Sir Richard C. Jebb, The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos

Isokrates: Forensic speeches

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THE six forensic speeches extant under the name of Isokrates belong to the first period of his literary life, and cover about ten years 403—393 B.C. They are all in private causes, and may be classed thus:—

• I. Action for Assault (δίκη αἰκίας). Against Lochites. [Or. XX.]
• II. Claim to an Inheritance (ἐπιδικασία). Aeginetikos. [Or. XIX.]
III. Action to Recover a Deposit (δίκη παρακαταθήκης).
• 1. Against Euthynus. [Or. XXI.]
• 2. Trapezitikos. [Or. XVII.]
• IV. Action for Damage (δίκη βλάβης). Concerning the Team of Horses (περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους). [Or. XVI.]
• V. Special Plea (παραγραφή). Against Kallimachos. [Or. XVIII.]

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I. Action for assault¹ (δίκη αἰκίας).

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Against Lochites.

Against Lochites [Or. XX.]—The plaintiff, ‘a poor man and one of the people’ (§ 19), brings an action against Lochites, a rich young citizen (§ 17), who has struck him a blow. The penalty demanded by the plaintiff is a heavy fine (§ 16).

Two points help to fix the date. (1) Lochites is

Date.

too young to have had any part in the doings of 405 B.C. (§ 11); (2) his insolence is compared to that of the oligarchs ‘who gave over our power to the enemy and levelled the walls’ (§ 11). This by no means proves, but it rather suggests, that the rebuilding of the walls by Konon had not begun; i.e. that the speech is earlier than 393 B.C. It is put by Sauppe in 394 B.C.²

The fact of the assault (the prosecutor says) has already

Analysis.

been established by witnesses³. Now, bodily injury is the most grievous kind of injury, and ought to be atoned for by the heaviest punishment. The framers of the Athenian laws have marked their sense of this by affording two special facilities for prosecution in such cases. First, the prosecutor is not required to deposit caution-money. Secondly, in cases of outrage (ὕβρις), the right of prosecuting is not confined to the person injured. Any citizen cognisant of the outrage can lay an indictment before the Thesmothetae. Again, it is in order to prevent personal violence that the penalty for abusive language has been placed so high as 500 drachmas (§§ 1—3). Outrages which were committed under the oligarchy are punished; much more is punishment due to outrages committed under the democracy (§ 4). Lochites will perhaps argue that the blow has proved harmless. But it is not for the damage, it is for the insult that the plaintiff claims satisfaction. Lochites acted in the spirit of that insolence which has twice overthrown the democracy itself, and of which every manifestation ought to be checked as dangerous to the whole community (§§ 5—14). Rich men alone are interested in the security of property. But rich and poor alike are concerned in the repression of personal violence. If the prosecutor is a poor man, it is not less the duty and the interest of the judges to give him the protection of the law (§§ 15—22).

The cleverness of this speech lies in the speaker's

Remarks.

identification of his own dignity ‘as a man of the people’ (τοῦ πλήθους εἷς) with that of the judges— men of the people too, exposed to the freaks of young men who happen to have the temper of the Thirty Tyrants. There is a good deal of rhetorical skill in the passage which points out that this insolence of Lochites is just the insolence which has twice overthrown public freedom (§§ 9—11). The speech has one special characteristic in common with that of Demosthenes against Konon. Each deals with an action for assault (αἰκία); but in each the plaintiff constantly speaks of the outrage (ὕβρις）— thus seeking to combine the forces of two distinct forms of accusation⁴.

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II. Claim to an inheritance (ἐπιδικασία).

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Aeginetikos.

Aeginetikos [Or. XIX].—Thrasylochos, a citizen of Siphnos, one of the Kyclades, had at his death left his property to the speaker, whom he had previously adopted as his son⁵. The speaker's right to the inheritance is disputed by a daughter of the testator; and the speech is in answer to her claim (ἐπιδικασία). The case is tried at Aegina, where the speaker had settled (κατοικισάμενος, § 24) before his death.

The date is uncertain. In §§ 18—20, there is a

Date.

reference to the seizure of Paros by some exiles from that island and from Siphnos; who afterwards took Siphnos, and drove out the party to which the speaker belonged. Now, from what the speaker says about his family in § 36, it is probable that he belonged to the oligarchic party, and that the successful exiles were democratic. A democratic revolution would have had most chance of success just after the sudden blow dealt to the power of Sparta—the support, throughout Greece, of oligarchy —by the defeat at Knidos in August, 394 B.C. Probably, then, the speech may be put at the end of 394 or early in 393 B.C.⁶

The relationship of the persons chiefly concerned is shown by this stemma:—

Thrasyllos first wife second wife daughter, the claimant against the speaker, § 6 Thrasylochostestator Sôpoliswho died before Thrasylochos, § 11 daughter, wife of the speaker, § 9

The speaker is glad of the opportunity given him by this

Analysis.

trial of proving publicly how much better his right to the inheritance is than that of the female claimant (§§ 1—4). He then explains the relations between the family of Thrasylochos (the testator) and his own (§§ 5—9). From boyhood he had been intimate with Thrasylochos, and had nursed him in his last illness. His friend showed his gratitude by adopting the speaker as his son—the necessary legal preliminary to making him his heir, and securing him against the claim of the next of kin. This proceeding is shown to be in accordance with (1) the law of Aegina, in which island Thrasylochos and the speaker were resident when the will was made; (2) with the law of Keos, valid also in Siphnos, of which the parties were citizens; (3) with the law of the city to which the female claimant and her representatives in this action belonged. [The name of this city is nowhere stated] (§§ 10—15.)

The speaker next contrasts his own conduct towards Thrasylochos with that of the female claimant. In the first place he had saved the very property now in question. Thrasylochos and his brother Sôpolis, citizens of Siphnos, had, for security, placed the greater part of their fortune in the neighbouring island of Paros. Paros was suddenly seized by a party of democratic exiles, Parians and Siphnians, led by one Pasînos. At the risk of his life, the speaker sailed by night to Paros, and carried the endangered property back to Siphnos. Presently the democratic masters of Paros attacked and took Siphnos itself. The speaker—whose family belonged to the aristocracy of the island, and had even given it kings—was among those who were forced to fly. He took with him, not only his own mother and sister, but Thrasylochos, who was then in weak health. The speaker and his family wished to remain at Melos. But Thrasylochos entreated them to accompany him to Troezen; and, though they knew the place to be unhealthy, they consented. The speaker's sister and mother died soon after their arrival. He afterwards nursed Thrasylochos through a long and distressing illness in Aegina. During that illness the half-sister of Thrasylochos, who now claims his property, never once visited him; nor, on his death, did she attend his funeral (§§ 16—33).

Her advocates do not question the genuineness of the will, but complain of it as unreasonable and unjust. It is, however, perfectly reasonable, since, by adopting the speaker as his son, Thrasylochos provided against his family being extinguished and his mother and sister left destitute. It is also just; for the speaker was in all respects best entitled to the inheritance. The choice of him as heir would have gratified Sôpolis, the late brother, and Thrasyllos, the late father, of the testator (§§ 34—46). The speaker claims a verdict on the ground of his benefits to the deceased; of the will; and of the law with which the will accords (§§ 47— 51).

This is perhaps the best of the extant forensic

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speeches of Isokrates. It is almost free from the artificialism which injures more or less the effect of all the rest. The passage in which the speaker gives the proofs of his devotion to Thrasylochos (§§ 18—27) is powerful because it is clear and plain. Nowhere else does Isokrates come so near to the especial excellences of Lysias⁷.

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III. Action to recover a deposit (παρακαταθήκης δίκη).

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1.

Against Euthynus.

1. Against Euthynus [Or. XXI.]—Soon after the establishment of the Thirty Tyrants, some personal enemies of Nikias the plaintiff threatened⁸ to strike his name off the list of citizens and to have him enrolled for military service under Lysander. Thereupon Nikias mortgaged his house, sent his servants out of Attica, deposited the sum of three talents with the defendant Euthynus, and went to live in the country. Presently, wishing to leave Attica, he applied to Euthynus for his money. Euthynus repaid two of the three talents, but disclaimed knowledge of the third. At the time, Nikias could only complain to friends. He now brings against Euthynus an action for withholding (ἀποστερῆσαι⁹ § 16) the third part of the deposit. The speaker is a friend of the plaintiff; the date is evidently just after the restoration of the democracy, 403 B.C.¹⁰

Date.

Lysias wrote a speech, now lost, for Euthynus¹¹. Diogenes Laertius also mentions a speech, in answer to that of Isokrates, by Antisthenes; which, if genuine, was probably a mere exercise¹².

The speaker can show good reason for appearing as

Analysis.

advocate of the plaintiff. Nikias is his friend, an injured man, and has no practice in speaking (§ 1). The facts of the case are then stated (§§ 2—3).

As no one, freeman or slave, was present when Nikias deposited or demanded the money, no witness can be brought. The case for the plaintiff must rest solely on presumptive evidence (τεκμήρια, § 4). Now, vexatious lawsuits are usually brought by needy and fluent men against wealthy men who cannot speak. But, in this case, the defendant is poorer, and a better speaker, than the plaintiff. Again, the temptation to dishonesty was stronger for Euthynus than for Nikias; since for the former the gain was certain, but the claim of the latter might fail. The state of public affairs, too, at the time made robbery easy and redress hopeless (§§ 5—7).

Had Nikias wished to practise extortion, he would not have chosen as victim his own first-cousin Euthynus, a man, too, with little money but with many friends. Probably Euthynus himself would not have chosen out his kinsman to wrong, if the fact of the deposit had not made the opportunity too tempting (§§ 8—10). The strongest presumption for the defendant's guilt may be found in the time of the transaction. Under the Thirty, Euthynus was all-powerful. Nikias, merely on account of his wealth, was exposed to danger. Thus Timodemos extorted 30 minae from him by the simple threat of arresting him. At such a time, it is more likely that he should have been a victim than a slanderer (§§ 11— 15). Euthynus will perhaps say that it is unlikely that he should have repaid two talents and withheld the third. It was just the foreseen plausibility of this argument which emboldened him. Judicious frauds of this kind are common; they ought not to be encouraged by the acquittal of Euthynus. Besides, the same argument will serve Nikias. Why, if he wished to extort money, should he not have claimed all three talents? No fraudulent motive can be assigned for his demanding only one. But the motive of Euthynus in repaying two is clear. It was notorious that Nikias had deposited a sum of money with him; but the amount of that sum was unknown. He saw, therefore, that it would be safe for him to steal a part of it, but unsafe to steal the whole (§§ 16— 21).

Philostratos reckons this ‘unattested¹³’ speech

Remarks.

one of the two best of Isokrates, praising it for a temperate and compact power of expression¹⁴, as he praises the Archidamos for brilliancy and spirit. The choice may seem arbitrary; but at least there is no adequate ground for doubting the genuineness of the speech against Euthynus. Benseler thinks it spurious; first and chiefly, because the examples of hiatus are stronger and more frequent than he can conceive Isokrates admitting; then, on account of the short, compact periods¹⁵. But surely the canons observed by Isokrates in his mature style cannot be applied so rigorously to early works, especially when these are forensic. The composition of the Aeginetikos offers a contrast as strong as possible to that (for instance) of the Panegyrikos, and yet the authenticity of the Aeginetikos is thoroughly well attested.

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2.

Trapezitikos.

2. Trapezitikos [Or. XVII.]—A subject of Satyros, king of Bosporos¹⁶, brings an action against the banker Pasion, for the recovery of money alleged to have been placed in Pasion's hands. The details of the case are reserved for the analysis of the speech itself.

Two points fix the date. (1) The Lacedaemonian supremacy

Date.

on the sea is spoken of as a thing of the past (§ 36); that is, the time is after the battle of Knidos, August 394 B.C. (2) Satyros I. of Bosporos is alive (§ 57): but he died at the siege of Theudosia in 393 B.C.¹⁷ The speech belongs, then, to the end of 394 or early part of 393 B.C.

‘An action of this class is always difficult to maintain.

Analysis.

The business between a banker and his customer is transacted without witnesses; and the banker usually commands money, friends, and credit (§§ 1—2). The facts of this case are as follows. I came to Athens, partly for pleasure, partly for business, having been sent out with two cornships by my father, who is governor of a large district, under Satyros, prince of Bosporos. I was introduced to Pasion and opened an account with him. Meanwhile my father had been arrested by Satyros on suspicion of treason. Some men from the Euxine who were at Athens received the orders of Satyros to take possession of all my property and to send me home. In this difficulty I consulted Pasion and decided to give up a small sum to the agents of Satyros, but to deny the existence of the larger sums which I had lying in Pasion's bank. To help the deception, Pasion was to represent me, not only as having no balance, but as owing money to himself and others. Having arranged matters with the agents of Satyros, I prepared to set out upon my homeward voyage, and applied to Pasion for my money. He told me that he had not the means of refunding it just then. I then sent to him my friends Philomelos and Menexenos; and to them he repudiated the debt altogether (§§ 3—10).

‘Presently news came that my father was restored to the favour of Satyros. Pasion, aware that there was now no longer any reason why legal proceedings should not be openly taken against him, hid his slave Kittos, who knew the truth. When Menexenos demanded that Kittos should be given up, Pasion retorted that we ourselves had made away with him, after bribing him to give us money from the bank. Presently, however, Kittos was found in Athens by Menexenos, who then demanded that he should be given up by Pasion for torture. Pasion at first asserted that Kittos was a freeman. Subsequently, however, he consented to submit him to the question: but, when we met for that purpose, refused to allow torture to be applied (§§ 11—16).

‘Finding that his conduct was blamed by everyone, he next sought a private interview with me. He pleaded poverty as the cause which had forced him to deny the debt. He then gave me a bond that he would accompany me to the Euxine and there pay the money—thus avoiding a scandal at Athens. The bond, which stipulated that, if we could not come to an agreement, Satyros should arbitrate, was placed in the hands of Pyron of Pherae, a merchant in the Euxine trade. In the event of an amicable settlement, he was to burn it; otherwise, to place it in the hands of Satyros (§§ 17—20).

‘Meanwhile Menexenos had upon his own account brought an action for libel against Pasion. Pasion was now terrified lest Menexenos should get hold of our bond. He implored my mediation, which I refused. Desperate, he bribed the slaves of Pyron, and found means of tampering with the bond. He then became defiant, and refused to go with me to the Euxine or to pay the money. When the bond was opened before witnesses, it was found to release Pasion from all claims on my part (§§ 21—23).

‘Pasion will rely much on this forged document. That it is a forgery, is evident (1) from the terms of the document itself; (2) from the absence of motive on my part for giving such a release; (3) from my daring to come into court now; (4) from Pasion's eagerness, before he had tampered with the bond, to have it cancelled. Such frauds are common. Last year, Pythodorus, a friend of Pasion, opened the balloting-urn of the Senate, and changed the names of those who had been nominated as judges in the festal contests. (§§ 22—34.)

‘Or perhaps Pasion will contend that I had no money at all here. Among other things which disprove this is the fact that he himself became security for me in seven talents when a vessel upon which I had lent money was denounced as being the property of a Delian, and was in danger of being put to death untried. In a word,—which is more probable—that, at a moment when I was helpless, I should have brought a false charge against Pasion, or that he should have been emboldened to defraud me? (§§ 35—50.)

‘Ultimately Pasion did not go himself to the Bosporos, but sent Kittus as his agent. Satyros declined to give a judgment, but took my part, and wrote in my behalf to Athens. It is the clearest argument for my claim that Pasion declined my challenge to have his slave tortured. Consider the strength of my cause; remember the benefits of Satyros and his father [Spartakos I.] to Athens, for whose sake he has often sent away empty the corn-ships of other States,—and give just sentence in my favour.’ (§§ 51—58.)

The Trapezitikos has a special interest as

Remarks.

illustrating the relations between Athens and the kingdom of Bosporos,—relations which remained no less friendly under the successors of Satyros I.¹⁸ Benseler believes this speech, like the last, to be spurious. His ground is the frequency of hiatus¹⁹. The Trapezitikos is, however, cited by Dionysios, not merely as genuine, but as the typical forensic work of Isokrates²⁰; and is thrice named by Harpokration without suspicion²¹. It has been further asked—Was this a mere declamation²²? There is nothing whatever to prove it; and one point is against it. Pasion, the banker, bore a high character at Athens²³. The writer of a declamation would not have selected him as the object of an imaginary charge of fraud.

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IV. Action for damage (δίκη βλάβης).

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Concerning the Team of Horses.

Concerning the Team of Horses (περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους). [Or. XVI.]—The speaker is the younger Alkibiades²⁴. Tisias, an Athenian citizen, alleges that the elder Alkibiades had robbed him of a team of four horses²⁵, and sues the son for their value.

The charge has a close likeness to another

Occasion.

mentioned elsewhere. Alkibiades had entered seven four-horse chariots at the Olympic festival²⁶. One of these chariots had originally belonged to the city of Argos. Diomedes, an Athenian, had commissioned Alkibiades to buy it for him from the Argives; Alkibiades had done so, and had then entered it as his own. Plutarch identifies the case of Diomedes with this case of Tisias²⁷. From § 49 of our speech it appears that the horses had won a victory for Alkibiades at Olympia, and in § 1 he is said to have bought them from Argos²⁸.

Tisias could not charge Alkibiades the son with

Form of procedure.

complicity in a fraud committed before he was born; he must therefore have brought against him simply an action for damage²⁹. The damages were laid at five talents (§ 46). The defendant says (ib.) that, if cast in the suit, he will be disfranchised. This means that, as he was unable to pay, an action of ejectment (ἐξούλης) would be brought against him: if cast in this, he would have to pay to the Treasury a sum equal to the original damages; and, failing to do this, he would be disfranchised (ἄτιμος) as a state-debtor.

In § 45 the speaker says that he was born just

Date.

before his father's banishment (in 415 B. C.); that is, at the end of 416 or early in 415 B. C. The action could not have been brought against him until he was eighteen years old; i.e. until the end of 398 or the beginning of 397 B. C. On the other hand, not much time would have been lost in bringing it. The date, then, is probably 397 B.C.³⁰,—about two years earlier than that of the Lysian speeches ‘Against Alkibiades’³¹.

The speech, as extant, appears to be mutilated at the beginning,—the lost part having contained the statement of the facts, followed by the citation of evidence³². The speaker now passes to a general defence of his father's life.

The specific charge against him, the defendant says, has

Analysis.

now been disproved. It has been shown on the evidence of the ambassadors from Argos, and of others acquainted with the facts, that his father had bought the yoke of horses in question from the city of Argos, and had not taken them by force from Tisias the plaintiff. But, as usual, the defendant's appearance in a private lawsuit has been made an opportunity for slandering his father's political career. No vindication of that conduct will be required by the older men present. For the sake of the younger, however, the facts shall be briefly stated. (§§ 1—4.)

Alkibiades was the victim of the men who concerted the Revolution of the Four Hundred. Finding that he would not come into their schemes, they brought against him the two most odious charges which they could devise,—that of profaning the Mysteries, and that of undermining the democracy. Their accusations broke down; and he was appointed commander of the expedition to Sicily. In his absence, they again caballed against him. Sentenced to an unjust banishment, he still respected the welfare of Athens. He went to Argos and lived quietly there, until the persecution kept up by his enemies at home at last drove him to Sparta. The acts imputed to him—his having caused Dekeleia to be fortified, having thrown the islands into revolt, having guided the tactics of Sparta—admit either of denial or of justification. Athenian citizens, who tasted the bitterness of banishment under the Thirty, ought to sympathise with an exile who was eager to return. Let them remember, too, what Alkibiades was before his banishment—how, with 200 hoplites, he gained for Athens the greatest cities of the Peloponnesus,—and how he commanded in Sicily. Again, let them remember what was the position of affairs at the moment when they received him back. The democracy had fallen; the democratic army at Samos regarded the oligarchic rulers of Athens as worse enemies than the Spartans; and the oligarchs were seeking help from the Spartan garrison at Dekeleia. The Persian king was paying the Spartan fleet; and 90 Phoenician ships were at Aspendos. Then it was that the generals sent for Alkibiades. Instead of disdaining them, he came at their call, and restored the prosperity of Athens at home and abroad. (§§ 5—22.)

It remains to speak of his private life—after a word as to his descent. On the paternal side, he sprang from the Eupatridac,—on the maternal, from the Alkmaeonidae—a family, one of whose members, Alkmaeon, was the first winner of a chariot-race at Olympia,—a family which was true to the people throughout the forty years of the Peisistratid tyranny, and which produced the leaders under whom the tyrants were overthrown. Alkibiades, whose father fell at Koroneia (great-grandson of him just named), became the ward of Perikles. On reaching the age for military service, he distinguished himself as one of 1000 picked hoplites whom Phormio led into Thrace. He afterwards married the daughter of Hipponikos,—whose hand was another prize won by him from many competitors. About the same time he conducted a sacred embassy to Olympia; and scorning to excel as a common athlete, sought a more splendid triumph in the chariot race. He entered more and better teams than the greatest State could have afforded; and gained the first, second, and third places. As regards his other public services, they might have been less brilliantly performed, and yet have formed the glory of other men: but to praise him for them would be trivial. (§§ 23—35.)

His loyalty to the democracy was proved by his sufferings. His banishment was the first preparation for the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, and the first consequence of the oligarchy of the Thirty. His interests were, indeed, closely bound up with yours. The Tyrants knew this; and while they drove others from Athens, drove Alkibiades from Hellas; thinking that it would be vain to level the walls, unless they removed him who could restore them. Among those Tyrants was Charikles, brother-in-law of Tisias. Tisias himself was a senator under the Thirty, and yet dares, in this instance, to violate an amnesty which alone protects his own life. (§§ 36—44.)

The defendant appeals to the pity of the judges. He has had experience enough of troubles. He was not four years old when his father was banished,—his mother being already dead—and was then in danger of his life. He was still a boy when he was driven from Athens by the Thirty; and at the restoration of the democracy, was prevented by his enemies from benefiting by the grant of land made to those whose property had been confiscated. The damages are now laid at five talents. He is too poor to pay this, and will therefore be disfranchised. The father's victory at Olympia ought not to have for a result the son's disgrace,— a citizen who has ere now lost his privileges in the cause of the people ought not again to lose them by the people's vote. (§§ 45—49.)

Isokrates marks elsewhere his admiration for the

Remarks.

genius of the elder Alkibiades³³; and the praise given to him here, one-sided though it is, was probably not due merely to the partiality of an advocate. It has been suggested that so strong an eulogy of so unpopular a man can hardly have been written for delivery in court, and that the speech, as it stands, must have been retouched³⁴. Rather in this very offence against forensic persuasion, and in the thoroughly epideictic character of the whole, we may recognise the first, and not the second, thoughts of Isokrates. Lysias took some verbal hints from this speech when (in 396 or 395) he wrote for the nephews of Nikias³⁵. It is interesting to contrast our speech with that Against Alkibiades of the pseudo-Andokides³⁶, and with the two speeches of Lysias³⁷. In all four there is much wild misrepresentation; but together they are aids to estimating a man whom neither enemies nor friends could describe with moderation.

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V. Special plea (παραγραφή).

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Against Kallimachos.

Against Kallimachos [Or. XVIII.]—Kallimachos had brought against the defendant an Action for Damage (δίκη βλάβης). The defendant has entered a Special Plea to show that the action is not maintainable.

The facts of the case are these. In 403 B. C., during the short reign of the Ten who succeeded the Thirty, Patrokles, the Archon Basileus, denounced Kallimachos for having in his possession a sum of money which was liable to confiscation, as being the property of a man who had joined the exiles in the Peiraeus. The Ten referred the case to the Senate, and the Senate decided that the money should be confiscated. On the restoration of the democracy, Kallimachos brought an action (1) against Patrokles, from whom he recovered ten minae; (2) against one Lysimachos, from whom he recovered two minae; (3) against the defendant. The defendant compromised the case, paying two minae; and this compromise was sanctioned by the award of an arbitrator³⁸ chosen by the parties. Such an award was a bar to further litigation. Notwithstanding this, Kallimachos presently sued the defendant for 100 minae on the same account. The defendant brought a witness to show that the action was barred by the previous arbitration. Kallimachos was then bound to prove that the witness was perjured. He did not attempt to do this, but, favoured by the Archon, merely brought his action afresh.

The defendant now avails himself of the new law

Form.

of Archînos, passed soon after the Restoration of the democracy. This provided that any person, against whom an action was brought in violation of the Amnesty, should be allowed to enter a Special Plea (παραγραφή); that such Plea should be heard before the cause was tried; and that the bringer of the Plea should speak first³⁹. If either party failed to obtain 1/5th of the votes on the Special Plea, he was liable to the fine of the epôbelia (1/6th of the damages originally laid⁴⁰). As the original Action for Damage would have been tried under the presidency of the Thesmothetae, these would be presidents of the court at the hearing of the Special Plea also.

The Amnesty of 403 is recent (§ 29); on the

Date.

other hand, there has been time for examples of that tendency to violate it which led to the measure of Archînos (§ 2). Probably the speech may be referred to the year 402 B.C.⁴¹

The Special Plea is a novelty, and its form must be

Analysis.

explained. The speaker then states the law of Archînos He can show that Kallimachos has violated the Amnesty; that the charge is untrue in itself; and that the matter in dispute had already been settled by arbitration. (§§ 1—4.)

A narrative of the facts follows. (§§ 5—12.)

‘Kallimachos intends,’ the defendant goes on, ‘to deny that any arbitration took place. It is not likely, he will say, that he should have chosen as referee my friend Nikomachos; or that he should have taken two minae in payment for a hundred. But the terms of the reference left no discretionary power to Nikomachos; and it is not surprising that a claimant who had no real case at all should have been satisfied by two minae. Even, however, if there had been no arbitration; even if no witnesses could be brought; you could infer the truth from my past character. When the oligarchy was strongest,—when injustice was easiest,—I never assailed the fortunes or life of any citizen, nor struck any one off the civic list to place him upon the muster-roll of Lysander. Is it likely that I should have dared to do so when the oligarchy was tottering? (§§ 11—18.)

‘This is enough to show that the accusation is untrue. It can also be shown that the action is illegal. The Amnesty, and the oaths which ratified it, shall be read to you. Kallimachos thinks to set aside the compact thus solemnly sworn to. Yet when Philon of Koelê was accused of malversation upon an embassy, and had no defence to offer, that compact protected him. And it deters your most influential citizens, Thrasybulos and Anytos, from claiming great sums of which they were robbed from those whom they know to be answerable. Do not allow Kallimachos to break an agreement which has been salutary to all Athens. Your verdict will affect the credit of public compacts generally. It is by these that civilized life is held together; in these, when we had been conquered by Sparta, we found refuge; and it would be ill for us if Sparta were to break her oaths. But how can we be trusted abroad if we violate pledges given among ourselves? You try this cause under two oaths—that which all judges take, and that which ratified the public amnesty. (§§ 19—34.)

‘Kallimachos will bewail his poverty and his peril; he will inveigh against the crimes of the oligarchy. The plea of poverty is no defence for a slanderer who has brought peril upon himself; the crimes of the oligarchy are irrelevant. (§§ 35—41.) Men will infer from your verdict whether the Amnesty is, or is not, to be observed. You yourselves know that that Amnesty has brought us peace and honour in exchange for an infamous civil war. (§§ 42—46.) Shall it be broken by a man of such life as Kallimachos? During the ten years of our war with Sparta, he kept away from us. When the Thirty came to power, he returned to Athens. When they were about to fall, he went to the Peiraeus; when the Spartan army had blockaded the exiles there, he fled to Boeotia. You do not know him as I do. Kratinos once had a lawsuit for a farm with the brother-inlaw of Kallimachos. A personal encounter took place; and the brother-in-law of Kallimachos swore that a female slave of his had died of a blow received from Kratinos during the fray. Kratinos allowed them to bring their action; and, as soon as Kallimachos had sworn that the woman was dead, produced her alive. That such a man should accuse others of falsehood is as if Phrynondas should say that his neighbours are blackguards; or, Philurgos, the stealer of the Gorgon's head, should tax his neighbours with sacrilege. (§§ 47—57.)

‘But there will be other opportunities of denouncing Kallimachos; I wish now to recall one of my own merits. When our fleet was lost at Aegospotami, I was one of the few trierarchs who saved their ships; and the only one who, on returning to the Peiraeus, did not lay down his trierarchy. In partnership with my brother, I continued to serve, bringing corn to Athens in defiance of Lysander's prohibition. For this you crowned us—at a time when crowns were less common than they now are. Remember the contrast between Kallimachos and me; remember the Amnesty; and decide in the interests of justice and of Athens.’ (§§ 58—68.)

The genuineness of the speech has been doubted

Remarks.

by some modern critics; one, at least, of whom is inclined to ascribe it to Isaeos⁴². In uniform plainness, indeed, it differs even more decidedly than the Aeginetikos from the latter writings of Isokrates. But this plainness accords with his own forensic ideal as hinted in the Panathenaikos⁴³; and, instead of proving anything against the authenticity, rather tends to show that his manner cannot be inferred from one period only of his work. The closeness and detail of technical argument, especially in §§ 1—41, is certainly like Isaeos. But this was made necessary by the complexity of the facts and by the very nature of the paragraphê, turning, as it did, upon the question of form.