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seq. To the same effect III 14, 8 δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι πάντα ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιαῦτα: πρὸς φαῦλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ἀκούοντα, ἐπεὶ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτος ᾖ, οὐθὲν δεῖ προοιμίου—as the vehicle for appeals to the feelings and other indirect proofs addressed to the judges personally, which were usually introduced into the προοίμιον. πίστεις] rhetorical, not demonstrative, proofs; modes of belief, of things probable; all the materials and arguments of Rhetoric being probable merely, none of them certain. See Introd. p. 136 note. προσθῆκαι...σῶμα τῆς πίστεως] All kinds of indirect proof are secondary, subordinate, non-essential, mere ‘adjuncts’ or ‘appendages’, like dress or ornaments to the body: ‘the body’ being the actual, logical, direct and substantial proof of the case. What is here called ‘the body’, meaning the substance as opposed to accidents, we usually represent by ‘the soul’ in this same relation; the body in its turn now standing for the accidents and non-essentials of a thing. So the Scholiast on Hermogenes, Proleg. (quoted by Ernesti, Lexicon Technologiae Graecae p. 110, Art. ἐνθύμημα) οἱ παλαιοὶ ὥσπερ τι ζῷον τὸν λόγον ὑπέθεντο ἐκ σώματός τε συνεστηκότα καὶ ψυχῆς: ψυχὴν μὲν καλοῦντες τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν διὰ τῶν κεφαλαίων συνισταμένην: σῶμα δὲ τὴν φράσιν καὶ τὸ ἔξωθεν κάλλος, ὃ ποιεῖν εἰώθασιν αἱ ἰδέαι. And Cicero, Orat. XIV 44 nam et invenire et iudicare quid dicas magna illa quidem sunt et tamquam animi instar in corpore. Quintilian describes the views of some of those who thus rigorously limit the province of Rhetoric as an art—αἱ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον— to the employment of the ‘enthymeme’, the rhetorical representative of the logical and demonstrative ‘syllogism’; with the exclusion of all that is, strictly speaking, ‘beside the subject or real issue’, all that is beside the facts of the case and the direct proof of them; all indirect proof, namely, from the assumed character of the speaker himself, or appeals to the feelings of the judges or audience, and also all ornaments and graces of style and delivery. Aristotle here assumes this to be theoretically the only true and proper method, though he by no means consistently adheres to it in his actual treatment of the subject. Quintilian's description is as follows, though, as the reasons for the exclusion of these indirect proofs are somewhat different from those assigned by Aristotle, he probably does not refer immediately to him: Fuerunt et clari quidem oratores quibus solum videretur oratoris officium docere. Namque et affectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant: primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio; deinde quia iudicem a veritate depelli misericordia vel ira similibusque non oporteret: et voluptatem audientium pctere, quum vincendi tantum gratia diceretur, non modo agenti supervacuum sed vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur. Inst. Orat. V. Prooem. I. On the general question of appeals to the feelings, Quint. II 17, 26 seq.: and on the prevailing practice, Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδ. § 321. πραγματεύεσθαι is well explained by Bonitz on Metaph. A 6, 987 a 30. ‘πραγματεύεσθαι περί τι, vel περί τινος is dicitur ab Aristotele, qui in investiganda et cognoscenda aliqua re via ac ratione procedit; itaque coniunctum legitur cum verbis διαλέγεσθαι, ζητεῖν, θεωρεῖν’. The primary sense of doing business, or occupying oneself about anything, passes into the more limited or special signification of an intellectual pursuit, and thence of ‘a special study’, ‘a systematic treatment of a particular subject of investigation, or practice’ (as in this present case, of Rhetoric, comp. § 10). πραγματεία, like μέθοδος, τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, φιλοσοφία, and many other words, is used to express not only the intellectual process of investigation, but also the resulting science, art, treatise, or written work, or part of such work. See on this point, Introd. p. 17, note 2. Also, on the general meaning of the term, Waitz on Anal. Post. II 13, 96 b 15. Trendel. de Anima p. 199. Elem. Log. Arist. § 58, p. 135.
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