Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 35
Cyrus Evans, Ed.

12. But neither the Boians nor the Spaniards, with whom they had been at war during that year, were such bitter and inveterate foes to the Romans as the nation of the Aetolians. [2] These, after the departure of the Roman armies from Greece, had, for some time, entertained hopes that Antiochus would come and take possession of Europe, without opposition; and that neither Philip nor Nabis would continue quiet. [3] But, seeing no active measures begun, in any quarter, they resolved, lest their designs might be damped by delay, to create some agitation and disturbance; and, with this view, they summoned a general assembly at Naupactum. [4] Here Thoas, their praetor, after complaining of the injurious behaviour of the Romans, and the present state of Aetolia, and asserting, that “of all the nations and states of Greece, they had been most unhonoured, after the victory which they themselves had been the means of obtaining,” moved, that ambassadors should be sent to each of the kings; [5] not only to sound their dispositions, but, by such incentives as suited the temper of each, to urge them to a war with Rome. [6] Damocritus was sent to Nabis, Nicander to Philip, and Dicaearchus, the praetor's brother, to Antiochus. [7] To the Lacedaemonian tyrant Damocritus represented, that, “by the maritime cities being taken from him, his government was left enervated; for from them he had drawn his soldiers, as well as his ships and seamen. He was now pent up almost within the walls of his capital, while he saw the Achaeans domineering over the whole Peloponnesus. [8] Never would he have another opportunity of recovering his rights, if he suffered the one that now offered to pass by. There was no Roman army in Greece, nor would the Romans deem Gythium, or the other towns on the coast of Laconia, sufficient cause for transporting their legions a second time into that country.” These arguments were used for the purpose of provoking the passions of Nabis; in order that when Antiochus should come into Greece. [9] the other, conscious of having infringed the treaty of amity with [p. 1565]Rome, by injuries offered to its allies, might unite himself with him. [10] Nicander excited Philip, by arguments somewhat similar; and he had more copious matter for discourse, as the king had been degraded from a more elevated state than the tyrant, and more possessions also had been taken from him. In addition to this, he introduced the ancient renown of the Macedonian kings, and the whole world pervaded by the victorious marches of that nation. [11] “The plan which he proposed,” he said, “was free from any danger, either in the commencement or in the issue. For he did not advise that Philip should stir until Antiochus should have come into Greece with an army; [12] and, considering that, without the aid of Antiochus, he had maintained a war so long against the combined forces of the Romans and Aetolians, with what possible force could the Romans withstand him, when joined by Antiochus, and supported by the aid of the Aetolians, who, on the former occasion, were more dangerous enemies than the Romans?” [13] He added the circumstance of Hannibal being general; “a man born a foe to the Romans, who had slain greater numbers, both of their commanders and soldiers, than were left surviving.” [14] Such were the representations of Nicander to Philip. Dicaearchus addressed other arguments to Antiochus. In the first place, he told him, that “the spoils of Philip belonged to the Romans, but the victory over him to the Aetolians; that none other than the Aetolians had afforded to the Romans admittance into Greece, and that the same people supplied them with the strength which enabled them to conquer.” [15] He next set forth the numerous forces, both horse and foot, which they were willing to furnish to Antiochus, for the purpose of the war; what quarters they would assign to his land armament, what harbours for his naval forces. [16] He then asserted whatever falsehoods he pleased, respecting Philip and Nabis; that “both were ready to recommence hostilities, and would greedily lay hold on the first opportunity of recovering what they had lost in war.” [17] Thus did the Aetolians labour, in every part of the world, to stir up war against the Romans. [18] The kings, however, either took no steps in it or took them too late.