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χρήσιμος—ἐντεύξεως] This passage is cited by Dionysius, Epist. ad Amm. I c. 6. He reads διά τε for διά τε, and διδασκαλία for διδασκαλίας (six lines below). On the defence of Rhetoric, compare Quint. Inst. Orat. II 17, 26, seq. (in II 16 he sums up the arguments against the use of it), Isocr. ἀντίδ. § 251 seq. and Id. Nicocles, §§ 1—9, also Gorgias, in Plato's dialogue, c. XI 456 A—457 C. On the true office and functions of the orator, Cic. de Orat. I 46, 202—a striking passage. Id. de Invent. I 3 and 4. διά τε] τε is answered by the (irregular) correlative δέ in ἔτι δέ at the beginning of the next sentence. de Anima II 4, 7, 416 a 2—6, οὔτε (parenth.)...πρὸς δὲ τούτοις. ἀνάγκη δἰ αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι] The argument of this clause, χρήσιμος δέ— ἐπιτιμήσεως, is summed up in two lines of Euripides, Alex. Fragm. 55 (12) Dind. ἀγλωσσίᾳ δὲ πολλάκις ληφθεὶς ἀνὴρ | δίκαια λέξας ἧσσον εὐγλώσσου φέρει. It is to the effect, that truth and right having a natural superiority over falsehood and wrong, the proper use of Rhetoric is to enable them to assert and enforce that superiority; to bring truth to light, and detect and expose deceit and sophistry. If the opposites of truth and right do ever prevail over these, it must be the fault of the parties concerned themselves, ἀνάγκη δἰ αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι, who have failed to avail themselves of this powerful instrument. Rhetoric is therefore ‘corrective’ or ‘remedial’ of the perversion of truth and right to which legal decisions are always more or less liable from misrepresentation of facts, fallacious arguments, or the blinding of the judgment by appeals to the feelings. According to this translation of δἰ αὐτῶν, it is correctly and logically said that it is a consequence (ὥστε) of the natural superiority of truth and right to their opposites, that if those who have truth and right on their side are defeated, their defeat must be due to themselves, to their own neglect of Rhetoric, which would have enabled them to enforce this their natural superiority. Whereas if we follow Victorius (and Spengel who assents to his view, Arist. Ars Rhet. Vol. II p. 26) in explaining δἰ αὐτῶν by δἰ ἐναντίων, ὥστε becomes incorrect or meaningless: for there is neither truth nor sense in saying that it follows from the natural superiority of truth and justice that these, in the case of a wrong judgment, are defeated by their opposites; and not only so, but with this interpretation ἀνάγκη is also wrong—the consequence, if there be one, is certainly not necessary—and δἰ αὐτῶν should be ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν. In the Introd. p. 144 note, I have referred to Waitz's note on Anal. Pr. 55 a 14, who gives examples of αὐτῶν &c. for the reflexive αὑτῶν &c. The usage is however so constant in Aristotle as hardly to need illustration. A good example is de Anima II 5, 6, 417 b 24, διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν βούληται, αἰσθάνεσθαι δ̓ οὐκ ἐπ̓ αὐτῷ. Rhet. I 4, 9, ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς, ‘in their own power’. πρὸς ἐνίους] ‘in dealing with some’. διδασκαλίας] de Soph. El. c. 2, 161 b 1, quoted in Introd. p. 75. Genuine and complete ‘instruction’ by demonstrative proofs. Top. A c. 14, 105 b 30, πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν (i.e. δἰ ἀποδείξεως) περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευτέον, διαλεκτικῶς (and therefore also ῥητορικῶς) πρὸς δόξαν. ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος] ἐπιστήμη defined ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, Eth. Nic. VI 3. τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δἰ ἀναγκαίων, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν,...ἡ δὲ δόξα ἀβέβαιον. ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς] A 2 101 a 30. τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως] Topic. u. s. Metaph. Γ 5, 1009 a 17, ἔστι δ᾽ οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος πρὸς πάντας τῆς ἐντεύξεως: οἱ μὲν γὰρ πειθοῦς δέονται, οἱ δὲ βίας, where in line 20, ἀπάντησις is substituted for ἔντευξις. Isocr. πρὸς Δημόνικον § 20, τὰς ἐντεύξεις μὴ ποιοῦ (hold conversation, intercourse) πυκνὰς τοῖς αὐτοῖς. Alex. ad Top. 1. c. ἐντεύξεις λέγει τὰς πρὸς πολλοὺς συνουσίας, οἷς δεῖ μὲν ἐντυγχάνειν κοινωνικοὺς ὄντας καὶ φιλανθρώπους καὶ ἐντυγχάνειν ὠφελίμως. ἔντευξις is therefore a lighting upon, or, meeting; hence a meeting which leads to a ‘conversation’; or, as arising casually out of that, a dialectical ‘encounter’. ἔτι δὲ τἀναντία—λύειν ἔχωμεν] de Soph. El. I, 165 a 24, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς ἓν πρὸς ἓν εἰπεῖν ἔργον περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ εἰδότος ἀψευδεῖν μὲν αὐτὸν περὶ ὧν οἶδε, τὸν δὲ ψευδόμενον ἐμφανίζειν δύνασθαι, Rhet. ad Alex. c. 19 (20) 2, τὰ μὲν οὖν αἰτήματα ταῦτά ἐστι, διειλόμεθα δ᾽ αὐτῶν τὰς διαφοράς, ἵν̓ εἰδότες τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον χρώμεθα κατὰ τὸν καιρόν, καὶ μὴ λανθάνωσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ ἐναντίοι ἄδικόν τι αἰτοῦντες τοὺς δικάζοντας. πῶς ἔχει] ‘the true state of the case’ (how things really are). λύειν] solvere, diluere, ‘to loose, untie, the knot of a fallacy’, or difficulty; and so to ‘solve’ as a problem. ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν προτέρων ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν Met. B I, 995 a 28. λύσις opposed to δέσις, Poet. c. 18, §§ 1, 2. On λύσις and λύειν see Introd. on II 25, p. 267, note. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν—τῶν ἐναντίων] Introd. p. 78. τὰ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα] Comp. I 2, 1, subiecta materies, ἡ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 b 12. τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ‘the logical subject’, of which other things are ‘predicated’, κατηγορεῖται. See Waitz, Comm. ad Organ. 1 a 20, Vol. I p. 274. Trendel. El. Log. Ar. § I, note p. 52. Id. Categorienlehre § 10, p. 53 seq. Bonitz ad Met. Z 3, 1028 b 36. τῷ σώματι μέν...λόγῳ δέ] On this use of μέν and δέ, Buttm. Gr. Gr. (Engl. Transl.) § 149, p. 396. Id. not. on Mid. § 7 a, 49 e, 56 d.
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