CCXX (F XV, 1)
TO THE MAGISTRATES AND SENATE
CILICIA, 22 SEPTEMBER
M. Tullius Cicero, son of Marcus, proconsul,
greets the consuls, praetors, tribunes, and
senate. If you are well, I am glad. I and the army
are well. Although I had
undoubted assurance that the Parthians had crossed
the Euphrates with nearly all their forces, yet,
believing that more definite information could be
sent you on these points by the proconsul M.
Bibulus, I concluded that it was not incumbent on
me to mention in a public despatch reports
reaching me concerning the province of another.
Having since then, however, received information
on the most unquestionable authority-from legates,
messengers, and despatches—whether I
considered the importance of the matter itself, or
the fact of not having yet heard of Bibulus's
arrival in Syria, or that the conduct
of this war was almost as much my business as that
of Bibulus, I came to the conclusion that it was
my duty to write you word of what had reached my
ears. The legates of king Antiochus of Commagene
were the first to inform me that large bodies of
Parthians had begun to cross the Euphrates. On the
receipt of this report, as there were certain
persons who thought that full credit could not be
given to that sovereign, I made up my mind that I
must wait for more trustworthy information. On the
18th of September, whilst marching into Cilicia at
the head of my army, on the frontier between
Lycaonia and Cappadocia, a despatch was handed to
me from Tarcondimotus, who is considered to be the
most faithful ally and the most devoted friend of
the Roman people beyond Mount Taurus, announcing
that Pacorus, son of Orodes, the king of the
Parthians, had crossed the Euphrates with a very
large body of Parthian cavalry, and had pitched
his camp at Tyba, and that consequently a very
serious commotion had been caused in the province
of Syria. On the same day a despatch on the same
subject reached me from Iamblichus, phylarch of
the Arabians, 1 who is
generally considered to be well-disposed and
friendly to our Republic. Though I was fully aware
that, on receipt of this information, our allies
were unsettled in their feelings and wavering from
the expectation of political change, I yet hoped
that those whom I had already visited, and who had
seen the mildness and purity of my administration,
had been made more devoted to the Roman people,
and that Cilicia, too, would become more certainly
loyal when it had once felt the advantage of my
equitable rule. Acting at once from this motive,
and also with a view to put down those of the
Cilicians who are in arms, and to show the enemy
in Syria that the army of the Roman people, so far
from retiring on receipt of that news, was
actually approaching nearer, I determined to lead
it right up to Mount Taurus. But if my authority
has any weight with you—especially in
matters which you only know by report, but which
are all but passing under my
eyes—I strongly urge and advise you to
take measures for the defence of these provinces:
it is over-late already, but better late than
never. For myself, you are well aware how
slenderly supplied and how imperfectly furnished
with troops, in view of the expected gravity of
this war, you have despatched me. And it was not
from the blindness of vanity, but from a modest
scruple as to refusing, that I did not decline
this business. For I have never considered any
danger so formidable, as to make me wish to avoid
it in preference to obeying your will. But at this
moment the matter is of such a nature, that unless
you promptly despatch into these provinces an army
on the same scale as you are wont to employ for
the most important war, there is the most imminent
danger of our having to give up all those
provinces, on which the revenues of the Roman
people depend. Again, there is this reason for
your not resting any hopes on a levy in the
province—that men are not numerous, and
that such as there are fly in every direction at
the first alarm. Again, what this class of soldier
is worth in his opinion has been shown by that
gallant officer, M. Bibulus: for, though you had
granted him leave to hold a levy in Asia, he has
declined to do so. 2 For auxiliaries raised from the allies,
owing to the harshness and injustice of our rule,
are either so weak that they can do us little
service, or so disaffected to us that it seems
improper to expect anything from them or trust
anything to them. Both the loyalty and the forces,
whatever their amount, of king Deiotarus I reckon
as being at our service. Cappadocia has nothing to
give. Other kings and despots are not to be relied
upon either in regard to their resources or their
loyalty. For myself, in spite of this short supply
of soldiers, I shall certainly show no lack of
courage, nor, I hope, of prudence either. What
will happen is uncertain. I pray that I may be
able to secure my safety! I will certainly secure
my honour.
CILICIA, 22 SEPTEMBER
