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  • The estate of Greece, derived from the remotest known antiquity thereof, to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.
  • -- The occasion and pretexts of this war, arising from the controversies of the Athenians with the Corinthians concerning Corcyra and Potidaea. -- The Lacedaemonians, instigated by the confederates, undertake the war; not so much at their instigation, as of envy to the greatness of the Athenian dominion. -- The degrees by which that dominion was acquired. -- The war generally decreed by the confederates at Sparta. -- The demands of the Lacedaemonians. -- The obstinacy of the Athenians, and their answer by the advice of Pericles.

1. Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians as they warred against each other, beginning to write as soon as the war was on foot, with expectation it should prove a great one and most worthy the relation of all that had been before it; conjecturing so much both from this, that they flourished on both sides in all manner of provision, and also because he saw the rest of Greece siding with the one or the other faction, some then presently and some intending so to do. [2] For this was certainly the greatest commotion that ever happened among the Grecians, reaching also to part of the barbarians and, as a man may say, to most nations. [3] For the actions that preceded this and those again that are yet more ancient, though the truth of them through length of time cannot by any means clearly be discovered, yet for any argument that, looking into times far past, I have yet light on to persuade me, I do not think they have been very great, either for matter of war or otherwise.

2. For it is evident that that which now is called Hellas was not of old constantly inhabited; but that at first there were often removals, everyone easily leaving the place of his abode to the violence always of some greater number. [2] For whilst traffic was not, nor mutual intercourse, but with fear, neither by sea nor land, and every man so husbanded the ground as but barely to live upon it without any stock of riches and planted nothing (because it was uncertain when another should invade them and carry all away, especially not having the defence of walls), but made account to be masters, in any place, of such necessary sustenance as might serve them from day to day, they made little difficulty to change their habitations. And for this cause they were of no ability at all, either for greatness of cities or other provision. [3] But the fattest soils were always the most subject to these changes of inhabitants, as that which is now called Thessalia, and Boeotia, and the greatest part of Peloponnesus, except Arcadia, and of the rest of Greece, whatsoever was most fertile. [4] For the goodness of the land increasing the power of some particular men both caused seditions, whereby they were ruined at home, and withal made them more obnoxious to the insidiation of strangers. [5] From hence it is that Attica, from great antiquity for the sterility of the soil free from seditions, hath been inhabited ever by the same people. [6] And it is none of the least evidences of what I have said that Greece, by reason of sundry transplantations, hath not in other parts received the like augmentation. For such as by war or sedition were driven out of other places, the most potent of them, as to a place of stability, retired themselves to Athens; where receiving the freedom of the city, they long since so increased the same in number of people, as, Attica being incapable of them itself, they sent out colonies into Ionia.

3. And to me the imbecility of ancient times is not a little demonstrated also by this [that followeth]. For before the Trojan war nothing appeareth to have been done by Greece in common; [2] nor indeed was it, as I think, called all by that one name of Hellas; nor before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion, was there any such name at all. But Pelasgicum (which was the farthest extended) and the other parts, by regions, received their names from their own inhabitants. But Hellen and his sons being strong in Phthiotis and called in for their aid into other cities, these cities, because of their conversing with them, began more particularly to be called Hellenes; and yet could not that name of a long time after prevail upon them all. This is conjectured principally out of Homer. [3] For though born long after the Trojan war, yet he gives them not anywhere that name in general, nor indeed to any but those that with Achilles came out of Phthiotis and were the first so called; but in his poems he mentioneth Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. Nor doth he likewise use the word barbarians; because the Grecians, as it seemeth unto me, were not yet distinguished by one common name of Hellenes, oppositely answerable unto them. [4] The Grecians then, neither as they had that name in particular by mutual intercourse, nor after, universally so termed, did ever before the Trojan war, for want of strength and correspondence, enter into any action with their forces joined. And to that expedition they came together by the means of navigation, which the most part of Greece had now received.

4. For Minos was the most ancient of all that by report we know to have built a navy. And he made himself master of the now Grecian Sea, and both commanded the isles called Cyclades and also was the first that sent colonies into most of the same, expelling thence the Carians and constituting his own sons there for governors; and also freed the seas of pirates as much as he could, for the better coming in, as is likely, of his own revenue.

5. For the Grecians in old time, and such barbarians as in the continent lived near unto the sea or else inhabited the islands after once they began to cross over one to another in ships, became thieves and went abroad under the conduct of their most puissant men, both to enrich themselves and to fetch in maintenance for the weak, and falling upon towns unfortified and scatteringly inhabited, rifled them and made this the best means of their living, being a matter at that time nowhere in disgrace but rather carrying with it something of glory. [2] This is manifest by some that dwell on the continent, amongst whom, so it be performed nobly, it is still esteemed as an ornament. The same also is proved by some of the ancient poets, who introduce men questioning of such as sail by, on all coasts alike, whether they be thieves or not, as a thing neither scorned by such as were asked nor upbraided by those that were desirous to know. [3] They also robbed one another within the mainland. And much of Greece useth that old custom, as the Locrians called Ozolae, the Acarnanians, and those of the continent in that quarter, unto this day. Moreover, the fashion of wearing iron remaineth yet with the people of that continent from their old trade of thieving.

6. For once they were wont throughout all Greece to go armed because their houses were unfenced and travelling was unsafe, and accustomed themselves, like the barbarians, to the ordinary wearing of their armour. [2] And the nations of Greece that live so yet, do testify that the same manner of life was anciently universal to all the rest. [3] Amongst whom the Athenians were the first that laid by their armour and growing civil, passed into a more tender kind of life. And such of the rich as were anything stepped into years laid away upon the same delicacy, not long after, the fashion of wearing linen coats and golden grasshoppers, which they were wont to bind up in the locks of their hair. From whence also the same fashion, by reason of their affinity, remained a long time in use amongst the ancient Ionians. [4] But the moderate kind of garment, and conformable to the wearing of these times, was first taken up by the Lacedaemonians, amongst whom also, both in other things and especially in the culture of their bodies, the nobility observed the most equality with the commons. [5] The same were also the first that when they were to contend in the Olympic games stripped themselves naked and anointed their bodies with ointment; whereas in ancient times the champions did also in the Olympic games use breeches, nor is it many years since this custom ceased. Also there are to this day amongst the barbarians, especially those of Asia, prizes propounded of fighting with fists and of wrestling, and the combatants about their privy parts wear breeches in the exercise. [6] It may likewise by many other things be demonstrated that the old Greeks used the same form of life that is now in force amongst the barbarians of the present age.

7. As for cities, such as are of late foundation and since the increase of navigation, inasmuch as they have had since more plenty of riches, have been walled about and built upon the shore, and have taken up isthmi [that is to say, necks of land between sea and sea] both for merchandise and for the better strength against confiners. But the old cities, men having been in those times for the most part infested by thieves, are built farther up, as well in the islands as in the continent. For others also that dwelt on the seaside, though not seamen, yet they molested one another with robberies. And even to these times those people are planted up high in the country.

8. But these robberies were the exercise especially of the islanders, namely, the Carians and the Phoenicians. For by them were the greatest part of the islands inhabited, a testimony whereof is this. The Athenians when in this present war they hallowed the isle of Delos and had digged up the sepulchres of the dead found that more than half of them were Carians, known so to be both by the armour buried with them and also by their manner of burial at this day. [2] And when Minos his navy was once afloat, navigators had the sea more free. For he expelled the malefactors out of the islands and in the most of them planted colonies of his own. [3] By which means they who inhabited the sea-coasts, becoming more addicted to riches, grew more constant to their dwellings, of whom some, grown now rich, compassed their towns about with walls. For out of desire of gain, the meaner sort underwent servitude with the mighty; and the mighty with their wealth brought the lesser cities into subjection. [4] And so it came to pass that rising to power they proceeded afterward to the war against Troy.

9. And to me it seemeth that Agamemnon got together that fleet, not so much for that he had with him the suitors of Helen bound thereto by oath to Tindareus as for this, that he exceeded the rest in power. [2] For they that by tradition of their ancestors know the most certainty of the acts of the Peloponnesians say that first Pelops, by the abundance of his wealth which he brought with him out of Asia to men in want, obtained such power amongst them, as, though he were a stranger, yet the country was called after his name; and that this power was also increased by his posterity. For Eurystheus being slain in Attica by the Heracleidae, Atreus, that was his uncle by the mother, and was then abiding with him as an exiled person for fear of his father for the death of Chrysippus, and to whom Eurystheus, when he undertook the expedition, had committed Mycenae and the government thereof, for that he was his kinsman; when as Eurystheus came not back (the Mycenians being willing to it for fear of the Heracleidae, and because he was an able man and made much of the common people), obtained the kingdom of Mycenae, and of whatsoever else was under Eurystheus, for himself; [3] and the power of the Pelopides became greater than that of the Perseides. To which greatness Agamemnon succeeding, and also far excelling the rest in shipping, took that war in hand, as I conceive it, and assembled the said forces, not so much upon favour as by fear. [4] For it is clear that he himself both conferred most ships to that action and that some also he lent to the Arcadians. And this is likewise declared by Homer (if any think his testimony sufficient), who, at the delivery of the scepter unto him, calleth him, ‘of many isles and of all Argos king.’ Now he could not, living in the continent, have been lord of the islands, other than such as were adjacent which cannot be many, unless he had also had a navy. And by this expedition we are to estimate what were those of the ages before it.

10. Now seeing Mycenae was but a small city, or if any other of that age seem but of light regard, let not any man for that cause, on so weak an argument, think that fleet to have been less than the poets have said and fame reported it to be. [2] For if the city of Lacedaemon were now desolate and nothing of it left but the temples and floors of the buildings, I think it would breed much unbelief in posterity long hence of their power in comparison of the fame. For although of five parts of Peloponnesus it possess two and hath the leading of the rest and also of many confederates without, yet the city being not close built and the temples and other edifices not costly, and because it is but scatteringly inhabited after the ancient manner of Greece, their power would seem inferior to the report. Again, the same things happening to Athens, one would conjecture by the sight of their city that their power were double to what it is. We ought not therefore to be incredulous [concerning the forces that went to Troy] nor have in regard so much the external show of a city as the power; [3] but we are to think that that expedition was indeed greater than those that went before it but yet inferior to those of the present age, if in this also we may credit the poetry of Homer, who being a poet was like to set it forth to the utmost. And yet even thus it cometh short. [4] For he maketh it to consist of twelve hundred vessels, those that were of Boeotians carrying one hundred and twenty men apiece, and those which came with Philoctetes fifty: setting forth, as I suppose, both the greatest sort and the least; and therefore of the bigness of any of the rest he maketh in his catalogue no mention at all, but declareth that they who were in the vessels of Philoctetes served both as mariners and soldiers; for he writes that they who were at the oar were all of them archers. And for such as wrought not, it is not likely that many went along except kings and such as were in chief authority; especially being to pass the sea with munition of war, and in bottoms without decks, built after the old and piratical fashion. [5] So then, if by the greatest and least one estimate the mean of their shipping, it will appear that the whole number of men considered as sent jointly from all Greece were not very many.

11. And the cause hereof was not so much want of men as of wealth. For, for want of victual they carried the lesser army, and no greater than they hoped might both follow the war and also maintain itself. When upon their arrival they had gotten the upper hand in fight (which is manifest, for else they could not have fortified their camp), it appears that from that time forward they employed not there their whole power, but that for want of victual they betook themselves, part of them to the tillage of Chersonesus and part to fetch in booties; whereby divided, the Trojans the more easily made that ten years resistance, as being ever a match for so many as remained at the siege. [2] Whereas, if they had gone furnished with store of provision and with all their forces, eased of booty-haling and tillage, since they were masters of the field, they had also easily taken the city. But they strove not with their whole power but only with such a portion of their army as at the several occasions chanced to be present; when as, if they had pressed the siege, they had won the place both in less time and with less labour. But through want of money not only they were weak matters, all that preceded this enterprise, but also this, which is of greater name than any before it, appeareth to be in fact beneath the fame and report which, by means of the poets, now goeth of it.

12. For also after the Trojan war the Grecians continued still their shifting and transplantations; insomuch as never resting, they improved not their power. [2] For the late return of the Greeks from Ilium caused not a little innovation; and in most of the cities there arose seditions, and those which were driven out built cities for themselves in other places. [3] For those that are now called Boeotians in the sixtieth year after the taking of Troy expelled Arne by the Thessalians, seated themselves in that country which, now Boeotia, was then called Cadmeis. (But there was in the same country a certain portion of that nation before, of whom also were they that went to the warfare of Troy.) And in the eightieth year the Dorians together with the Heracleidae seized on Peloponnesus. [4] And with much ado, after long time, Greece had constant rest and, shifting their seats no longer, at length sent colonies abroad. And the Athenians planted Ionia and most of the islands, and the Peloponnesians most of Italy and Sicily and also certain parts of the rest of Greece. But these colonies were all planted after the Trojan war.

13. But when the power of Greece was now improved, and the desire of money withal, their revenues being enlarged, in most of the cities there were erected tyrannies (for before that time kingdoms with honours limited were hereditary); and the Grecians built navies and became more seriously addicted to the affairs of the sea. [2] The Corinthians are said to have been the first that changed the form of shipping into the nearest to that which is now in use, and at Corinth are reported to have been made the first galleys of all Greece. [3] Now it is well known that Aminocles, the shipwright of Corinth, built four ships at Samos; and from the time that Aminocles went to Samos until the end of this present war are at the most but three hundred years. [4] And the most ancient naval battle that we know of was fought between the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans, and from that battle to the same time are but two hundred and sixty years. [5] For Corinth, seated on an isthmus, had been always a place of traffic (because the Grecians of old, from within and without Peloponnesus, trading by land more than by sea, had no other intercourse one to another but through the Corinthians' territory), and was also wealthy in money, as appears by the poets, who have surnamed this town the rich. And after the Grecians had commerce also by sea, then likewise having furnished themselves with a navy, they scoured the sea of pirates and, affording traffic both by sea and land, mightily increased their city in revenue of money. [6] After this, the Ionians, in the times of Cyrus, first king of the Persians, and of his son Cambyses, got together a great navy, and making war on Cyrus, obtained for a time the dominion of that part of the sea that lieth on their own coast. Also Polycrates, who in the time of Cambyses tyrannised in Samos, had a strong navy wherewith he subdued divers of the islands; and amongst the rest having won Rhenea, he consecrated the same to Apollo of Delos. The Phocaeans likewise, when they were building the city of Marseilles, overcame the Carthaginians in a fight at sea.

14. These were the greatest navies extant. And yet even these, though many ages after the time of Troy, consisted, as it seems, but of a few galleys, and were made up with vessels of fifty oars and with long boats, as well as those of former times. [2] And it was but a little before the Medan war and death of Darius, successor of Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, that the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyraeans had of galleys any number. For these last were the only navies worth speaking of in all Greece before the invasion of the Medes. [3] And the people of Aegina and the Athenians had but small ones, and the most of them consisting but of fifty oars apiece; and that so lately as but from the time that the Athenians making war on Aegina, and withal expecting the coming of the barbarian, at the persuasion of Themistocles built those ships which they used in that war. And these also not all had decks.

15. Such were then the navies of the Greeks, both ancient and modern. Nevertheless, such as applied themselves to naval business gained by them no small power, both in revenue of money and in dominion over other people. For with their navies (especially those men that had not sufficient land, where they inhabited, to maintain themselves) they subdued the islands. [2] But as for war by land, such as any state might acquire power by, there was none at all; and such as were, were only between borderer and borderer. For the Grecians had never yet gone out with any army to conquer any nation far from home, because the lesser cities neither brought in their forces to the great ones as subjects nor concurred as equals in any common enterprise; but such as were neighbours warred against each other hand to hand. [3] For the war of old between the Chalcideans and the Eretrians was it wherein the rest of Greece was most divided and in league with either party.

16. As others by other means were kept back from growing great, so also the Ionians by this: that the Persian affairs prospering, Cyrus and the Persian kingdom after the defeat of Croesus made war upon all that lieth from the river Halys to the seaside and so subdued all the cities which they possessed in the continent; and Darius afterward, when he had overcome the Phoenician fleet, did the like unto them in the islands.

17. And as for the tyrants that were in the Grecian cities, who forecasted only for themselves how with as much safety as was possible to look to their own persons and their own families, they resided for the most part in the cities and did no action worthy of memory, unless it were against their neighbours. For as for the tyrants of Sicily, they were already arrived at greater power. Thus was Greece for a long time hindered, that neither jointly it could do anything remarkable nor the cities singly be adventurous.

18. But after that the tyrants, both of Athens and of the rest of Greece where tyrannies were, were the most and last of them, excepting those of Sicily, put down by the Lacedaemonians (for Lacedaemon, after that it was built by the Dorians that inhabited the same, though it hath been longer troubled with seditions than any other city we know, yet hath it had for the longest time good laws, and been also always free from tyrants; for it is unto the end of this war four hundred years and something more that the Lacedaemonians have used one and the same government, and thereby being of power themselves, they also ordered the affairs in the other cities); I say, after the dissolution of tyrannies in Greece, it was not long before the battle was fought by the Medes against the Athenians in the fields of Marathon. And in the tenth year again after that came the barbarian with the great fleet into Greece to subdue it. [2] And Greece being now in great danger, the leading of the Grecians that league in that war was given to the Lacedaemonians, as to the most potent state. And the Athenians, who had purposed so much before and already stowed their necessaries, at the coming in of the Medes went a ship-board and became seamen. When they had jointly beaten back the barbarian, then did the Grecians, both such as were revolted from the king and such as had in common made war upon him, not long after divide themselves into leagues, one part with the Athenians and the other with the Lacedaemonians, these two cities appearing to be the mightiest, for this had the power by land and the other by sea. [3] But this confederation lasted but awhile; for afterwards the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, being at variance, warred each on other together with their several confederates. And the rest of Greece, where any discord chanced to arise, had recourse presently to one of these. In so much that from the war of the Medes to this present war being continually [exercised] sometimes in peace sometimes in war, either one against the other or against revolted confederates, they arrived at this war, both well furnished with military provisions and also expert because their practice was with danger.

19. The Lacedaemonians governed not their confederates so as to make them tributaries but only drew them by fair means to embrace the oligarchy convenient to their own policy. But the Athenians, having with time taken into their hands the galleys of all those that stood out (except the Chians and Lesbians), reigned over them and ordained every of them to pay a certain tribute of money. By which means their own particular provision was greater in the beginning of this war than when, in their flourishing time the league between them and the rest of Greece remaining whole, it was at the most.

20. Such then I find to have been the state of things past, hard to be believed, though one produce proof for every particular thereof. For men receive the report of things, though of their own country if done before their own time, all alike, from one as from another, without examination. [2]

For the vulgar sort of Athenians think that Hipparchus was the tyrant, and slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and know not that Hippias had the government, as being the eldest son of Pisistratus, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brethren; and that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspecting that some of their accomplices had that day and at that instant discovered unto Hippias somewhat of their treason, did forbear Hippias as a man forewarned; and desirous to effect somewhat, though with danger, before they should be apprehended, lighting on Hipparchus slew him near the temple called Leocorium, whilst he was setting forth the Panathenaical show. [3] And likewise divers other things now extant, and which time hath not yet involved in oblivion, have been conceived amiss by other Grecians, as that the kings of Lacedaemon, in giving their suffrages, had not single but double votes, and that Pitanate was a band of soldiers so called there, whereas there was never any such. So impatient of labour are the most men in search of truth, and embrace soonest the things that are next to hand.

21. Now he that by the arguments here adduced shall frame a judgment of the things past and not believe rather that they were such as the poets have sung or prose-writers have composed, more delightfully to the ear than conformably to the truth, as being things not to be disproved and by length of time turned for the most part into the nature of fables without credit, but shall think them here searched out by the most evident signs that can be, and sufficiently too, considering their antiquity: he, I say, shall not err. [2] And though men always judge the present war wherein they live to be greatest, and when it is past, admire more those that were before it, yet if they consider of this war by the acts done in the same, it will manifest itself to be greater than any of those before mentioned.

22. What particular persons have spoken when they were about to enter into the war or when they were in it were hard for me to remember exactly, whether they were speeches which I have heard myself or have received at the second hand. But as any man seemed to me that knew what was nearest to the sum of the truth of all that had been uttered to speak most agreeably to the matter still in hand, so I have made it spoken here. [2] But of the acts themselves done in the war, I thought not fit to write all that I heard from all authors nor such as I myself did but think to be true, but only those whereat I was myself present and those of which with all diligence I had made particular inquiry. [3] And yet even of those things it was hard to know the certainty, because such as were present at every action spake not all after the same manner, but as they were affected to the parts or as they could remember. [4]

To hear this history rehearsed, for that there be inserted in it no fables, shall be perhaps not delightful. But he that desires to look into the truth of things done and which (according to the condition of humanity) may be done again, or at least their like, he shall find enough herein to make him think it profitable. And it is compiled rather for an everlasting possession than to be rehearsed for a prize.

23. The greatest action before this was that against the Medes; and yet that, by two battles by sea and as many by land, was soon decided. But as for this war, it both lasted long and the harm it did to Greece was such as the like in the like space had never been seen before. [2] For neither had there ever been so many cities expugned and made desolate, what by the barbarians and what by the Greeks warring on one another (and some cities there were that when they were taken changed their inhabitants), nor so much banishing and slaughter, some by the war some by sedition, as was in this. [3] And those things which concerning former time there went a fame of, but in fact rarely confirmed, were now made credible: as earthquakes, general to the greatest part of the world and most violent withal; eclipses of the sun oftener than is reported of any former time; great droughts in some places, and thereby famine; and that which did none of the least hurt but destroyed also its part, the plague. [4] All these evils entered together with this war, which began from the time that the Athenians and Peloponnesians brake the league which immediately after the conquest of Euboea had been concluded between them for thirty years. [5] The causes why they brake the same and their quarrels I have therefore set down first, because no man should be to seek from what ground so great a war amongst the Grecians could arise. [6] And the truest quarrel, though least in speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power, which putting the Lacedaemonians into fear necessitated the war. But the causes of the breach of the league publicly voiced were these.

24. Epidamnus is a city situated on the right hand to such as enter into the Ionian Gulf. Bordering upon it are the Taulantii, barbarians, a people of Illyris. [2] This was planted by the Corcyraeans; but the captain of the colony was one Phalius, the son of Heratoclidas, a Corinthian of the lineage of Hercules, and, according to an ancient custom, called to this charge out of the metropolitan city. [3] Besides that, the colony itself consisted in part of Corinthians and others of the Doric nation. In process of time the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; [4] and having for many years together been annoyed with sedition, was by a war, as is reported, made upon them by the confining barbarians brought low and deprived of the greatest part of their power. [5] But that which was the last accident before this war was that the nobility, forced by the commons to fly the city, went and joined with the barbarians and both by land and sea robbed those that remained within. [6] The Epidamnians that were in the town, oppressed in this manner, sent their ambassadors to Corcyra, as being their mother city, praying the Corcyraeans not to see them perish but to reconcile unto them those whom they had driven forth and to put an end to the barbarian war. [7] And this they entreated in the form of suppliants, sitting down in the temple of Juno. But the Corcyraeans, not admitting their supplication, sent them away again without effect.

25. The Epidamnians, now despairing of relief from the Corcyraeans and at a stand how to proceed in their present affairs, sending to Delphi enquired at the oracle whether it were not best to deliver up their city into the hands of the Corinthians as of their founders and make trial what aid they should obtain from thence. [2] And when the oracle had answered that they should deliver it and take the Corinthians for their leaders, they went to Corinth and according to the advice of the oracle gave their city to them, and declared how the first founder of it was a Corinthian, and what answer the oracle had given them, entreating their help and that they would not stand by beholding their destruction. [3] And the Corinthians undertook their defence not only for the equity of the cause, as thinking them no less their own than the Corcyraeans' colony, but also for hatred of the Corcyraeans, who being their colony yet contemned them and allowed them not their due honour in public meetings nor in the distribution of the sacrifice began at a Corinthian, as was the custom of other colonies; [4] but being equal to the richest Grecians of their time for store of money and strongly furnished with ammunition of war, had them in contempt. Also they sticked not sometimes to boast how much they excelled in shipping, and that Corcyra had been once inhabited by the Phaeaces who flourished in glory of naval affairs, which was also the cause why they the rather provided themselves of a navy. And they were indeed not without power that way; for when they began this war, they had one hundred and twenty galleys.

26. The Corinthians therefore, having all these criminations against them, relieved Epidamnus willingly, not only giving leave to whosoever would to go and dwell there but also sent thither a garrison of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and of their own citizens. [2] Which succours, for fear the Corcyraeans should have hindered their passage by sea, marched by land to Apollonia. [3] The Corcyraeans, understanding that new inhabitants and a garrison were gone to Epidamnus and that the colony was delivered to the Corinthians, were vexed extremely at the same, and sailing presently thither with twenty-five galleys, and afterwards with another fleet, in an insolent manner commanded them both to recall those whom they had banished (for these banished men of Epidamnus had been now at Corcyra and, pointing to the sepulchres of their ancestors and claiming kindred, had entreated the Corcyraeans to restore them) and to send away the garrison and inhabitants sent thither by the Corinthians. [4] But the Epidamnians gave no ear to their commandments. Whereupon the Corcyraeans with forty galleys, together with the banished men (whom they pretended to reduce) and with the Illyrians, whom they had joined to their part, warred upon them, [5] and having laid siege to the city, made proclamation that such of the Epidamnians as would, and all strangers, might depart safely, or otherwise were to be proceeded against as enemies. But when this prevailed not, the place being an isthmus, they enclosed the city in on every side.

27. The Corinthians, when news was brought from Epidamnus how it was besieged, presently made ready their army, and at the same time caused a proclamation to be made for the sending thither of a colony, and that such as would go should have equal and like privileges with those that were there before, and that such as desired to be sharers in the same, and yet were unwilling to go along in person at that present, if they would contribute fifty Corinthian drachmas, might stay behind. [2] And they were very many, both that went and that laid down their silver. Moreover they sent to the Megareans, for fear of being stopped in their passage by the Corcyraeans, to aid them with some galleys, who accordingly furnished out eight; the citizens of Pale in Cephalonia, four. They also required galleys of the Epidaurians, who sent them five; the citizens of Hermione, one; the Troezenians, two; the Leucadians, ten; the Ambraciots, eight. Of the Thebans and Phliasians they required money; of the Eleans, both money and empty galleys. And of the Corinthians themselves there were ready thirty galleys and three thousand men of arms.

28. The Corcyraeans, advertised of this preparation, went to Corinth in company of the ambassadors of the Lacedaemonians and of the Sicyonians whom they took with them and required the Corinthians to recall the garrison and inhabitants which they had sent to Epidamnus, as being a city, they said, wherewith they had nothing to do; [2] or if they had anything to allege, they were content to have the cause judicially tried in such cities of Peloponnesus as they should both agree on; and they then should hold the colony to whom the same should be adjudged. They said also that they were content to refer their cause to the oracle at Delphi, that war they would make none; [3] but if they must needs have it, they should, by the violence of them, be forced in their own defence to seek out better friends than those whom they already had. [4] To this the Corinthians answered that if they would put off with their fleet and dismiss the barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would then consult of the matter; for before they could not honestly do it because whilst they should be pleading the case, the Epidamnians should be suffering the misery of a siege. [5] The Corcyraeans replied to this that if they would call back those men of theirs already in Epidamnus, that then they also would do as the Corinthians had required them; or otherwise they were content to let the men on both sides stay where they were and to suspend the war till the cause should be decided.

29. The Corinthians not assenting to any of these propositions, since their galleys were manned and their confederates present, having defied them first by a herald, put to sea with seventy-five galleys and two thousand men of arms, and set sail for Epidamnus against the Corcyraeans. [2] Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellicas, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes; and the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus. [3] After they were come as far as Actium, in the territory of Anactorium (which is a temple of Apollo and ground consecrated unto him) in the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, the Corcyraeans sent a herald to them at Actium to forbid their coming on, and in the meantime manned out their fleet, and, having repaired and made fit for service their old galleys and furnished the rest with things necessary, shipped their munition and went aboard. [4] The herald was no sooner returned from the Corinthians with an answer not inclining to peace but having their galleys already manned and furnished to the number of eighty sail (for forty attended always the siege of Epidamnus), they put to sea and, arranging themselves, came to a battle in which the Corcyraeans were clearly victors; [5] and on the part of the Corinthians there perished fifteen galleys. And the same day it happened likewise that they that besieged Epidamnus had the same rendered unto them, with conditions, that the strangers therein found should be ransomed and the Corinthians kept in bonds till such time as they should be otherwise disposed of.

30. The battle being ended, the Corcyraeans, after they had set up their trophy in Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, slew their other prisoners but kept the Corinthians still in bonds. [2] After this, when the Corinthians with their vanquished fleet were gone home to Corinth, the Corcyraeans, masters now of the whole sea in those parts, went first and wasted the territory of Leucas, a Corinthian colony, and then sailed to Cyllene, which is the arsenal of the Eleans, and burnt it because they had both with money and shipping given aid to the Corinthians. [3] And they were masters of those seas and infested the confederates of Corinth for the most part of that year, till such time as in the beginning of the summer following the Corinthians sent a fleet and soldiers unto Actium, the which, for the more safe keeping of Leucas and of other cities their friends, encamped about Chimerium in Thesprotis; and the Corcyraeans, both with their fleet and land soldiers, lay over against them in Leucimna. [4] But neither part stirred against the other; but after they had lain quietly opposite all the summer, they retired in winter both the one side and the other to their cities.

31. All this year, as well before as after the battle, the Corinthians, being vexed at the war with the Corcyraeans, applied themselves to the building of galleys and to the preparing of a fleet, the strongest they were able to make, and to procure mariners out of Peloponnesus and all other parts of Greece. [2] The Corcyraeans, having intelligence of their preparations, began to fear and (because they had never been in league with any Grecian city, nor were in the roll of the confederates either of the Athenians or Lacedaemonians) thought it best now to send to Athens to see if they could procure any aid from thence. [3] This being perceived by the Corinthians, they also sent their ambassadors to Athens, lest the addition of the Athenian navy to that of the Corcyraeans might hinder them from carrying the war as they desired. [4] And the assembly at Athens being met, they came to plead against each other; and the Corcyraeans spake to this effect:

32. "Men of Athens, it is but justice that such as come to implore the aid of their neighbours (as now do we), and cannot pretend by any great benefit or league some precedent merit, should, before they go any farther, make it appear, principally, that what they seek conferreth profit, or if not so, yet is not prejudicial at least to those that are to grant it; and next, that they will be constantly thankful for the same; and if they cannot do this, then not to take it ill though their suit be rejected. [2] And the Corcyraeans, being fully persuaded that they can make all this appear on their own parts, have therefore sent us hither, desiring you to ascribe them to the number of your confederates. [3] Now so it is that we have had a custom, both unreasonable in respect of our suit to you and also for the present unprofitable to our own estate. [4] For having ever till now been unwilling to admit others into league with us, we are now not only suitors for league to others but also left destitute by that means of friends in this our war with the Corinthians. And that which before we thought wisdom, namely, not to enter with others into league because we would not at the discretion of others enter into danger, we now find to have been our weakness and imprudence. [5] Wherefore, though alone we repulsed the Corinthians in the late battle by sea, yet since they are set to invade us with greater preparation out of Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece, and seeing with our own single power we are not able to go through, and since also the danger, in case they subdue us, would be very great to all Greece, it is necessary that we seek the succours both of you and of whomsoever else we can; and we are also to be pardoned, though we make bold to cross our former custom of not having to do with other men, proceeding not from malice but error of judgment.

33. "Now if you yield unto us in what we request, this coincidence on our part of need will on your part be honourable for many reasons. First, in this respect, that you lend your help to such as have suffered and not to such as have committed the injustice. And next, considering that you receive into league such as have at stake their whole fortune, you shall so place your benefit as to have a testimony of it, if ever any can be so, indelible. [2] Besides this, the greatest navy but your own is ours. Consider then, what rarer hap, and of greater grief to your enemies, can befall you than that that power which you would have prized above any money or other requital should come voluntarily and without all danger or cost present itself to your hands, bringing with it reputation amongst most men, a grateful mind from those you defend, and strength to yourselves. All which have not happened at once to many. And few there be of those that sue for league that come not rather to receive strength and reputation than to confer it. [3] If any here think that the war wherein we may do you service will not at all be, he is in an error and seeth not how the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, are already in labour of the war; and that the Corinthians, gracious with them and enemies to you, making way for their enterprise, assault us now in the way to the invasion of you hereafter, that we may not stand amongst the rest of their common enemies, but that they may be sure beforehand either to weaken us or to strengthen their own estate. [4] It must therefore be your part, we offering and you accepting the league, to begin with them and to anticipate plotting rather than to counterplot against them.

34. "If they object injustice in that you receive their colony, henceforth let them learn that all colonies so long as they receive no wrong from their mother city, so long they honour her; but when they suffer injury from her, they then become alienate; for they are not sent out to be the slaves of them that stay, but to be their equals. [2] That they have done us the injury is manifest; for when we offered them a judicial trial of the controversy touching Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute their quarrel rather by arms than judgment. [3] Now let that which they have done unto us, who are their kindred, serve you for some argument not to be seduced by their demands and made their instruments before you be aware. For he lives most secure that hath fewest benefits bestowed upon him by his enemies to repent of.

35. "As for the articles between you and the Lacedaemonians, they are not broken by receiving us into your league, because we are in league with neither party. [2] For there it is said that whosoever is confederate of neither party may have access lawfully to either. [3] And sure it were very unreasonable that the Corinthians should have the liberty to man their fleet out of the cities comprised in the league, and out of any other parts of Greece, and not the least out of places in your dominion, and we be denied both the league now propounded and also all other help from whencesoever. And if they impute it to you as a fault that you grant our request, we shall take it for a greater that you grant it not. [4] For therein you shall reject us that are invaded and be none of your enemies; and them, who are your enemies and make the invasion, you shall not only not oppose but also suffer to raise unlawful forces in your dominions. Whereas you ought in truth either not to suffer them to take up mercenaries in your states, or else to send us succours also in such manner as you shall think good yourselves, but especially by taking us into your league and so aiding us. [5] Many commodities, as we said in the beginning, we show unto you, but this for the greatest: that whereas they are your enemies (which is manifest enough) and not weak ones but able to hurt those that stand up against them, we offer you a naval, not a terrestrial, league; and the want of one of these is not as the want of the other. Nay, rather your principal aim, if it could be done, should be to let none at all have shipping but yourselves, or at least, if that cannot be, to make such your friends as are best furnished therewith.

36. If any man now think thus that what we have spoken is indeed profitable, but fears, if it were admitted, the league were thereby broken, let that man consider that his fear joined with strength will make his enemies fear, and his confidence, having (if he reject us) so much the less strength, will so much the less be feared. Let him also remember that he is now in consultation no less concerning Athens than Corcyra, wherein he forecasteth none of the best (considering the present state of affairs) that makes a question whether against a war at hand and only not already on foot he should join unto it or not that city which with most important advantages or disadvantages will be friend or enemy. [2] For it lieth so conveniently for sailing into Italy and Sicily that it can both prohibit any fleet to come to Peloponnesus from thence and convoy any coming from Peloponnesus thither, and is also for divers other uses most commodious. [3] And to comprehend all in brief, consider whether we be to be abandoned or not by this. For Greece having but three navies of any account, yours, ours, and that of Corinth, if you suffer the other two to join in one by letting the Corinthians first seize us, you shall have to fight by sea at one time both against the Corcyraeans and the Peloponnesians; whereas by making league with us, you shall, with your fleet augmented, have to deal against the Peloponnesians alone. [4]

Thus spake the Corcyraeans, and after them the Corinthians, thus:

37. "The Corcyraeans in their oration having made mention not only of your taking them into league, but also that they are wronged and unjustly warred on, it is also necessary for us first to answer concerning both those points, and then afterwards to proceed to the rest of what we have to say: to the end you may foreknow that ours are the safest demands for you to embrace, and that you may upon reason reject the needy estate of those others. [2] Whereas they allege in defence of their refusing to enter league with other cities that the same hath proceeded from modesty, the truth is that they took up that custom not from any virtue but mere wickedness, as being unwilling to have any confederate for a witness of their evil actions, and to be put to blush by calling them. [3] Besides, their city being by the situation sufficient within itself, giveth them this point, that when they do any man a wrong, they themselves are the judges of the same, and not men appointed by consent. For going seldom forth against other nations, they intercept such as by necessity are driven into their harbour. [4] And in this consisteth their goodly pretext for not admitting confederates, not because they would not be content to accompany others in doing evil, but because they had rather do it alone; that where they were too strong, they might oppress; and when there should be none to observe them, the less of the profit might be shared from them; and that they might escape the shame when they took anything. [5] But if they had been honest men (as they themselves say they are), by how much the less they are obnoxious to accusation, so much the more means they have, by giving and taking what is due, to make their honesty appear.

38. "But they are not such, neither towards others nor towards us. For being our colony, they have not only been ever in revolt, but now they also make war upon us and say they were not sent out to be injured by us. [2] But we say again that we did not send them forth to be scorned by them but to have the leading of them and to be regarded by them as is fit. [3] For our other colonies both honour and love us much: [4] which is an argument, seeing the rest are pleased with our actions, that these have no just cause to be offended alone, and that without some manifest wrong we should not have had colour to war against them. [5] But say we had been in an error, it had been well done in them to have given way to our passion, as it had been also dishonourable in us to have insulted over their modesty. But through pride and wealth they have done wrong, both in many other things and also in this; that Epidamnus being ours which whilst it was vexed with wars they never claimed, as soon as we came to relieve it, was forcibly seized by them, and so holden.

39. "They say now that before they took it, they offered to put the cause to trial of judgment. But you are not to think that such a one will stand to judgment as hath advantage and is sure already of what he offereth to plead for, but rather he that before the trial will admit equality in the matter itself as well as in the pleading. [2] Whereas contrarily, these men offered not this specious pretence of a judicial trial before they had besieged the city but after, when they saw we meant not to put it up. And now hither they be come, not content to have been faulty in that business themselves but to get in you, into their confederacy? no, but into their conspiracy, and to receive them in this name that they are enemies to us. [3] But they should have come to you then when they were most in safety, not now when we have the wrong and they the danger, and when you that never partaked of their power must impart unto them of your aid, and having been free from their faults, must have an equal share from us of the blame. They should communicate their power before hand that mean to make common the issue of the same, and they that share not in the crimes ought also to have no part in the sequel of them.

40. "Thus it appears that we come for our parts with arguments of equity and right, whereas the proceedings of these other are nothing else but violence and rapine. And now we shall show you likewise that you cannot receive them in point of justice. [2] For although it be in the articles that the cities written with neither of the parties may come in to whether of them they please, yet it holds not for such as do so to the detriment of either, but only for those that, having revolted from neither part, want protection and bring not a war with them instead of peace to those (if they be wise) that receive them. [3] For you shall not only be auxiliaries unto these but to us, instead of confederates, enemies. For if you go with them, it follows they must defend themselves not without you. [4] You should do most uprightly to stand out of both our ways; and if not that, then to take our parts against the Corcyraeans (for between the Corinthians and you there are articles of peace, but with the Corcyraeans you never had so much as a truce) and not to constitute a new law of receiving one another's rebels. [5] For neither did we give our votes against you when the Samians revolted, though the rest of Peloponnesus was divided in opinion, but plainly alleged that it was reason that everyone should have liberty to proceed against their own revolting confederates. [6] And if you shall once receive and aid the doers of wrong, it will be seen that they will come over as fast from you to us; and you shall set up a law not so much against us as against yourselves.

41. "These are the points of justice we had to show you conformable to the law of the Grecians. And now we come to matter of advice and claim of favour, which (being not so much your enemies as to hurt you nor such friends as to surcharge you), we say, ought in the present occasion to be granted us by way of requital. [2] For when you had want of long barks against the Aeginetae a little before the Medan war, you had twenty lent to you by the Corinthians; which benefit of ours, and that other against the Samians when by us it was that the Peloponnesians did not aid them, was the cause both of your victory against the Aeginetae and of the punishment of the Samians. [3] And these things were done for you in a season when men, going to fight against their enemies, neglect all respects but of victory. For even a man's domestic affairs are ordered the worse through eagerness of present contention.

42. "Which benefits considering, and the younger sort taking notice of them from the elder, be you pleased to defend us now in the like manner. And have not this thought: that though in what we have spoken there be equity, yet, if the war should arise, the profit would be found in the contrary. [2] For utility followeth those actions most wherein we do the least wrong; besides that the likelihood of the war, wherewith the Corcyraeans frighting you go about to draw you to injustice, is yet obscure and not worthy to move you to a manifest and present hostility with the Corinthians; but it were rather fit for you, indeed, to take away our former jealousies concerning the Megareans. [3] For the last good turn done in season, though but small, is able to cancel an accusation of much greater moment. [4] Neither suffer yourselves to be drawn on by the greatness of the navy which now shall be at your service by this league. For to do no injury to our equals is a firmer power than that addition of strength which, puffed up with present shows, men are to acquire with danger.

43. And since we be come to this, which once before we said at Lacedaemon, that everyone ought to proceed as he shall think good against his own confederates, we claim that liberty now of you; and that you that have been helped by our votes will not hurt us now by yours, but render like for like; [2] remembering that now is that occasion wherein he that aideth us is our greatest friend, and he that opposeth us our greatest enemy; and that you will not receive these Corcyraeans into league against our wills nor defend them in their injuries. [3] These things if you grant us, you shall both do as is fit and also advise the best for the good of your own affairs. [4]

This was the effect of what was spoken by the Corinthians.

44. Both sides having been heard and the Athenian people twice assembled, in the former assembly they approved no less of the reasons of the Corinthians than of the Corcyraeans. But in the latter they changed their minds, not so as to make a league with the Corcyraeans both offensive and defensive, that the friends and enemies of the one should be so of the other (for then, if the Corcyraeans should have required them to go against Corinth, the peace had been broken with the Peloponnesians), but made it only defensive, that if anyone should invade Corcyra or Athens, or any of their confederates, they were then mutually to assist one another. [2] For they expected that even thus they should grow to war with the Peloponnesians and were therefore unwilling to let Corcyra, that had so great a navy, to fall into the hands of the Corinthians, but rather, as much as in them lay, desired to break them one against another; that if need required, they might have to do with the Corinthians, and others that had shipping, when they should be weakened to their hands. [3] And the island seemed also to lie conveniently for passing into Italy and Sicily.

45. With this mind the people of Athens received the Corcyraeans into league, and when the Corinthians were gone, sent ten galleys not long after to their aid. [2] The commanders of them were Lacedaemonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of Epicles, [3] and had order not to fight with the Corinthians unless they invaded Corcyra or offered to land there or in some other place of theirs, which, if they did, then with all their might to oppose them. This they forbad, because they would not break the peace concluded with the Peloponnesians. So these galleys arrived at Corcyra.

46. The Corinthians, when they were ready, made towards Corcyra with one hundred and fifty sail; of the Eleans ten, of the Megareans twelve, of the Leucadians ten, of the Ambraciots twenty-seven, of the Anactorians one, and ninety of their own. [2] The commanders of these were men chosen out of the said several cities for the several parts of the fleet which they sent in, and over those of Corinth was Xenocleides the son of Euthicles with four others. [3] After they were all come together upon the coast of the continent over against Corcyra, they sailed from Leucas and came to Chimerium in the country of Thesprotis. [4] In this place is a haven, and above it, farther from the sea, the city of Ephyra in that part of Thesprotis which is called Elaeatis; and near into it disbogueth into the sea the lake Acherusia, and into that (having first passed through Thesprotis) the river Acheron from which it taketh the name. Also the river Thyamis runneth here, which divideth Thesprotis from Cestrine, betwixt which two rivers ariseth this promontory of Chimerium. [5] To this part of the continent came the Corinthians and encamped.

47. The Corcyraeans understanding that they made against them, having ready one hundred and ten galleys under the conduct of Miciades, Aesimides, and Eurybatus, came and encamped in one of the islands called Sybota; and the ten galleys of Athens were also with them. [2] But their land forces stayed in the promontory of Leucimna, and with them one thousand men of arms of the Zacynthians that came to aid them. [3] The Corinthians also had in the continent the aids of many barbarians, which in those quarters have been evermore their friends.

48. The Corinthians, after they were ready and had taken aboard three days' provision of victual, put off by night from Chimerium with purpose to fight, [2] and about break of day, as they were sailing, described the galleys of the Corcyraeans, which were also put off from Sybota and coming on to fight with the Corinthians. [3] As soon as they had sight one of another, they put themselves into order of battle. In the right wing of the Corcyraeans were placed the galleys of Athens, and the rest being their own were divided into three commands under the three commanders, one under one. [4] This was the order of the Corcyraeans. The Corinthians had in their right wing the galleys of Megara and of Ambracia; in the middle, other their confederates in order; and opposite to the Athenians and right wing of the Corcyraeans they were themselves placed, with such galleys as were best of sail, in the left.

49. The standard being on either side lift up, they joined battle, having on both parts both many men of arms and many archers and slingers, but after the old fashion as yet somewhat unskilfully appointed. [2] The battle was not so artificially as cruelly fought, near unto the manner of a fight at land. [3] For after they had once run their galleys up close aboard one of another, they could not for the number and throng be easily gotten asunder again, but relied for the victory especially upon their men of arms who fought where they stood whilst the galleys remained altogether without motion. Passages through each other they made none but fought it out with courage and strength rather than with skill. [4] Insomuch as the battle was in every part not without much tumult and disorder, in which the Athenian galleys being always, where the Corcyraeans were oppressed, at hand, kept the enemies in fear, but yet began no assault because their commanders stood in awe of the prohibition of the Athenian people. [5] The right wing of the Corinthians was in the greatest distress, for the Corcyraeans with twenty galleys had made them turn their backs and chased them dispersed to the continent; and sailing to their very camp, went aland, burnt their abandoned tents, and took away their baggage. [6] So that in this part the Corinthians and their confederates were vanquished, and the Corcyraeans had the victory. But in the left wing where the Corinthians were themselves they were far superior because the Corcyraeans had twenty galleys of their number, which was at first less than that of the Corinthians, absent in the chase of the enemy. [7] And the Athenians, when they saw the Corcyraeans were in distress, now aided them manifestly, whereas before, they had abstained from making assault upon any. But when once they fled outright and that the Corinthians lay sore upon them, then everyone fell to the business without making difference any longer; and it came at last to this necessity, that they undertook one another, Corinthians and Athenians.

50. The Corinthians, when their enemies fled, stayed not to fasten the hulls of the galleys they had sunk unto their own galleys that so they might tow them after, but made after the men, rowing up and down, to kill rather than to take alive, and through ignorance (not knowing that their right wing had been discomfited) slew also some of their own friends. [2] For the galleys of either side being many and taking up a large space at sea, after they were once in the medley they could not easily discern who were of the victors and who of the vanquished party. For this was the greatest naval battle for number of ships that ever had been before of Grecians against Grecians. [3] When the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the shore, they returned to take up the broken galleys and bodies of their dead, which for the greatest part they recovered and brought to Sybota where also lay the land forces of the barbarians that were come to aid them. This Sybota is a desert haven of Thesprotis. When they had done, they reunited themselves and made again to the Corcyraeans. [4] And they likewise, with such galleys as they had fit for the sea remaining of the former battle together with those of Athens, put forth to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land upon their territory. [5] By this time the day was far spent, and the song which they used to sing when they came to charge was ended, when suddenly the Corinthians began to row astern, for they had descried twenty Athenian galleys sent from Athens to second the former ten for fear lest the Corcyraeans (as it also fell out) should be overcome and those ten galleys of theirs be too few to defend them.

51. When the Corinthians therefore had sight of these galleys, suspecting that they were of Athens and more in number than they were, by little and little they fell off. [2] But the Corcyraeans (because the course of these galleys was unto them more out of sight) described them not but wondered why the Corinthians rowed astern, till at last some that saw them said they were enemies, and then retired also the Corcyraeans. [3] For by this time it was dark, and the Corinthians had turned about the heads of their galleys and dissolved themselves. [4] And thus were they parted, and the battle ended in night. The Corcyraeans lying at Leucimna, these twenty Athenian galleys under the command of Glaucon the son of Leagrus and Andocides the son of Leogorus, passing through the midst of the floating carcasses and wrecks, soon after they were described arrived at the camp of the Corcyraeans in Leucimna. [5] The Corcyraeans at first (being night) were afraid they had been enemies, but knew them afterwards; so they anchored there.

52. The next day both the thirty galleys of Athens and as many of Corcyra as were fit for service went to the haven in Sybota, where the Corinthians lay at anchor, to see if they would fight. [2] But the Corinthians, when they had put off from the land and arranged themselves in the wide sea, stood quiet, not meaning of their own accord to begin the battle, both for that they saw the supply of fresh galleys from Athens and for many difficulties that happened to them, both about the safe custody of their prisoners aboard and also for that being in a desert place their galleys were not yet repaired, but took thought rather how to go home for fear lest the Athenians, having the peace already broken in that they had fought against each other, should not suffer them to depart. [3]

53. They therefore thought good to send afore unto the Athenians certain men without privilege of heralds for to sound them and to say in this manner: [2] Men of Athens, you do unjustly to begin the war and violate the articles; for whereas we go about to right us on our enemies, you stand in our way and bear arms against us; if therefore you be resolved to hinder our going against Corcyra or whatsoever place else we please, dissolve the peace, and laying hands first upon us that are here, use us as enemies.’ Thus said they; [3] and the Corcyraeans, as many of the army as heard them, cried out immediately to take and kill them. [4] But the Athenians made answer thus: ‘Men of Peloponnesus, neither do we begin the war nor break the peace; but we bring aid to these our confederates, the Corcyraeans; if you please therefore to go any whither else, we hinder you not, but if against Corcyra, or any place belonging unto it, we will not suffer you.

54. When the Athenians had given them this answer, the Corinthians made ready to go home and set up a trophy in Sybota of the continent. And the Corcyraeans also both took up the wreck and bodies of the dead which, carried every way by the waves and the winds that arose the night before, came driving to their hands, and, as if they had had the victory, set up a trophy likewise in Sybota the island. The victory was thus challenged on both sides upon these grounds. [2] The Corinthians did set up a trophy because in the battle they had the better all day, having gotten more of the wreck and dead bodies than the other and taken no less than a thousand prisoners and sunk about seventy of the enemies' galleys. And the Corcyraeans set up a trophy because they had sunk thirty galleys of the Corinthians and had, after the arrival of the Athenians, recovered the wreck and dead bodies that drove to them by reason of the wind; and because the day before, upon sight of the Athenians, the Corinthians had rowed astern and went away from them; and lastly, for that when they went to Sybota, the Corinthians came not out to encounter them. Thus each side claimed victory.

55. The Corinthians in their way homeward took in Anactorium, a town seated in the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, by deceit (this town was common to them and to the Corcyraeans), and having put into it Corinthians only, departed and went home. Of the Corcyraeans, eight hundred that were servants they sold, and kept prisoners two hundred and fifty, whom they used with very much favour that they might be a means, at their return, to bring Corcyra into the power of the Corinthians, the greatest part of these being principal men of the city. [2] And thus was Corcyra delivered of the war of Corinth, and the Athenian galleys went from them. This was the first cause that the Corinthians had of war against the Athenians: namely, because they had taken part with the Corcyraeans in a battle by sea against the Corinthians with whom they were comprised in the same articles of peace.

56. Presently after this, it came to pass that other differences arose between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians to induce the war. [2] For whilst the Corinthians studied to be revenged, the Athenians, who had their hatred in jealousy, commanded the citizens of Potidaea, a city seated in the Isthmus of Pallene, a colony of the Corinthians but confederate and tributary to the Athenians, to pull down that part of the wall of their city that stood towards Pallene, and to give them hostages, and also to send away and no more receive the Epidemiurgi (magistrates so called) which were sent unto them year by year from Corinth, fearing lest through the persuasion of Perdiccas and of the Corinthians they should revolt and draw to revolt with them their other confederates in Thrace.

57. These things against the Potidaeans, the Athenians had precontrived presently after the naval battle fought at Corcyra. [2] For the Corinthians and they were now manifestly at difference; and Perdiccas, who before had been their confederate and friend, now warred upon them. [3] And the cause why he did so was that when his brother Philip and Derdas joined in arms against him, the Athenians had made a league with them. [4] And therefore being afraid, he both sent to Lacedaemon to negotiate the Peloponnesian war and also reconciled himself to the Corinthians the better to procure the revolt of Potidaea. [5] And likewise he practised with the Chalcideans of Thrace and with the Bottiaeans to revolt with them; for if he could make these confining cities his confederates, with the help of them he thought his war would be the easier. [6] Which the Athenians perceiving and intending to prevent the revolt of these cities, gave order to the commanders of the fleet (for they were now sending thirty galleys with a thousand men of arms under the command of Archestratus the son of Lycomedes, and ten others, into the territories of Perdiccas) both to receive hostages of the Potidaeans and to demolish their walls, and also to have an eye to the neighboring cities that they revolted not.

58. The Potidaeans having sent ambassadors to Athens to try if they could persuade the people not to make any alteration amongst them, by other ambassadors, whom they sent along with the ambassadors of Corinth to Lacedaemon, dealt with the Lacedaemonians at the same time, if need required, to be ready to revenge their quarrel. When after long solicitation at Athens and no good done, the fleet was sent away against them no less than against Macedonia, and when the magistrates of Lacedaemon had promised them if the Athenians went to Potidaea, to invade Attica, then at last they revolted, and together with them the Chalcideans and Bottiaeans, all mutually sworn in the same conspiracy. [2] For Perdiccas had also persuaded the Chalcideans to abandon and pull down their maritime towns and to go up and dwell at Olynthus and that one city to make strong, and unto those that removed gave part of his own and part of the territory of Mygdonia, about the lake Bolbe, to live on so long as the war against the Athenians should continue. So when they had demolished their cities and were gone up higher into the country, they prepared themselves to the war.

59. The Athenian galleys, when they arrived in Thrace, found Potidaea and the other cities already revolted. [2] And the commanders of the fleet, conceiving it to be impossible, with their present forces, to make war both against Perdiccas and the towns revolted, set sail again for Macedonia, against which they had been at first sent out, and there staying, joined with Philip and the brothers of Derdas that had invaded the country from above.

60. In the meantime after Potidaea was revolted, and whilst the Athenian fleet lay on the coast of Macedonia, the Corinthians, fearing what might become of the city and making the danger their own, sent unto it, both of their own city and of other Peloponnesians which they hired, to the number of sixteen hundred men of arms and four hundred light armed. [2] The charge of these was given to Aristeus the son of Adimantus, for whose sake most of the volunteers of Corinth went the voyage: for he had been ever a great favourer of the Potidaeans. [3] And they arrived in Thrace after the revolt of Potidaea forty days.

61. The news of the revolt of these cities was likewise quickly brought to the Athenian people, who, hearing withal of the forces sent unto them under Aristeus, sent forth against the places revolted two thousand men of arms and forty galleys under the conduct of Callias, the son of Calliades. [2] These, coming first into Macedonia, found there the former thousand, who by this time had taken Therme and were now besieging the city of Pydna; [3] and staying, helped for a while to besiege it with the rest. But shortly after they took composition and, having made a necessary league with Perdiccas (urged thereto by the affairs of Potidaea, and the arrival there of Aristeus), departed from Macedonia. [4] Thence coming to Berrhoea, they attempted to take it; but when they could not do it, they turned back and marched towards Potidaea by land. They were of their own number three thousand men of arms, besides many of their confederates, and of Macedonians that had served with Philip and Pausanias, six hundred horsemen. [5] And their galleys, seventy in number, sailing by them along the coast, by moderate journeys came in three days to Gigonus and there encamped.

62. The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians under Aristeus, in expectation of the coming of the Athenians, lay now encamped in the isthmus near unto Olynthus and had the market kept for them without the city. [2] And the leading of the foot the confederates had assigned to Aristeus, and of the horse to Perdiccas; for he fell off again presently from the Athenians and, having left Iolaus governor in his place, took part with the Potidaeans. [3] The purpose of Aristeus was to have the body of the army with himself within the isthmus and therewith to attend the coming on of the Athenians, and to have the Chalcideans and their confederates without the isthmus, and also the two hundred horse under Perdiccas, to stay in Olynthus, and when the Athenians were passed by, to come on their backs and to inclose the enemy betwixt them. [4] But Callias the Athenian general, and the rest that were in commission with him, sent out before them their Macedonian horsemen and some few of their confederates to Olynthus to stop those within from making any sally from the town, and then dislodging marched on towards Potidaea. [5] When they were come on as far as the isthmus and saw the enemy make ready to fight, they also did the like; [6] and not long after they joined battle. That wing wherein was Aristeus himself with the chosen men of the Corinthians and others put to flight that part of their enemies that stood opposite unto them and followed execution a great way. But the rest of the army of the Potidaeans and Peloponnesians were by the Athenians defeated and fled into the city.

63. And Aristeus, when he came back from the execution, was in doubt what way to take, to Olynthus or to Potidaea. In the end he resolved of the shortest way, and with his soldiers about him ran as hard as he was able into Potidaea, and with much ado got in at the pier through the sea, cruelly shot at and with the loss of a few but the safety of the greatest part of his company. [2] As soon as the battle began, they that should have seconded the Potidaeans from Olynthus (for it is at most but sixty furlongs off, and in sight) advanced a little way to have aided them; and the Macedonian horse opposed themselves likewise in order of battle to keep them back. But the Athenians having quickly gotten the victory, and the standards being taken down, they retired again, they of Olynthus into that city, and the Macedonian horsemen into the army of the Athenians. So that neither side had their cavalry at the battle. [3] After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy and gave truce to the Potidaeans for the taking up of the bodies of their dead. Of the Potidaeans and their friends there died somewhat less than three hundred, and of the Athenians themselves one hundred and fifty, with Callias one of their commanders.

64. Presently upon this the Athenians raised a wall before the city on the part toward the isthmus which they kept with a garrison, but the part to Pallene-ward they left unwalled. For they thought themselves too small a number both to keep a guard in the isthmus and withal to go over and fortify in Pallene, fearing lest the Potidaeans and their confederates should assault them when divided. [2] When the people of Athens understood that Potidaea was unwalled on the part toward Pallene, not long after they sent thither sixteen hundred men of arms under the conduct of Phormio the son of Asopius, who arriving in Pallene left his galleys at Aphytis, and marching easily to Potidaea wasted the territory as he passed through. And when none came out to give him battle, he raised a wall before the city on that part also that looketh towards Pallene. [3] Thus was Potidaea on both sides strongly besieged, and also from the sea by the Athenian galleys that came up and rode before it.

65. Aristeus, seeing the city enclosed on every side and without hope of safety save what might come from Peloponnesus or some other unexpected way, gave advice to all but five hundred, taking the opportunity of a wind, to go out by sea that the provision might the longer hold out for the rest, and of them that should remain within offered himself to be one. [2] But when his counsel took not place, being desirous to settle their business and make the best of their affairs abroad, he got out by sea unseen of the Athenian guard, and staying amongst the Chalcideans, amongst other actions of the war, laid an ambush before Sermylius and slew many of that city and solicited the sending of aid from Peloponnesus. And Phormio, after the siege laid to Potidaea, having with him his sixteen hundred men of arms, wasted the territory of the Chalcideans and Bottiaeans, and some small towns he took in.

66. These were the quarrels between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians. The Corinthians quarrelled the Athenians for besieging Potidaea and in it the men of Corinth and Peloponnesus. The Athenians quarrelled the Peloponnesians for causing their confederate and tributary city to revolt, and for that they had come thither and openly fought against them in the behalf of Potidaea. Nevertheless the war brake not openly forth as yet, and they yet abstained from arms; for this was but a particular action of the Corinthians.

67. But when Potidaea was once besieged, both for their men's sakes that were within and also for fear to lose the place they could no longer hold. But out of hand they procured of their confederates to go to Lacedaemon; and thither also they went themselves with clamours and accusations against the Athenians that they had broken the league and wronged the Peloponnesians. [2] The Aeginetae, though not openly by ambassadors for fear of the Athenians, yet privily instigated them to the war as much as any, alleging that they were not permitted to govern themselves according to their own laws, as by the articles they ought to have been. [3] So the Lacedaemonians having called together the confederates, and whosoever else had any injustice to lay to the charge of the Athenians, in the ordinary council of their own state commanded them to speak. [4] Then presented everyone his accusation; and amongst the rest the Megareans, besides many other their great differences, laid open this especially, that contrary to the articles they were forbidden the Athenian markets and havens. [5] Last of all, the Corinthians, when they had suffered the Lacedaemonians to be incensed first by the rest, came in and said as followeth.

68. "Men of Lacedaemon, your own fidelity both in matter of estate and conversation maketh you the less apt to believe us when we accuse others of the contrary. And hereby you gain indeed a reputation of equity, but you have less experience in the affairs of foreign states. [2] For although we have oftentimes foretold you that the Athenians would do us a mischief, yet from time to time when we told it you, you never would take information of it but have suspected rather that what we spake hath proceeded from our own private differences. And you have therefore called hither these confederates not before we had suffered but now when the evil is already upon us. Before whom our speech must be so much the longer by how much our objections are the greater in that we have both by the Athenians been injured and by you neglected. [3] If the Athenians lurking in some obscure place had done these wrongs unto the Grecians, we should then have needed to prove the same before you as to men that knew it not. But now what cause have we to use long discourse when you see already that some are brought into servitude, and that they are contriving the like against others, and especially against our confederates, and are themselves, in case war should be made against them, long since prepared for it? [4] For else they would never have taken Corcyra and holden it from us by force, nor have besieged Potidaea, whereof the one was most commodious for any action against Thrace, and the other had brought unto the Peloponnesians a most fair navy.

69. "And of all this you are yourselves the authors, in that you suffered them upon the end of the Persian war to fortify their city and again afterwards to raise their long walls, whereby you have hitherto deprived of their liberty not only the states by them already subdued but also your own confederates. For not he that bringeth into slavery, but he that being able to hinder it neglects the same is most truly said to do it, especially if they assume the honour to be esteemed the deliverers of Greece [as you do]. [2] And for all that, we are hardly yet come together, and indeed not yet with any certain resolution what to do. For the question should not have been put whether or not we have received injury, but rather in what manner we are to repair it. For they that do the wrong, having consulted upon it beforehand, use no delay at all but come upon them whom they mean to oppress whilst they be yet irresolute. [3] And we know not only that the Athenians have incroached upon their neighbours but also by what ways they have done it. And as long as they think they carry it closely through your blindness, they are the less bold; [4] but when they shall perceive that you see, and will not see, they will then press us strongly indeed. For, Lacedaemonians, you are the only men of all Greece that sitting still defend others, not with your forces but with promises; [5] and you are also the only men that love to pull down the power of the enemy, not when it beginneth but when it is doubled. You have indeed a report to be sure, but yet it is more in fame that than in fact. For we ourselves know that the Persian came against Peloponnesus from the utmost parts of the earth before you encountered him as became your state. And also now you connive at the Athenians who are not as the Medes, far off, but hard at hand, choosing rather to defend yourselves from their invasion than to invade them, and by having to do with them when their strength is greater, to put yourselves upon the chance of fortune. And yet we know that the barbarian's own error, and in our war against the Athenians their own oversights more than your assistance, was the thing that gave us victory. For the hope of your aid hath been the destruction of some that, relying on you, made no preparation for themselves by other means. [6] Yet let not any man think that we speak this out of malice but only by way of expostulation: for expostulation is with friends that err, but accusation against enemies that have done an injury.

70. "Besides, if there be any that may challenge to exprobate his neighbour, we think ourselves may best do it, especially on so great quarrels as these whereof you neither seem to have any feeling nor to consider what manner of men and how different from you in every kind the Athenians be that you are to contend withal. [2] For they love innovation and are swift to devise and also to execute what they resolve on. But you on the contrary are only apt to save your own, not devise anything new, nor scarce to attain what is necessary. [3] They again are bold beyond their strength, adventurous above their own reason, and in danger hope still the best. Whereas your actions are ever beneath your power, and you distrust even what your judgment assures, and being in a danger never think to be delivered. They are stirrers, you studies; they love to be abroad, and you at home the most of any. [4] For they make account by being abroad to add to their estate; you, if you should go forth against the state of another, would think to impair your own. [5] They, when they overcome their enemies, advance the farthest and, when they are overcome by their enemies, fall off the least; [6] and as for their bodies, they use them in the service of the commonwealth as if they were none of their own; but their minds, when they would serve the state, are right their own. [7] Unless they take in hand what they have once advised on, they account so much lost of their own. And when they take it in hand, if they obtain anything, they think lightly of it in respect of what they look to win by their prosecution. If they fail in any attempt, they do what is necessary for the present and enter presently into other hopes. [8] For they alone both have and hope for at once whatsoever they conceive through their celerity in execution of what they once resolve on. And in this manner they labour and toil all the days of their lives. What they have, they have no leisure to enjoy for continual getting of more; nor holiday esteem they any, but whereon they effect some matter profitable; [9] nor think they ease with nothing to do, a less torment than laborious business. So that, in a word, to say they are men born neither to rest themselves nor suffer others is to say the truth.

71. Now notwithstanding, men of Lacedaemon, that this city, your adversary, be such as we have said, yet you still delay time, not knowing that those only are they to whom it may suffice for the most part of their time to sit still who, though they use not their power to do injustice, yet bewray a mind unlikely to swallow injuries, but placing equity belike in this, that you neither do any harm to others nor receive it in defending of yourselves. [2] But this is a thing you hardly could attain, though the states about you were of the same condition. But, as we have before declared, your customs are in respect of theirs antiquated; [3] and of necessity, as it happeneth in arts, the new ones will prevail. True it is that for a city living for the most part in peace, unchanged customs are the best; but for such as be constrained to undergo many matters, many devices will be needful. Which is also the reason why the Athenian customs, through much experience, are more new to you than yours are to them. [4] Here, therefore, give a period to your slackness and by a speedy invasion of Attica, as you promised, relieve both Potidaea and the rest, lest otherwise you betray your friends and kindred to their cruelest enemies, and lest we and others be driven through despair to seek out some other league. [5] Which to do were no injustice neither against the Gods, judges of men's oaths, nor against men, the hearers of them. For not they break the league who being abandoned have recourse to others, but they that yield not their assistance to whom they have sworn it. But if you mean to follow the business seriously, we will stay; [6] for else we should do irreligiously, neither should we find any other more conformable to our manners than yourselves. [7] Therefore, deliberate well of these points, and take such a course that Peloponnesus may not by your leading fall into worse estate than it was left unto you by your progenitors.

72. Thus spake the Corinthians. The Athenian ambassadors, who chanced to be residing at Lacedaemon upon their business, when they heard of this oration thought fit to present themselves before the Lacedaemonians, not to make apology for what they were charged with by the other cities, but to show in general that it was not fit for them in this case to take any sudden resolution but farther time to consider. Also they desired to lay open the power of their city, to the elder sort, for a remembrance of what they knew already, and to the younger, for an information of what they knew not, supposing that when they should have spoken, they would incline to quietness rather than to war. [2] And therefore they presented themselves before the Lacedaemonians saying that they also, if they might have leave, desired to speak in the assembly, who willed them to come in. And the Athenians went into the assembly and spake to this effect:

73. "Though our embassage was not to this end, that we should argue against our confederates, but about such other affairs as the city was pleased to employ us in; yet having heard of the great exclamation against us, we came into the court not to make answer to the criminations of the cities (for to plead before you here were not to plead before the judges either of them or us) but to the end you may not be drawn away to take the worse resolution at the persuasion of the confederates in matters of so great importance, and withal, touching the sum of the oration made against us, to inform you that what we possess we have it justly, and that our city deserveth reputation. [2] But what need we now to speak of matters long past, confirmed more by hearsay than by the eyes of those that are to hear us relate them? But our actions against the Persian, and such as you yourselves know as well as we, those, though it be tedious to hear them ever objected, we must of necessity recite. For when we did them, we hazarded ourselves for some benefit, of which, as you had your parts in the substance, so must we have ours (if that be any benefit) in the commemoration. [3] And we shall make recital of them not by way of deprecation but of protestation and declaration of what a city, in case you take ill advice, you have to enter the list withal. [4] We therefore say that we not only first and alone hazarded battle against the barbarian in the fields of Marathon, but also afterwards, when he came again, being unable to resist him by land, embarked ourselves, every man that was able to bear arms, and gave him battle amongst the rest by sea at Salamis, which was the cause that kept him back from sailing to Peloponnesus and laying it waste city after city; for against so many galleys you were not able to give each other mutual succour. [5] And the greatest proof of this is the Persian himself, who, when his fleet was overcome and that he had no more such forces, went away in haste with the greatest part of his army.

74. "Which being so, and evident that the whole state of the Grecians was embarked in their fleet, we conferred to the same the three things of most advantage, namely, the greatest number of galleys, the most prudent commander, and the most lively courage. For of four hundred galleys in the whole, our own were few less than two-thirds; and for commander Themistocles, who was the principal cause that the battle was fought in the strait whereby he clearly saved the whole business and whom, though a stranger, you yourselves have honoured for it more than any man that came unto you. [2] And a forwardness we showed more adventurous than any other in this, that when none of them had aided us by land before, and the rest of the cities, as far as to our own, were brought into servitude, we were nevertheless content both to quit our city and lose our goods, and even in that estate not to betray the common cause of the confederates, or divided from them to be unuseful, but to put ourselves into our navy and undergo the danger with them, and that without passion against you for not having formerly defended us in the like manner. [3] So that we may say that we have no less conferred a benefit upon you than we received it from you. You came indeed to aid us, but it was from cities inhabited and to the end you might still keep them so, and when you were afraid not of our danger but your own. Whereas we, coming from a city no more being, and putting ourselves into danger for a city hopeless ever to be again, saved both you in part and ourselves. [4] But if we had joined with the Persian, fearing (as others did) to have our territories wasted, or afterwards, as men lost, durst not have put ourselves into our galleys, you must not have fought with him by sea because your fleet had been too small; but his affairs had succeeded as he would himself.

75. "Therefore, men of Lacedaemon, we deserve not so great envy of the Grecians, for our courage at that time and for our prudence and for the dominion we hold, as we now undergo. [2] Which dominion we obtained not by violence, but because the confederates, when yourselves would not stay out the relics of the war against the barbarian, came in and entreated us to take the command of their own accord. [3] So that at first we were forced to advance our dominion to what it is out of the nature of the thing itself, as chiefly for fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit. [4] For when we had the envy of many and had reconquered some that had already revolted, and seeing you were no more our friends as you had been but suspected and quarrelled us, we held it no longer a safe course laying by our power to put ourselves into your danger. For the revolts from us would all have been made to you. [5] Now it is no fault for men in danger to order their affairs to the best.

76. "For you also, men of Lacedaemon, have command over the cities of Peloponnesus and order them to your best advantage. And had you, when the time was, by staying it out, been envied in your command, as we know well, you would have been no less heavy to the confederates than we, you must have been constrained to rule imperiously or to have fallen into danger. [2] So that, though overcome by three of the greatest things, honour, fear, and profit, we have both accepted the dominion delivered us and refuse again to surrender it, we have therein done nothing to be wondered at nor beside the manner of men. Nor have we been the first in this kind, but it hath been ever a thing fixed for the weaker to be kept under by the stronger. Besides, we took the government upon us as esteeming ourselves worthy of the same; and of you also so esteemed till having computed the commodity, you now fall to allegation of equity, a thing which no man that had the occasion to achieve anything by strength ever so far preferred as to divert him from his profit. [3] Those men are worthy of commendation who following the natural inclination of man in desiring rule over others are juster than for their own power they need. [4] And therefore if another had our power, we think it would best make appear our own moderation; and yet our moderation hath undeservedly incurred contempt rather than commendation.

77. "For though in pleas of covenants with our confederates when, in our own city we have allowed them trial by laws equal both to them and us, the judgment hath been given against us, we have then nevertheless been reputed contentious. [2] None of them considering that others, who in other places have dominion and are toward their subject states less moderate than we, yet are never upbraided for it. [3] For they that have the power to compel need not at all to go to law. And yet these men having been used to converse with us upon equal terms, if they lose anything which they think they should not, either by sentence or by the power of our government, they are not thankful for the much they retain, but take in worse part the little they forego than if at first, laying law aside, we had openly taken their goods by violence. For in this kind also they themselves cannot deny but the weaker must give way to the stronger. [4] And men, it seems, are more passionate for injustice than for violence. For that, coming as from an equal, seemeth rapine, and the other, because from one stronger, but necessity. [5] Therefore, when they suffered worse things under the Medes' dominion, they bore it, but think ours to be rigorous. And good reason, for to men in subjection the present is ever the worst estate. [6] Insomuch as you also, if you should put us down and reign yourselves, you would soon find a change of the love which they bear you now for fear of us if you should do again as you did for awhile when you were their commanders against the Medes. For not only your own institutions are different from those of others, but also when any one of you comes abroad [with charge], he neither useth those of yours nor yet those of the rest of Greece.

78. Deliberate therefore of this a great while as of a matter of great importance, and do not upon the opinions and criminations of others procure your own trouble. Consider before you enter how unexpected the chances of war be. [2] For a long war for the most part endeth in calamity from which we are equally far off, and whether part it will light on is to be tried with uncertainty. [3] And men, when they go to war, use many times to fall first to action, the which ought to come behind; and when they have taken harm, then they fall to reasoning. [4] But since we are neither in such error ourselves, nor do find that you are, we advise you, whilst good counsel is in both our elections, not to break the peace nor violate your oaths, but according to the articles, let the controversy be decided by judgment; or else we call the gods you have sworn by to witness that if you begin the war, we will endeavour to revenge ourselves the same way that you shall walk in before us.

79. Thus spake the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had heard both the complaints of the confederates against the Athenians and the Athenians' answer, they put them everyone out of the court and consulted of the business among themselves. [2] And the opinions of the greatest part concurred in this, that the Athenians had done unjustly and ought speedily to be warred on. But Archidamus their king, a man reputed both wise and temperate, spake as followeth.

80. "Men of Lacedaemon, both I myself have the experience of many wars, and I see you of the same age with me to have the like, insomuch as you cannot desire this war either through inexperience, as many do, nor yet as apprehending it to be profitable or safe. [2] And whosoever shall temperately consider the war we now deliberate of will find it to be no small one. [3] For though in respect of the Peloponnesians and our neighbour states we have equal strength and can quickly be upon them, yet against men whose territory is remote and are also expert seamen and with all other things excellently furnished, as money, both private and public, shipping, horses, arms, and number, more than any one part of Greece besides, and that have many confederates paying them tribute: against such, I say, why should we lightly undertake the war? And since we are unfurnished, whereon relying should we make such haste to it? On our navy? [4] But therein we are too weak; and if we will provide and prepare against them, it will require time. On our money? But therein also we are more too weak; for neither hath the state any, nor will private men readily contribute.

81. "But it may be some rely on this, that we exceed them in arms and multitude of soldiers so that we may waste their territories with incursions. [2] But there is much other land under their dominion, and by sea they are able to bring in whatsoever they shall stand in need of. [3] Again, if we essay to alienate their confederates, we must aid them with shipping because the most of them are islanders. [4] What a war then will this of ours be? For unless we have the better of them in shipping or take from them their revenue whereby their navy is maintained, we shall do the most hurt to ourselves. [5] And in this case to let fall the war again will be no honour for us when we are chiefly thought to have begun it. [6] As for the hope that if we waste their country, the war will soon be at an end, let that never lift us up; for I fear we shall transmit it rather to our children. For it is likely the Athenians have the spirit not to be slaves to their earth, nor as men without experience to be astonished at the war.

82. "And yet I do not advise that we should stupidly suffer our confederates to be wronged and not apprehend the Athenians in their plots against them, but only not yet to take up arms but to send and expostulate with them, making no great show neither of war nor of sufferance; and in the meantime to make our provision and make friends both of Greeks and barbarians, such as in any place we can get of power either in shipping or money (nor are they to be blamed that being laid in wait for, as we are by the Athenians, take unto them not Grecians only but also barbarians for their safety), and withal to set forth our own. [2] If they listen to our ambassadors, best of all; if not, then two or three years passing over our heads, being better appointed, we may war upon them if we will. [3] And when they see our preparation and hear words that import no less, they will perhaps relent the sooner, especially having their grounds unhurt and consulting upon commodities extant and not yet spoiled. [4] For we must think their territory to be nothing but an hostage, and so much the more by how much the better husbanded. The which we ought therefore to spare as long as we may, lest making them desperate, we make them also the harder to expugn. [5] For if, unfurnished as we be, at the instigation of the confederates we waste their territory, consider if in so doing we do not make the war both more dishonourable to the Peloponnesians and also more difficult. [6] For though accusations, as well against cities as private men, may be cleared again, a war for the pleasure of some taken up by all, the success whereof cannot be foreseen, can hardly with honour be letten fall again.

83. "Now let no man think it cowardice that being many cities, we go not presently and invade that one city. [2] For of confederates that bring them in money, they have more than we; and war is not so much war of arms as war of money by means whereof arms are useful, especially when it is a war of land men against sea men. [3] And therefore let us first provide ourselves of money and not first raise the war upon the persuasion of the confederates. For we that must be thought the causers of all events, good or bad, have reason also to take some leisure in part to foresee them.

84. "As for the slackness and procrastination wherewith we are reproached by the confederates, be never ashamed of it; for the more haste you make to the war, you will be the longer before you end it for that you go to it unprovided. [2] Besides, our city hath been ever free and well thought of, and this which they object is rather to be called a modesty proceeding upon judgment. For by that it is that we alone are neither arrogant upon good success nor shrink so much as others in adversity. Nor are we, when men provoke us to it with praise, through the delight thereof moved to undergo danger more than we think fit ourselves; nor when they sharpen us with reprehension doth the smart thereof a jot the more prevail upon us. [3] And this modesty of ours maketh us both good soldiers and good counsellors: good soldiers, because shame begetteth modesty, and valour is most sensible of shame; good counsellors in this, that we are brought up more simply than to disesteem the laws and by severity more modestly than to disobey them, and also in that we do not, like men exceeding wise in things needless, find fault bravely with the preparation of the enemy and in effect not assault him accordingly, but do think our neighbour's cogitations like our own, and that the events of fortune cannot be discerned by a speech; [4] and do therefore always so furnish ourselves really against the enemy as against men well advised. For we are not to build our hopes upon the oversights of them but upon the safe foresight of ourselves. Nor must we think that there is much difference between man and man, but him only to be the best, that hath been brought up amongst the most difficulties.

85. Let us not therefore cast aside the institutions of our ancestors which we have so long retained to our profit; nor let us of many men's lives, of much money, of many cities, and much honour, hastily resolve in so small a part of one day, but at leisure, the which we have better commodity than any other to do, by reason of our power. [2] Send to the Athenians about the matter of Potidaea; send about that wherein the confederates say they are injured; and the rather because they be content to refer the cause to judgment, and one that offereth himself to judgment may not lawfully be invaded as a doer of injury before the judgment be given. And prepare withal for the war. So shall you take the most profitable counsel for yourselves, and the most formidable to the enemy. [3]

Thus spake Archidamus. But Sthenelaidas, then one of the Ephori, stood up last of all and spake to the Lacedaemonians in this manner:

86. For my part, I understand not the many words used by the Athenians; for though they have been much in their own praises, yet they have said nothing to the contrary but that they have done injury to our confederates and to Peloponnesus. And if they carried themselves well against the Medes, when time was, and now ill against us, they deserve a double punishment, because they are not good as they were and because they are evil as they were not. [2] Now are we the same we were and mean not (if we be wise) either to connive at the wrongs done to our confederates or defer to repair them, for the harm they suffer is not deferred. [3] Others have much money, many galleys, and many horses; and we have good confederates not to be betrayed to the Athenians nor to be defended with words (for they are not hurt in words), but to be aided with all our power and with speed. [4] Let no man tell me that after we have once received the injury we ought to deliberate. No, it belongs rather to the doers of injury to spend time in consultation. [5] Wherefore, men of Lacedaemon, decree the war, as becometh the dignity of Sparta; and let not the Athenians grow yet greater, nor let us betray our confederates, but in the name of the Gods proceed against the doers of injustice.

87. Having thus spoken, being himself Ephor, he put it to the question in the assembly of the Lacedaemonians; [2] and saying afterwards that he could not discern whether was the greater cry (for they used there to give their votes viva voce and not with balls) and desiring that it might be evident that their minds were inclined most to the war, he put it unto them again and said, ‘to whomsoever of you it seemeth that the peace is broken and that the Athenians have done unjustly, let him arise and go yonder,’ and withal he showed them a certain place, ‘and to whomsoever it seemeth otherwise, let him go to the other side. [3] So they arose and the room was divided, wherein far the greater number were those that held the peace to be broken. [4]

Then calling in the confederates they told them that for their own parts their sentence was that the Athenians had done them wrong; but yet they desired to have all their confederates called together, and then to put it to the question again that if they would, the war might be decreed by common consent. [5] This done, their confederates went home; and so did also afterwards the Athenians when they had dispatched the business they came about. [6] This decree of the assembly that the peace was broken was made in the fourteenth year of those thirty years for which a peace had been formerly concluded after the actions past in Euboea.

88. The Lacedaemonians gave sentence that the peace was broken and that war was to be made, not so much for the words of the confederates as for fear the Athenian greatness should still increase. For they saw that a great part of Greece was fallen already into their hands.

89. Now the manner how the Athenians came to the administration of those affairs by which they so raised themselves was this. [2] After that the Medes, overcome by sea and land, were departed, and such of them as had escaped by sea to Mycale were there also utterly overthrown, Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, then commander of the Grecians at Mycale, with their confederates of Peloponnesus went home. But the Athenians with their confederates of Ionia and the Hellespont, as many as were already revolted from the king, stayed behind and besieged Sestus, holden then by the Medes; and when they had lain before it all the winter, they took it abandoned by the barbarians. And after this they set sail from the Hellespont, everyone to his own city. [3] And the body of the Athenians, as soon as their territory was clear of the barbarians, went home also and fetched thither their wives and children and such goods as they had from the places where they had been put out to keep, and went about the reparation of their city and walls. For there were yet standing some pieces of the circuit of their wall, and likewise a few houses (though the most were down) which the principal of the Persians had reserved for their own lodgings.

90. The Lacedaemonians, hearing what they went about, sent thither their ambassadors—partly because they would themselves have been glad that neither the Athenians nor any other had had walls, but principally as incited thereto by their confederates who feared not only the greatness of their navy, which they had not before, but also their courage showed against the Persians—and entreated them not to build their walls but rather to join with them in pulling down the walls of what cities soever without Peloponnesus had them yet standing, not discovering their meaning and the jealousy they had of the Athenians but pretending this: [2] that if the barbarian returned, he might find no fortified city to make the seat of his war, as he did of Thebes, and that Peloponnesus was sufficient for them all whereinto to retire and from whence to withstand the war. [3] But the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, when the Lacedaemonian ambassadors had so said, dismissed them presently with this answer, that they would presently send ambassadors about the business they spake of to Lacedaemon. Now Themistocles willed them to send himself to Lacedaemon for one, and that as speedily as they could; but such as were chosen ambassadors with him not to send away presently, but to stay them till the walls were so raised as to fight upon them from a sufficient height; and that all the men in the city, in the meantime, both they and their wives and children, sparing neither private nor public edifice that might advance the work but pulling all down whatsoever, should help to raise it. [4] When he had thus instructed them, adding that he would himself do the rest at Lacedaemon, he took his journey. [5] And when he came to Lacedaemon, he went not to the state, but delaying the time excused himself, and when any of those that were in office asked him why he did not present himself to the state, answered, ‘that he stayed for his fellow-ambassadors who, upon some business that fell out, were left behind, but he expected them very shortly and wondered they were not come already.

91. Hearing this, they gave credit to Themistocles for the love they bore him; but when others coming thence averred plainly that the wall went up and that it was come to good height already, they could not then choose but believe it. [2] Themistocles, when he saw this, wished them not to be led by reports, but rather to send thither some of their own, such as were honest men, and, having informed themselves, would relate the truth, which they also did. [3] And Themistocles sendeth privily to the Athenians about the same men to take order for their stay with as little appearance of it as they could and not to dismiss them till their own ambassadors were returned (for by this time were arrived those that were joined with him, namely, Abronychus the son of Lysicles, and Aristides the son of Lysimachus, and brought him word that the wall was of a sufficient height); [4] for he feared lest the Lacedaemonians, when they knew the truth, would refuse to let them go. The Athenians therefore kept there those ambassadors according as it was written to them to do. Themistocles, coming now to his audience before the Lacedaemonians, said plainly, ‘that the city of Athens was already walled, and that sufficiently for the defence of those within, and that if it shall please the Lacedaemonians upon any occasion to send ambassadors unto them, they were to send thenceforward as to men that understood what conduced both to their own and also to the common good of all Greece. [5] For when they thought it best to quit their city and put themselves into their galleys,’ he said, ‘they were bold to do it without asking the advice of them; [6] and in common counsel the advice of the Athenians was as good as the advice of them. And now at this time their opinion is that it will be best, both for themselves in particular and for all the confederates in common, that their city should be walled. [7] For that in strength unequal men cannot alike and equally advise for the common benefit of Greece. Therefore,’ said he, ‘either must all the confederate cities be unwalled, or you must not think amiss of what is done by us.

92. The Lacedaemonians when they heard him, though they made no show of being angry with the Athenians (for they had not sent their ambassadors to forbid them but, by way of advice, to admonish them not to build the wall; besides, they bare them affection then for their courage shown against the Medes), yet they were inwardly offended because they missed of their will. And the ambassadors returned home of either side without complaint.

93. Thus the Athenians quickly raised their walls, the structure itself making manifest the haste used in the building. [2] For the foundation consisteth of stones of all sorts, and those in some places unwrought and as they were brought to the place. Many pillars also taken from sepulchres and polished stones were piled together among the rest. For the circuit of the city was set every way farther out, and therefore hastening they took alike whatsoever came next to hand. [3] Themistocles likewise persuaded them to build up the rest of Piraeus, for it was begun in the year that himself was archon of Athens, as conceiving the place both beautiful, in that it had three natural havens, and that being now seamen, it would very much conduce to the enlargement of their power. [4] For he was indeed the first man that dared tell them that they ought to take upon them the command of the sea, and withal presently helped them in the obtaining it. [5] By his counsel also it was that they built the wall of that breadth about Piraeus which is now to be seen. For two carts carrying stones met and passed upon it one by another. And yet within it there was neither rubbish nor mortar [to fill it up], but it was made all of great stones cut square and bound together with iron and lead. But for height it was raised but to the half, at the most, of what he had intended. [6] For he would have had it able to hold out the enemy both by the height and breadth, and that a few and the less serviceable men might have sufficed to defend it and the rest have served in the navy. [7] For principally he was addicted to the sea because, as I think, he had observed that the forces of the king had easier access to invade them by sea than by land, and thought that Piraeus was more profitable than the city above. And oftentimes he would exhort the Athenians that, in case they were oppressed by land, they should go down thither and with their galleys make resistance against what enemy soever. [8] Thus the Athenians built their walls, and fitted themselves in other kinds, immediately upon the departure of the Persians.

94. In the meantime was Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, sent from Lacedaemon commander of the Grecians with twenty galleys out of Peloponnesus, with which went also thirty sail of Athens, besides a multitude of other confederates, and making war on Cyprus subdued the greatest part of the same; [2] and afterwards, under the same commander, came before Byzantium, which they besieged and won.

95. But Pausanias, being now grown insolent, both the rest of the Grecians and especially the Ionians who had newly recovered their liberty from the king, offended with him, came to the Athenians and requested them for consanguinity's sake to become their leaders and to protect them from the violence of Pausanias. [2] The Athenians, accepting the motion, applied themselves both to the defence of these and also to the ordering of the rest of the affairs there in such sort as it should seem best to themselves. [3] In the meantime the Lacedaemonians sent for Pausanias home to examine him of such things as they had heard against him. For great crimes had been laid to his charge by the Grecians that came from thence; [4] and his government was rather an imitation of tyranny than a command in war. And it was his hap to be called home at the same time that the confederates, all but the soldiers of Peloponnesus, out of hatred to him had turned to the Athenians. [5] When he came to Lacedaemon, though he were censured for some wrongs done to private men, yet of the greatest matters he was acquit, especially of Medising, the which seemed to be the most evident of all. [6] Him therefore they sent general no more, but Dorcis, and some others with him, with no great army, whose command the confederates refused; [7] and they, finding that, went their ways likewise. And after that the Lacedaemonians sent no more, because they feared lest such as went out would prove the worse for the state, as they had seen by Pausanias, and also because they desired to be rid of the Persian war, conceiving the Athenians to be sufficient leaders and at that time their friends.

96. When the Athenians had thus gotten the command by the confederates' own accord for the hatred they bare to Pausanias, they then set down an order which cities should contribute money for this war against the barbarians, and which galleys. For they pretended to repair the injuries they had suffered by laying waste the territories of the king. [2] And then first came up amongst the Athenians the office of treasurers of Greece, who were receivers of the tribute, for so they called this money contributed. And the first tribute that was taxed came to four hundred and sixty talents. The treasury was at Delos, and their meetings were kept there in the temple.

97. Now using their authority at first in such manner as that the confederates lived under their own laws and were admitted to common council, by [the] war and administration of the common affairs of Greece from the Persian war to this, what against the barbarians, what against their own innovating confederates, and what against such of the Peloponnesians as chanced always in every war to fall in, they effected those great matters following. [2] Which also I have therefore written both because this place hath been pretermitted by all that have written before me (for they have either compiled the Grecian acts before the invasion of the Persians or that invasion only, of which number is Hellanicus, who hath also touched them in his Attic history, but briefly and without exact mention of the times), and also because they carry with them a demonstration of how the Athenian empire grew up.

98. And first, under the conduct of Cimon the son of Miltiades they took Eion upon the river Strymon from the Medes by siege and carried away the inhabitants captives. [2] Then the isle Scyros, in the Aegean sea, inhabited by the Dolopes, the inhabitants whereof they also carried away captives and planted therein a colony of their own. [3] Likewise they made war on the Carystians alone without the rest of the Euboeans, and those also after a time came in by composition. [4] After this they warred on the revolted Naxians and brought them in by siege. And this was the first confederate city which contrary to the ordinance they deprived of their free estate; though afterwards, as it came to any of their turns, they did the like by the rest.

99. Amongst other causes of revolts the principal was their failing to bring in their tribute and galleys and their refusing (when they did so) to follow the wars. For the Athenians exacted strictly and were grievous to them by imposing a necessity of toil which they were neither accustomed nor willing to undergo. [2] They were also otherwise not so gentle in their government as they had been, nor followed the war upon equal terms, and could easily bring back to their subjection such as should revolt. [3] And of this the confederates themselves were the causes. For through this refusal to accompany the army the most of them, to the end they might stay at home, were ordered to excuse their galleys with money, as much as it came to, by which means the navy of the Athenians was increased at the cost of their confederates, and themselves unprovided and without means to make war in case they should revolt.

100. After this it came to pass that the Athenians and their confederates fought against the Medes, both by land and by water, upon the river of Eurymedon in Pamphilia; and in one and the same day the Athenians had victory in both and took or sunk all the Phoenician fleet to the number of two hundred galleys. [2] After this again happened the revolt of Thasos upon a difference about the places of trade and about the mines they possessed in the opposite parts of Thrace. And the Athenians, going thither with their fleet, overthrew them in a battle at sea and landed in the island. [3] But having about the same time sent ten thousand of their own and of their confederates' people unto the river of Strymon for a colony to be planted in a place called then the Nine-ways, now Amphipolis, they won the said Nine-ways, which was held by the Eidonians; but advancing farther towards the heart of the country of Thrace, they were defeated at Drabescus, a city of the Eidonians, by the whole power of the Thracians that were enemies to this new-built town of the Nine-ways.

101. The Thasians in the meantime, being overcome in divers battles and besieged, sought aid of the Lacedaemonians and entreated them to divert the enemy by an invasion of Attica, [2] which, unknown to the Athenians, they promised to do and also had done it, but by an earthquake that then happened, they were hindered. In which earthquake their Helots, and of neighboring towns the Thuriatae and Aethaeans, revolted and seized on Ithome. Most of these Helots were the posterity of the ancient Messenians brought into servitude in former times, whereby also it came to pass that they were called all Messenians. [3] Against these had the Lacedaemonians now a war at Ithome. The Thasians in the third year of the siege rendered themselves to the Athenians upon condition to raze their walls, to deliver up their galleys, to pay both the money behind and for the future as much as they were wont, and to quit both the mines and the continent.

102. The Lacedaemonians, when the war against those in Ithome grew long, amongst other their confederates sent for aid to the Athenians, who also came with no small forces under the command of Cimon. [2] They were sent for principally for their reputation in mural assaults, the long continuance of the siege seeming to require men of ability in that kind, whereby they might perhaps have gotten the place by force. [3] And upon this journey grew the first manifest dissension between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians. For the Lacedaemonians, when they could not take the place by assault, fearing lest the audacious and innovating humour of the Athenians, whom withal they esteemed of a contrary race, might, at the persuasion of those in Ithome, cause some alteration if they stayed, dismissed them alone of all the confederates, not discovering their jealousy but alleging that they had no farther need of their service. [4] But the Athenians, perceiving that they were not sent away upon good cause but only as men suspected, made it a heinous matter, and conceiving that they had better deserved at the Lacedaemonians' hands, as soon as they were gone left the league which they had made with the Lacedaemonians against the Persian and became confederates with their enemies the Argives; and then both Argives and Athenians took the same oath and made the same league with the Thessalians.

103. Those in Ithome, when they could no longer hold out, in the tenth year of the siege rendered the place to the Lacedaemonians upon condition of security to depart out of Peloponnesus and that they should no more return, and whosoever should be taken returning to be the slave of him that should take him. [2] For the Lacedaemonians had before been warned by a certain answer of the Pythian oracle to let go the suppliant of Jupiter Ithometes. [3] So they came forth, they and their wives and their children. And the Athenians, for hatred they bore to the Lacedaemonians, received them and put them into Naupactus; which city they had lately taken from the Locrians of Ozolae. [4] The Megareans also revolted from the Lacedaemonians and came to the league of the Athenians because they were holden down by the Corinthians with a war about the limits of their territories. Whereupon Megara and Pegae were put into the hands of the Athenians, who built for the Megareans the long walls from the city to Nisaea and maintained them with a garrison of their own. And from hence it was chiefly that the vehement hatred grew of the Corinthians against the Athenians.

104. Moreover Inarus, the son of Psammetticus, an African, king of the Africans that confine on Egypt, making war from Mareia above Pharus, caused the greatest part of Egypt to rebel against the king Artaxerxes; [2] and when he had taken the government of them upon himself, he brought in the Athenians to assist him, who chancing to be then warring on Cyprus with two hundred galleys, part their own and part their confederates, left Cyprus and went to him. And going from the sea up the river of Nilus after they had made themselves masters of the river and of two parts of the city of Memphis, assaulted the third part called the White Wall. Within were of the Medes and Persians, such as had escaped, and of the Egyptians, such as had not revolted amongst the rest.

105. The Athenians came also with a fleet to Halias and landing their soldiers fought by land with the Corinthians and Epidaurians, and the Corinthians had the victory. After this, the Athenians fought by sea against the fleet of the Peloponnesians at Cecryphaleia, and the Athenians had the victory. [2] After this again, the war being on foot of the Athenians against the Aeginetae, a great battle was fought between them by sea upon the coast of Aegina, the confederates of both sides being at the same, in which the Athenians had the victory, and having taken seventy galleys landed their army and besieged the city under the conduct of Leocrates the son of Stroebus. [3] After this, the Peloponnesians, desiring to aid the Aeginetae, sent over into Aegina itself three hundred men of arms of the same that had before aided the Corinthians and Epidaurians and with other forces seized on the top of Geraneia. And the Corinthians and their confederates came down from thence into the territory of Megara, supposing that the Athenians, having much of their army absent in Aegina and in Egypt, would be unable to aid the Megareans or, if they did, would be forced to rise from before Aegina. [4] But the Athenians stirred not from Aegina; but those that remained at Athens, both young and old, under the conduct of Myronides went to Megara; [5] and after they had fought with doubtful victory, they parted asunder again with an opinion on both sides not to have had the worse in the action. [6] And the Athenians, who notwithstanding had rather the better, when the Corinthians were gone away erected a trophy. But the Corinthians, having been reviled at their return by the ancient men of the city, about twelve days after came again prepared and set up their trophy likewise, as if the victory had been theirs. Hereupon the Athenians sallying out of Megara with a huge shout both slew those that were setting up the trophy and, charging the rest, got the victory.

106. The Corinthians, being overcome, went their way; but a good part of them, being hard followed and missing their way, lighted into the enclosed ground of a private man, which fenced with a great ditch had no passage through. [2] Which the Athenians perceiving, opposed them at the place by which they entered with their men of arms and, encompassing the ground with their light armed soldiers, killed those that were entered with stones. This was a great loss to the Corinthians, but the rest of their army got home again.

107. About this time the Athenians began the building of their long walls from the city down to the sea, the one reaching to the haven called Phaleron, the other to Piraeus. [2] The Phoceans also making war upon Boeum, Cytinium, and Erineus, towns that belonged to the Dorians of whom the Lacedaemonians are descended, and having taken one of them, the Lacedaemonians, under the conduct of Nicomedes the son of Cleombrotus in the place of Pleistoanactes son of king Pausanias who was yet in his minority, sent unto the aid of the Dorians fifteen hundred men of arms of their own, and of their confederates ten thousand. [3] And when they had forced the Phoceans upon composition to surrender the town they had taken, they went their ways again. Now if they would go home by sea through the Crisaean Gulf, the Athenians going about with their fleet would be ready to stop them; and to pass over Geraneia they thought unsafe because the Athenians had in their hands Megara and Pegae. For Geraneia was not only a difficult passage of itself but was also always guarded by the Athenians. [4] They thought good, therefore, to stay amongst the Boeotians and to consider which way they might most safely go through. Whilst they were there, there wanted not some Athenians that privily solicited them to come to the city, hoping to have put the people out of government and to have demolished the long walls then building. [5] But the Athenians, with the whole power of their city and a thousand Argives and other confederates as they could be gotten together, in all fourteen thousand men, went out to meet them; [6] for there was suspicion that they came thither to depose the democracy. [7] There also came to the Athenians certain horsemen out of Thessaly, which in the battle turned to the Lacedaemonians.

108. They fought at Tanagra of Boeotia, and the Lacedaemonians had the victory; but the slaughter was great on both sides. [2] Then the Lacedaemonians, entering into the territories of Megara and cutting down the woods before them, returned home by the way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. [3] Upon the twoand-sixtieth day after this battle the Athenians, under the conduct of Myronides, made a journey against the Boeotians and overthrew them at Oenophyta and brought the territories of Boeotia and Phocis under their obedience, and withal razed the walls of Tanagra and took of the wealthiest of the Locrians of Opus a hundred hostages, and finished also at the same time their long walls at home. [4] After this, Aegina also yielded to the Athenians on these conditions: that they should have their walls pulled down and should deliver up their galleys and pay their taxed tribute for the time to come. [5] Also the Athenians made a voyage about Peloponnesus wherein they burnt the arsenal of the Lacedaemonians' navy, took Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians, and landing their forces in Sicyonia overcame in the fight those that made head against them.

109. All this while the Athenians stayed still in Egypt and saw much variety of war. First the Athenians were masters of Egypt; [2] and the king of Persia sent one Megabazus, a Persian, with money to Lacedaemon to procure the Peloponnesians to invade Attica, and by that means to draw the Athenians out of Egypt. [3] But when this took no effect, and money was spent to no purpose, Megabazus returned with the money he had left into Asia. [4] And then was Megabazus the son of Zopyrus, a Persian, sent into Egypt with great forces, and coming in by land overthrew the Egyptians and their confederates in a battle, drave the Grecians out of Memphis, and finally inclosed them in the isle of Prosopis. There he besieged them a year and a half, till such time as having drained the channel and turned the water another way, he made their galleys lie aground and the island for the most part continent, and so came over and won the island with land soldiers.

110. Thus was the army of the Grecians lost after six years' war; and few of many passing through Africa saved themselves in Cyrene, but the most perished. [2] So Egypt returned to the obedience of the king except only Amyrtaeus that reigned in the fens. For him they could not bring in, both because the fens are great, and the people of the fens of all the Egyptians the most warlike. [3] But Inarus, king of the Africans and author of all this stir in Egypt, was taken by treason and crucified. [4] The Athenians moreover had sent fifty galleys more into Egypt for a supply of those that were there already, which putting in at Mendesium, one of the mouths of Nilus, knew nothing of what had happened to the rest, and being assaulted from the land by the army and from the sea by the Phoenician fleet, lost the greatest part of their galleys and escaped home again with the lesser part. Thus ended the great expedition of the Athenians and their confederates into Egypt.


Also Orestes the son of Echecratidas, king of the Thessalians, driven out of Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. And the Athenians, taking with them the Boeotians and Phoceans, their confederates, made war against Pharsalus, a city of Thessaly, and were masters of the field as far as they strayed not from the army (for the Thessalian horsemen kept them from straggling) but could not win the city nor yet perform anything else of what they came for but came back again without effect and brought Orestes with them. [2] Not long after this, a thousand Athenians went aboard the galleys that lay at Pegae (for Pegae was in the hands of the Athenians) under the command of Pericles the son of Xantippus, and sailed into Sicyonia and landing put to flight such of the Sicyonians as made head, and then presently took up forces in Achaia, and putting over made war on Oenias, a city of Acarnania, which they besieged. [3] Nevertheless they took it not but returned home.

112. Three years after this, was a truce made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians for five years. [2] And the Athenians gave over the Grecian war and with two hundred galleys, part their own and part confederates, under the conduct of Cimon made war on Cyprus. [3] Of these there went sixty sail into Egypt, sent for by Amyrtaeus that reigned in the fens; and the rest lay at the siege of Citium. [4] But Cimon there dying and a famine arising in the army, they left Citium and when they had passed Salamis in Cyprus, fought at once both by sea and land against the Phoenicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians and, having gotten victory in both, returned home, and with them the rest of their fleet, now come back from Egypt. [5] After this, the Lacedaemonians took in hand the war called the holy war and, having won the temple at Delphi, delivered the possession thereof to the Delphians. But the Athenians afterward, when the Lacedaemonians were gone, came with their army and, regaining it, delivered the possession to the Phoceans.

113. Some space of time after this, the outlaws of Boeotia being seized of Orchomenus and Chaeroneia and certain other places of Boeotia, the Athenians made war upon those places, being their enemies, with a thousand men of arms of their own and as many of their confederates as severally came in, under the conduct of Tolmidas the son of Tolmaeus. [2] And when they had taken Chaeroneia, they carried away the inhabitants captives and, leaving a garrison in the city, departed. In their return, those outlaws that were in Orchomenus, together with the Locrians of Opus and the Euboean outlaws and others of the same faction, set upon them at Coroneia; [3] and overcoming the Athenians in battle, some they slew and some they took alive. [4] Whereupon the Athenians relinquished all Boeotia and made peace with condition to have their prisoners released. So the outlaws and the rest returned, and lived again under their own laws.

114. Not long after revolted Euboea from the Athenians; and when Pericles had already passed over into it with the Athenian army, there was brought him news that Megara was likewise revolted and that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and that the Megareans had slain the Athenian garrison, except only such as fled into Nisaea. Now the Megareans, when they revolted, had gotten to their aid the Corinthians, Epidaurians, and Sicyonians. Wherefore Pericles forthwith withdrew his army from Euboea; [2] and the Lacedaemonians afterward brake into Attica and wasted the country about Eleusine and Thriasium under the conduct of Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, and came no farther on, but so went away. [3] After which the Athenians passed again into Euboea and totally subdued it: the Hestiaeans they put quite out, taking their territory into their own hands, but ordered the rest of Euboea according to composition made.

115. Being returned from Euboea, within awhile after they made a peace with the Lacedaemonians and their confederates for thirty years and rendered Nisaea, Achaia, Pegae, and Troezene (for these places the Athenians held of theirs) to the Peloponnesians. [2] In the sixth year of this peace fell out the war between the Samians and Milesians concerning Priene; and the Milesians, being put to the worse, came to Athens and exclaimed against the Samians. Wherein also certain private men of Samos itself took part with the Milesians out of desire to alter the form of government. [3] Whereupon the Athenians went to Samos with a fleet of forty galleys and set up the democracy there and took of the Samians fifty boys and as many men for hostages, which, when they had put into Lemnos and set a guard upon them, they came home. [4] But certain of the Samians (for some of them not enduring the popular government were fled into the continent) entering into a league with the mightiest of them in Samos and with Pissuthnes the son of Hystaspes, who then was governor of Sardis, and levying about seven hundred auxiliary soldiers, passed over into Samos in the evening and first set upon the popular faction and brought most of them into their power; [5] and then stealing their hostages out of Lemnos, they revolted and delivered the Athenian guard and such captains as were there into the hands of Pissuthnes, and withal prepared to make war against Miletus. With these also revolted the Byzantines.

116. The Athenians, when they heard of these things, sent to Samos sixty galleys, sixteen whereof they did not use (for some of them went into Caria to observe the fleet of the Phoenicians and some to fetch in succours from Chios and Lesbos), but with the forty-four that remained, under the command of Pericles and nine others, fought with seventy galleys of the Samians (whereof twenty were such as served for the transport of soldiers) as they were coming altogether from Miletus; and the Athenians had the victory. [2] After this came a supply of forty galleys more from Athens, and from Chios and Lesbos twenty-five. With these having landed their men, they overthrew the Samians in battle and besieged the city, which they inclosed with a triple wall, and shut it up by sea with their galleys. [3] But Pericles, taking with him sixty galleys out of the road, made haste towards Caunus and Caria upon intelligence of the coming against them of the Phoenician fleet. For Stesagoras with five galleys was already gone out of Samos and others out of other places to meet the Phoenicians.

117. In the meantime, the Samians, coming suddenly forth with their fleet and falling upon the harbour of the Athenians which was unfortified, sunk the galleys that kept watch before it and overcame the rest in fight, insomuch that they became masters of the sea near their coast for about fourteen days together, importing and exporting what they pleased. [2] But Pericles returning shut them up again with his galleys. And after this there came to him from Athens a supply of forty sail, with Thucydides, Agnon, and Phormio; and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles; and from Chios and Lesbos thirty more. [3] And though the Samians fought against these a small battle at sea, yet unable to hold out any longer, in the ninth month of the siege they rendered the city upon composition: namely, to demolish their walls, to give hostages, to deliver up their navy, and to repay the money spent by the Athenians in the war at days appointed. And the Byzantines also yielded with condition to remain subject to them in the same manner as they had been before their revolt.

118. Now not many years after this happened the matters before related, of the Corcyraeans and the Potidaeans and whatsoever other intervenient pretext of this war. [2] These things done by the Grecians one against another or against the barbarians came to pass all within the compass of fifty years at most, from the time of the departure of Xerxes to the beginning of this present war. In which time the Athenians both assured their government over the confederates and also much enlarged their own particular wealth. This the Lacedaemonians saw and opposed not, save now and then a little, but, as men that had ever before been slow to war without necessity and also for that they were hindered sometimes with domestic war, for the most part of the time stirred not against them; till now at last, when the power of the Athenians was advanced manifestly indeed and that they had done injury to their confederates, they could forbear no longer, but thought it necessary to go in hand with the war with all diligence and to pull down, if they could, the Athenian greatness. For which purpose it was by the Lacedaemonians themselves decreed that the peace was broken and that the Athenians had done unjustly; [3] and also having sent to Delphi and enquired of Apollo whether they should have the better in the war or not, they received, as it is reported, this answer: ‘That if they warred with their whole power, they should have victory and that himself would be on their side, both called and uncalled.

119. Now when they had assembled their confederates again, they were to put it to the question amongst them, ‘whether they should make war or not.’ And the ambassadors of the several confederates coming in and the council set, as well the rest spake what they thought fit, most of them accusing the Athenians of injury and desiring the war, as also the Corinthians, who had before entreated the cities everyone severally to give their vote for the war, fearing lest Potidaea should be lost before help came, being then present spake last of all to this effect:

120. "Confederates, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians, they having both decreed the war themselves and also assembled us to do the same. For it is fit for them who have the command in a common league, as they are honoured of all before the rest, so also (administering their private affairs equally with others) to consider before the rest of the common business. [2] And though as many of us as have already had our turns with the Athenians need not be taught to beware of them, yet it were good for those that dwell up in the land, and not as we in places of traffic on the sea side, to know that unless they defend those below, they shall with a great deal the more difficulty both carry to the sea the commodities of the seasons and again more hardly receive the benefits afforded to the inland countries from the sea; and also not to mistake what is now spoken, as if it concerned them not, but to make account that if they neglect those that dwell by the sea, the calamity will also reach to themselves; [3] and that this consultation concerneth them no less than us, and therefore not to be afraid to change their peace for war. For though it be the part of discreet men to be quiet unless they have wrong, yet it is the part of valiant men, when they receive injury, to pass from peace into war, and after success, from war to come again to composition, and neither to swell with the good success of war nor to suffer injury through pleasure taken in the ease of peace. [4] For he whom pleasure makes a coward, if he sit still, shall quickly lose the sweetness of the ease that made him so. And he that in war is made proud by success observeth not that his pride is grounded upon unfaithful confidence. [5] For though many things ill advised come to good effect against enemies worse advised, yet more, thought well advised, have fallen but badly out against well advised enemies. For no man comes to execute a thing with the same confidence he premeditates it. For we deliver opinions in safety, whereas in the action itself we fail through fear.

121. "As for the war, at this time we raise it, both upon injuries done us and upon other sufficient allegations; and when we have repaired our wrongs upon the Athenians, we will also in due time lay it down. [2] And it is for many reasons probable that we shall have the victory: first, because we exceed them in number; [3] and next, because when we go to any action intimated, we shall be all of one fashion. And as for a navy, wherein consisteth the strength of the Athenians, we shall provide it both out of everyone's particular wealth and with the money at Delphi and Olympia. For taking this at interest, we shall be able to draw from them their foreign mariners by offer of greater wages. For the forces of the Athenians are rather mercenary than domestic; whereas our own power is less obnoxious to such accidents, consisting more in the persons of men than in money. [4] And if we overcome them but in one battle by sea, in all probability they are totally vanquished. And if they hold out, we also shall with longer time apply ourselves to naval affairs. And when we shall once have made our skill equal to theirs, we shall surely overmatch them in courage. For the valour that we have by nature, they shall never come unto by teaching; but the experience which they exceed us in, that must we attain unto by industry. [5] And the money wherewith to bring this to pass, it must be all our parts to contribute. For else it were a hard case that the confederates of the Athenians should not stick to contribute to their own servitude, and we should refuse to lay out our money to be revenged of our enemies and for our own preservation, and that the Athenians take not our money from us and even with that do us mischief.

122. "We have also many other ways of war, as the revolt of their confederates, which is the principal means of lessening their revenue; the building of forts in their territory; and many other things which one cannot now foresee. For the course of war is guided by nothing less than by the points of our account, but of itself contriveth most things upon the occasion. Wherein he that complies with it with most temper standeth the firmest, and he that is most passionate oftenest miscarries. [2] Imagine we had differences each of us about the limits of our territory with an equal adversary; we must undergo them. But now the Athenians are a match for us all at once, and one city after another too strong for us. Insomuch that unless we oppose them jointly and every nation and city set to it unanimously, they will overcome us asunder without labour. And know that to be vanquished (though it trouble you to hear it) brings with it no less than manifest servitude, which but to mention as a doubt, as if so many cities could suffer under one, were very dishonourable to Peloponnesus. [3] For it must then be thought that we are either punished upon merit, or else that we endure it out of fear and so appear degenerate from our ancestors. For by them the liberty of all Greece hath been restored, whereas we for our part assure not so much as our own but, claiming the reputation of having deposed tyrants in the several cities, suffer a tyrant city to be established amongst us. [4] Wherein we know not how we can avoid one of these three great faults, foolishness, cowardice, or negligence. For certainly you avoid them not by imputing it to that which hath done most men hurt, contempt of the enemy: for contempt, because it hath made too many men miscarry, hath gotten the name of foolishness.

123. "But to what end should we object matters past more than is necessary to the business in hand? We must now by helping the present labour for the future, for it is peculiar to our country to attain honour by labour. And though you be now somewhat advanced in honour and power, you must not therefore change the custom; for there is no reason that what was gotten in want should be lost by wealth. But we should confidently go in hand with the war as for many other causes so also for this, that both the God hath by his oracle advised us thereto and promised to be with us himself, and also for that the rest of Greece, some for fear and some for profit, are ready to take our parts. [2] Nor are you they that first break the peace, which the God, inasmuch as he doth encourage us to the war, judgeth violated by them; but you fight rather in defence of the same. For not he breaketh the peace that taketh revenge, but he that is the first invader.

124. So that seeing it will be every way good to make the war, and since in common we persuade the same, and seeing also that both to the cities and to private men it will be the most profitable course, put off no longer neither the defence of the Potidaeans, who are Dorians and besieged (which was wont to be contrary) by lonians, nor the recovery of the liberty of the rest of the Grecians. For it is a case that admitteth not delay when they are some of them already oppressed, and others (after it shall be known we met and durst not right ourselves) shall shortly after undergo the like. [2] But think, confederates, you are now at a necessity and that this is the best advice; and therefore give your votes for the war, not fearing the present danger but coveting the long peace proceeding from it. For though by war growth the confirmation of peace, yet for love of ease to refuse the war doth not likewise avoid the danger. [3] But making account that a tyrant city set up in Greece is set up alike over all and reigneth over some already and the rest in intention, we shall bring it again into order by the war and not only live for the time to come out of danger ourselves but also deliver the already enthralled Grecians out of servitude.’ Thus said the Corinthians.

125. The Lacedaemonians, when they had heard the opinion of them all, brought the balls to all the confederates present in order, from the greatest state to the least; and the greatest part gave their votes for the war. [2] Now after the war was decreed, though it were impossible for them to go in hand with it presently because they were unprovided and every state thought good without delay severally to furnish themselves of what was necessary, yet there passed not fully a year in this preparation before Attica was invaded and the war openly on foot.

126. In the meantime they sent ambassadors to the Athenians with certain criminations to the end that if they would give ear to nothing, they might have all the pretext that could be for raising of the war. [2] And first the Lacedaemonians, by their ambassadors to the Athenians, required them to banish such as were under curse of the goddess Minerva for pollution of sanctuary. Which pollution was thus. [3] There had been one Cylon an Athenian, a man that had been victor in the Olympian exercises, of much nobility and power amongst those of old time, and that had married the daughter of Theagenes, a Megarean, in those days tyrant of Megara. [4] To this Cylon asking counsel at Delphi the God answered that on the greatest festival day he should seize the citadel of Athens. [5] He therefore, having gotten forces of Theagenes and persuaded his friends to the enterprise, seized on the citadel at the time of the Olympic holidays in Peloponnesus with intention to take upon him the tyranny, esteeming the feast of Jupiter to be the greatest and to touch withal on his particular in that he had been victor in the Olympian exercises. [6] But whether the feast spoken of were meant to be the greatest in Attica or in some other place, neither did he himself consider nor the oracle make manifest. For there is also amongst the Athenians the Diasia, which is called the greatest feast of Jupiter Meilichius and is celebrated without the city, wherein in the confluence of the whole people many men offered sacrifices not of living creatures but such as was the fashion of the natives of the place. [7] But he, supposing he had rightly understood the oracle, laid hand to the enterprise. [8] And when the Athenians heard of it, they came with all their forces out of the fields and lying before the citadel besieged it. But the time growing long, the Athenians, wearied with the siege, went most of them away, and left both the guard of the citadel and the whole business to the nine archontes with absolute authority to order the same as to them it should seem good. [9] For at that time, most of the affairs of the commonweal were administered by those nine archontes. [10] Now those that were besieged with Cylon were for want of both victual and water in very evil estate, and therefore Cylon and a brother of his fled privily out; [11] but the rest, when they were pressed and some of them dead with famine, sat down as suppliants by the altar that is in the citadel. And the Athenians, to whose charge was committed the guard of the place, raising them upon promise to do them no harm, put them all to the sword. Also they had put to death some of those that had taken sanctuary at the altars of the severe goddesses as they were going away. And from this the Athenians, both themselves and their posterity, were called accursed and sacrilegious persons. [12] Hereupon the Athenians banished those that were under the curse; and Cleomenes, a Lacedaemonian, together with the Athenians in a sedition, banished them afterwards again, and not only so but disinterred and cast forth the bodies of such of them as were dead. Nevertheless there returned of them afterwards again, and there are of their race in the city unto this day.

127. This pollution, therefore, the Lacedaemonians required them to purge their city of, principally, forsooth, as taking part with the gods, but knowing withal that Pericles the son of Xantippus was by the mother's side one of that race. For they thought if Pericles were banished, the Athenians would the more easily be brought to yield to their desire. [2] Nevertheless, they hoped not so much that he should be banished as to bring him into the envy of the city, as if the misfortune of him were in part the cause of the war. [3] For being the most powerful of his time and having the sway of the state, he was in all things opposite to the Lacedaemonians, not suffering the Athenians to give them the least way but inciting them to the war.

128. Contrariwise, the Athenians required the Lacedaemonians to banish such as were guilty of breach of sanctuary at Taenarus. For the Lacedaemonians, when they had caused their Helots, suppliants in the temple of Neptune at Taenarus, to forsake sanctuary, slew them: for which cause they themselves think it was that the great earthquake happened afterwards at Sparta. [2] Also they required them to purge their city of the pollution of sanctuary in the temple of Pallas Chalcioeca, which was thus. [3] After that Pausanias the Lacedaemonian was recalled by the Spartans from his charge in Hellespont, and having been called in question by them was absolved though he was no more sent abroad by the state, yet he went again into Hellespont in a galley of Hermione as a private man, without leave of the Lacedaemonians, to the Grecian war, as he gave out, but in truth to negotiate with the king, as he had before begun, aspiring to the principality of Greece. [4] Now the benefit that he had laid up with the king, and the beginning of the whole business, was at first from this. [5] When after his return from Cyprus he had taken Byzantium when he was there the first time (which, being holden by the Medes, there were taken in it some near to the king and of his kindred), unknown to the rest of the confederates he sent unto the king those near ones of his which he had taken and gave out they were run away. [6] This he practised with one Gongylus, an Eretrian, to whose charge he had committed both the town of Byzantium and the prisoners. Also he sent letters unto him which Gongylus carried wherein, as was afterwards known, was thus written: [7] Pausanias, General of the Spartans, being desirous to do thee a courtesy, sendeth back unto thee these men whom he hath by arms taken prisoners. And I have a purpose, if the same seem also good unto thee, to take thy daughter in marriage and to bring Sparta and the rest of Greece into thy subjection. These things I account myself able to bring to pass if I may communicate my counsels with thee. If, therefore, any of these things do like thee, send some trusty man to the seaside by whose mediation we may confer together.

129. These were the contents of the writing. Xerxes, being pleased with the letter, sends away Artabazus the son of Pharnaces to the seaside with commandment to take the government of the province of Dascylis and to dismiss Megabates, that was governor there before, and withal gives him a letter to Pausanias, which he commanded him to send over to him with speed to Byzantium and to show him the seal and well and faithfully to perform whatsoever in his affairs he should by Pausanias be appointed to do. [2] Artabazus, after he arrived, having in other things done as he was commanded, sent over the letter; [3] wherein was written this answer: ‘Thus saith king Xerxes to Pausanias: For the men which thou hast saved and sent over the sea unto me from Byzantium, thy benefit is laid up in our house indelibly registered forever; and I like also of what thou hast propounded. And let neither night nor day make thee remiss in the performance of what thou hast promised unto me. Neither be thou hindered by the expense of gold and silver or multitude of soldiers requisite, whithersoever it be needful to have them come. But with Artabazus, a good man whom I have sent unto thee, do boldly both mine and thine own business as shall be most fit for the dignity and honour of us both.

130. Pausanias having received these letters, whereas he was before in great authority for his conduct at Plataea, became now many degrees more elevated and endured no more to live after the accustomed manner of his country but went apparelled at Byzantium after the fashion of Persia, and when he went through Thrace, had a guard of Medes and Egyptians, and his table likewise after the Persian manner. Nor was he able to conceal his purpose, but in trifles made apparent beforehand the greater matters he had conceived of the future. [2] He became moreover difficult of access, and would be in such choleric passions toward all men indifferently that no man might endure to approach him, which was also none of the least causes why the confederates turned from him to the Athenians.

131. When the Lacedaemonians heard of it, they called him home the first time. And when being gone out the second time without their command in a galley of Hermione, it appeared that he continued still in the same practices and, after he was forced out of Byzantium by siege of the Athenians, returned not to Sparta, but news came that he had seated himself at Colonae in the country of Troy practicing still with the barbarians and making his abode there for no good purpose, then the ephori forebore no longer but sent unto him a public officer with the scytale commanding him not to depart from the officer and, in case he refused, denounced war against him. [2] But he, desiring as much as he could to decline suspicion and believing that with money he should be able to discharge himself of his accusations, returned unto Sparta the second time. And first he was by the ephori committed to ward (for the ephori have power to do this to their king); but afterwards, procuring his enlargement, he came forth and exhibited himself to justice against such as had anything to allege against him.

132. And though the Spartans had against him no manifest proof, neither his enemies nor the whole city, whereupon to proceed to the punishment of a man both of the race of their kings and at that present in great authority (for Plistarchus the son of Leonidas being king and as yet in minority, Pausanias, who was his cousin-german, had the tuition of him yet), by his licentious behaviour and affectation of the barbarian customs, he gave much cause of suspicion that he meant not to live in the equality of the present state. [2] They considered also that he differed in manner of life from the discipline established: amongst other things by this, that upon the tripode at Delphi, which the Grecians had dedicated as the best of the spoil of the Medes, he had caused to be inscribed of himself in particular this elegiac verse:

Pausanias, Greek General,
     Having the Medes defeated,
To Phoebus in record thereof
     This gift hath consecrated.

[3] But the Lacedaemonians then presently defaced that inscription of the tripode and engraved thereon by name all the cities that had joined in the overthrow of the Medes, and dedicated it so. This therefore was numbered amongst the offences of Pausanias and was thought to agree with his present design, so much the rather for the condition he was now in. [4] They had information farther that he had in hand some practice with the Helots. And so he had, for he promised them not only manumission but also freedom of the city if they would rise with him and co-operate in the whole business. [5] But neither thus upon some impeachment of the Helots would they proceed against him but kept the custom which they have in their own cases not hastily to give a peremptory sentence against a Spartan without unquestionable proof. Till at length (as it is reported) purposing to send over to Artabazus his last letters to the king, he was bewrayed unto them by a man of Argilus, in time past his minion and most faithful to him, who, being terrified with the cogitation that not any of those which had been formerly sent had ever returned, got him a seal like to the seal of Pausanias (to the end that if his jealousy were false or that he should need to alter anything in the letter, it might not be discovered) and opened the letter, wherein (as he had suspected the addition of some such clause) he found himself also written down to be murdered.

133. The ephori, when these letters were by him shown unto them, though they believed the matter much more than they did before, yet desirous to hear somewhat themselves from Pausanias his own mouth, the man being upon design gone to Taenarus into sanctuary and having there built him a little room with a partition in which he hid the ephori, and Pausanias coming to him and asking the cause of his taking sanctuary, they plainly heard the whole matter. For the man both expostulated with him for what he had written about him and from point to point discovered all the practice, saying that though he had never boasted unto him these and these services concerning the king, he must yet have the honour as well as many other of his servants to be slain. And Pausanias himself both confessed the same things and also bade the man not to be troubled at what was past and gave him assurance to leave sanctuary, intreating him to go on in his journey with all speed and not to frustrate the business in hand.

134. Now the ephori, when they had distinctly heard him, for that time went their way, and knowing now the certain truth intended to apprehend him in the city. It is said that when he was to be apprehended in the street, he perceived by the countenance of one of the ephori coming towards him what they came for; and when another of them had by a secret beck signified the matter for good will, he ran into the close of the temple of Pallas Chalcioeca and got in before they overtook him (now the temple itself was hard by) and, entering into a house belonging to the temple to avoid the injury of the open air, there stayed. [2] They that pursued him could not then overtake him; but afterwards they took off the roof and the doors of the house and, watching a time when he was within, beset the house and mured him up and, leaving a guard there, famished him. [3] When they perceived him about to give up the ghost, they carried him, as he was, out of the house, yet breathing; and being out he died immediately. [4] After he was dead, they were about to throw him into the Caeada where they use to cast in malefactors; yet afterwards they thought good to bury him in some place thereabouts. But the oracle of Delphi commanded the Lacedaemonians afterward both to remove the sepulchre from the place where he died (so that he lies now in the entry of the temple, as is evident by the inscription of the pillar) and also (as having been a pollution of the sanctuary) to render two bodies to the goddess of Chalcioeca for that one. Whereupon they set up two brazen statues and dedicated the same unto her for Pausanias.

135. Now the Athenians, the god himself having judged this a pollution of sanctuary, required the Lacedaemonians to banish out of their city such as were touched with the same. [2]

At the same time that Pausanias came to his end, the Lacedaemonians by their ambassadors to the Athenians accused Themistocles, for that he also had Medised together with Pausanias, having discovered it by proofs against Pausanias, and desired that the same punishment might be likewise inflicted upon him. [3] Whereunto consenting (for he was at this time in banishment by ostracism; and though his ordinary residence was at Argos, he travelled to and fro in other places of Peloponnesus), they sent certain men in company of the Lacedaemonians who were willing to pursue him with command to bring him in wheresoever they could find him.

136. But Themistocles, having had notice of it beforehand, flieth out of Peloponnesus into Corcyra to the people of which city he had formerly been beneficial. But the Corcyraeans, alleging that they durst not keep him there for fear of displeasing both the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, convey him into the opposite continent; [2] and being pursued by the men thereto appointed asking continually which way he went, he was compelled at a strait to turn in to Admetus, king of the Molossians, his enemy. [3] The king himself being then from home, he became a suppliant to his wife, and by her was instructed to take their son with him and sit down at the altar of the house. [4] When Admetus not long after returned, he made himself known to him and desired him that though he had opposed him in some suit in Athens, not to revenge it on him now in the time of his flight, saying that being now the weaker, he must needs suffer under the stronger, whereas noble revenge is of equals upon equal terms; and that he had been his adversary but in matter of profit, not of life, whereas, if he delivered him up (telling him withal for what and by whom he was followed), he deprived him of all means of saving his life. Admetus having heard him bade him arise together with his son whom he held as he sat, which is the most submissive supplication that is.

137. Not long after came the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians; and though they alleged much to have him, yet he delivered him not but sent him away by land to Pydna upon the other sea (a city belonging to Alexander) because his purpose was to go to the king, where finding a ship bound for Ionia, he embarked and was carried by foul weather upon the fleet of the Athenians that besieged Naxos. [2] Being afraid, he discovered to the master (for he was unknown) who he was and for what he fled, and said that unless he would save him, he meant to say that he had hired him to carry him away for money; and that to save him, there needed no more but this, to let none go out of the ship till the weather served to be gone; to which if he consented, he would not forget to requite him according to his merit. The master did so; and having lain a day and a night at sea upon the fleet of the Athenians, he arrived afterward at Ephesus. [3] And Themistocles having liberally rewarded him with money (for he received there both what was sent him from his friends at Athens and also what he had put out at Argos), he took his journey upwards in company of a certain Persian of the low countries and sent letters to the king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, newly come to the kingdom, wherein was written to this purpose: [4] I, Themistocles, am coming unto thee, who, of all the Grecians, as long as I was forced to resist thy father that invaded me, have done your house the maniest damages; yet the benefits I did him were more after once I with safety, he with danger, was to make retreat. And both a good turn is already due unto me,’ (writing here, how he had forewarned him of the Grecians' departure out of Salamis and ascribing the then not breaking of the bridge falsely unto himself) ‘and at this time to do thee many other good services, I present myself, persecuted by the Grecians for thy friendship's sake. But I desire to have a year's respite that I may declare unto thee the cause of my coming myself.

138. The king, as is reported, wondered what his purpose might be and commanded him to do as he had said. In this time of respite he learned as much as he could of the language and fashions of the place. [2] And a year after coming to the court, he was great with the king more than ever had been any Grecian before, both for his former dignity and the hope of Greece which he promised to bring into his subjection, but especially for the trial he gave of his wisdom. [3] For Themistocles was a man in whom most truly was manifested the strength of natural judgment, wherein he had something worthy admiration different from other men. For by his natural prudence, without the help of instruction before or after, he was both of extemporary matters upon short deliberation the best discerner and also of what for the most part would be their issue the best conjecturer. What he was perfect in he was able also to explicate, and what he was unpractised in he was not to seek how to judge of conveniently. Also he foresaw, no man better, what was best or worst in any case that was doubtful. And (to say all in few words) this man, by the natural goodness of his wit and quickness of deliberation, was the ablest of all men to tell what was fit to be done upon a sudden. [4] But falling sick he ended his life; some say he died voluntarily by poison because he thought himself unable to perform what he had promised to the king. [5] His monument is in Magnesia in Asia, in the market place; for he had the government of that country, the king having bestowed upon him Magnesia which yielded him fifty talents by the year for his bread, and Lampsacus for his wine (for this city was in those days thought to have store of wine), and the city of Myus for his meat. [6] His bones are said by his kindred to have been brought home by his own appointment and buried in Attica unknown to the Athenians, for it was not lawful to bury one there that had fled for treason. These were the ends of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian and Themistocles the Athenian, the most famous men of all the Grecians of their time.

139. And this is that which the Lacedaemonians did command, and were commanded, in their first embassage touching the banishment of such as were under the curse.

After this they sent ambassadors again to Athens commanding them to levy the siege from before Potidaea and to suffer Aegina to be free, but principally and most plainly telling them that the war should not be made in case they would abrogate the act concerning the Megareans, by which act they were forbidden both the fairs of Attica and all ports within the Athenian dominion. [2] But the Athenians would not obey them, neither in the rest of their commands nor in the abrogation of that act, but recriminated the Megareans for having tilled holy ground and unset out with bounds and for receiving of their slaves that revolted. [3] But at length, when the last ambassadors from Lacedaemon were arrived, namely, Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, and spake nothing of that which formerly they were wont but only this, that ‘the Lacedaemonians desire that there should be peace, which may be had if you will suffer the Grecians to be governed by their own laws,’ the Athenians called an assembly and, propounding their opinions amongst themselves, thought good, after they had debated the matter, to give them an answer once for all. [4] And many stood forth and delivered their minds on either side, some for the war and some that this act concerning the Megareans ought not to stand in their way to peace but to be abrogated. And Pericles the son of Xantippus, the principal man at that time of all Athens and most sufficient both for speech and action, gave his advice in such manner as followeth:

140. "Men of Athens, I am still not only of the same opinion not to give way to the Peloponnesians (notwithstanding I know that men have not the same passions in the war itself which they have when they are incited to it but change their opinions with the events), but also I see that I must now advise the same things or very near to what I have before delivered. And I require of you with whom my counsel shall take place that if we miscarry in aught, you will either make the best of it, as decreed by common consent, or if we prosper, not to attribute it to your own wisdom only. For it falleth out with the events of actions, no less than with the purposes of man, to proceed with uncertainty, which is also the cause that when anything happeneth contrary to our expectation, we use to lay the fault on fortune. [2] That the Lacedaemonians, both formerly and especially now, take counsel how to do us mischief is a thing manifest. For whereas it is said [in the articles] that in our mutual controversies we shall give and receive trials of judgment, and in the meantime either side hold what they possess, they never yet sought any such trial themselves nor will accept of the same offered by us. They will clear themselves of their accusations by war rather than by words, and come hither no more now to expostulate but to command. [3] For they command us to arise from before Potidaea and to restore the Aeginetae to the liberty of their own laws and to abrogate the act concerning the Megareans. [4] And they that come last command us to restore all the Grecians to their liberty. Now let none of you conceive that we shall go to war for a trifle by not abrogating the act concerning Megara (yet this by them is pretended most, and that for the abrogation of it war shall stay), nor retain a scruple in your minds as if a small matter moved you to the war. [5] For even this small matter containeth the trial and constancy of your resolution. Wherein if you give them way, you shall hereafter be commanded a greater matter as men that for fear will obey them likewise in that. But by a stiff denial you shall teach them plainly to come to you hereafter on terms of more equality.

141. "Resolve therefore from this occasion either to yield them obedience before you receive damage, or if we must have war (which for my part I think is best), be the pretence weighty or light, not to give way nor keep what we possess in fear. For a great and a little claim imposed by equals upon their neighbours before judgment by way of command hath one and the same virtue, to make subject. [2] As for the war, how both we and they be furnished, and why we are not like to have the worse, by hearing the particulars you shall now understand. [3] The Peloponnesians are men that live by their labour without money either in particular or in common stock. Besides, in long wars and by sea they are without experience, for that the wars which they have had one against another have been but short through poverty. [4] And such men can neither man their fleets nor yet send out their armies by land very often, because they must be far from their own wealth and yet by that be maintained and be besides barred the use of the sea. [5] It must be a stock of money, not forced contributions, that support the wars; and such as live by their labour are more ready to serve the wars with their bodies than with their money. For they make account that their bodies will outlive the danger, but their money they think is sure to be spent, especially if the war (as it is likely) should last. [6] So that the Peloponnesians and their confederates, though for one battle they be able to stand out against all Greece besides, yet to maintain a war against such as have their preparations of another kind, they are not able; inasmuch as not having one and the same counsel, they can speedily perform nothing upon the occasion; and having equality of vote and being of several races, everyone will press his particular interest, whereby nothing is like to be fully executed. [7] For some will desire to take revenge on some enemy and others to have their estates least wasted. And being long before they can assemble, they take the lesser part of their time to debate the common business and the greater to dispatch their own private affairs. And everyone supposeth that his own neglect of the common estate can do little hurt and that it will be the care of somebody else to look to that for his own good, not observing how by these thoughts of everyone in several the common business is jointly ruined.

142. "But their greatest hindrance of all will be their want of money, which being raised slowly, their actions must be full of delay, which the occasions of war will not endure. [2] As for their fortifying here and their navy, they are matters not worthy fear. [3] For it were a hard matter for a city equal to our own in time of peace to fortify in that manner, much less in the country of an enemy, and we no less fortified against them. [4] And if they had a garrison here, though they might, by excursions and by the receiving of our fugitives, annoy some part of our territory, yet would not that be enough both to besiege us and also to hinder us from sallying into their territories and from taking revenge with our fleet, which is the thing wherein our strength lies. [5] For we have more experience in land service by use of the sea than they have in sea service by use of the land. [6] Nor shall they attain the knowledge of naval affairs easily. [7] For yourselves, though falling to it immediately upon the Persian war, yet have not attained it fully. How then should husbandmen not seamen, whom also we will not suffer to apply themselves to it by lying continually upon them with so great fleets, perform any matter of value? [8] Indeed, if they should be opposed but with a few ships, they might adventure, encouraging their want of knowledge with store of men; but awed by many they will not stir that way, and not applying themselves to it will be yet more unskillful and thereby more cowardly. [9] For knowledge of naval matters is an art as well as any other and not to be attended at idle times and on the by, but requiring rather that while it is a-learning, nothing else should be done on the by.

143. "But say they should take the money at Olympia and Delphi and therewith, at greater wages, go about to draw from us the strangers employed in our fleet, this indeed, if, going aboard both ourselves and those that dwell among us, we could not match them, were a dangerous matter. But now we can both do this and (which is the principal thing) we have steersmen and other necessary men for the service of a ship both more and better of our own citizens than are in all the rest of Greece. [2] Besides that, not any of these strangers upon trial would be found content to fly his own country and, withal upon less hope of victory, for a few days' increase of wages take part with the other side. [3]

"In this manner, or like to this, seems to me to stand the case of the Peloponnesians; whereas ours is both free from what in theirs I have reprehended, and has many great advantages besides. [4] If they invade our territory by land, we shall invade theirs by sea. And when we have wasted part of Peloponnesus and they all Attica, yet shall theirs be the greater loss. For they, unless by the sword, can get no other territory instead of that we shall destroy; whereas for us there is other land both in the islands and continent. [5] For the dominion of the sea is a great matter. Consider but this. If we dwelt in the islands, whether of us then were more inexpugnable? We must therefore now, drawing as near as can be to that imagination, lay aside the care of fields and villages, and not for the loss of them, out of passion, give battle to the Peloponnesians, far more in number than ourselves. For though we give them an overthrow, we must fight again with as many more; and if we be overthrown, we shall lose the help of our confederates, which are our strength; for when we cannot war upon them, they will revolt. Nor bewail ye the loss of fields or houses but of men's bodies; for men may acquire these, but these cannot acquire men. And if I thought I should prevail, I would advise you to go out and destroy them yourselves and show the Peloponnesians that you will never the sooner obey them for such things as these.

144. There be many other things that give hope of victory in case you do not, whilst you are in this war, strive to enlarge your dominion and undergo other voluntary dangers (for I am afraid of our own errors more than of their designs); [2] but they shall be spoken of at another time in prosecution of the war itself. For the present, let us send away these men with this answer: 'that the Megareans shall have the liberty of our fairs and ports if the Lacedaemonians will also make no banishment of us nor of our confederates as of strangers,' for neither our act concerning Megara nor their banishment of strangers is forbidden in the articles, 'also, that we will let the Grecian cities be free if they were so when the peace was made; and if the Lacedaemonians will also give leave unto their confederates to use their freedom not as shall serve the turn of the Lacedaemonians, but as they themselves shall every one think good; also that we will stand to judgment according to the articles and will not begin the war but be revenged on those that shall.' For this is both just and for the dignity of the city to answer. [3] Nevertheless you must know that of necessity war there will be; and the more willingly we embrace it, the less pressing we shall have our enemies, and that out of the greatest dangers, whether to cities or private men, arise the greatest honours. [4] For our fathers, when they undertook the Medes, did from less beginnings, nay abandoning the little they had, by wisdom rather than fortune, by courage rather than strength, both repel the barbarian and advance this state to the height it now is at. Of whom we ought not now to come short but rather to revenge us by all means upon our enemies, and do our best to deliver the state unimpaired by us to posterity.

145. Thus spake Pericles. The Athenians, liking best of his advice, decreed as he would have them, answering the Lacedaemonians according to his direction, both in particulars as he had spoken and generally, ‘that they would do nothing on command, but were ready to answer their accusations upon equal terms by way of arbitrament.’ So the ambassadors went home, and after these there came no more.

146. These were the quarrels and differences on either side before the war, which quarrels began presently upon the business of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Nevertheless there was still commerce betwixt them, and they went to each other without any herald, though not without jealousy. For the things that had passed were but the confusion of the articles and matter of the war to follow.

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