ἂν … θιγόντα=“ὅτι θίγοι ἂν”: cp. Thuc. 7. 42“ὁρῶν...εἰ ἐπικρατήσειέ τις...ῥᾳδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθέν” (=“ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἂν ληφθείη”). Soph. O. C. 761“κἀπὸ παντὸς ἂν φέρων” | “λόγου δικαίου μηχάνημα ποικίλον”, n.—With πανουργίας, despite its derivation, “πάσης” must be supplied: so in Soph. Ant. 300 f. “πανουργίας” is followed by “παντὸς ἔργου”. ἀφ᾽ ἧς μηδὲν … ποεῖν: from (=as a result of) which he would be likely, in the end, to effect anything not just. His objects have always something unjust in them; and he is unscrupulous in the choice of means. When the optat. with “ἄν” (as here the implied “θίγοι ἄν”) stands in the antecedent clause, the optat. (without “ἄν”) often stands in the relative clause: cp. n. on O. C. 560“δεινὴν γάρ τιν᾽ ἂν πρᾶξιν τύχοις” | “λέξας ὁποίας ἐξαφισταίμην ἐγώ”. This usage confirms L's μέλλοι against “μέλλει” (though the latter would be tenable: cp. Ant. 375 n.). μηδὲν here admits of two distinct explanations, though the sense is virtually the same with either. (1) It is ‘generic’ (170 n.): i.e. his purposes are of such a kind as can have no honest result. Cp. 1006 “μηδὲν ὑγιὲς...φρονῶν”: Ant. 493“ὁ θυμὸς”... | “τῶν μηδὲν ὀρθῶς <*>ϝ σκότῳ τεχνωμένων”. I prefer this view. (2) It is ‘final’: i.e. “μέλλοι ποεῖν”=“ποήσοι”: ‘from which he shall not effect anything just.’ When the fut. indic. in a relative clause denotes purpose, the negative is “μή”: cp. O. T. 1412“ἐκρίψατ̓”, “ἔνθα μήποτ᾽ εἰσόψεσθ᾽ ἔτι” (n.). ἐς τέλος, ultimately (though his “λόγος” may be plausible at first sight): cp. Her. 9. 37“οὐ μέντοι ἔς γε τέλος οἱ συνήνεικε τὸ ἔχθος” (‘in the end,’—though for a time he prospered). ποεῖν: for the spelling, cp. on 120: for the pres. inf. after “μέλλοι”, O. T. 967 n.
This text is part of:
Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments, with critical notes, commentary, and translation in English prose. Part IV: The Philoctetes. Sir Richard C. Jebb. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1932.
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