Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 34
Cyrus Evans, Ed.

12. They were thus dismissed on that day without any positive answer. During the following night, the consul's thoughts were greatly perplexed and divided. [2] He was unwilling to abandon these allies, yet equally so to diminish his army, which might either oblige him to decline a battle, or occasion danger in an engagement. [3] He was firmly resolved, however, not to lessen his forces, lest he should in the mean time suffer some disgrace from the enemy; and there- [p. 1504]fore he judged it expedient, instead of real succour, to hold out hopes to the allies. [4] For he considered that, in many cases, but especially in war, mere appearances have had all the effect of realities; and that a person, under a firm persuasion that he can command resources, virtually has them; that by that very confidence he was insured in his hopes and efforts. [5] Next day he told the ambassadors, that “although he was afraid to lend a part of his forces to others, and so to weaken his own, yet that he was giving more attention to their circumstances and danger than to his own.” [6] He then gave orders to the third part of the soldiers of every cohort, to make haste and prepare victuals, which they were to carry with them on board ships, and that the vessels should be got in readiness against the third day. [7] He desired two of the ambassadors to carry an account of these proceedings to Bilistages and the Ilergetians; but, by kind treatment and presents, he prevailed on the chieftain's son to remain with him. [8] The ambassadors did not leave the place until they saw the troops embarked on board the ships; then reporting this at home as a matter of certainty, they spread, not only among their own people, but likewise among the enemy, a confident assurance of the approach of Roman succours.