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πολιτικωτερας τῆς δημηγορικης πραγματείας] πραγματείας, here applied to the study and practice of one of the departments of Rhetoric; sec on § 3.—πολιτικωτέρας: There are three possible senses of this word, firstly, ‘more worthy of, more becoming to, a citizen’, more agreeable to the position and duties of a citizen, ‘better and worthier’; secondly, ‘more suitable to a public man, statesman, or politician’, larger, more comprehensive, and liberal; as opposed to the comparatively trifling and petty occupations of private citizens: thirdly, more public and common, wider, more general; κοινόν, as opposed to ἴδιον and οἰκεῖον: the second seems to be the most appropriate here, and so I have rendered it in the paraphrase. [p. 141 of the Introduction: “nobler and larger and more liberal (or ‘statesmanlike’, or ‘more worthy of a citizen’,) vid. not. ad loc.”]

μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικανικά] The third kind of Rhetoric, τὸ ἐπιδεικτικόν, is here omitted, but afterwards supplied, c. 3 § 1.

τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα] ‘The most general expression which the Athenians have for a contract is συναλλάγυα, συνθήκη, συμβόλαιον.’ Meier und Schömann der Attische Process p. 494. The difference usually taken between συνθήκη and συνάλλαγμα appears in Rhet. I 15, 22 ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων (ordinary dealings, buying and selling and such like transactions), καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια κατὰ συνθήκας (in the way of, by contracts): we are concerned here only with the first and third of these, συνάλλαγμα and συμβόλαιον.

The ordinary signification of both of these is a contract, or covenant, or mutual agreement, or interchange (συνάλλαγμα), between two or more parties. They are thence extended to any dealings, especially business transactions, or even any circumstances of ordinary intercourse between man and man, and more particularly any of those which may give rise to a suit at law. These are ἴδια συμβόλαια or συναλλάγματα: see Dem. de Cor. p. 298 § 210, τὰ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν βίου συμβόλαια, with Dissen's note: Isocr. Paneg. §§ 11, 78, π. ἀντιδ. §§ 3, 38, 40, 42, 79 τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ συμβόλαια τὰ γιγνόμενα πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. § 309 ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τοῖς περὶ τῶν συμβολαίων. The former of these two seems to refer rather to dealings in general, the second to special contracts. Areop. §§ 33, 34. Arist. Eth. N. II 1, 1103 b 15 πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γιγνόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοί. Rhet. I 15, 22 ἔτι δὲ πράττεται πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια κατὰ τὰς συν- θήκας. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1 (2 Oxf.) § 2 ταῖς περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια δικαιολογίαις.

That the meaning of the terms is not confined to contracts proper, is plain also from Eth. N. v 1131 a 2. (This passage is quoted at length on I 15, 22.) τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια τὰ δ᾽ ἀκούσια (the ‘voluntary’ being illustrated by buying and selling, lending and borrowing, whereas ‘involuntary’ are all of them crimes, λαθραῖα or βίαια: all of them cases in which the breach of the supposed contract, private or public, entitles the aggrieved party to a legal remedy). Opposed to these ἴδια συμβόλαια or συναλλάγματα are the public (κοινά) international commercial treaties, σύμβολα. See further on σύμβολα, note on c. 4 § 11.

συμβόλαια is also employed in a wider and more general sense, as Rhet. ad Alex. c. 2 (3 Oxf.) § 2 περὶ τῶν πρὸς ἄλλας πόλεις συμμαχιῶν καὶ συμβολαίων. Other examples may be found in Plat. Gorg. 484 D ἄπειροι τῶν λόγων οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς ξυμβολαίοις. Rep. I 333 A τί δὲ δή; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρείαν κτῆσιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ φαίης ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι; Πρὸς τὰ ξυμβόλαια, Σώκρατες. Ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα, τι ἄλλο; κοινωνήματα δῆτα, and several others in Ast's Lexicon. Arist. Polit. IV (VI) 16, 1300 b 22, and 32 περὶ τῶν μικρῶν συναλλαγμάτων, ὅσα δραχμιαῖα καὶ πεντάδραχμα καὶ μικρῷ πλείονος. Ib. 15 ult. 1300 b 12, ἀρχὴ τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγόραν συμβολαίων (dealings) κυρία. Comp. c. 8 sub init. ἀρχὴ περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια. VI (VII) 2, 1317 b 27, III 13, 1283 b 30, and elsewhere.

πρὸ ἔργου] ‘to the purpose’; anything ‘for’, or ‘in favour of’, and therefore ‘likely to promote’, any ‘work’ we may have in hand; and hence generally ‘serviceable’ or ‘profitable’ to any purposes. πρὸ ἔργου (which also occurs infra I 4 §§ 3, 7) is the Aristotelian mode of writing what in Xenophon, Plato, Demosthenes, and indeed ordinary Greek in general, appears as προύργου. Some examples in Fritsche ad Eth. Eud. A 3, 1215 a 8.

κακοῦργον] As a special variety of the general conception of dishonesty, fraud, knavery, this adjective is applied in a peculiar sense to sophistical reasoning. Rhet. III 2, 7 τῶν δ᾽ ὀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῃ ὁμωνυμίαι χρήσιμοι, παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακουργεῖ. Topic. I 11, 172 b 21. Plat. Gorg. 483 A. Dem. Lept. 491. Stallb. ad Rep. I 338 D. Similarly συκοφαντεῖν is used for cheating in argument, bringing fallacious objections, Top. Θ 2, 157 a 32. I (de Soph. El.) 15, 174 b 9. Both of them represent the knavish tricks and fallacies which may be employed in rhetorical and dialectical reasoning. Plat. Rep. 341 B πρὸς ταῦτα κακούργει καὶ συκοφάντει.

A debate in a political assembly, which turns upon questions of public and national concern (κοινότερον), in which accordingly the audience, who are all members of it, have a strong personal interest, and are therefore impatient of anything that would divert them from the direct proof of the expediency or inexpediency of the policy recommended or condemned, affords much less room for these deceptive arts ad captandum, τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος, than the practice of the law-courts, where the judges who decide the case are usually not personally interested in the issue, and the pleader has therefore to create an interest in them by these irregular methods: this is on the principle so pithily stated by the Corinthian envoys, Thuc. I 120, 3 κακοὺς κριτὰς ὡς μὴ προσηκόντων εἶναι. (This is a more correct mode of stating the argument than that adopted in the paraphrase, Introd. p. 141.)

This contrast of the two kinds of audiences, in respect of their several dispositions to keep the speakers to the point, does not hold of our own law-courts and parliaments. The Athenian dicasts, careless, ignorant, and unprofessional, selected at random from the population of the city, with their sense of responsibility diminished or destroyed by the large number of those who had to decide, might very likely be indifferent to the issue of the case before them, and require a stimulus to their attention from the parties immediately concerned: but this is not true of the professional judges of our courts, who regard the right decision of the case as a business and a duty.

κριτής] applied to the ἐκκλησιαστής in the general sense of ‘judge’ or ‘critic’ of the question or arguments employed; supr. § 7. Introd. p. 137, note 1.

ἀναλαβεῖν] is to ‘bring back’, ‘recover’; hence to ‘gain over’, ‘conciliate’, as ἀνά in ἀναπείθειν, ἀναδιδάσκειν, ἀναδιδόναι, ἀναδέχεσθαι κ.τ.λ. ‘Membranae Balliolenses, captare: Muretus, accurare, excipere: Portus, reficere, recreare, μεταφορά ab aegrotis; vel conciliare. Omnes hae notiones a primaria resumendi, ad se recipiendi, facile deducuntur.’ Gaisford. The order is, (1) to ‘get or bring back’; thence, (2) to ‘bring back into the proper and normal state’, as of ‘recovery’ from a disease—the notion of something as due being again implied as in ἀποδιδόναι, note on § 7— and thence again, (3) as here, to ‘restore’, as it were, the audience to their proper state of mind, conciliate them to your views and interests. Hence, lastly, the senses of reparare, reficere, recreare, and the like; abundantly illustrated in Steph. Thes. ed. Did. Vol. II pp. 431—2.

διδόασιν] (ἑαυτούς) sese dant, ‘lend themselves’, δ᾽ ἡδονῇ δούς, Eur. Phoen. 21. Valck. Diatr. p. 233. And so, many of its compounds, ἐνδιδόναι, ἐκδιδόναι, ἐπιδιδόναι, ἀποδιδόναι, διαδιδόναι, ὑποδιδόναι, παραδιδόναι, (ἡδονῇ παραδούς, Pl. Phaedr. 250 D), προδιδόναι (Herod. bis), ἐκδιδόναι (Herod.). The process is the usual one by which transitive verbs become intransitive, viz. by the ellipse of the reflexive pronoun.

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