10.
It appeared likely that this town would be more troublesome to recover, not only because it was wholly in the hands of the enemy, but also because a faction of the Nepesini had betrayed their state and arranged the capitulation.
[2]
It was nevertheless decided to send word to their leaders, that they should sever themselves from the Etruscans and extend to the Romans the same trusty aid which they had requested at their hands.
[3]
When the reply came [p. 229]back that they were powerless, that the Etruscans1 held the walls and guarded the gates, the Romans first laid waste their fields, in an effort to frighten the townsfolk;
[4]
then, when the sanctity of their surrender proved to be more binding on them than that of their alliance, they gathered osiers from the fields and made fascines, and the army being led against the walls filled up the moat, erected scaling ladders, and carried the town at the first shout and charge.
[5]
The Nepesini were then commanded to lay down their weapons and the order was given to spare such as were unarmed. The Etruscans were put to death, whether armed or not. Of the Nepesini, too, those who were responsible for the surrender were executed; the innocent populace were given back their possessions, and the town was left with a garrison.
[6]
After thus regaining from the enemy two cities of the allies, the victorious army under its tribunes marched gloriously back to Rome.
The same year demands for reparation were made upon the Latins and the Hernici, and they were asked why, during recent years, they had furnished no soldiers, as they had agreed to do.
[7]
Both nations replied in plenary assemblies that no blame or evil purpose attached to the state because a few of their young men had served with the Volsci.
[8]
These men had, for that matter, paid the penalty for their distorted judgment, and not one of them had come back; as to their having furnished no soldiers, this had been due to their constant fear of the Volsci —a pest that clung so fast to them that with all that long succession of wars they had been unable to shake it off.
[9]
On learning of this answer, the [p. 231]senators were of opinion that they lacked not so2 much the ground for war as a favourable opportunity.
Livy. Books V, VI and VII With An English Translation. Cambridge. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, Ltd. 1924: no copyright notice.
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