Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 30
Frank Gardener Moore, Professor Emeritus in Columbia University, Ed.

10. From that point, just as they were throwing up an earthwork, the Romans sighted the enemy's fleet making towards Utica from Carthage. [2] Accordingly work was dropped, marching orders given and the standards hastily set in motion, that the ships, headed towards land and. the besieged city, also in no condition for a naval battle, might not be taken by [p. 397]surprise. [3] For how could an easily manœuvred fleet,¹ properly rigged with ship's gear and armed, have been resisted by ships carrying artillery and engines, and either converted now into transports or lying so close to the walls as to make scaling possible as if from an embankment and drawbridges?

[4] Consequently Scipio, on reaching the place, gave those war-ships² which might have defended the others a place in the rear line near the land, contrary to the usual practice in a naval battle. On the other hand he placed four lines of transports as a bulwark against the enemy. [5] To prevent the lines from being broken in the confusion of the battle he also held these transports together by placing masts and yards crosswise from ship to ship and lashing them with stout ropes as if by a single cable. In addition he laid down planks above to make a gangway the whole length of the line of ships; and beneath these bridges he left openings where scouting vessels could dash out against the enemy and return in safety. [6] These preparations having been hastily completed as best the circumstances permitted, about a thousand picked fighting men were placed on board the transports. [7] A vast number of weapons, chiefly missiles, were assembled, that they might be sufficient for a battle no matter how long-continued. Thus equipped and alert they were awaiting the approach of the enemy.

[8] [p. 399] The Carthaginians, whose first attack, had they³ made it in good time, would have been overpowering when everything was confused by the mass of men dashing about, were discouraged by their disastrous defeats on the land. [9] And having in consequence no sufficient confidence on the sea either, where lay their own superiority, after spending the day in sailing slowly, they put in with their fleet about sunset into a harbour called Rusucmon⁴ by the Africans. [10] On the next day about sunrise they drew up their ships in the open sea, as if for a regular naval battle and anticipating that the Romans would come out against them. [11] After keeping their position for a long time and observing no movement on the part of the enemy, then only did they attack the transports. [12] It was not in the least like a naval battle, but had almost the appearance of ships attacking the walls of a city. The transports were considerably higher. [13] From their war-ships the Carthaginians generally hurled their weapons to no purpose against a higher position, since they did so leaning backwards, while a hit from the transports above was heavier and from its mere weight had more force. [14] Scouting vessels and other light craft, which kept dashing out through openings underneath the bridges, were at first themselves sunk by the mere momentum and mass of the war-ships. [15] Later they interfered with the fighting men as well because, as they mingled with the enemy's vessels, they often compelled the soldiers to withhold their missiles for fear in their uncertain aim they might hit their own men. [16] Finally poles with an iron hook [p. 401]at the end —grappling-irons⁵ the soldiers call them⁶ —began to be thrown from the Carthaginian ships upon the Roman. [17] Since the crews were unable either to cut off these poles or the chains by which they were hanging when thrown, whenever a warship was propelled astern, dragging a transport grappled by the hook, one might have seen men breaking up [18??] the links by which it had been bound to others, and even several of the vessels being towed away together. [19] Much after this fashion the bridges in the first line were broken down and hardly enough time was given the fighting men to spring across to the second line of ships. [20] About sixty transports⁷ were towed away by the stern to Carthage. Rejoicing for that was excessive, but all the more acceptable because, in the midst of uninterrupted defeats and sorrows, one ray of joy however small had unexpectedly beamed upon them. [21] In addition it was clear to them that the Roman fleet had narrowly escaped destruction, and would have been destroyed if the captains⁸ of their own ships had not loitered, and if Scipio had not come to its aid in the nick of time.