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ῥητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῆ is translated by Cicero, ex altera parte respondere dialecticae, Orat. XXXII 114. ‘Vox a scena ducta videtur. Chori antistrophe strophae ad assem respondet, eiusque motus ita fit, ut posterior in prioris locum succedat...Significat ex altera parte respondere et quasi ex adverso oppositum esse; id quod etiam in antistrophen cadit.’ Trendel. El. Log. Arist. § 14 p. 74: and to the same effect, Comment. ad Arist. de Anima, II 11 5 p. 408. ‘ἀντίστροφον dicitur quod alius rei quasi partes agit eamque repraesentat;’ Waitz, Comm. ad Anal. Pr. I 2, 25 a 6.

The term is borrowed from the manoeuvres of the chorus in the recitation of the choral odes. Στροφή denotes its movement in one direction, to which the ἀντιστροφή, the counter-movement, the wheeling in the opposite direction, exactly corresponds, the same movements being repeated. Müller, Diss. Eumen. p. 41. Hist. Gr. Lit. c. XIV § 4. Mure, Hist. Gk. Lit. Bk. III. c. 1 § 15. Hence it is extended to the words sung by the chorus during the latter of these evolutions, and signifies a set of verses precisely parallel or answering in all their details to the verses of the στροφή. And thus, when applied in its strict and proper sense, it denotes an exact correspondence in detail, as a fac-simile or counterpart.

Hence in Logic ἀντιστρέφειν is used to express terms and propositions which are convertible, and therefore identical in meaning, precisely similar in all respects. On the various senses of ἀντιστρέφειν and its derivatives in Logic, see Waitz, u. s. In this signification, however, ἀντίστροφος does not properly represent the relation actually subsisting between the two arts, the differences between them being too numerous to admit of its being described as an exact correspondence in detail; as I have already pointed out in the paraphrase (Introd. p. 134).

It also represents Rhetoric as an art, independent of, though analogous to, Dialectics, but not growing out of it, nor included under it. The word is of very frequent occurrence in Plato (Gorgias, Republic, Philebus, Timaeus, Theaetetus, Leges), who joins it indifferently with the genitive and dative; and he employs it in this latter sense; as likewise Isocrates, περὶ ἀντιδ. § 182; and Aristotle himself in several places; Polit. VI (IV) 5, 1292 b 7, καὶ ἔστιν ἀντίστροφος (corresponding) αὕτη ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὥσπερ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις. c. 6 ult. 1293 a 33. c. 10, 1295 a 18. de part. anim. II 17 ult. ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτοις τοῖς ζῴοις γλῶττα τοιαύτη τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἀντιστρόφως ἔχουσα τῷ μυκτῆρι τῶν ἐλεφάντων.

Lastly, Waitz, u. s., points out a peculiar signification of it, ‘res contraria alteri quam potestate aequiparat,’ in de Gen. Anim. II 6, 743 b 28. τὸ ψυχρὸν συνίστησιν ἀντίστροφον (as a balance) τῇ θερμότητι τῇ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τὸν ἐγκέφαλον. Trendelenburg, Comm. ad de Anima u. s., after defining ἀντιστρέφειν as above, adds, ἀντίστροφος ex eadem chori similitudine significat ex altera parte respondere (this is from Cicero, u. s.) Arist. Rhet. I 1; quod non significat, rhetoricam in dialecticae locum succedere (i.e. can be substituted for it, step into its place, as a convertible term), sed quasi ex adverso esse oppositam (stands over against it, as a corresponding opposite in a συστοιχία, two parallel rows of coordinate opposites, like the partners in a country dance). Quintilian, Inst. Orat. II 17, 42, specie magis quam genere differunt.

The term ἀντίστροφος therefore applied to the two arts, seems to represent them as two coordinate opposites, or opposites in the same row (see Spengel on the study of Rhetoric, Munich 1842, p. 21). They are sister arts, with general resemblances and specific differences; two species under one genus, proof: both modes of proof, both dealing with probable materials, but distinguished by the difference of the two instruments of proof employed: the one concluding by the formal svllogism, and by the regular induction, assumed complete; the other drawing its inferences by the abbreviated, imperfect, conversational enthymeme, never complete in form, and by the single example in the place of the general induction.

Rhetoric is afterwards described as παραφυές, μόριον and ὁμοίωμα (infra c. II § 7). παραφυές and μόριον both express in different ways the relation that Rhetoric bears to Dialectics as the off-shoot, branch, or part; a species or variety of the general art of probable reasoning: παραφυές as a subordinate shoot, growing out of the same root with the larger plant or tree,—a term so far corresponding with ἀντίστροφος, but differing from it in making Rhetoric subordinate. μόριον reduces it to a still lower level in comparison with the other. ὁμοίωμα implies no more than a mere general resemblance.

In Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII 6, occurs an explanation of ἀντίστροφος, quite in character with the ordinary Greek etymologies, ῥητορικήν, ἧς ἀντίστροφον εἶναι τὴν διαλεκτικήν, (not referring apparently to this passage, but most probably to the συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν) τουτέστιν ἰσόστροφον, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὕλην στρέφεσθαι (versari circa), as Homer called Ulysses ἀντίθεον instead of ἰσόθεον. Alexander (infr.) gives the same explanation.

Bacon Adv. of learning Bk. II IX 3, has antistrophe for ‘correspondence’, “and it hath the same relation or antistrophe that the former hath.”

The points of correspondence and difference between the two arts have been already fully explained in the Introduction, p. 90 foll.: I will here give a summary of them from Alexander's Commentary on the Topics, p. 4. They are 1. that both of them are μὴ περὶ ἕν τι γένος ἀφωρισμένον; that is, that neither of them has any special subject-matter, like the sciences, but argues or perorates upon any thesis or subject whatsoever that can be presented to it. 2. τὸ δἰ ἐνδόξων καὶ πιθανῶν, no proof or conclusion, or principle, that they employ is more than probable; exact demonstration and necessary conclusions are excluded from both alike; πίστις, belief, the result of mere persuasion, and not ἐπιστήμη, the infallible result of scientific demonstration, being the object aimed at. 3. μὴ δἰ οἰκείων ἀρχῶν, they have no ‘special, appropriate’ first principles, such as those from which the special sciences are deduced; though they likewise appeal to the τὰ κοινά, the κοιναὶ ἀρχαί, the ultimate axioms and principles common to all reasoning, which are above those of the special sciences, and from which the latter must be deduced. And, 4. they are ὁμοίως περὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις; they argue indifferently the opposite sides of the same question, and conclude the positive or negative of any proposition or problem; unlike science and demonstration, which can only arrive at one conclusion. Where the materials and the method are alike only probable, every question has, or may be made to appear to have, two sides, either of which may be maintained on probable principles; in Dialectics and Rhetoric no certainty is either attained or attainable. The chief points of difference between them are, that Dialectics deals practically as well as theoretically with every kind of problem or question that can be submitted to it; proceeds by question and answer, in the way of debate, and its discussions are of a more general or universal character; whereas the subjects of Rhetoric are practically, though not theoretically, almost absolutely limited to Politics; it follows a method of continuous narration or explanation (διεξοδικῶς), and deals in its conclusions rather with individual cases than with general principles or universal rules, maxims and axioms.

Alexander, in a preceding passage, gives the following very extraordinary account of the derivation and original meaning of ἀντίστροφος: τὸ γὰρ ἀντ. ἀντὶ τοῦ ἰσόστροφόν τε καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ στρεφομένην καὶ καταγινομένην λέγει.

κοινὰ ἁπάντων] See Introd., p. 87, and the Paraphrase, pp. 134—5.

ἀφωρισμένης] ‘marked off, separated by a limit’, from every thing else about it; and so ‘definite, special’ (§ 7). 1, 2, 1 περί τι γένος ἴδιον ἀφωρισμένον, opposed to περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος. Polit. I 13, 1260 b 1 ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ δουλείαν (a definite, limited, kind of slavery). Ib. IV (VI) 4, 1290 b 25 ἀποδιορίζειν. ἀφορίζεται ( τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις) πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις τῷ ἔργῳ τούτῳ, “this capacity of the soul is marked off, separated, distinguished, from all the rest by this function,” de Anima II 4, 9, 416 a 20. The preposition is similarly used in the compound ἀποβλέπειν, which is ‘to look away, or off’, from all surrounding objects, so as to fix the attention on one particular thing, or turn it in one particular direction. Comp. Lat. definire, determinare.

Parallel passages, in which this same characteristic of Rhetoric and Dialectics is noticed, are cited in the Introd. p. 75. See also Quintilian, II 21, 16—19, on the province of the orator.

ἐξετάζειν...λόγον] Note 1, Introd. p. 135. διαλεκτικὴ ἐξεταστική, Top. A 2, 101 b 3.


συνήθειαν] ‘habituation, familiarity, practice’, acquired by association (prop. that of living or herding together). Top. A 14, 105 b 27 τῇ διὰ τῆς ἀπαγωγῆς συνηθείᾳ πειρατέον γνωρίζειν ἑκάστην αὐτῶν (τῶν προτάσεων). See also on I 10, 18. This συνήθεια is derived from the constant operation or activity, the ἐνέργειαι, of the developed and acquired and settled ἕξις, or mental state (ἕξις from ἔχειν, ‘to be in such and such a state or condition’, τὸ πῶς ἔχειν): by the constant exercise of the ἕξις, or established confirmed habit, and its ἐνέργειαι, is produced by association that familiarity, or habituation, or practice, which secures success even to the empirical unartistic use of Dialectics or Rhetoric.

εἰκῇ ταῦτα δρᾷν is the use of them antecedent to practice, and without previously acquired familiarity: ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, by a mere spontaneous impulse, and therefore ‘at random.’

‘Est autem dialectica,’ says John of Salisbury, Metalogicus, II 4, ‘ut Augustino placet, bene disputandi scientia: quod quidem ita accipiendum est ut vis habeatur in verbis; ne scilicet dialectici credantur, quos casus iuvat artis beneficio destitutos.’

αὐτά] Rhetoric and its processes.

ὁδοποιεῖν] ‘to make a way’; to trace a path to be followed, which will lead you without unnecessary deviations to the place at which you wish to arrive. ὁδός therefore, in this metaphorical usage, is not merely a way, but the way, the best way; the way which will lead you most surely and expeditiously to the end proposed. Hence it denotes a regular, systematic, or scientific method; the best and easiest way of attaining the end desired in any intellectual pursuit or branch of study. And thus it is that the simple ὁδός, as well as the compound μέθοδος, come to denote a scientific or systematic procedure in the pursuit of truth as a philosophical ‘method’, or in any art or study. Hence we find ὁδῷ διῃρῆσθαι, Plat. Phaedr. 263 B, of a systematic methodical scientific division; and Rep. VII 533 D: καθ᾽ ὁδόν, in the same sense, Rep. IV 435 A, and Crat. 425 B. In Aristotle, de gen. et corr. I 8, 2 ὁδῷ δὲ μάλιστα περὶ πάντων...διωρίκασι Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος. de part. Anim. 14, 9 πῶς μὲν οὖν ἀποδέχεσθαι δεῖ τὴν περὶ φύσεως μέθοδον, καὶ τίνα τρόπον γένοιτ᾽ ἂν θεωρία περὶ αὐτῶν ὁδῷ καὶ ῥᾷστα... Anal. Pr. I 30 init., μὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων αὐτὴ καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὁποιανοῦν καὶ μάθημα. Top. B 2, 109 b 14 ὁδῷ γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐν ἐλάττοσιν σκέψις. Eth. Nic. I, 2 ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ὁδός. Dionysius, de Comp. Verb. c. 25, has ῥητορικὴ ὁδός for the more usual μέθοδος: and again ὁδῷ, de Comp. Verb. c. 4 sub fin. From this usage of the Greek word the Latins seem to have borrowed their via or via et ratione, which frequently occurs in precisely the same sense. See Cicero de Fin. III 5, 18, IV 4, 10; Orat. III 10, XXXIII 116; de Orat. I 25, 113. Quint. II 17, 41 esse certe viam atque ordinem in bene dicendo nemo dubitaverit; and x 7, 6 via dicere.

The verb ὁδοποιεῖν is found in the same sense, Met. A 3, 984 a 18. προϊόντων δ᾽ οὕτως, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὡδοποίησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνηνάγκασε ζητεῖν, and Rhet. III 12, 3 (according to MS A^{c} and some others); and the substantive ὁδοποίησις, III 14, 1.

προοδοποιεῖν, which occurs several times in Aristotle (as Rhet. II 2, 10, II 13, 7, III 12, 3, Prob. XXX 1, 954 b 12, de part. Anim. II 4, §§ 4, 5, 6, III 9, 8, de gen. anim. IV 4, 9, περὶ Μαντικῆς, I 11. Polit. II 9, 1270 a 4, IV (VII) 17, 1336 a 32, and V (VIII) 3, 1338 a 35 πρὸ ὁδοῦ), has a meaning slightly differing from the preceding. The metaphor is now taken from the office of pioneers, who precede an advancing army, and prepare, clear, or ‘pave the way’ for them.

δἰ ...τὴν αἰτίαν] τὴν αἰτίαν is here grammatically the antecedent to , the cause, αἰτία, being in the relative pronoun expressed as an abstract notion (‘the cause, which thing’) in the neuter. A similar change from feminine to neuter, in antecedent and relative, occurs in de Anima 1 3, 407 a 4 τὴν γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς (ψυχὴν) τοιαύτην εἶναι βούλεται οἷόν ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν καλούμενος νοῦς, Pol. II 2 init. καὶ δἰ ἣν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετῆσθαι... οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων, and in Eur. Iph. T. 900 (Herm.) δ᾽ αἰτία τίς ἀνθ̓ ὅτου κτείνει πόσιν; where ὅτου must be understood as neuter: see Hermann on v. 1038.


seq. To the same effect III 14, 8 δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι πάντα ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιαῦτα: πρὸς φαῦλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ἀκούοντα, ἐπεὶ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτος , οὐθὲν δεῖ προοιμίου—as the vehicle for appeals to the feelings and other indirect proofs addressed to the judges personally, which were usually introduced into the προοίμιον.

πίστεις] rhetorical, not demonstrative, proofs; modes of belief, of things probable; all the materials and arguments of Rhetoric being probable merely, none of them certain. See Introd. p. 136 note.

προσθῆκαι...σῶμα τῆς πίστεως] All kinds of indirect proof are secondary, subordinate, non-essential, mere ‘adjuncts’ or ‘appendages’, like dress or ornaments to the body: ‘the body’ being the actual, logical, direct and substantial proof of the case. What is here called ‘the body’, meaning the substance as opposed to accidents, we usually represent by ‘the soul’ in this same relation; the body in its turn now standing for the accidents and non-essentials of a thing. So the Scholiast on Hermogenes, Proleg. (quoted by Ernesti, Lexicon Technologiae Graecae p. 110, Art. ἐνθύμημα) οἱ παλαιοὶ ὥσπερ τι ζῷον τὸν λόγον ὑπέθεντο ἐκ σώματός τε συνεστηκότα καὶ ψυχῆς: ψυχὴν μὲν καλοῦντες τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν διὰ τῶν κεφαλαίων συνισταμένην: σῶμα δὲ τὴν φράσιν καὶ τὸ ἔξωθεν κάλλος, ποιεῖν εἰώθασιν αἱ ἰδέαι. And Cicero, Orat. XIV 44 nam et invenire et iudicare quid dicas magna illa quidem sunt et tamquam animi instar in corpore.

Quintilian describes the views of some of those who thus rigorously limit the province of Rhetoric as an artαἱ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον— to the employment of the ‘enthymeme’, the rhetorical representative of the logical and demonstrative ‘syllogism’; with the exclusion of all that is, strictly speaking, ‘beside the subject or real issue’, all that is beside the facts of the case and the direct proof of them; all indirect proof, namely, from the assumed character of the speaker himself, or appeals to the feelings of the judges or audience, and also all ornaments and graces of style and delivery. Aristotle here assumes this to be theoretically the only true and proper method, though he by no means consistently adheres to it in his actual treatment of the subject. Quintilian's description is as follows, though, as the reasons for the exclusion of these indirect proofs are somewhat different from those assigned by Aristotle, he probably does not refer immediately to him: Fuerunt et clari quidem oratores quibus solum videretur oratoris officium docere. Namque et affectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant: primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio; deinde quia iudicem a veritate depelli misericordia vel ira similibusque non oporteret: et voluptatem audientium pctere, quum vincendi tantum gratia diceretur, non modo agenti supervacuum sed vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur. Inst. Orat. V. Prooem. I.

On the general question of appeals to the feelings, Quint. II 17, 26 seq.: and on the prevailing practice, Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδ. § 321.

πραγματεύεσθαι is well explained by Bonitz on Metaph. A 6, 987 a 30. ‘πραγματεύεσθαι περί τι, vel περί τινος is dicitur ab Aristotele, qui in investiganda et cognoscenda aliqua re via ac ratione procedit; itaque coniunctum legitur cum verbis διαλέγεσθαι, ζητεῖν, θεωρεῖν’. The primary sense of doing business, or occupying oneself about anything, passes into the more limited or special signification of an intellectual pursuit, and thence of ‘a special study’, ‘a systematic treatment of a particular subject of investigation, or practice’ (as in this present case, of Rhetoric, comp. § 10). πραγματεία, like μέθοδος, τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, φιλοσοφία, and many other words, is used to express not only the intellectual process of investigation, but also the resulting science, art, treatise, or written work, or part of such work. See on this point, Introd. p. 17, note 2. Also, on the general meaning of the term, Waitz on Anal. Post. II 13, 96 b 15. Trendel. de Anima p. 199. Elem. Log. Arist. § 58, p. 135.


διαβολή from διαβάλλειν ‘to sunder or set at variance’, and so ‘to make hostile, to engender a mutual dislike between two parties’, in its technical application to Rhetoric, of which it is a potent instrument; and with its opposite ἀπολύεσθαι ‘to absolve oneself, clear away from oneself ill-feeling and suspicion’, forms one of the principal topics of the προοίμιον (see Introd. pp. 343, 4). It denotes the exciting of suspicion and ill-will in the minds of the judges or audience, in order to prejudice them against the opponent with whom you are in controversy: and is therefore improperly classed with the πάθη or emotions such as ἔλεος and ὀργή. This has been already noticed by Victorius and Muretus: the latter says, ‘διαβολὴ non est πάθος, sed pertinet ad iudicem ponendum ἐν πάθει.’

Top. Δ 5, 126 a 31. [διάβολον] τὸν δυνάμενον διαβάλλειν καὶ ἐχθροὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς φίλους. These words, which seem to be a mere gloss upon διάβολον in the text of the Topics, occur apparently in one MS only, marked u by Waitz, and inserted by him in the critical notes of his edition, Vol. II p. 144. Bekker altogether omits to notice them. Though of no authority they will equally well answer the purpose for which they are here employed, of helping, namely, to define the meaning of διαβολή.

On πάθος and πάθη, see Introd. pp. 113—118.

οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος δικαστήν] Appeals to the feelings are ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος: they are ‘beside the proper subject, the real question, the direct issue’, which is the fact and the proof of it; and ‘directed to the judge’, intended to bias and pervert his judgment, to incline him to our side in the contest, and so to have the effect of a secondary or indirect kind of proof of the justice of our case.

ὥστ᾽ εἰ περὶ πάσαςλέγωσιν] Similarly in Rhet. III 1, 4, it is said of the ornaments of style, and declamation in general, as of appeals to the feelings here, that they are only allowed to be employed διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν πολιτειῶν; in well-governed states they would not be permitted at all.


οἳ μέν...οἳ δέ] ‘either...or’. The one only think that the laws ought to be so framed, hold the opinion as a theory; the others, as the Court of Areopagus, actually (καί, also, besides the mere theory) carry it into practice, καὶ χρῶνται.

ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ] Heindorf ad Theaet. § 76. Lycurgus c. Leocr. §§ 12, 13, quoted by Gaisford, καὶ ταῦτα κάλλιστον ἔχοντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων παράδειγμα τὸ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ συνέδριον, τοσοῦτον διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων δικαστηρίων, ὥστε καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὁμολογεῖσθαι τοῖς ἁλισκομένοις δικαίαν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κρίσιν, πρὸς δεῖ καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀποβλέποντας μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τοῖς ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσιν: κ.τ.λ.

Lucian, Hermotimus, c. 64, has something similar about the practice of this court, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ἀρεοπαγίτας αὐτὸ ποιοῦντα: οἳ ἐν νυκτὶ καὶ σκότῳ δικάζουσιν, ὡς μὴ εἰς τοὺς λέγοντας ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὰ λεγόμενα ἀποβλέποιεν. (Lucian ed. Hemsterh. I p. 805), and again, Anacharsis s. de Gymn. c. 10, (Vol. II p. 898) οἱ δὲ (δικαζόμενοι) ἔς τ᾽ ἂν μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος λέγωσιν ἀνέχεται βουλὴ καθ̓ ἡσυχίαν ἀκούουσα: ἢν δέ τις φροίμιον εἴπῃ πρὸ τοῦ λόγου, ὡς εὐνουστέρους ἀπεργάσαιτο αὐτούς, οἶκτον δείνωσιν ἔξωθεν ἐπάγοι τῷ πράγματι, οἷα πολλὰ ῥητόρων παῖδες ἐπὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς μηχανῶνται, παρελθὼν κῆρυξ κατεσιώπησεν εὐθύς, οὐκ ἐῶν ληρεῖν πρὸς τὴν βουλήν κ.τ.λ. There are several allusions to the same in Quintilian, II 16, 4, VI 1, 7, X I, 107, XII 10, 26. Spalding in his note on the first of these passages calls attention to—what indeed is sufficiently apparent on the face of the statements—Quintilian's carelessness in extending to all the lawcourts of Athens, a practice actually prevailing at the most only in one of them; in spite of the direct evidence to the contrary in the extant orations of the Athenian orators, and the story of Hyperides and Phryne which he himself tells in II 15, 9.

διαστρέφειν] to warp, or distort to wrest out of the straight (‘right’) line or proper direction, to pervert or ‘deprave’ the judgment. The same metaphor is repeated in στρεβλόν. The metaphor which compares wrong, the deviation from the ‘right’ line or path, to the crooked or twisted, the divergence from the straight, and represents wrong judgment as the warping of the moral rule, occurs in various languages; σκολιός, and ὀρθός, εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς, Solon ap. Dem. de F. L. p. 423, σκολιαῖς ὁδοῖς πατῶν, Pind. Pyth. II 156, Pl. Theaet. 173 A &c. &c. So ἑλικτός, Eur. Androm. 448 ἑλικτὰ κοὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ἀλλὰ πᾶν πέριξ φρονοῦντες. So Plato of the good and bad horse in the human chariot, Phaedr. 253 D, μὲν...τό τε εἰδος ὀρθός... δ᾽ αὖ σκολιός κ.τ.λ.

So also rectum and pravum or varum or curvum, right and wrong (wrung or twisted out of shape, distorted, similarly intortus) tort, Fr. (tortum), torto, Ital. Compare Lucretius, IV 516, denique ut in fabrica, si prava est fabrica prima Normaque si fallax rectis regionibus exit,—Omnia mendose fieri, &c. Cic. Acad. Pr. II 11, 33, interesse oportet, ut inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Hor. Ep. II 2, 44, curvo dignoscere rectum, (‘virtutem distinguere a vitio’. Orelli). Pers. Sat. III 52, haud tibi inexpertum curvos deprendere mores. IV 11, rectum discernis ubi inter curva subit, vel cum fallit pede regula varo. V 38, apposita intortos extendit regula mores.

‘Crooked’ for perverse, immoral, wrong, is very common in the earlier writers of our own language. Deut. xxxii 5, a perverse and crooked generation. Ps. cxxv 5, Prov. ii 15, whose ways are crooked, and they froward in their paths. Ep. ad Phil. ii 15, and in many other places and authors. For examples of the latter, see Richardson's Dict. Art. ‘crooked’.

Very different to this are the principles laid down by the author of the Π̔ητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον as a guide to the practice of the rhetorician, c. 36 (37) § 4. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς ἐπαίνῳ θεραπεῦσαι, ὡς δικασταὶ δίκαιοι καὶ δεινοί εἰσιν. συμπαραληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐλαττώσεις, εἴ που τῶν ἀντιδίκων καταδεεστέρως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ λέγειν πράττειν ἄλλο τι πρὸς τὸν ἀγῶνα. The judges are to be flattered, and the opponent represented in the darkest colours, whether his alleged defects have or have not any bearing upon the matter at issue. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐμβλητέον τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἀκόλουθα; which is the exact contradictory of the course prescribed by Aristotle in § 6 as alike fair and in accordance with the true principles of the art.

προάγοντας εἰς] Comp. III 14, 7, and note.

κἂν εἴ τις...ποιήσειε] The process by which ἄν in this and similar forms of expression—ὡς ἂν εἰ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ, καθάπερ ἂν εἰ, οἱόνπερ ἂν εἰ, and the like—has lost its force, become inactive, (consopitum, ‘gone to sleep’, Buttm.,) in the sentence, is explained by Buttmann in his note on Dem. Mid. § 15, p. 530. The conditional ἄν belongs to some verb in the apodosis, originally expressed, afterwards left to be understood, as in the clause before us. The expression at full length would be, κἂν, εἴ τις ποιήσειε, ποιήσειε, ‘as one would do, if he were to do’. Still, though the particle has lost its direct and active force in this sentence, some latent notion of conditionality always remains, even when the verb which ἂν supposes cannot actually be supplied. This is the case in such phrases as φοβούμενος ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ παῖς, Pl. Gorg. 479 A ‘fearing as a child would’: Ar. parva naturalia περὶ μαντικῆς I 2, 2 ὅσων ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ λάλος φύσις ἐστιν, ‘whose natural habit is, as it might be (ἄν), talkative’; de Anima I 5, 5, 409 b 27, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ πράγματα τιθέντες. In such cases the ἄν is retained by habit and association, when the sense no longer requires it. The phrase accordingly is not found in the earlier forms of the language, and does not become common till the time of Plato and Aristotle, with whom, the latter especially, it is very frequent. The association required time before it was established as a fixed habit. I believe that it does not occur in Thucydides, and that it makes its first appearance in Xenophon; that is, in the forms above given; for as an unnecessary appendage to a participle, or in cases analogous, ἄν is thus used by earlier writers. See Hermann on Soph. Phil. 491, and Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 430, I, for some instances [Kühner's Ausführliche Grammatik § 398 p. 209 sq. S.].

Aristotle seems to be the earliest writer who assumed the license of joining κἂν εἰ with the subjunctive mood, as in Pol. II 1 init. κἂν εἰ τυγχάνωσιν, c. 2, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμῆς πλεῖον ἑλκύσῃ, and III 8 κἂν εἰ συμβαίνῃ, also Poet. I 5, κἂν εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνωσιν. Κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκῇ is the MSS reading in Plat. Rep. IX 579 D, and defended by Schneider (not. ad loc.); but rejected by Ast, Bek., Stallb. and the Zurich Editors who substitute δοκεῖ. I subjoin a few examples of the usage in its various forms. Soph. Aj. 1078 δοκεῖν πεσεῖν ἂν κἂν (it might be even) ἀπὸ σμικροῦ κακοῦ. Xenophon, Symp. II 20, IX 4, Cyrop. I 3, 1, Memor. III 6, 4 and 10, 12. Plato, Apol. 23 B, Phaed. 72 C, 109 C, and elsewhere, Men. 97 B, Gorg. 479 A, Rep. VI 493 A, Isocr. Paneg. §§ 69, 148, Aristotle in addition to those already quoted, Rhet. II 20, 4, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις, Eth. N. v 7, 1132, II. Ib. V 12, 1137, 2; VI 13 sub. fin., 1145, 2 and 10; VII 8, 1150, 16, κἂν εἰ ῥέπουσι, Pol. III 6 (sub init.) κἂν εἰ πλείους, and several more: Hist. Anim. IV 2, 16, IV 11, 11, VIII 2, 10, de part. Anim. IV 5, 26, de Gen. Anim. III 9, 7. In Aristotle it has become habitual. The analogous use of ἂν with the participle is exemplified by Pol. II 2, 1261 b 4 ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι; and Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. I 5, 1, ὡς ἄν καθόλου λέγοντας, and I 6, 6, ὡς ἂν κατὰ λόγον, where ἄν may be considered as redundant. [Vahlen, Beiträge zu Ar. Poet. I p. 35—37; Eucken, de Ar. dicendi ratione I p. 61—64. S.]


On the ‘legal issues’, στάσεις, ἀμφισβητήσεις, which, as Victorius remarks, are here tacitly referred to, see Introd. p. 397, Appendix E to Bk. III.


κειμένους νόμους] κεῖσθαι and some of its compounds are often convertible with the passive of τιθέναι. κεῖσθαι itself ‘to be placed, fixed, established’=τίθεσθαι; συγκεῖσθαι ‘to be put together or composed’=συντίθεσθαι; διακεῖσθαι ‘to be disposed’=διατίθεσθαι; ποκεῖσθαι (as I 2 13) ‘to be assumed’=ὑποτίθεσθαι or ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι.

[κεῖμαι is constantly borrowed as a perfect passive to τίθημι, while τέθειμαι is almost invariably used as a deponent perfect. Thus the usage of the perfect in the best writers would be: νομοθέτης τέθεικε τὸν νόμον. πόλις τέθειται τὸν νόμον: νόμος κεῖται (Dem. Or. 46 § 12 note). infra chap. 15 § 23 τοῖς νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὦσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, Plato Leg. p. 793 B (νόμων) τῶν ἐν γράμμασι τεθέντων τε καὶ κειμένων καὶ τῶν ἔτι τεθησομένων. See also Cobet's variae lectiones p. 311. S.]

τοῖς κρίνουσι, κρίσεις, τοὺς κρίνοντας] On the different senses of κρίνειν and κριτής as applied to the different branches of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 137 note I: and on the necessary imperfections of laws in their application to particular cases, the consequent introduction of ἐπιείκεια to modify them and adapt them to the circumstances of the case, and Plato's opinion, on the authority of laws, see p. 138 note I.

ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι] ἐπί resting, and so depending, upon; hence penes, in the power of, at the discretion of. § 8 ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς καταλείπειν.

This primary, literal, and physical sense of ἐπί, (in this application of it, which represents the object of the preposition as the basis on which something stands or rests, and therefore depends upon), of the half dozen Grammars and Lexicons, which, after forming my own opinion, I have consulted on the point, is to be found distinctly stated only in that of Rost and Palm, where it lurks hardly discoverable, amidst the enormous mass of illustrations of the various usages of ἐπί accumulated in Vol. I pp. 1032 —1045, in p. 1038, col. 2.

αἱ νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκεψαμένων γίνονται] ‘legislation arises from (is the work of men after) long previous consideration’. Thuc. I 58, ἐκ πολλοῦ πράσσοντες οὐδὲν εὕροντο ἐπιτήδειον.

ἐξ ὑπογυίου] (retained by Bekker; Gaisford not. var. prefers ὑπογύου, and so L. Dindorf, on Xen. Cyr. VI 1, 43.) ὑπόγυιον: πρὸ μικροῦ γεγονός, Hesychius. ἐξ ὑπογύου: παρ᾽ αὐτά, ἀπερισκέπτως, ἐκ τῶν σύνεγγυς, Suidas. By the Scholiast on Arist. Nub. 145, in Suidas v. ἀρτί (Gaisf.), ἐξ ὑπογυίου λέγειν is interpreted by αὐτοσχεδιάζειν; and in Eustath. (ap. eund.) it is said to be derived from γυῖον in the sense of χείρ, (compare Theocr. Idyl. XXII 81 and 121; the ‘hand’ is the member, par excellence), from which likewise he deduces ἐγγύη, ἐγγυᾷν, and ἐγγυαλίζειν; and ὑπόγυον, καὶ ἐξ ὑπογύου λέγεται, τὸ ἐγγύς φασι προσδόκιμον, παραυτίκα γεγονός, καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν πρόχειρον, μᾶλλον ὑποχείριον. Examples may be found, all bearing much the same sense, in Koch's note on Moeris Lex. p. 343, and a still larger list in Rost and Palm's Lex. s.v., to which add Rhet. II 22, 11; Pol. VII (VI) 8, 1321 b 17. ὑπογυιότατον (the readiest way or means) πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν. Isocr. Paneg. § 13. Menand. ap. Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 391. In Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδ. § 4, and Epist. 6. 2, p. 418 B, it stands for ‘close at hand’, ἤδη ὑπογυίου μοι τῆς τοῦ βίου τελευτῆς οὔσης, and similarly Ar. Eth. Nic. III 9 (Bekk.) sub fin., ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπογυῖα ὄντα.

It appears from all this that ὑπογυῖον means ‘under the hand’, as an unfinished or just finished work, fresh and recent, πρόσφατον (so Rhet. II 3, 12) as Moeris explains it: and ἐξ ὑπογυίου, ‘from under the hand’, corresponds to our ‘off-hand’, or ‘out of hand’, and is used to express anything ‘sudden and unexpected’ or ‘unpremeditated’, ‘extemporaneous’ a signification which appears in all the examples. Similarly ἐκ χειρός, ἀπὸ χειρο<*>ς, ‘off-hand’.

ἀποδιδόναι] a word of very frequent use in Aristotle, has for one of its elementary senses that of ‘to give back’, reddere; ἀπό as in ἀπονέμειν, ἀπολαμβάνειν, ἀπαιτεῖν, ἀπόπλους, ἀποπλεῖν (see Sturz. Lex. Xenoph.), from which all the other senses in which at least Aristotle employs it may be deduced. Another of the original senses of the word is ‘to give forth’, or ‘produce’, as the earth produces her fruits, and this also might be applied to the interpretation of it in several of its various uses. But as this signification is likewise deducible from the other—for production, as when the earth produces her fruits, may be regarded as a payment or restoration, or ‘return’ of something as due—it may perhaps be better to refer them all to the one original signification, reddere. So in Eth. N. II 1, 1103, a 27, b 22, τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδιδόναι is not simply ‘to produce’, but to produce energies that are due to the system, energies corresponding to the faculties from which they spring. So Trendelenburg, El. Log. Arist. § 55, p. 132, ‘ἀποδιδόναι proprie est reddere, unde ex suum cuique tribuendi significatione facile orta est declarandi vis (declarare is the sense which the word bears in the passage specially referred to, Top. A 5, 102 a 3) nihil enim est aliud quam logice suam cuique naturam reddere.’

ἀποδιδόναι is therefore (1) to give back, restore, repay, render, always implying some kind of obligation, (2) to render as a due, ‘assign’ (which best represents it in the majority of cases in Aristotle); of due distribution, suum cuique; hence (3) of the due fulfilment of any office or duty, as ἀποδιδόναι λόγον, ‘to render an account’, to explain, or set forth, any statement or doctrine, ἀποφαίνεσθαι, declarare. To one or the other of these I believe all the multifarious uses of the word may be referred.

I will add a few examples in the way of illustration:—Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 638 § 56, τοὺς ἐχθρὰ ποιοῦντας ἐν ἐχθροῦ μέρει κολάζειν ἀπέδωκεν (assigns as a due) νόμος; and elsewhere. Plat. Phaed. 71 E (a good example), οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν (pay back in return), ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλὴ (mutilated, defective, lopsided, single where all the rest are pairs) ἔσται φύσις; ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι κ.τ.λ. de Anima I 1, 403 b 1, τούτων δὲ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, ‘assigns’ or ‘applies’, that is, to the definition, which is the thing in question, to which it assigns matter as the sole element: comp. c. 4, 408 a 3; and ἀπονέμειν, in precisely the same sense, ib. V 1, and Pl. Tim. 34 A. ἀποδιδῶσι make to correspond, bring into comparison, Rhet. III 11, 13. ἀποδ. λειτουργίαν de part. An. III 14, 9, ‘duly to fulfil certain functions (services)’. Ib. II 14, 5, ( φύσις) πανταχοῦ ἀποδίδωσι (makes due compensation, duly assigns) λαβοῦσα ἑτέρωθεν πρὸς ἄλλο μόριον. Top. Δ 1, 121 a 15, et passim, τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος, ἀποδιδόναι γένος. Top. A 18, 108 b 9, τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τῶν ὁρισμῶν, the rendering, or due preparation, production, of definitions: and so elsewhere. de part. An. III 7, 18, ἀποδ. τὸ ἔργον of the due performance of the work. Ib. I 1, 43 ἀποδ. τὸ ὀστοῦν τί ἐστι, to state, give a sufficient account or explanation. Phys. I 6, 1, 189 a 16, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πάντα ἀποδιδόναι (to produce, effect everything) οἴεται ὅσαπερ Ἀναξ. ἐκ τῶν ἀπείρων. Eth. Nic. III 1, 110 b 8, ποῖα δὲ...οὐ ῥάδιον ἀποδοῦναι, to give an account, explain.

So here ἀποδιδόναι is ‘duly to assign, distribute, or apportion’ and again I 2, 5, ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις ‘we render our judgments’. These same applications of the word occur likewise in Plato, as Rep. 379 A, (to represent), Ib. 472 D, VI 508 E, Phaedr. 237 C, Theaet. 175 D, Polit. 295 A. The precise opposite, ἀπολαμβάνειν, occurs with the same sense of ἀπό, I 11, 3. ἀπονέμειν is used in exactly the same sense, ‘to assign as a due’; see for instance Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 b 18, τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, Ib. V 35, τιμὴ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, Ib. 1124 a 9.

ἤδη...κρίνουσιν] by this time, now that we have come to them, ‘they actually decide’ So in the next line, τὸ φιλεῖν ἤδη καὶ τὸ μισεῖν ‘this time’, in theircase, not in the former, of something new, special, and marked. ἤδη therefore in these cases is often translatable by a mere emphasis. The word is repeated so soon after, applied to the same persons, and expressing almost identically the same thing, that it is not improbable that Spengel may be right in his conjecture that the one or the other should be erased. Rhet. Gr. Vol. I. Pref. p. v. ‘paulo post alterutrum ἤδη abundat, puto prius.’ However there are two still closer together, II 25, 14.

It may be worth while to say a few words on this very common usage of ἤδη and analogous particles of time, in the way of illustration and exemplification. Ἤδη and its analogues ἔτι, οὐκέτι, οὔπω, are used emphatically to mark a critical point, climax, degree attained, as deserving of special and particular attention, at the moment, and in reference to something else which is not equally remarkable. They are all particles of time, and derive this their secondary sense from the metaphorical application of this notion of ‘already’, a definite time which we have just reached: ‘point’, or ‘stage’, or ‘degree’ attained being substituted by the metaphor for ‘time’ in the original sense of the word.

This will be best illustrated by a few examples. Arist. περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως c. 2. 16, ὥσπερ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος, ‘habit, already by this time, now that we have reached this point, has become a second nature’. Met. Δ 21, 1022 b 18, ἕνα δὲ [τρόπον πάθος λέγεται] τούτων ἐνέργειαι καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ἤδη, ‘one sense of πάθος is, the actual energies and changes of these’. ἤδη, by the time that they have reached this stage or state, and have actually become what they are. Categ. c. 8, 9, a 4, ἣν ἄν τις ἴσως ἕξιν ἤδη προσαγορεύσοι, ‘which may now (at this stage) be fairly called a ἕξις’. περὶ ἑρμηνείας c. 9, 19, a 39, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν ἑτέραν, οὐ μέντοι ἤδη (not yet actually, not quite, not yet arrived at the stage of,) ἀληθῆ ψευδῆ. Polit. II 8, 1268 b 20, ἐκεῖνος ἤδη ἐπιορκεῖ. III 7, 1279 a 40, πλείους δ᾽ ἤδη χαλεπὸν ἠκριβῶσθαι. VIII (v) 8, 1308 a 15, ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ δῆμος ἤδη οἱ ὅμοιοι, i.e. though this may not be strictly true of all oligarchies, when we come to the ὅμοιοι, at this stage, by this time, it is now quite true that they may be regarded as a δῆμος. Eth. Nic. V 3, 1132 a 2, πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ἄρχων, ‘when a man has come to be a ruler, he must then...’ in the case of others this perhaps is not necessarily true, but the ruler must, actually, live or act in relation to others and in society’. Rhet. I 6, 24, πάντες ἤδη ὁμολογοῦσιν. I 10, 11, ἤδη διαφέρει ‘it does make a difference’. c. 11 § 3, τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται. Ib. § 26, ἔργον ἤδη γίγνεται. II 6 § 12, and 25 § 14, bis. I have confined myself in these illustrations to examples from Aristotle; from the ordinary language, in which this usage is at least equally common, I will content myself with citing Herod. III 5, ἀπὸ ταύτης ἤδη Αἴγυπτος: and Eur. Hippol. 1195 (Monk) πρὸς πόντον ἤδη κειμένον Σαρωνικόν.

It is found also in French, Italian and German—déjà, gia, schon. C'est déjà quelque chose, ‘and that's something’. das ist schon etwas. The Italian gia, when used as an expression of assent, may be similarly explained.

The use of demum is precisely similar, and common in most Latin writers. Sallust, Cat. XX idem velle atque idem nolle ea demum (that and that alone) firma amicitia est. Quint. II 5, 1, artemque de qua loquimur bonis demum (to the good, and to them alone) tribui volunt. VII Praef. init. neque enim ea demum quae ad docendum pertinent exsecuti sumus. VII 2, 21, VIII Prooem. 3, IV 5, 7, XI 1 § 44, 3 § 68, et passim. Cic. Tusc. Disp. I 19, 43, eaque ei demum naturalis est sedes, et seq., de Orat. II 30, 131, hi loci ei demum oratori prodesse possunt. Rarer is the analogous use of denique and tandem: Cic. de Orat. II 30, 131, c. 34, 146, tum denique scrutari locos, c. 75, 304, quantum est in eo tandem mali! c. 77, 315, hisce omnibus rebus consideratis, tum denique id... Hor. Ep. I 17, 2, quo tandem pacto... On iam in this same usage, see Munro, on Lucr. I 600, 613, II 314, 426; add, II 974, and Virg. Aen. V 179, iam senior, VI 304, VII 46, 735.

Similarly in a negative sentence, οὔπω sometimes introduces the notion of time in estimating the amount or degree, Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 a 11, τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι οὔπω, ἀλλ᾽ ἄδικον. Ib. 23, ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δὲ οὔπω. Ib. b 24, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι —in the two former cases the unjust habit of mind is distinguished as ‘not yet amounting to’ the actual crime or unjust act; and in the third case this distinction is applied to the ἁμάρτημα, which, though a wrong in itself, has not yet reached the stage or degree of the vice, confirmed evil habit, of ἀδικία—also VI 10, 1142 b 14, αὕτη γὰρ οὔπω φάσις. Ib. 25, οὐδ᾽ αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, and 28.

So also οὐκέτι, ‘no longer; not as before; not, now that we have reached this point’. Pol. V (VIII) 3, 1338 a 6. Rhet. I 2, 21, ἂν γὰρ ἐντύχῃ ἀρχαῖς οὐκέτι διαλεκτικὴ οὐδὲ ῥητορική, II 24, 3, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη κ.τ.λ. Ib. II 9, 3. de gen. et corr. I 2, 3, 315 b 3, πῶς δὲ τοῦτο οὐκέτι, Hist. Anim. I 6, 3, 490 b 16, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ζῴων οὐκέτι τὰ γένη μέγαλα, Ib. V 1 7, 539 a 30, τὰ δὲ θηλέα μέν ἐστιν, ἄρρενα δ᾽ οὐκέτι. Dem. de F. Leg. § 80, ὃν δ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὶ λάβητε μηκέτ̓ ἐκείνοις περὶ τούτου προστάττετε. Plat. Gorg. 503 A, οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς. Protag. 312 E. Xen. Oecon. 3. 1. Buttm. ad Mid. 13 a p. 528, ‘οὐκέτι proprie valet non ut antea, hinc non ut alias, non item, non iam.

συνήρηται] (Bekker and Spengel. Alii συνήρτηται) ‘with whom are connected...’ In πρὸς οὕς, πρὸς expresses a mere general reference, ‘with respect to whom’, ‘in whose case’; and συνῄρηται ‘are often taken into, embraced in, the account’, σύν, together with their proper business, the mere facts of the case and the proof of them. I can find no sufficient authority for συναιρεῖν in this sense; the nearest approach to it is in Plat. Phaedr. 249 B, εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον, but even this is something different. Vater makes a similar observation. The interpretation also of πρός is certainly rather strained. Probably συνήρτηται is right.

τὸ ἀληθές] No one is a fair judge, where his own passions or interests are concerned. Gaisford quotes appositely, Pol. III 16, 1287 a ult. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονταί γ᾽ ἐφ̓ ἑαυτοὺς οἱ ἰατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους ἰατρούς, καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυμναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες.

ἐπισκοτεῖν] ‘to bring darkness, throw a shadow over, overshadow’. Dem. c. Mid. 565, 25, οἰκίαν ᾠκοδόμηκεν ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι τοσαύτην ὥστε πᾶσιν ἐπισκοτεῖν τοῖς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ. Infr. III 3, 3. Plat. Euthyd. 274, Εὐθύδημος ἐπεσκότει τῷ Κτησίππῳ τῆς θέας: an odd and unexplained use of this word. It seems to mean that Euthydemus, by bending forward and getting in the way, obscured or darkened Ctesippus—not however in the ordinary sense of the word, but in that of intercepting the object, and so darkening by throwing a cloud over, and thereby depriving him of his view (τῆς θέας gen. of deprivation, implied in the verb).

In a metaphorical sense it occurs in Dem. Olynth. B 23, 26, Isocr. ad Dem. § 6, and in several fragments of the Comic Poets, (Ind. ad Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. Vol. v Pt. I p. 393,) for instance, Eubul. incert. Fr. 11 (Mein. III 267) τὸν οἶνον τῷ φρονεῖν ἐπισκοτεῖν; and in other authors. See also Victorius: and Gaisford in not. var. p. 18.


ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος] ἔξω for ἐκτός. Lobeck, Phryn. p. 128.

τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦσιν] infra § 11; comp. de Anima I 3, 406 b 26 καὶ Τίμαιος (Plato, in the Timaeus) φυσιολογεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα.

διορίζειν] to separate by a limit or boundary line. Herodot. IV 42 διουρισάντων Ἀσίην τε καὶ Λιβύην. Hence to separate a thing from others, to mark off as a special province or domain, and so of ‘the definition’, which includes all that is essential to, or characteristic of, the thing defined, and excludes everything else. The word here of course means something more than a bare definition; it expresses the limitation or ‘determination’ of the proper contents of the προοίμιον.

ἔντεχνοι πίστεις] are the regular systematic proofs by enthymeme and example, the σῶμα τῆς πίστεως § 3, and opposed here, not merely to the ἄτεχνοι πίστεις of c. 15, the witnesses, documents, torture, oaths and such like, which we do not invent, but find ready to our hand to be employed in the support of our case; but also to the irregular appeals to the feelings (πάθος), and to evidence from character (ἦθος).


πολιτικωτερας τῆς δημηγορικης πραγματείας] πραγματείας, here applied to the study and practice of one of the departments of Rhetoric; sec on § 3.—πολιτικωτέρας: There are three possible senses of this word, firstly, ‘more worthy of, more becoming to, a citizen’, more agreeable to the position and duties of a citizen, ‘better and worthier’; secondly, ‘more suitable to a public man, statesman, or politician’, larger, more comprehensive, and liberal; as opposed to the comparatively trifling and petty occupations of private citizens: thirdly, more public and common, wider, more general; κοινόν, as opposed to ἴδιον and οἰκεῖον: the second seems to be the most appropriate here, and so I have rendered it in the paraphrase. [p. 141 of the Introduction: “nobler and larger and more liberal (or ‘statesmanlike’, or ‘more worthy of a citizen’,) vid. not. ad loc.”]

μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικανικά] The third kind of Rhetoric, τὸ ἐπιδεικτικόν, is here omitted, but afterwards supplied, c. 3 § 1.

τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα] ‘The most general expression which the Athenians have for a contract is συναλλάγυα, συνθήκη, συμβόλαιον.’ Meier und Schömann der Attische Process p. 494. The difference usually taken between συνθήκη and συνάλλαγμα appears in Rhet. I 15, 22 ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων (ordinary dealings, buying and selling and such like transactions), καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια κατὰ συνθήκας (in the way of, by contracts): we are concerned here only with the first and third of these, συνάλλαγμα and συμβόλαιον.

The ordinary signification of both of these is a contract, or covenant, or mutual agreement, or interchange (συνάλλαγμα), between two or more parties. They are thence extended to any dealings, especially business transactions, or even any circumstances of ordinary intercourse between man and man, and more particularly any of those which may give rise to a suit at law. These are ἴδια συμβόλαια or συναλλάγματα: see Dem. de Cor. p. 298 § 210, τὰ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν βίου συμβόλαια, with Dissen's note: Isocr. Paneg. §§ 11, 78, π. ἀντιδ. §§ 3, 38, 40, 42, 79 τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ συμβόλαια τὰ γιγνόμενα πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. § 309 ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τοῖς περὶ τῶν συμβολαίων. The former of these two seems to refer rather to dealings in general, the second to special contracts. Areop. §§ 33, 34. Arist. Eth. N. II 1, 1103 b 15 πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γιγνόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοί. Rhet. I 15, 22 ἔτι δὲ πράττεται πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια κατὰ τὰς συν- θήκας. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1 (2 Oxf.) § 2 ταῖς περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια δικαιολογίαις.

That the meaning of the terms is not confined to contracts proper, is plain also from Eth. N. v 1131 a 2. (This passage is quoted at length on I 15, 22.) τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια τὰ δ᾽ ἀκούσια (the ‘voluntary’ being illustrated by buying and selling, lending and borrowing, whereas ‘involuntary’ are all of them crimes, λαθραῖα or βίαια: all of them cases in which the breach of the supposed contract, private or public, entitles the aggrieved party to a legal remedy). Opposed to these ἴδια συμβόλαια or συναλλάγματα are the public (κοινά) international commercial treaties, σύμβολα. See further on σύμβολα, note on c. 4 § 11.

συμβόλαια is also employed in a wider and more general sense, as Rhet. ad Alex. c. 2 (3 Oxf.) § 2 περὶ τῶν πρὸς ἄλλας πόλεις συμμαχιῶν καὶ συμβολαίων. Other examples may be found in Plat. Gorg. 484 D ἄπειροι τῶν λόγων οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς ξυμβολαίοις. Rep. I 333 A τί δὲ δή; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρείαν κτῆσιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ φαίης ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι; Πρὸς τὰ ξυμβόλαια, Σώκρατες. Ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα, τι ἄλλο; κοινωνήματα δῆτα, and several others in Ast's Lexicon. Arist. Polit. IV (VI) 16, 1300 b 22, and 32 περὶ τῶν μικρῶν συναλλαγμάτων, ὅσα δραχμιαῖα καὶ πεντάδραχμα καὶ μικρῷ πλείονος. Ib. 15 ult. 1300 b 12, ἀρχὴ τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγόραν συμβολαίων (dealings) κυρία. Comp. c. 8 sub init. ἀρχὴ περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια. VI (VII) 2, 1317 b 27, III 13, 1283 b 30, and elsewhere.

πρὸ ἔργου] ‘to the purpose’; anything ‘for’, or ‘in favour of’, and therefore ‘likely to promote’, any ‘work’ we may have in hand; and hence generally ‘serviceable’ or ‘profitable’ to any purposes. πρὸ ἔργου (which also occurs infra I 4 §§ 3, 7) is the Aristotelian mode of writing what in Xenophon, Plato, Demosthenes, and indeed ordinary Greek in general, appears as προύργου. Some examples in Fritsche ad Eth. Eud. A 3, 1215 a 8.

κακοῦργον] As a special variety of the general conception of dishonesty, fraud, knavery, this adjective is applied in a peculiar sense to sophistical reasoning. Rhet. III 2, 7 τῶν δ᾽ ὀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῃ ὁμωνυμίαι χρήσιμοι, παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακουργεῖ. Topic. I 11, 172 b 21. Plat. Gorg. 483 A. Dem. Lept. 491. Stallb. ad Rep. I 338 D. Similarly συκοφαντεῖν is used for cheating in argument, bringing fallacious objections, Top. Θ 2, 157 a 32. I (de Soph. El.) 15, 174 b 9. Both of them represent the knavish tricks and fallacies which may be employed in rhetorical and dialectical reasoning. Plat. Rep. 341 B πρὸς ταῦτα κακούργει καὶ συκοφάντει.

A debate in a political assembly, which turns upon questions of public and national concern (κοινότερον), in which accordingly the audience, who are all members of it, have a strong personal interest, and are therefore impatient of anything that would divert them from the direct proof of the expediency or inexpediency of the policy recommended or condemned, affords much less room for these deceptive arts ad captandum, τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος, than the practice of the law-courts, where the judges who decide the case are usually not personally interested in the issue, and the pleader has therefore to create an interest in them by these irregular methods: this is on the principle so pithily stated by the Corinthian envoys, Thuc. I 120, 3 κακοὺς κριτὰς ὡς μὴ προσηκόντων εἶναι. (This is a more correct mode of stating the argument than that adopted in the paraphrase, Introd. p. 141.)

This contrast of the two kinds of audiences, in respect of their several dispositions to keep the speakers to the point, does not hold of our own law-courts and parliaments. The Athenian dicasts, careless, ignorant, and unprofessional, selected at random from the population of the city, with their sense of responsibility diminished or destroyed by the large number of those who had to decide, might very likely be indifferent to the issue of the case before them, and require a stimulus to their attention from the parties immediately concerned: but this is not true of the professional judges of our courts, who regard the right decision of the case as a business and a duty.

κριτής] applied to the ἐκκλησιαστής in the general sense of ‘judge’ or ‘critic’ of the question or arguments employed; supr. § 7. Introd. p. 137, note 1.

ἀναλαβεῖν] is to ‘bring back’, ‘recover’; hence to ‘gain over’, ‘conciliate’, as ἀνά in ἀναπείθειν, ἀναδιδάσκειν, ἀναδιδόναι, ἀναδέχεσθαι κ.τ.λ. ‘Membranae Balliolenses, captare: Muretus, accurare, excipere: Portus, reficere, recreare, μεταφορά ab aegrotis; vel conciliare. Omnes hae notiones a primaria resumendi, ad se recipiendi, facile deducuntur.’ Gaisford. The order is, (1) to ‘get or bring back’; thence, (2) to ‘bring back into the proper and normal state’, as of ‘recovery’ from a disease—the notion of something as due being again implied as in ἀποδιδόναι, note on § 7— and thence again, (3) as here, to ‘restore’, as it were, the audience to their proper state of mind, conciliate them to your views and interests. Hence, lastly, the senses of reparare, reficere, recreare, and the like; abundantly illustrated in Steph. Thes. ed. Did. Vol. II pp. 431—2.

διδόασιν] (ἑαυτούς) sese dant, ‘lend themselves’, δ᾽ ἡδονῇ δούς, Eur. Phoen. 21. Valck. Diatr. p. 233. And so, many of its compounds, ἐνδιδόναι, ἐκδιδόναι, ἐπιδιδόναι, ἀποδιδόναι, διαδιδόναι, ὑποδιδόναι, παραδιδόναι, (ἡδονῇ παραδούς, Pl. Phaedr. 250 D), προδιδόναι (Herod. bis), ἐκδιδόναι (Herod.). The process is the usual one by which transitive verbs become intransitive, viz. by the ellipse of the reflexive pronoun.


δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξίς τις] ἀπόδειξις, in its strict, proper, and highest senses, is exact scientific demonstrative proof, by syllogism, leading from and to universal and necessary conclusions. And therefore, properly speaking, παραπλήσιον φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν, Eth. Nic. I 1. ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμὸς ἐπιστημονικός, Anal. Post. I 2, 71 b 18. ἐξ ἀναγκαίων ἄρα συλλογισμός ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις, c. 4, 73 a 24. ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμὸς δεικτικὸς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διά τι, Ib. c 24, 85 b 23. ἀπόδειξις ἐστίν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων συλλογισμὸς , ἐκ τοιούτων διά τινων πρώτων καὶ ἀληθῶν τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ γνώσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφεν, Topic. A 1, 100 a 27. Waitz, Comm. ad Anal. Post. Vol. II p. 293 seq. πίστις therefore, whose premisses and conclusions are never more than ‘probable’, cannot properly be said to be ‘a kind of demonstration’. It resembles it however, and may be regarded as a ‘sort of demonstration’ in this; that probable proof often produces a belief or conviction as strong and certain as that which follows from demonstration. It is therefore to be understood here, as often elsewhere, as a general term including proof of every kind. A similar misapplication of ἀπόδειξις to rhetorical proof is found in Rhet. II 1, 2, and II 20, 9. So συλλογίζεσθαι, of reasoning, inference, conclusion in general; Rhet. I 6 § 17, 10 § 1, 11 § 23 and II 22 § 4, where συλλογισμοί stands for ‘Enthymemes’; Poet. 4, 5, συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον. Phys. II 1, 193 a 7, συλλογίσαιτο γὰρ ἄν τις ἐκ γενετῆς ὢν τυφλὸς περὶ χρωμάτων. Similarly, ἀποδεικτικός of a rhetorical argument or speech, Rhet. II 1, 2, πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁρᾷν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικός (conclusive) καὶ πιστός. A still more remarkable example of this looseness of expression occurs I 4, 5, where Dialectics is called ἀναλυτικὴ ἐπιστήμη˙ The rhetorical enthymeme, again ‘a kind of ἀπόδειξις’, is subsequently and this time correctly, called κυριώτατο:ν τῶν πίστεων. See Introd. p. 92.

τὸ δ᾽ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός˙ τις]. On the enthvmeme, Introd. p. 101— 105. On περὶ δὲ συλλογισμοῦ ἰδεῖν, and on μέρους τινός, Introd. p. 143, note.

δῆλον δέ] δέ, omitted by one MS, and rejected by Buhle, Schrader, Bekker, and Spengel, is retained and defended by Victorius and Vater. It is justified not only by the common usage of the Greek language (see Buttm. Exc. XII on Dem. c. Mid. de particula δέ in apodosi, p. 150; the passages which he thus quotes might be multiplied indefinitely), but also by the special usage of Aristotle himself. Waitz, on Organ. 17 b 1, Vol. I p. 335, comp. Zell ad Eth. Nic. I 1 § 4, Vol. II p. 5, who quotes examples from Aristotle, to which add Rhet. I 4 § 2, I 10 § 4, I 11 §§ 6 and 11, II 25 § 10, an exact parallel, the protasis here also commencing with ἐπεί. Similarly Pol. VII (IV) 13 init. ἐπεὶ δὲ δὐ ἐστιν (a long parenthesis of several clauses intervenes, and the apodosis begins with) δεῖ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις κ.τ.λ. de Anima I 3, 406 a 4 and 10. Phys. VI 8, 2, εἰ τὸ μέν... ἵστασθαι δέ. See also Stallb. on Phædo 78 C. The particle is thus used in the apodosis generally, not always, as a repetition of a preceding δέ, and in these cases may be translated by “I say”. It repeats in order to recal the attention to the connexion of the apodosis with the foregoing protasis, which might be overlooked after a long parenthesis: in cases where this would not be necessary, it may be accounted for by the influence of habit or association. Of the many illustrative passages I had collected from other writers as well as Aristotle, I will content myself with citing two or three apposite ones from Thucydides. I 11, sub init., ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν, (parenthesis) φαίνονται δέ κ.τ.λ. I 18 init., ἐπειδὴ δέ (ten lines) μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν κ.τ.λ. II 65, ἐπεί τε πόλεμος κατέστη, δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προγνοὺς τὴν δύναμιν. IV 132, δὲ Περδίκκας κ.τ.λ. and VIII 29 (three of these are referred to by Arnold, note 2 on I 11). Paley on Aesch. P. V. 952, 994, 2nd ed. gives some instances from Aeschylus. I may also add Plat. Phaedo 78 C, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ᾽ ἄλλως καὶ μήδεποτε κατὰ ταὐτά, ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι τὰ ξύνθετα. A good example may be found in Phaedo 87 A, B, δοὺς δέεἰ δὲ τοῦτο...

τοὺς λογικοὺς συλλογισμούς] Waitz on Anal. Post. I 21, 82 b 35, p. 353, ‘opponitur τῷ λογικῶς τὸ ἀναλυτικῶς 84 a 8, 86 a 22, 88 a 19, accurata demonstratio, quae veris ipsius rei principiis nititur, ei quae probabili quadam ratione contenta est....Unde fit ut λογικόν idem fere sit quod διαλεκτικόν.’ And this is its usual signification...‘Quamquam’ (he adds, referring to the present passage) ‘1355 a 13, quum λογικὸς συλλογισμός et hic et in iis quæ proxime sequuntur opponatur rhetorico syllogismo (ἐνθυμήματι), veram demonstrationem significare videatur.’ To the same effect is what follows, where τὸ ἀληθές exact truth and knowledge, scientific certainty, is represented as the object of the λογικοὶ συλλογισμοί, and τὸ ο<*>´μοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ (probability, τὰ ἔνδοξα, which has only a resemblance to truth), as the object of the enthymeme. And as both are apprehended by the same faculty, this faculty will be cultivated by the study and exercise of both alike, and the processes that lead to them, syllogism and enthymeme: and therefore the knowledge of the materials and modes of constructing syllogisms, and the practical application of them, equally in all their varieties, demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical (enthymeme), are serviceable to the rhetorician as a training and preparation for the practice of his art.

πρὸς τὰ ἔνδοξα] ‘things probable, matters of opinion, not certainty’; the materials, objects, and results of Rhetoric, as of Dialectics. Top. A 10, 104 a 8, ἔστι δὲ πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἔνδοξος, κ.τ.λ. Ib. c. 1, 100 b 21, ἔνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν τοῖς πλείστοις τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις πᾶσιν τοῖς πλείστοις τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις. Cic. de Orat. I 23, 108, sunt enim varia et ad vulgarem popularemque sensum accommodata omnia genera huius forensis nostrae dictionis.

διότι] ‘that’,=ὅτι. The earliest instance of this use of διότι appears to be in Herod. II 50. It occurs in Xenophon (add Symp. I 11, to the examples in Sturz's Lexicon), Plato, Ep. I 309 D, Dem. de Cor. §§ 155, 167, 184, but each time in a document. Isocr. Paneg. § 48, Phil. § 1, Archid. § 24, Plat. § 23, Antid. §§ 133, 263. π. τοῦ ζεύγους § 43, πρὸς Καλλίμαχον §§ 1, 31. (Some of these referring to Isocrates are derived from Benseler's note, Praef. p. v note 4, who has the following remark, from Baiter on Paneg. § 48, ‘Isocrates ubicunque διότι usurpavit, id fecisse videtur hiatus evitandi causa’ [see esp. Isocr. Lochit. § 7, where ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι is followed by καὶ διότι...S.]. It is found several times in the Rhet. ad Alex. as c. 17 p. 1432 a 16, c. 30 p. 1437 a 19, and elsewhere, but it is in Aristotle that it first becomes common; too common to need further illustration. See however Waitz on Anal. Pr. 58 b 7, Comm. I p. 495. For διότι = ὅτι, Steph. Thes. Vol. II 1544 cites Crito Com. ap. Athen. 4, p. 173 C, πάντων ἀκούων διότι παρασίτῳ τόπος οὗτος τρία μόνον ἀγαθὰ κεκτῆσθαι δοκεῖ. Its ordinary sense is ‘because’.

It has also a third signification, ‘why.’; the indirect interrogative, corresponding to the direct, διὰ τί, as ὅπως to πῶς, ὅποτε to πότε, ὅσος to πόσος, ὅπου to ποῦ, &c. In this sense it occurs in Plato, Phaedo 100 C, (four other examples in Ast's Lex.), Xen. Cyrop. VIII 4, 7, καὶ ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν διότι; Demosth. Phil. A 46, 10; Isocr. Archid. § 16, and in Aristotle, Rhet. II 23, 24, (where it is explained by the preceding τὴν αἰτίαν), Polit. IV (VI) 11, 1296 a 22. Met. A I, 981 a 29, where again it is explained by τὴν αἰτίαν). περὶ ἀναπνεύσεως 14, ult. and elsewhere, e.g. Ar. de Anima II 8, 12, 421 a 4, φανερὸν δὲ καὶ διότι οἱ ἰχθὺς ἄφωνοι, οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι φάρυγγα. In Rhet. III 11, 14, it is explained by τὸ αἴτιον. Cf. Amphis Dith. Fragm. 1 ap. Meineke, Comm. Fragm. III 306; B. διὰ τί δ̓ οὐκ ἄγεις εἰς τὸν ὄχλον αὐτό; Α. διότι φυλὴν περιμένω.

With διότι ‘that’, compare οὕνεκα and ὁθούνεκα in Sophocles, as Philoct. 634, the reason, the what for, passes into a mere statement of fact; because, into that. See Ellendt, Lex. Soph. ὁθούνεκα.

ἀπονεύειν, to bend the head away from something else and turn the attention to a particular object; hence, to incline to, fix the attention upon: ἀπό as in ἀποβλέπειν, (supr. § 1). Plat. Theaet. 165 A, ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. In Plat. Legg. VII 815 A, ἔκνευσις πληγῶν καὶ βολῶν, is declinatio, the bending of the head aside to avoid a blow. (In Eur. Iph. T. 1186 v. 1155 Herm. σὺ δ᾽ ἐς τὸ τῆς θεοῦ γ̓ ἐξένευσας εἰκότως, ἐξένευσας is of doubtful interpretation. Hermann, followed by Paley, derives it from ἐκνεῖν evadere, referring to Valckenaer on Hippol. 469, and 822. It seems however at least equally probable that the aorist belongs to ἐκνεύειν abnuere, opposed to ἐπινεύειν annuere, and that the meaning of the line is “It was natural, or reasonable, for thee to decline, reject, their offer, εἰς τὸ τῆς θεοῦ γ̓, looking to, in respect of, in regard of, thy duty to the goddess”. This sense of the word seems to be more in conformity with what precedes; and it occurs again in line 1330 Dind., with the same sense and derivation, ἐξένευσ᾽ ἀποστῆναι, beckoned us off, “gave us a sign to stand aloof”.)


χρήσιμοςἐντεύξεως] This passage is cited by Dionysius, Epist. ad Amm. I c. 6. He reads διά τε for διά τε, and διδασκαλία for διδασκαλίας (six lines below).

On the defence of Rhetoric, compare Quint. Inst. Orat. II 17, 26, seq. (in II 16 he sums up the arguments against the use of it), Isocr. ἀντίδ. § 251 seq. and Id. Nicocles, §§ 1—9, also Gorgias, in Plato's dialogue, c. XI 456 A—457 C. On the true office and functions of the orator, Cic. de Orat. I 46, 202—a striking passage. Id. de Invent. I 3 and 4.

διά τε] τε is answered by the (irregular) correlative δέ in ἔτι δέ at the beginning of the next sentence. de Anima II 4, 7, 416 a 2—6, οὔτε (parenth.)...πρὸς δὲ τούτοις.

ἀνάγκη δἰ αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι] The argument of this clause, χρήσιμος δέἐπιτιμήσεως, is summed up in two lines of Euripides, Alex. Fragm. 55 (12) Dind. ἀγλωσσίᾳ δὲ πολλάκις ληφθεὶς ἀνὴρ | δίκαια λέξας ἧσσον εὐγλώσσου φέρει. It is to the effect, that truth and right having a natural superiority over falsehood and wrong, the proper use of Rhetoric is to enable them to assert and enforce that superiority; to bring truth to light, and detect and expose deceit and sophistry. If the opposites of truth and right do ever prevail over these, it must be the fault of the parties concerned themselves, ἀνάγκη δἰ αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι, who have failed to avail themselves of this powerful instrument. Rhetoric is therefore ‘corrective’ or ‘remedial’ of the perversion of truth and right to which legal decisions are always more or less liable from misrepresentation of facts, fallacious arguments, or the blinding of the judgment by appeals to the feelings.

According to this translation of δἰ αὐτῶν, it is correctly and logically said that it is a consequence (ὥστε) of the natural superiority of truth and right to their opposites, that if those who have truth and right on their side are defeated, their defeat must be due to themselves, to their own neglect of Rhetoric, which would have enabled them to enforce this their natural superiority. Whereas if we follow Victorius (and Spengel who assents to his view, Arist. Ars Rhet. Vol. II p. 26) in explaining δἰ αὐτῶν by δἰ ἐναντίων, ὥστε becomes incorrect or meaningless: for there is neither truth nor sense in saying that it follows from the natural superiority of truth and justice that these, in the case of a wrong judgment, are defeated by their opposites; and not only so, but with this interpretation ἀνάγκη is also wrong—the consequence, if there be one, is certainly not necessary—and δἰ αὐτῶν should be ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν.

In the Introd. p. 144 note, I have referred to Waitz's note on Anal. Pr. 55 a 14, who gives examples of αὐτῶν &c. for the reflexive αὑτῶν &c. The usage is however so constant in Aristotle as hardly to need illustration. A good example is de Anima II 5, 6, 417 b 24, διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν βούληται, αἰσθάνεσθαι δ̓ οὐκ ἐπ̓ αὐτῷ. Rhet. I 4, 9, ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς, ‘in their own power’.

πρὸς ἐνίους] ‘in dealing with some’.

διδασκαλίας] de Soph. El. c. 2, 161 b 1, quoted in Introd. p. 75. Genuine and complete ‘instruction’ by demonstrative proofs. Top. A c. 14, 105 b 30, πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν (i.e. δἰ ἀποδείξεως) περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευτέον, διαλεκτικῶς (and therefore also ῥητορικῶς) πρὸς δόξαν.

κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος] ἐπιστήμη defined ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, Eth. Nic. VI 3. τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δἰ ἀναγκαίων, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν,... δὲ δόξα ἀβέβαιον.

ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς] A 2 101 a 30.

τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως] Topic. u. s. Metaph. Γ 5, 1009 a 17, ἔστι δ᾽ οὐχ αὐτὸς τρόπος πρὸς πάντας τῆς ἐντεύξεως: οἱ μὲν γὰρ πειθοῦς δέονται, οἱ δὲ βίας, where in line 20, ἀπάντησις is substituted for ἔντευξις. Isocr. πρὸς Δημόνικον § 20, τὰς ἐντεύξεις μὴ ποιοῦ (hold conversation, intercourse) πυκνὰς τοῖς αὐτοῖς. Alex. ad Top. 1. c. ἐντεύξεις λέγει τὰς πρὸς πολλοὺς συνουσίας, οἷς δεῖ μὲν ἐντυγχάνειν κοινωνικοὺς ὄντας καὶ φιλανθρώπους καὶ ἐντυγχάνειν ὠφελίμως.

ἔντευξις is therefore a lighting upon, or, meeting; hence a meeting which leads to a ‘conversation’; or, as arising casually out of that, a dialectical ‘encounter’.

ἔτι δὲ τἀναντίαλύειν ἔχωμεν] de Soph. El. I, 165 a 24, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς ἓν πρὸς ἓν εἰπεῖν ἔργον περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ εἰδότος ἀψευδεῖν μὲν αὐτὸν περὶ ὧν οἶδε, τὸν δὲ ψευδόμενον ἐμφανίζειν δύνασθαι, Rhet. ad Alex. c. 19 (20) 2, τὰ μὲν οὖν αἰτήματα ταῦτά ἐστι, διειλόμεθα δ᾽ αὐτῶν τὰς διαφοράς, ἵν̓ εἰδότες τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον χρώμεθα κατὰ τὸν καιρόν, καὶ μὴ λανθάνωσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ ἐναντίοι ἄδικόν τι αἰτοῦντες τοὺς δικάζοντας.

πῶς ἔχει] ‘the true state of the case’ (how things really are).

λύειν] solvere, diluere, ‘to loose, untie, the knot of a fallacy’, or difficulty; and so to ‘solve’ as a problem. γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν προτέρων ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν Met. B I, 995 a 28. λύσις opposed to δέσις, Poet. c. 18, §§ 1, 2. On λύσις and λύειν see Introd. on II 25, p. 267, note.

τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶντῶν ἐναντίων] Introd. p. 78.

τὰ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα] Comp. I 2, 1, subiecta materies, ὑποκειμένη ὕλη Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 b 12. τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ‘the logical subject’, of which other things are ‘predicated’, κατηγορεῖται. See Waitz, Comm. ad Organ. 1 a 20, Vol. I p. 274. Trendel. El. Log. Ar. § I, note p. 52. Id. Categorienlehre § 10, p. 53 seq. Bonitz ad Met. Z 3, 1028 b 36.

τῷ σώματι μέν...λόγῳ δέ] On this use of μέν and δέ, Buttm. Gr. Gr. (Engl. Transl.) § 149, p. 396. Id. not. on Mid. § 7 a, 49 e, 56 d.


εἰ δ᾽ ὅτι μέγαλα βλάψειεν ἄν (φήσει τις) κ.τ.λ.] On the abuse of arts and natural gifts, and the answers to the argument from the abuse to the use of them, see Quint. Inst. Orat. II 16, 5, Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 252, Plato, Gorg. u. s., Bacon, Nov. Org. P 129. Comp. Eth. Nic. III 3 τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τἀγαθά διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν. ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δἰ ἀνδρείαν.

τοῦτό γε κοινόν] Ovid. Trist. II 266, Nil prodest quod non laedere possit idem. Schrader.

πλὴν αρετῆς] Gaisford refers in illustration to Archytas ap. Stob. I p. 15. Xen. Cyrop. IV 1, 15. Pl. Meno, 87 E and Isoc<*>. Nicocles, init.


οὐκ ἔστιν ἑνός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένου ῥητ., ἀλλὰ καθάπερ διαλεκτική] See note and reff. on § 1 p. 3.

οὐ τὸ πεῖσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ.] on Aristotle's alteration and improvement of the original definition of Rhetoric by the Sophistical school of Rhetoricians, see Introd. p. 32 seq.

‘Non dubium est quin verba illa dirigantur adversus id quod apud Platonem ait Gorgias, p. 453 A, τὴν ῥητορικὴν πειθοῦς δημιοῦργον εἰναι, καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾶν.’ Muretus. Cicero's definition follows that of Aristotle, de Orat. I 61, 260, accommodate ad persuadendum posse dicere.

The notion of art, or proceeding by rule of art, consists not in the result, or success of the process, which is often unattainable, but in the correctness of the method followed. Top. Z 12, 149 b 25. τοιοῦτος δ᾽ τοῦ ῥήτορος καὶ τοῦ κλέπτου ὅρος, εἴπερ ἐστὶ ῥήτωρ μὲν δυνάμενος τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ πιθανὸν θεωρεῖν καὶ μηδὲν παραλείπειν, κλέπτης δ̓ λάθρα λαμβάνων. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοιοῦτος ὢν ἑκάτερος μὲν ἀγαθὸς ῥήτωρ δ̓ ἀγαθὸς κλέπτης ἔσται: οὐ γὰρ λάθρα λαμβάνων ἀλλ̓ βουλόμενος λάθρα λαμβάνειν κλέπτης ἐστίν. The art of doing anything is distinguished from the mere fact that the thing is done (as accidentally for instance), by the intention of the agent systematically carried out, but not necessarily realised in success. Comp. de Anima III 9, 8, καὶ ὅλως δὲ ὁρῶμεν ὅτι ἔχων τὴν ἰατρικὴν οὐκ ἰᾶται, ὡς ἑτέρου τινὸς κυρίου ὄντος τοῦ ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην (of the successful result of the artistic process), ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 b 12.

Topic. A 3, ἕξομεν δὲ τελέως τὴν μέθοδον, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχωμεν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ῥητορικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυνάμεων. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖν προιαιρούμεθα. οὔτε γὰρ ῥητορικὸς ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου πείσει, οὔθ̓ ἰατρικὸς ὑγιάσει. ἀλλ̓ ἐὰν τῶν ἐνδεχομένων μηδὲν παραλίπῃ, ἱκανῶς αὐτὸν ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην φήσομεν. Comp. Top. E c. 7, 136 b 57, and 137 a 5. Quint. II 17, 23 seq. Cic. de Inventione I 5, 6. Bacon, Adv. of learning, Bk. II X 2. ‘For almost all other arts and sciences are judged by acts or masterpieces, as I may term them, and not by the successes and events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of the cause. The master in the ship is judged by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage.’

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις (φανερὸν) ὅτικατὰ τὴν δύναμιν] The explanation and connexion are given in the Paraphrase, Introd. p. 148, and note 3.

Comp Met. Γ 2, 1004 b 17, οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταί...ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ προαιρέσει, and Bonitz’ note. Top. Δ 5, 126 a 35, πάντες γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι κατὰ ˙προαίρεσιν λέγονται. Z 12, 149 b 29 u.s. οὐ γὰρ λάθρα λαμβάνων ἀλλ᾽ βουλόμενος λάθρα λαμβάνειν κλέπτης ἐστίν. Eth. Nic. IV 13, 1127 b 15, οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀλαζών, ἀλλ̓ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει. Rhet. I 13, 10.

πλήν] ‘except that,—only’, a reservation. Soph. Oed. Col. 1639 (Herm.), Trach. 41, Arist. Equit. 1397, Dem. de Cor. p. 281 init., Arist. An. Pr. II 27, 70 a 29, Top. B 8, 114 a 8, Γ 4, 119 b 22, Θ 3, 158 b 37; I (de Soph. El.) c. 4, 166 a 4, Eth. N. IV 12, 1126 b 27, Polit. II 6, 1266 a 16, Rhet. I 12, 10.

μεθόδου] Note on ὁδοποιεῖν, § 2.

πάλιν οὖνλέγωμεν τὰ λοιπά] ‘Let us then take as it were a fresh start, and so first define it, and then proceed to the rest’.

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