CCCLXVIII (A IX, 13)
TO ATTICUS (AT ROME)
FORMIAE, 23 MARCH
"'Tis no true tale " 1 —as I
think—that about the ships. 2
For in that case what would have been the meaning
of Dolabella's words in his letter, dated from
Brundisium on the 13th of March, when he mentioned
it as a success on the part of Caesar that Pompey
was in full retreat, and was going to sail with
the first favourable wind? This is quite
inconsistent with those letters, of which I have
already sent you copies. Here, indeed, they talk
of nothing but disaster. But we have no more
recent authority, and of this particular fact no
better one, than Dolabella. I have received your letter of the 22nd of
March, in which you propose to postpone all plans
till we know what has happened. Of course that is
quite right: and meanwhile it is
impossible not merely to settle but even to
consider any plan. However, this letter of
Dolabella's inclines me to recur to my original
ideas. For on the day before the Quinquatrus (18th
of March) the weather was splendid, and I suppose
he has taken advantage of it. That
précis of your advice was not made by
me by way of reproach to you, but rather to
console myself. For the evils of the time were not
causing me so much vexation, as the idea of my
having done wrong and acted rashly. I have now got
rid of that idea, since my actions and plans
coincide with your suggestions. You remark in your
letter that it is rather my avowal of Pompey's
services, than the actual amount of them, that
makes me seem to be under an obligation to him.
That is true: I have always magnified them, and
the more so that I might prevent his thinking that
I remembered his earlier conduct. However much I
might remember this, I should yet be bound to
follow the example he set at that time. 3 He gave me no aid when he might have done
so. True: but afterwards he was my friend, and a
very warm one, I don't at all know why. Therefore
I too will be his friend. Nay, more, there is this
analogy in our two cases, that we have been
betrayed by the same people. But oh, that it had
been in my power to render him as important a
service, as he was able to render me! After all, I
am exceedingly grateful for what he did; yet, at
the present moment, I neither know how to help
him, nor, if I could, should I think I ought to
assist him while preparing to engage on such an
execrable war. Only I don't wish to hurt his
feelings by remaining here. I should neither have
the resolution, by Hercules! to watch the events,
which you can even now foresee in imagination, nor
to take part in those unhappy measures. But I was
all the slower to depart, from the difficulty of
imagining a voluntary departure when there is no
hope of a return. For I see that Caesar is so well
equipped with infantry, cavalry, fleets, and
Gallic auxiliaries. About these last I suppose
Matius was talking big, but he certainly said that
10,000 infantry and 6,ooo cavalry promised their
services at their own expense for ten years. But
grant this to be gasconnade. He
certainly has great forces, and he will not merely
have the revenue of Italy, but the property of the
citizens. Add to this the man's own
self-confidence and the weakness of the loyalists,
who, in fact, because they think Pompey deservedly
enraged with them, have, as you expressed it,
become disgusted with the game. Yes, but I could
have wished that you had indicated who these men
were. The fact is that Caesar, because he has done
much less than he threatened, is regarded with
affection ; 4 while in every direction those who loved
Pompey now cease to do so. The municipal towns, in
fact, and the Romans living in the country fear
Pompey, and are still attached to Caesar.
Accordingly, the latter is so well prepared that,
even if he proves unable to win a victory, I yet
cannot see how he can be beaten himself. For
myself, I am not so much afraid of Caesar's
sorcery, as of his power of compulsion. "For the
requests of tyrants," as Plato says,"you know,
partake of the nature of commands." 5
I see you don't like a
place of residence for me without a port. Neither
do I: but the fact is I have there both a means of
concealment and a trusty band of followers. If I
could have had the same at Brundisium, I should
have preferred it. But concealment is impossible
there. However, as you say, when we know! I am not
very careful to excuse myself to, the loyalists.
For what dinners they are giving and attending,
according to Sextus's letter to me! How splendid,
how early! 6
But let them be as loyalist as they please, they
are not more so than we are. I should have cared
more for their opinion, if they had shewn more
courage. I was wrong about
Phamea's estate at Lanuvium. I was dreaming of one
near Troja. 7 I wanted it for
Quintus; but it is too dear. I should, however,
have liked to buy that one, if I had
seen any prospect of enjoying it. What, frightful
news we are reading every day you will understand
from the small roll inclosed in this packet. Our
friend Lentulus is at Puteoli, distracted with
doubt, he too, as Caecius tells me, as to what to
do. He is in terror of a contretemps like that at
Corfinium. 8 He thinks that he had done his duty to
Pompey, and is affected by Caesar's magnanimous
treatment, but still more, after all, by the
outlook in the future.
FORMIAE, 23 MARCH