cavalry would have least opportunity of annoying
them, either before or during the action, being fenced off on one side by
walls, houses, trees, and by a marsh, and on the other by cliffs.
[2]
They also felled the neighbouring trees and carried them down to the sea,
and formed a palisade alongside of their ships, and with stones which they
picked up and wood hastily raised a fort at Daskon, the most vulnerable
point of their position, and broke down the bridge over the Anapus.
[3]
These preparations were allowed to go on without any interruption from the
city, the first hostile force to appear being the Syracusan cavalry,
followed afterwards by all the foot together.
At first they came close up to the Athenian army, and then, finding that
they did not offer to engage, crossed the Helorine road and encamped for the
night.
67.
The next day the Athenians and their allies
prepared for battle, their dispositions being as follows:—Their
right wing was occupied by the Argives and Mantineans, the centre by the
Athenians, and the rest of the field by the other allies.
Half their army was drawn up eight deep in advance, half close to their
tents in a hollow square, formed also eight deep, which had orders to look
out and be ready to go to the support of the troops hardest pressed.
The camp followers were placed inside this reserve.
[2]
The Syracusans, meanwhile, formed their heavy infantry sixteen deep,
consisting of the mass-levy of their own people, and such allies as had
joined them, the strongest contingent being that of the Selinuntines; next to them the cavalry of the Geloans, numbering two hundred in all, with
about twenty horse and fifty archers from Camarina.
The cavalry was posted on their right, full twelve hundred strong, and next
to it the darters.
[3]
As the Athenians were about to begin the attack, Nicias went along the
lines, and addressed these words of encouragement to the army and the
nations composing it:—
68.
‘Soldiers, a long exhortation is
little needed by men like ourselves, who are here to fight in the same
battle, the force itself being, to my thinking, more fit to inspire
confidence than a fine speech with a weak army.
[2]
Where we have Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the first of the
islanders in the ranks together, it were strange indeed, with so many and so
brave companions in arms, if we did not feel confident of victory; especially when we have mass-levies opposed to our picked troops, and what
is more, Siceliots, who may disdain us but will not stand against us, their
skill not being at all commensurate to their rashness.
[3]
You may also remember that we are far from home and have no friendly land
near, except what your own swords shall win you; and here I put before you a motive just the reverse of that which the enemy
are appealing to; their cry being that they shall fight for their country, mine that we shall
fight for a country that is not ours, where we must conquer or hardly get
away, as we shall have their horse upon us in great numbers.
[4]
Remember, therefore, your renown, and go boldly against the enemy, thinking
the present strait and necessity more terrible than they.’
69.
After this address Nicias at once led on the
army.
The Syracusans were not at that moment expecting an immediate engagement,
and some had even gone away to the town, which was close by; these now ran up as hard as they could, and though behind time, took their
places here or there in the main body as fast as they joined it.
Want of zeal or daring was certainly not the fault of the Syracusans,
either in this or the other battles, but although not inferior in courage,
so far as their military science might carry them, when this failed them
they were compelled to give up their resolution also.
On the present occasion, although they had not supposed that the Athenians
would begin the attack, and although constrained to stand upon their defence
at short notice, they at once took up their arms and advanced to meet them.
[2]
First, the stone-throwers, slingers, and archers of either army began
skirmishing, and routed or were routed by one another, as might be expected
between light troops; next, soothsayers brought forward the usual victims, and trumpeters urged
on the heavy infantry to the charge;
[3]
and thus they advanced, the Syracusans to fight for their country, and each
individual for his safety that day and liberty hereafter; in the enemy's army, the Athenians to make another's country theirs and to
save their own from suffering by their defeat; the Argives and independent allies to help them in getting what they came
for, and to earn by victory another sight of the country they had left
behind; while the subject allies owed most of their ardour to the desire of
self-preservation, which they could only hope for if victorious; next to which, as a secondary motive, came the chance of serving on easier
terms, after helping the Athenians to a fresh conquest.
70.
The armies now came to close quarters, and
for a long while fought without either giving ground.
Meanwhile there occurred some claps of thunder with lightning and heavy
rain, which did not fail to add to the fears of the party fighting for the
first time, and very little acquainted with war; while to their more experienced adversaries these phenomena appeared to be
produced by the time of year, and much more alarm was felt at the continued
resistance of the enemy.
[2]
At last the Argives drove in the Syracusan left, and after them the
Athenians routed the troops opposed to them, and the Syracusan army was thus
cut in two and betook itself to flight.
[3]
The Athenians did not pursue far, being held in check by the numerous and
undefeated Syracusan horse, who attacked and drove back any of their heavy
infantry whom they saw pursuing in advance of the rest; in spite of which the victors followed so far as was safe in a body, and
then went back and set up a trophy.
[4]
Meanwhile the Syracusans rallied at the Helorine road, where they reformed
as well as they could under the circumstances, and even sent a garrison of
their own citizens to the Olympieum, fearing that the Athenians might lay
hands on some of the treasures there.
The rest returned to the town.
71.
The Athenians, however did not go to the
temple, but collected their dead and laid them upon a pyre, and passed the
night upon the field.
The next day they gave the enemy back their dead under truce, to the number
of about two hundred and sixty, Syracusans and allies, and gathered together
the bones of their own, some fifty, Athenians and allies, and taking the
spoils of the enemy, sailed back to Catana.
[2]
It was now winter; and it did not seem possible for the moment to carry on the war before
Syracuse, until horse should have been sent for from Athens and levied among
the allies in Sicily—to do away with their utter inferiority in
cavalry—and money should have been collected in the country and
received from Athens, and until some of the cities, which they hoped would
be now more disposed to listen to them after the battle, should have been
brought over, and corn and all other necessaries provided, for a campaign in
the spring against Syracuse.
72.
With this intention they sailed off to Naxos
and Catana for the winter.
Meanwhile the Syracusans burned their dead, and then held an assembly,
[2]
in which Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a man who with a general ability of
the first order had given proofs of military capacity and brilliant courage
in the war, came forward and encouraged them, and told them not to let what
had occurred make them give way,
[3]
since their spirit had not been conquered, but their want of discipline had
done the mischief.
Still they had not been beaten by so much as might have been expected,
especially as they were, one might say, novices in the art of war, an army
of artisans opposed to the most practised soldiers in Hellas.
[4]
What had also done great mischief was the number of the generals
(there were fifteen of them) and the quantity of orders given, combined with the disorder and
insubordination of the troops.
But if they were to have a few skilful generals, and used this winter in
preparing their heavy infantry, finding arms for such as had not got any, so
as to make them as numerous as possible, and forcing them to attend to their
training generally, they would have every chance of beating their
adversaries, courage being already theirs and discipline in the field having
thus been added to it.
Indeed, both these qualities would improve, since danger would exercise
them in discipline, while their courage would be led to surpass itself by
the confidence which skill inspires.
[5]
The generals should be few and elected with full powers, and an oath should
be taken to leave them entire discretion in their command: if they adopted
this plan, their secrets would be better kept, all preparations would be
properly made, and there would be no room for excuses.
73.
The Syracusans heard him, and voted
everything as he advised, and elected three generals, Hermocrates himself,
Heraclides, son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus, son of Execestes.
[2]
They also sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon to procure a force of
allies to join them, and to induce the Lacedaemonians for their sakes openly
to address themselves in real earnest to the war against the Athenians, that
they might either have to leave Sicily or be less able to send
reinforcements to their army there.
74.
The Athenian forces at Catana now at once
sailed against Messina, in the expectation of its being betrayed to them.
The intrigue, however, after all came to nothing: Alcibiades, who was in
the secret, when he left his command upon the summons from home, foreseeing
that he would be outlawed, gave information of the plot to the friends of
the Syracusans in Messina, who had at once put to death its authors, and now
rose in arms against the opposite faction with those of their way of
thinking, and succeeded in preventing the admission of the Athenians.
[2]
The latter waited for thirteen days, and then, as they were exposed to the
weather and without provisions, and met with no success, went back to Naxos,
where they made places for their ships to lie in, erected a palisade round
their camp, and retired into winter quarters; meanwhile they sent a galley to Athens for money and cavalry to join them
in the spring.
75.
During the winter the Syracusans built a wall on to the city, so as to take
in the statue of Apollo Temenites, all along the side looking towards
Epipolae, to make the task of circumvallation longer and more difficult, in
case of their being defeated, and also erected a fort at Megara and another
in the Olympieum, and stuck palisades along the sea wherever there was a
landing place.
[2]
Meanwhile, as they knew that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they
marched with all their people to Catana, and ravaged the land and set fire
to the tents and encampment of the Athenians, and so returned home.
[3]
Learning also that the Athenians were sending an embassy to Camarina, on
the strength of the alliance concluded in the time of Laches, to gain, if
possible, that city, they sent another from Syracuse to oppose them.
They had a shrewd suspicion that the Camarinaeans had not sent what they
did send for the first battle very willingly; and they now feared that would refuse to assist them at all in future,
after seeing the success of the Athenians in the action, and would join the
latter on the strength of their old friendship.
[4]
Hermocrates, with some others, accordingly arrived at Camarina from
Syracuse, and Euphemus and others from the Athenians; and an assembly of the Camarinaeans having been convened, Hermocrates spoke
as follows, in the hope of prejudicing them against the
Athenians:—
76.
‘Camarinaeans, we did not come on
this embassy because we were afraid of your being frightened by the actual
forces of the Athenians, but rather of your being gained by what they would
say to you before you heard anything from us.
[2]
They are come to Sicily with the pretext that you know, and the intention
which we all suspect, in my opinion less to restore the Leontines to their
homes than to oust us from ours; as it is out of all reason that they should restore in Sicily the cities
that they lay waste in Hellas, or should cherish the Leontine Chalcidians
because of their Ionian blood, and keep in servitude the Euboean
Chalcidians, of whom the Leontines are a colony.
[3]
No; but the same policy which has proved so successful in Hellas is now being
tried in Sicily.
After being chosen as the leaders of the Ionians and of the other allies of
Athenian origin, to punish the Mede, the Athenians accused some of failure
in military service, some of fighting against each other, and others, as the
case might be, upon any colourable pretext that could be found, until they
thus subdued them all.
[4]
In fine, in the struggle against the Medes, the Athenians did not fight for
the liberty of the Hellenes, or the Hellenes for their own liberty, but the
former to make their countrymen serve them instead of him, the latter to
change one master for another, wiser indeed than the first, but wiser for
evil.
77.
But we are not now come to declare to an
audience familiar with them the misdeeds of a state so open to accusation as
is the Athenian, but much rather to blame ourselves, who, with the warnings
we possess in the Hellenes in those parts that have been enslaved through
not supporting each other, and seeing the same sophisms being now tried upon
ourselves—such as restorations of Leontine kinsfolk and support of
Egestaean allies—do not stand together and resolutely show them
that here are no Ionians, or Hellespontines, or islanders, who change
continually, but always serve a master, sometimes the Mede and sometimes
some other, but free Dorians from independent Peloponnese, dwelling in
Sicily.
[2]
Or, are we waiting until we be taken in detail, one city after another; knowing as we do that in no other way can we be conquered, and seeing that
they turn to this plan, so as to divide some of us by words, to draw some by
the bait of an alliance into open war with each other, and to ruin others by
such flattery as different circumstances may render acceptable?
And do we fancy when destruction first overtakes a distant
fellow-countryman that the danger will not come to each of us also, or that
he who suffers before us will suffer in himself alone?
78.
As for the Camarinaean, who says that it is
the Syracusan, not he, that is the enemy of the Athenian, and who thinks it
hard to have to encounter risk in behalf of my country, I would have him
bear in mind that he will fight in my country, not more for mine than for
his own, and by so much the more safely in that he will enter on the
struggle not alone, after the way has been cleared by my ruin, but with me
as his ally; and that the object of the Athenian is not so much to punish the enmity of
the Syracusan as to use me as a blind to secure the friendship of the
Camarinaean.
[2]
As for him who envies or even fears us (and envied and feared
great powers must always be), and who on this account wishes
Syracuse to be humbled to teach us a lesson, but would still have her
survive in the interest of his own security, the wish that he indulges is
not humanly possible.
A man can control his own desires, but he cannot likewise control
circumstances.
[3]
And in the event of his calculations proving mistaken, he may live to
bewail his own misfortune, and wish to be again envying my prosperity.An
idle wish, if he now sacrifice us and refuse to take his share of perils
which are the same, in reality though not in name, for him as for us; what is nominally the preservation of our power being really his own
salvation.
[4]
It was to be expected that you, of all people in the world, Camarinaeans,
being our immediate neighbours and the next in danger, would have foreseen
this, and instead of supporting us in the lukewarm way that you are now
doing, would rather come to us of your own accord, and be now offering at
Syracuse the aid which you would have asked for at Camarina, if to Camarina
the Athenians had first come, to encourage us to resist the invader.
Neither you, however, nor the rest have as yet bestirred yourselves in this
direction.
79.
Fear perhaps will make you study to do right both by us and by the
invaders, and plead that you have an alliance with the Athenians.
But you made that alliance, not against your friends, but against the
enemies that might attack you, and to help the Athenians when they were
wronged by others, not when as now they are wronging their neighbours.
[2]
Even the Rhegians, Chalcidians though they be, refuse to help to restore
the Chalcidian Leontines; and it would be strange if, while they suspect the gist of this fine
pretence and are wise without reason, you, with every reason on your side,
should yet choose to assist your natural enemies, and should join with their
direst foes in undoing those whom nature has made your own kinsfolk.
[3]
This is not to do right; but you should help us without fear of their armament, which has no terrors
if we hold together, but only if we let them succeed in their endeavours to
separate us; since even after attacking us by ourselves and being victorious in battle,
they had to go off without effecting their purpose.
80.
United, therefore, we have no cause to
despair, but rather new encouragement to league together; especially as succors will come to us from the Peloponnesians, in military
matters the undoubted superiors of the Athenians.
And you need not think that your prudent policy of taking sides with
neither, because allies of both, is either safe for you or fair to us.
[2]
Practically it is not as fair as it pretends to be.
If the vanquished be defeated, and the victor conquer, through your
refusing to join, what is the effect of your abstention but to leave the
former to perish unaided, and to allow the latter to offend unhindered?
And yet it were more honourable to join those who are not only the injured
party, but your own kindred, and by so doing to defend the common interests
of Sicily and save your friends the Athenians from doing wrong.
[3]
In conclusion, we Syracusans say that it is
useless for us to demonstrate either to you or to the rest what you know
already as well as we do; but we entreat, and if our entreaty fail, we protest that we are menaced by
our eternal enemies the Ionians, and are betrayed by you our fellow Dorians.
[4]
If the Athenians reduce us, they will owe their victory to your decision,
but in their own name will reap the honour, and will receive as the prize of
their triumph the very men who enabled them to gain it.
On the other hand, if we are the conquerors, you will have to pay for
having been the cause of our danger.
[5]
Consider, therefore; and now make your choice between the security which present servitude
offers and the prospect of conquering with us and so escaping disgraceful
submission to an Athenian master and avoiding the lasting enmity of
Syracuse.’
81.
Such were the words of Hermocrates; after whom Euphemus, the Athenian ambassador, spoke as
follows:—
82.
‘Although we came here only to
renew the former alliance, the attack of the Syracusans compels us to speak
of our empire and of the good right we have to it.
[2]
The best proof of this the speaker himself furnished, when he called the
Ionians eternal enemies of the Dorians.
It is the fact; and the Peloponnesian Dorians being our superiors in numbers and next
neighbours, we Ionians looked out for the best means of escaping their
domination.
[3]
After the Median war we had a fleet, and so got rid of the empire and
supremacy of the Lacedaemonians, who had no right to give orders to us more
than we to them, except that of being the strongest at that moment; and being appointed leaders of the king's former subjects, we continue to
be so, thinking that we are least likely to fall under the dominion of the
Peloponnesians, if we have a force to defend ourselves with, and in strict
truth having done nothing unfair in reducing to subjection the Ionians and
islanders, the kinsfolk whom the Syracusans say we have enslaved.
[4]
They, our kinsfolk, came against their mother country, that is to say
against us, together with the Mede, and instead of having the courage to
revolt and sacrifice their property as we did when we abandoned our city,
chose to be slaves themselves, and to try to make us so.
83.
We, therefore, deserve to rule because we
placed the largest fleet and an unflinching patriotism at the service of the
Hellenes, and because these, our subjects, did us mischief by their ready
subservience to the Medes; and, desert apart, we seek to strengthen ourselves against the
Peloponnesians.
[2]
We make no fine professions of having a right to rule because we overthrew
the barbarian single-handed, or because we risked what we did risk for the
freedom of the subjects in question any more than for that of all, and for
our own: no one can be quarrelled with for providing for his proper safety.
If we are now here in Sicily, it is equally in the interest of our
security, with which we perceive that your interest also coincides.
[3]
We prove this from the conduct which the Syracusans cast against us and
which you somewhat too timorously suspect; knowing that those whom fear has made suspicious, may be carried away by
the charm of eloquence for the moment, but when they come to act follow
their interests.
[4]
Now, as we have said, fear makes us hold our
empire in Hellas, and fear makes us now come, with the help of our friends,
to order safely matters in Sicily, and not to enslave any but rather to
prevent any from being enslaved.
84.
Meanwhile, let no one imagine that we are interesting ourselves in you
without your having anything to do with us, seeing that if you are preserved
and able to make head against the Syracusans, they will be less likely to
harm us by sending troops to the Peloponnesians.
[2]
In this way you have everything to do with us, and on this account it is
perfectly reasonable for us to restore the Leontines, and to make them, not
subjects like their kinsmen in Euboea, but as powerful as possible, to help
us by annoying the Syracusans from their frontier.
[3]
In Hellas we are alone a match for our enemies; and as for the assertion that it is out of all reason that we should free
the Sicilian, while we enslave the Chalcidian, the fact is that the latter
is useful to us by being without arms and contributing money only; while the former, the Leontines and our other friends, cannot be too
independent.
85.
Besides, for tyrants and imperial cities
nothing is unreasonable if expedient, no one a kinsman unless sure; but friendship or enmity is everywhere an affair of time and circumstance.
Here, in Sicily, our interest is not to weaken our friends, but by means of
their strength to cripple our enemies.
Why doubt this?
In Hellas we treat our allies as we find them useful.
[2]
The Chians and Methymnians govern themselves and furnish ships; most of the rest have harder terms and pay tribute in money; while others, although islanders and easy for us to take, are free
altogether, because they occupy convenient positions round Peloponnese.
[3]
In our settlement of the states here in Sicily, we should, therefore,
naturally be guided by our interest, and by fear, as we say, of the
Syracusans.
Their ambition is to rule you, their object to use the suspicions that we
excite to unite you, and then, when we have gone away without effecting
anything, by force or through your isolation, to become the masters of
Sicily.
And masters they must become, if you unite with them; as a force of that magnitude would be no longer easy for us to deal with
united, and they would be more than a match for you as soon as we were away.
86.
Any other view of the case is condemned by
the facts.
When you first asked us over, the fear which you held out was that of
danger to Athens if we let you come under the dominion of Syracuse;
[2]
and it is not right now to mistrust the very same argument by which you
claimed to convince us, or to give way to suspicion because we are come with
a larger force against the power of that city.
Those whom you should really distrust are the Syracusans.
[3]
We are not able to stay here without you, and if we proved perfidious
enough to bring you into subjection, we should be unable to keep you in
bondage, owing to the length of the voyage and the difficulty of guarding
large, and in a military sense continental, towns: they, the Syracusans,
live close to you, not in a camp, but in a city greater than the force we
have with us, plot always against you, never let slip an opportunity once
offered,
[4]
as they have shown in the case of the Leontines and others, and now have
the face, just as if you were fools, to invite you to aid them against the
power that hinders this, and that has thus far maintained Sicily
independent.
[5]
We, as against them, invite you to a much more real safety, when we beg you
not to betray that common safety which we each have in the other, and to
reflect that they, even without allies, will, by their numbers, have always
the way open to you, while you will not often have the opportunity of
defending yourselves with such numerous auxiliaries; if, through your suspicions, you once let these go away unsuccessful or
defeated, you will wish to see if only a handful of them back again, when
the day is past in which their presence could do anything for you.
87.
But we hope, Camarinaeans, that the calumnies
of the Syracusans will not be allowed to succeed either with you or with the
rest: we have told you the whole truth upon the things we are suspected of,
and will now briefly recapitulate, in the hope of convincing you.
[2]
We assert that we are rulers in Hellas in order not to be subjects; liberators in Sicily that we may not be harmed by the Sicilians; that we are compelled to interfere in many things, because we have many
things to guard against; and that now, as before, we are come as allies to those of you who suffer
wrong in this island, not without invitation but upon invitation.
[3]
Accordingly, instead of making yourselves judges or censors of our conduct,
and trying to turn us, which it were now difficult to do, so far as there is
anything in our interfering policy or in our character, that chimes in with
your interest, this take and make use of; and be sure that far from being injurious to all alike, to most of the
Hellenes that policy is even beneficial.
[4]
Thanks to it, all men in all places, even where we are not, who either
apprehend or meditate aggression, from the near prospect before them, in the
one case, of obtaining our intervention in their favour, in the other, of
our arrival making the venture dangerous, find themselves constrained,
respectively, to be moderate against their will, and to be preserved without
trouble of their own.
[5]
Do not you reject this security that is open to all who desire it, and is
now offered to you; but do like others, and instead of being always on the defensive against
the Syracusans, unite with us, and in your turn at last threaten
them.’
88.
Such were the words of Euphemus.
What the Camarinaeans felt was this.
Sympathising with the Athenians, except in so far as they might be afraid
of their subjugating Sicily, they had always been at enmity with their
neighbour Syracuse.
From the very fact, however, that they were their neighbours, they feared
the Syracusans most of the two, and being apprehensive of their conquering
even without them, both sent them in the first instance the few horsemen
mentioned, and for the future determined to support them most in fact,
although as sparingly as possible; but for the moment in order not to seem to slight the Athenians, especially
as they had been successful in the engagement, to answer both alike.
[2]
Agreeably to this resolution they answered that as both the contending
parties happened to be allies of theirs, they thought it most consistent
with their oaths, at present, to side with neither; with which answer the ambassadors of either party departed.
[3]
In the meantime, while Syracuse pursued her
preparations for war, the Athenians were encamped at Naxos, and tried by
negotiation to gain as many of the Sicels as possible.
[4]
Those more in the low lands, and subjects of Syracuse, mostly held aloof; but the peoples of the interior who had never been otherwise than
independent, with few exceptions, at once joined the Athenians, and brought
down corn to the army, and in some cases even money.
[5]
The Athenians marched against those who refused to join, and forced some of
them to do so; in the case of others they were stopped by the Syracusans sending garrisons
and reinforcements.
Meanwhile the Athenians moved their winter quarters from Naxos to Catana,
and reconstructed the camp burnt by the Syracusans, and stayed there the
rest of the winter.
[6]
They also sent a galley to Carthage, with proffers of friendship, on the
chance of obtaining assistance, and another to Tyrrhenia; some of the cities there having spontaneously offered to join them in the
war.
They also sent round to the Sicels and to Egesta, desiring them to send
them as many horses as possible, and meanwhile prepared bricks, iron, and
all other things necessary for the work of circumvallation, intending by the
spring to begin hostilities.
[7]
In the meantime the Syracusan envoys
despatched to Corinth and Lacedaemon tried as they passed along the coast to
persuade the Italiots to interfere with the proceedings of the Athenians,
which threatened Italy quite as much as Syracuse, and having arrived at
Corinth made a speech calling on the Corinthians to assist them on the
ground of their common origin.
[8]
The Corinthians voted at once to aid them heart and soul themselves, and
then sent on envoys with them to Lacedaemon, to help them to persuade her
also to prosecute the war with the Athenians more openly at home and to send
succors to Sicily.
[9]
The envoys from Corinth having reached Lacedaemon found there Alcibiades
with his fellow-refugees, who had at once crossed over in a trading vessel
from Thurii, first to Cyllene in Elis, and afterwards from thence to
Lacedaemon; upon the Lacedaemonians' own invitation, after first obtaining a safe
conduct, as he feared them for the part he had taken in the affair of
Mantinea.
[10]
The result was that the Corinthians, Syracusans, and Alcibiades, pressing
all the same request in the assembly of the Lacedaemonians, succeeded in
persuading them; but as the Ephors and the authorities, although resolved to send envoys to
Syracuse to prevent their surrendering to the Athenians, showed no
disposition to send them any assistance, Alcibiades now came forward and
inflamed and stirred the Lacedaemonians by speaking as
follows:—
89.
‘I am forced first to speak to you
of the prejudice with which I am regarded, in order that suspicion may not
make you disinclined to listen to me upon public matters.
[2]
The connection with you as your Proxeni, which the ancestors of our family
by reason of some discontent renounced, I personally tried to renew by my
good offices towards you, in particular upon the occasion of the disaster at
Pylos.
But although I maintained this friendly attitude, you yet chose to
negotiate the peace with the Athenians through my enemies, and thus to
strengthen them and to discredit me.
[3]
You had therefore no right to complain if I turned to the Mantineans and
Argives, and seized other occasions of thwarting and injuring you; and the time has now come when those among you, who in the bitterness of
the moment may have been then unfairly angry with me, should look at the
matter in its true light, and take a different view.
Those again who judged me unfavourably, because I leaned rather to the side
of the commons, must not think that their dislike is any better founded.
[4]
We have always been hostile to tyrants, and all who oppose arbitrary power
are called commons; hence we continued to act as leaders of the multitude; besides which, as democracy was the government of the city, it was
necessary in most things to conform to established conditions.
[5]
However, we endeavoured to be more moderate than the licentious temper of
the times; and while there were others, formerly as now, who tried to lead the
multitude astray, the same who banished me,
[6]
our party was that of the whole people, our creed being to do our part in
preserving the form of government under which the city enjoyed the utmost
greatness and freedom, and which we had found existing.
As for democracy, the men of sense among us knew what it was, and I perhaps
as well as any, as I have the more cause to complain of it; but there is nothing new to be said of a patent
absurdity—meanwhile we did not think it safe to alter it under the
pressure of your hostility.
90.
So much then for the prejudices with which I
am regarded: I now can call your attention to the questions you must
consider, and upon which superior knowledge perhaps permits me to speak.
[2]
We sailed to Sicily first to conquer, if possible, the Siceliots, and after
them the Italiots also, and finally to assail the empire and city of
Carthage.
[3]
In the event of all or most of these schemes succeeding, we were then to
attack Peloponnese, bringing with us the entire force of the Hellenes lately
acquired in those parts, and taking a number of barbarians into our pay,
such as the Iberians and others in those countries, confessedly the most
warlike known, and building numerous galleys in addition to those which we
had already, timber being plentiful in Italy; and with this fleet blockading Peloponnese from the sea and assailing it
with our armies by land, taking some of the cities by storm, drawing works
of circumvallation round others, we hoped without difficulty to effect its
reduction, and after this to rule the whole of the Hellenic name.
[4]
Money and corn meanwhile for the better execution of these plans were to be
supplied in sufficient quantities by the newly acquired places in those
countries, independently of our revenues here at home.
91.
You have thus heard the history of the
present expedition from the man who most exactly knows what our objects
were; and the remaining generals will, if they can, carry these out just the
same.
But that the states in Sicily must succumb if you do not help them, I will
now show.
[2]
Although the Siceliots, with all their inexperience, might even now be
saved if their forces were united, the Syracusans alone, beaten already in
one battle with all their people and blockaded from the sea, will be unable
to withstand the Athenian armament that is now there.
[3]
But if Syracuse falls, all Sicily falls also, and Italy immediately
afterwards; and the danger which I just now spoke of from that quarter will before long
be upon you.
[4]
None need therefore fancy that Sicily only is in question; Peloponnese will be so also, unless you speedily do as I tell you, and send
on board ship to Syracuse troops that shall be able to row their ships
themselves, and serve as heavy infantry the moment that they land; and what I consider even more important than the troops, a Spartan as
commanding officer to discipline the forces already on foot and to compel
recusants to serve.
The friends that you have already will thus become more confident, and the
waverers will be encouraged to join you.
[5]
Meanwhile you must carry on the war here more openly, that the Syracusans
seeing that you do not forget them, may put heart into their resistance, and
that the Athenians may be less able to reinforce their armament.
[6]
You must fortify Decelea in Attica, the blow of which the Athenians are
always most afraid and the only one that they think they have not
experienced in the present war; the surest method of harming an enemy being to find out what he most fears,
and to choose this means of attacking him, since every one naturally knows
best his own weak points and fears accordingly.
[7]
The fortification in question, while it benefits you, will create
difficulties for your adversaries, of which I shall pass over many, and
shall only mention the chief.
Whatever property there is in the country will most of it become yours,
either by capture or surrender; and the Athenians will at once be deprived of their revenues from the
silver mines at Laurium, of their present gains from their land and from the
law courts, and above all of the revenue from their allies, which will be
paid less regularly, as they lose their awe of Athens, and see you
addressing yourselves with vigour to the war.
92.
The zeal and speed with which all this shall be done depends,
Lacedaemonians, upon yourselves; as to its possibility, I am quite confident, and I have little fear of
being mistaken.
[2]
Meanwhile I hope that none of you will think
any the worse of me if after having hitherto passed as a lover of my
country, I now actively join its worst enemies in attacking it, or will
suspect what I say as the fruit of an outlaw's enthusiasm.
[3]
I am an outlaw from the iniquity of those who drove me forth, not, if you
will be guided by me, from your service: my worst enemies are not you who
only harmed your foes, but they who forced their friends to become enemies;
[4]
and love of country is what I do not feel when I am wronged, but what I
felt when secure in my rights as a citizen.
Indeed I do not consider that I am now attacking a country that is still
mine; I am rather trying to recover one that is mine no longer; and the true lover of his country is not he who consents to lose it
unjustly rather than attack it, but he who longs for it so much that he will
go all lengths to recover it.
[5]
For myself, therefore, Lacedaemonians, I beg you to use me without scruple
for danger and trouble of every kind, and to remember the argument in every
one's mouth, that if I did you great harm as an enemy, I could likewise do
you good service as a friend, inasmuch as I know the plans of the Athenians,
while I only guessed yours.
For yourselves I entreat you to believe that your most capital interests
are now under deliberation; and I urge you to send without hesitation the expeditions to Sicily and
Attica; by the presence of a small part of your forces you will save important
cities in that island, and you will destroy the power of Athens both present
and prospective; after this you will dwell in security and enjoy the supremacy over all
Hellas, resting not on force but upon consent and
affection.’
93.
Such were the words of Alcibiades.
The Lacedaemonians, who had themselves before intended to march against
Athens, but were still waiting and looking about them, at once became much
more in earnest when they received this particular information from
Alcibiades, and considered that they had heard it from the man who best knew
the truth of the matter.
[2]
Accordingly they now turned their attention to the fortifying of Decelea
and sending immediate aid to the Sicilians; and naming Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, to the command of the Syracusans,
bade him consult with that people and with the Corinthians and arrange for
succors reaching the island, in the best and speediest way possible under
the circumstances.
[3]
Gylippus desired the Corinthians to send him at once two ships to Asine,
and to prepare the rest that they intended to send, and to have them ready
to sail at the proper time.
Having settled this, the envoys departed from Lacedaemon.
[4]
In the meantime arrived the Athenian galley
from Sicily sent by the generals for money and cavalry; and the Athenians, after hearing what they wanted, voted to send the
supplies for the armament and the cavalry.
And the winter ended, and with it ended the seventeenth year of the present
war of which Thucydides is the historian.
94.
The next summer, at the very beginning of the
season, the Athenians in Sicily put out from Catana, and sailed along shore
to Megara in Sicily, from which, as I have mentioned above, the Syracusans
expelled the inhabitants in the time of their tyrant Gelo, themselves
occupying the territory.
[2]
Here the Athenians landed and laid waste the country, and after an
unsuccessful attack upon a fort of the Syracusans, went on with the fleet
and army to the river Terias, and advancing inland laid waste the plain and
set fire to the corn; and after killing some of a small Syracusan party which they encountered,
and setting up a trophy, went back again to their ships.
[3]
They now sailed to Catana and took in provisions there, and going with
their whole force against Centoripa, a town of the Sicels, acquired it by
capitulation, and departed, after also burning the corn of the Inessaens and
Hybleans.
[4]
Upon their return to Catana they found the horsemen arrived from Athens, to
the number of two hundred and fifty (with their equipments, but
without their horses which were to be procured upon the spot), and
thirty mounted archers and three hundred talents of silver.
95.
The same spring the Lacedaemonians marched
against Argos, and went as far as Cleonae, when an earthquake occurred and
caused them to return.
After this the Argives invaded the Thyreatid, which is on their border, and
took much booty from the Lacedaemonians, which was sold for no less than
twenty-five talents.
[2]
The same summer, not long after, the Thespian commons made an attack upon
the party in office, which was not successful, but succors arrived from
Thebes, and some were caught, while others took refuge at Athens.
96.
The same summer the Syracusans learned that
the Athenians had been joined by their cavalry, and were on the point of
marching against them; and seeing that without becoming masters of Epipolae, a precipitous spot
situated exactly over the town, the Athenians could not, even if victorious
in battle, easily invest them, they determined to guard its approaches, in
order that the enemy might not ascend unobserved by this, the sole way by
which ascent was possible,
[2]
as the remainder is lofty ground, and falls right down to the city, and can
all be seen from inside; and as it lies above the rest the place is called by the Syracusans
Epipolae or Overtown.
[3]
They accordingly went out in mass at daybreak into the meadow along the
river Anapus, their new generals, Hermocrates and his colleagues, having
just come into office, and held a review of their heavy infantry, from whom
they first selected a picked body of six hundred, under the command of
Diomilus, an exile from Andros, to guard Epipolae, and to be ready to muster
at a moment's notice to help wherever help should be required.
97.
Meanwhile the Athenians, the very same
morning, were holding a review, having already made land unobserved with all
the armament from Catana, opposite a place called Leon, not much more than
half a mile from Epipolae, where they disembarked their army, bringing the
fleet to anchor at Thapsus, a peninsula running out into the sea, with a
narrow isthmus, and not far from the city of Syracuse either by land or
water.
[2]
While the naval force of the Athenians threw a stockade across the isthmus
and remained quiet at Thapsus, the land army immediately went on at a run to
Epipolae, and succeeded in getting up by Euryelus before the Syracusans
perceived them, or could come up from the meadow and the review.
[3]
Diomilus with his six hundred and the rest advanced as quickly as they
could, but they had nearly three miles to go from the meadow before reaching
them.
[4]
Attacking in this way in considerable disorder, the Syracusans were
defeated in battle at Epipolae and retired to the town, with a loss of about
three hundred killed, and Diomilus among the number.
[5]
After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the Syracusans
their dead under truce, and next day descended to Syracuse itself; and no one coming out to meet them, reascended and built a fort at
Labdalum, upon the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae, looking towards Megara,
to serve as a magazine for their baggage and money, whenever they advanced
to give battle or to work at the lines.
98.
Not long afterwards three hundred cavalry
came to them from Egesta, and about a hundred from the Sicels, Naxians, and
others; and thus, with the two hundred and fifty from Athens, for whom they had got
horses from the Egestaeans and Catanians, besides others that they bought,
they now mustered six hundred and fifty cavalry in all.
[2]
After posting a garrison in Labdalum, they advanced to Syca, where they
sate down and quickly built the Circle or centre of their wall of
circumvallation.
The Syracusans, appalled at the rapidity with which the work advanced,
determined to go out against them and give battle and interrupt it;
[3]
and the two armies were already in battle array, when the Syracusan
generals observed that their troops found such difficulty in getting into
line, and were in such disorder, that they led them back into the town,
except part of the cavalry.
These remained and hindered the Athenians from carrying stones or
dispersing to any great distance,
[4]
until a tribe of the Athenian heavy infantry, with all the cavalry, charged
and routed the Syracusan horse with some loss; after which they set up a trophy for the cavalry action.
99.
The next day the Athenians began building the
wall to the north of the Circle, at the same time collecting stone and
timber, which they kept laying down towards Trogilus along the shortest line
for their works from the great harbour to the sea;
[2]
while the Syracusans, guided by their generals, and above all by
Hermocrates, instead of risking any more general engagements, determined to
build a counterwork in the direction in which the Athenians were going to
carry their wall.
If this could be completed in time the enemy's lines would be cut; and meanwhile, if he were to attempt to interrupt them by an attack, they
would send a part of their forces against him, and would secure the
approaches beforehand with their stockade, while the Athenians would have to
leave off working with their whole force in order to attend to them.
[3]
They accordingly sallied forth and began to build, starting from their
city, running a cross wall below the Athenian Circle, cutting down the
olives and erecting wooden towers.
[4]
As the Athenian fleet had not yet sailed round into the great harbour, the
Syracusans still commanded the sea-coast, and the Athenians brought their
provisions by land from Thapsus.
100.
The Syracusans now thought the stockades and
stonework of their counter-wall sufficiently far advanced; and as the Athenians, afraid of being divided and so fighting at a
disadvantage, and intent upon their own wall, did not come out to interrupt
them, they left one tribe to guard the new work and went back into the city.
Meanwhile the Athenians destroyed their pipes of drinking-water carried
underground into the city; and watching until the rest of the Syracusans were in their tents at
midday, and some even gone away into the city, and those in the stockade
keeping but indifferent guard, appointed three hundred picked men of their
own, and some men picked from the light troops and armed for the purpose, to
run suddenly as fast as they could to the counterwork, while the rest of the
army advanced in two divisions, the one with one of the generals to the city
in case of a sortie, the other with the other general to the stockade by the
postern gate.
[2]
The three hundred attacked and took the stockade, abandoned by its
garrison, who took refuge in the outworks round the statue of Apollo
Temenites.
Here the pursuers burst in with them, and after getting in were beaten out
by the Syracusans, and some few of the Argives and Athenians slain;
[3]
after which the whole army retired, and having demolished the counterwork
and pulled up the stockade, carried away the stakes to their own lines, and
set up a trophy.
101.
The next day the Athenians from the Circle
proceeded to fortify the cliff above the marsh which on this side of
Epipolae looks towards the great harbour; this being also the shortest line for their work to go down across the
plain and the marsh to the harbour.
[2]
Meanwhile the Syracusans marched out and began a second stockade, starting
from the city, across the middle of the marsh, digging a trench alongside to
make it impossible for the Athenians to carry their wall down to the sea.
[3]
As soon as the Athenians had finished their work at the cliff they again
attacked the stockade and ditch of the Syracusans.
Ordering the fleet to sail round from Thapsus into the great harbour of
Syracuse, they descended at about dawn from Epipolae into the plain, and
laying doors and planks over the marsh where it was muddy and firmest,
crossed over on these, and by daybreak took the ditch and the stockade,
except a small portion which they captured afterwards.
[4]
A battle now ensued, in which the Athenians were victorious, the right wing
of the Syracusans flying to the town and the left to the river.
The three hundred picked Athenians, wishing to cut off their passage,
pressed on at a run to the bridge,
[5]
when the alarmed Syracusans, who had with them most of their cavalry,
closed and routed them, hurling them back upon the Athenian right wing, the
first tribe of which was thrown into a panic by the shock.
[6]
Seeing this, Lamachus came to their aid from the Athenian left with a few
archers and with the Argives, and crossing a ditch, was left alone with a
few that had crossed with him, and was killed with five or six of his men.
These the Syracusans managed immediately to snatch up in haste and get
across the river into a place of security, themselves retreating as the rest
of the Athenian army now came up.
102.
Meanwhile those who had at first fled for
refuge to the city, seeing the turn affairs were taking, now rallied from
the town and formed against the Athenians in front of them, sending also a
part of their number to the Circle on Epipolae, which they hoped to take
while denuded of its defenders.
[2]
These took and destroyed the Athenian outwork of a thousand feet, the
Circle itself being saved by Nicias, who happened to have been left in it
through illness, and who now ordered the servants to set fire to the engines
and timber thrown down before the wall; want of men, as he was aware, rendering all other means of escape
impossible.
[3]
This step was justified by the result, the Syracusans not coming any
further on account of the fire, but retreating.
Meanwhile succors were coming up from the Athenians below, who had put to
flight the troops opposed to them; and the fleet also, according to orders, was sailing from Thapsus into the
great harbour.
[4]
Seeing this, the troops on the heights retired in haste, and the whole army
of the Syracusans re-entered the city, thinking that with their present
force they would no longer be able to hinder the wall reaching the sea.
103.
After this the Athenians set up a trophy and
restored to the Syracusans their dead under truce, receiving in return
Lamachus and those who had fallen with him.
The whole of their forces, naval and military, being now with them, they
began from Epipolae and the cliffs and enclosed the Syracusans with a double
wall down to the sea.
[2]
Provisions were now brought in for the armament from all parts of Italy; and many of the Sicels, who had hitherto been looking to see how things
went, came as allies to the Athenians: there also arrived three ships of
fifty oars from Tyrrhenia.
Meanwhile everything else progressed favourably for their hopes.
[3]
The Syracusans began to despair of finding safety in arms, no relief having
reached them from Peloponnese, and were now proposing terms of capitulation
among themselves and to Nicias, who after the death of Lamachus was left
sole commander.
[4]
No decision was come to, but as was natural with men in difficulties and
besieged more straitly than before, there was much discussion with Nicias
and still more in the town.
Their present misfortunes had also made them suspicious of one another; and the blame of their disasters was thrown upon the ill-fortune or
treachery of the generals under whose command they had happened; and these were deposed and others, Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias, elected
in their stead.
104.
Meanwhile the Lacedaemonian, Gylippus, and
the ships from Corinth were now off Leucas, intent upon going with all haste
to the relief of Sicily.
The reports that reached them being of an alarming kind, and all agreeing
in the falsehood that Syracuse was already completely invested, Gylippus
abandoned all hope of Sicily, and wishing to save Italy, rapidly crossed the
Ionian Sea to Tarentum with the Corinthian, Pythen, two Laconian, and two
Corinthian vessels, leaving the Corinthians to follow him after manning, in
addition to their own ten, two Leucadian and two Ambraciot ships.
[2]
From Tarentum Gylippus first went on an embassy to Thurii, and claimed anew
the rights of citizenship which his father had enjoyed; failing to bring over the townspeople, he weighed anchor and coasted along
Italy.
Opposite the Terinaean gulf he was caught by the wind which blows violently
and steadily from the north in that quarter, and was carried out to sea; and after experiencing very rough weather, remade Tarentum, where he hauled
ashore and refitted such of his ships as had suffered most from the tempest.
[3]
Nicias heard of his approach, but, like the Thurians, despised the scanty
number of his ships, and set down piracy as the only probable object of the
voyage, and so took no precautions for the present.
105.
About the same time in this summer, the
Lacedaemonians invaded Argos with their allies, and laid waste most of the
country.
The Athenians went with thirty ships to the relief of the Argives, thus
breaking their treaty with the Lacedaemonians in the most overt manner.
[2]
Up to this time incursions from Pylos, descents on the coasts of the rest
of Peloponnese, instead of on the Laconian, had been the extent of their
cooperation with the Argives and Mantineans; and although the Argives had often begged them to land, if only for a
moment, with their heavy infantry in Laconia, lay waste ever so little of it
with them, and depart, they had always refused to do so.
Now, however, under the command of Pythodorus, Laespodius, and Demaratus,
they landed at Epidaurus, Limera, Prasiae, and other places, and plundered
the country; and thus furnished the Lacedaemonians with a better pretext for hostilities
against Athens.
[3]
After the Athenians had retired from Argos with their fleet, and the
Lacedaemonians also, the Argives made an incursion into the Phliasid, and
returned home after ravaging their land and killing some of the
inhabitants.
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