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In regard to proof, whether massed or sectional, the characteristic difference between Isaeos and Lysias is fairly represented by the remark of the same critic, that Lysias uses enthymeme, Isaeos uses also epicheireme1. By enthymeme, Aristotle meant a
Enthymeme and Epicheireme.
rhetorical syllogism: that is, a syllogism drawn, not from the premisses (ἀρχαί) proper to any particular science—such, for instance, as medicine—but from propositions relating to contingent things in the sphere of human action2, which are the common property of all discussion; propositions which he classifies as general (εἰκότα) and particular (σημεῖα); and accordingly defines an enthymeme as ‘a syllogism from probabilities and signs3.’ A misapprehension of Aristotle's meaning had, as early as the first century B.C., led to the conception of the enthymeme as not merely a syllogism of a particular subject-matter, but also as a syllogism of which one premiss is suppressed4. The term epicheireme was then brought in to denote a rhetorical syllogism which is stated in full—an ‘essay’ to deal thoroughly with the issue at stake5. Dionysios means, then, that Lysias is content with a sketching style of proof, a proof which is not formally complete, whereas Isaeos, aiming at a precise development, goes through every step of his argument. In other phrases of Dionysios himself, Lysias proves ‘briefly’ and ‘generally,’—Isaeos, ‘at length,’ and ‘accurately’ (διεξοδικῶςἀκριβῶς6). The difference between
Example: Or. VII.
epicheireme and enthymeme is well exemplified in the seventh speech. The question is whether Apollodoros, the testator, had really adopted the speaker. The speaker first proves the adoption by direct testimony, and then says that he will bring, further, some indirect testimony. At this stage, Lysias would probably have been content with an enthymeme to the following effect:—‘Thrasybulos, the nephew of the female claimant, has made no claim, though his right is better than hers.’ Isaeos, however, will be satisfied with nothing less than a systematic and rigorous demonstration. Eupolis had two daughters,—the claimant, and another, who has left a son. Now there is, indeed, a law which gives brother and sister equal claim to the estate of a brother. But, where the kinship is less near, men precede women. Hence, if the adoption is invalid, this daughter of Eupolis has no claim, while her nephew, Thrasybulos, has a right to all. But Thrasybulos has raised no claim. Presumably, therefore, he recognises the adoption as valid7. Isaeos, as Sir William Jones well says, lays close siege to the understandings of the jury. His reasonings, generally based on positive law, are constraining even when they are not persuasive. Often, again, an argument is founded on the feeling or conduct of the testator towards the speaker and the adversary respectively8: on the conduct of the adversary, as being inconsistent with his assumption9: on the services rendered by the speaker's client to the deceased10 or to the State11: on the demerits of the adversary as regards general character12, on his omission to perform public services13, or on his anxiety to obtain the estate while he is content that the testator's house should be left desolate14. The example which the Greek critic selects is, for us, the only considerable specimen of the orator's work in a cause not testamentary15. Euphiletos had been struck off the list of his deme on the ground that he was not a trueborn citizen, and has appealed to a jury:—

1 Dionys. Isae. 16, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀποδεικτικοῖς διαλλάττειν ἂν δόξειεν Ἰσαῖος Λυσίου τῷ μὴ κατ᾽ ἐνθήμημά τι λέγειν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ᾽ ἐπιχείρημα.

2 See Arist. Rh. I. 1—3. Rhetoric, like Dialectic, deals with τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ὔλλως ἔχειν. But, while Dialectic deals with all such things, Rhetoric deals only with a certain class of them, viz. τὰ βουλεύεσθαι εἰωθότα, τὰ πραττόμενα, things of which men can influence the course: in short, τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ὄντα.

3 Arist. An. Pr. II. 27, συλλογισμὸς ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημεἰων.

4 Quint. v. 10 § 3: this is what Juvenal means, Sat. VI. 449, by curtum enthymema. That the suppression of one premiss was not essential to Aristotle's conception of the Enthymeme, has been shown unanswerably by Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, XX. vol. III. pp. 386 f. He observes: 1. That Aristotle, who regards the syllogism, not in relation to expression, but as an exclusively mental process (An. Post. I. 10 § 7), would not have distinguished a class of syllogisms by a verbal accident: 2. That, having defined the enthymeme as a syllogism of a peculiar matter (An. Pr. II. 27), he cannot have defined it by another difference (the suppression of a premiss) which has no analogy to the former. I would add: 3. That in Arist. Rh. I. 2, where the enthymeme is said to consist ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἐξ ὧν πρῶτος συλλογισμός, the πολλάκις can be explained on no other view. As to the interpolation ἀτελής in An. Pr. II. 27, see Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy, pp. 153 f.

5 On the epicheireme, see Volkmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen und Romer (1872), pp. 153 f.—Sir W. Jones (Prefatory Discourse, p. x) describes it with substantial correctness as ‘that oratorical syllogism where the premises are respectively proved by argument before the speaker draws his conclusion:’ but it was enough to constitute the epicheireme that the premisses should be stated. See Quint. v. 10 § 5, Propria eius appellatio et maxima in usu est posita certa quaedam sententiae comprehensio, quae ex tribus minimum partibus constat. Cicero rendered it by ratiocinatio, which Quintilian likes better than ratio or aggressio: he himself keeps epichirema.

6 Dionys. Isae. 16. The necessary amplitude of epicheirematic, as compared with enthymematic, proof, is well expressed by the phrase of Dionys. Dinarch. c. 6 (of Hypereides as compared with Lysias)—πιστοῦται δ᾽ οὐ κατ᾽ ἐνθύμημα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ᾽ ἐπιχείρημα πλατύνων.

7 Or. VII. §§ 18—21.

8 e.g. Or. I. (Kleonymos) §§ 30— 33: Or. III. (Pyrrhos) § 75: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) § 8: Or. VIII. (Kiron) § 18: Or. IX. (Astyphilos) §§ 16 f., 31.

9 e.g. Or. I. (Kleonymos) § 22: Or. II. (Menekles) § 39: Or. VI. (Philoktemon) § 46: Or. VIII. (Kiron) §§ 21 f.

10 To the deceased: e.g. Or. II. (Menekles) §§ 18, 36: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) § 37: Or. IX. (Astyphilos) § 27.

11 To the State: e.g. Or. VI. (Philoktemon) § 60: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) § 41: Or. VIII. (Kiron) §§ 35, 40 f.

12 e.g. Or. II. (Menekles) § 37, Or. IV. (Nikostratos) § 28, Or. VI. (Philoktemon) passim.

13 e.g. Or. v. (Dikaeogenes) §§ 35 f., 43: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) § 39.

14 e.g. Or. II. (Menekles) §§ 26, 37: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) §§ 31 f., 44.

15 On the fragment For Euphiletos—now ranked as Or. XII.—see ch. XXI.

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