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Deliberative Constructions

IN a paper on The Extent of the Deliberative Construction in Relative Clauses in Greek, in the Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. vii. (1896), pp. 1-12, I have reviewed the recent discussion on this subject, and have maintained the following points, on which I agree substantially with Professor Hale's paper in the Transactions of the American Philological Association, xxiv. pp. 156-205.

1. Οὐκ ἔχω, οὐκ ἔστι with the dative, and similar expressions, in the sense of ἀπορῶ, may be followed by a deliberative subjunctive in an indirect question; as οὐκ ἔχω τι εἴπω or οὐκ ἔχω τί φῶ, I know not what to say, non habeo quod (or quid dicam, τι here being purely interrogative like τί. This subjunctive can become an optative after a past tense or another optative; as “οὐκ εἴχομεν ὅτου ἐπιλαβοίμεθα,DEM. XXXV. 25. Besides the examples in 677 we have the following.

In AR. Eq. 1320,τίν᾽ ἔχων φήμην ἀγαθὴν ἥκεις, ἐφ᾽ ὅτῳ κνισῶμεν ἀγυιάς;” we probably have an indirect question representing ἐπὶ τίνι (in whose honor or for what) κνισῶμεν ἀγυιάς; depending on the idea what have you to report to us? or can you tell us?

In all these we find no case parallel to the Homeric “ἡγεμόν᾽ ὄπασσον, κέ με κεῖσ᾽ ἀγάγῃ,Od. xv. 310.

2. Expressions like οὐκ ἔχει τι εἴπῃ, he has nothing to say, give rise by analogy to ἔχει τι εἴπῃ, he has something to say, though in the latter there is really no indirect question. See examples in § 572, 1.

3. A further extension of the deliberative usage leads to the subjunctive and optative in clauses introduced by true relatives with distinct antecedents, when these depend on expressions implying doubt, perplexity, or ignorance. See examples in § 572, 2. Thus, in οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ᾽ ὅτῳ λέγω, we cannot distinguish the modal force of the subjunctive from that in οὐ γὰρ οἶδ᾽ ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ λέγω, the subjunctive being deliberative in both. The former is the result of a simple evolution, by which a relative clause derives its modal force from an interrogative form. Whatever final force is felt in the expression comes from the intimate relation between the deliberative and the hortatory subjunctive (see § 291). See A. Sidgwick in the Classical Review for 1891, p. 148. We have the evolution actually going on in XEN. An. i. 7, 7, where μὴ οὐκ ἔχω τι δῶ is interrogative and μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ἱκανοὺς οἷς δῶ is purely relative, while the modal force of δῶ must be the same in both. See also XEN. Hellen. i. 3, 21, SOPH. Phil. 692, THEOC. xxv. 218. In AESCH. Prom. 470, LYS. xxiv. 1, ISOC. xxi. 1, we may call the dependent clause an indirect question, depending directly on the idea I cannot (could not) see. See Tarbell in Classical Review for 1891, p. 302.

4. While most of the optatives quoted in this discussion are simply explained as correlatives of the deliberative subjunctive, a very different problem is presented by the examples in § 573. In SOPH. Tr. 903,κρύψασ᾽ ἑαυτὴν ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι” , we cannot suppose an Attic construction like κρύψω ἐμαυτὴν ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδῃ, for we should certainly find εἰσόψεται, as in SOPH. Aj. 658,κρύψω τόδ᾽ ἔγχος ἔνθα μή τις ὄψεται” . (For an occasional future optative, see § 574.) In AR. Ran. 97,ὅστις λάκοι” clearly expresses purpose, and we cannot think of substituting ὅστις λάκῃ for it; and ὅστις φθέγξεται, the true Attic expression, is found in the next verse: the latter decides the force of ὅστις λάκοι. It would seem that the optative, which is further removed than the subjunctive from the original deliberative construction, took another step in the process of “extension,” and gave us a few such expressions as have been quoted. Another case of final optative is PLAT. Rep. 398B,ὃς . . . μιμοῖτο καὶ . . . λέγοι” . In PLAT. Rep. 578E,εἴ τις θεῶν ἄνδρα θείη εἰς ἐρημίαν, ὅπου αὐτῷ μηδεὶς μέλλοι βοηθήσειν” , if some God should put a man in a desert, where there should be nobody likely to help him, we might take the second clause as either final or conditional; it probably combines a final with a conditional force, expressing the purpose of putting the man into a desert and also continuing the condition of the preceding clause.

In SOPH. Phil. 279-282,ὁρῶντα ῾παστ̓ ναῦς βεβώσας, ἄνδρα δ᾽ οὐδέν᾽ ἔντοπον ῾σξ. ὄντα, οὐχ ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν οὐδ᾽ ὅστις συλλάβοιτο” , I formerly classed the optatives with those in § 573; but it now seems to me that οὐδεὶς ἔντοπός ἐστιν ὅστις ἀρκέσῃ would be as natural as ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐκέτ᾽ ἐστὶν εἰς τι βλέπω in SOPH. Aj. 514, and I have therefore included this passage with the examples under § 573.2.

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