25.
Who of us would call himself equal to Manius Curius, or to Caius Fabricius or
to Caius Duilius? Who reckons himself a match for Atilius Calatinius or for
Cnaeus and Publius Scipio or for Africanus, Marcellus or Maximus? And yet we
have arrived at the same degree of rank that they did. In
truth, in virtue there are many steps; so that he is the most eminent in
renown, who is the superior in virtue. The summit of the honours conferred
by the people is the consulship. And by this time nearly eight hundred men
have obtained that. And of this eight hundred, if you examine carefully, you
will find hardly one tenth of the number worthy of such a preeminence. But
yet no one ever went on as you do. “Why is that man made consul?
What could he have got more if he had been Lucius Brutus, who delivered the
city from the tyranny of the kings?” He could have got no higher
rank certainly, but he would have much more glory. And in the same manner,
therefore, Plancius has been made quaestor, and tribune of the people, and
aedile, just as much as if he had been a man of the highest rank by birth;
but a countless number of other men, born in the same rank as he, have also
attained these honours.
[61]
You speak of the
triumphs of Titus Didius, and Caius Marius; and ask what there is like these
exploits in Plancius. As if those men whom you are speaking of obtained
their magistracies because they had triumphed, and did not on the contrary
triumph after having performed great achievements, because those
magistracies were entrusted to them. You ask what campaigns he has served;
when he was a soldier in Crete,
while Metellus, who is here in court, was commander-in-chief, and military
tribune in Macedonia; and when he
was quaestor he only abstracted just so much time from his attention to his
military duties as he thought it better to devote to protecting me.
[62]
You ask whether he is an eloquent man. At
all events, what is the next best thing to being so, he does not think
himself one. “Is he a lawyer?” As if there were any one
who complains that he has given him a false answer in a point of law. For
all such acts as that are open to criticism in the case of men who, after
they have professed an acquaintance with them, are unable to satisfy
people's expectations; not in the case of men who confess that they have
never paid any attention to those pursuits. What is usually required in a
candidate is virtue, and honesty, and integrity, not volubility of tongue,
or an acquaintance with any particular art or science. As we, when we are
procuring slaves, are annoyed if we have bought a man as a smith or a
plasterer, and find, however good a man he may be, that he
knows nothing of those trades which we had in view in buying him; but if we
have bought a man to give him charge of our property as steward, or to
employ him to look after our stock, then we do not care for any other
qualities in him except frugality, industry, and vigilance; so the Roman
people elects magistrates to be as it were stewards of the republic, and if
they are masters of some accomplishment besides, the people have no
objection, but if not, they are content with their virtue and innocence. For
how few men are eloquent; how few are skillful lawyers, even if you include
all those in your calculation who wish to be so! But if no one else is
worthy of honour, what on earth is to become of so many most virtuous and
most accomplished citizens?
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