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οἳ μέν...οἳ δέ] ‘either...or’. The one only think that the laws ought to be so framed, hold the opinion as a theory; the others, as the Court of Areopagus, actually (καί, also, besides the mere theory) carry it into practice, καὶ χρῶνται. ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ] Heindorf ad Theaet. § 76. Lycurgus c. Leocr. §§ 12, 13, quoted by Gaisford, καὶ ταῦτα κάλλιστον ἔχοντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων παράδειγμα τὸ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ συνέδριον, ὃ τοσοῦτον διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων δικαστηρίων, ὥστε καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὁμολογεῖσθαι τοῖς ἁλισκομένοις δικαίαν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κρίσιν, πρὸς ὃ δεῖ καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀποβλέποντας μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τοῖς ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσιν: κ.τ.λ. Lucian, Hermotimus, c. 64, has something similar about the practice of this court, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ἀρεοπαγίτας αὐτὸ ποιοῦντα: οἳ ἐν νυκτὶ καὶ σκότῳ δικάζουσιν, ὡς μὴ εἰς τοὺς λέγοντας ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὰ λεγόμενα ἀποβλέποιεν. (Lucian ed. Hemsterh. I p. 805), and again, Anacharsis s. de Gymn. c. 10, (Vol. II p. 898) οἱ δὲ (δικαζόμενοι) ἔς τ᾽ ἂν μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος λέγωσιν ἀνέχεται ἡ βουλὴ καθ̓ ἡσυχίαν ἀκούουσα: ἢν δέ τις ἢ φροίμιον εἴπῃ πρὸ τοῦ λόγου, ὡς εὐνουστέρους ἀπεργάσαιτο αὐτούς, ἢ οἶκτον ἢ δείνωσιν ἔξωθεν ἐπάγοι τῷ πράγματι, οἷα πολλὰ ῥητόρων παῖδες ἐπὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς μηχανῶνται, παρελθὼν ὁ κῆρυξ κατεσιώπησεν εὐθύς, οὐκ ἐῶν ληρεῖν πρὸς τὴν βουλήν κ.τ.λ. There are several allusions to the same in Quintilian, II 16, 4, VI 1, 7, X I, 107, XII 10, 26. Spalding in his note on the first of these passages calls attention to—what indeed is sufficiently apparent on the face of the statements—Quintilian's carelessness in extending to all the lawcourts of Athens, a practice actually prevailing at the most only in one of them; in spite of the direct evidence to the contrary in the extant orations of the Athenian orators, and the story of Hyperides and Phryne which he himself tells in II 15, 9. διαστρέφειν] to warp, or distort to wrest out of the straight (‘right’) line or proper direction, to pervert or ‘deprave’ the judgment. The same metaphor is repeated in στρεβλόν. The metaphor which compares wrong, the deviation from the ‘right’ line or path, to the crooked or twisted, the divergence from the straight, and represents wrong judgment as the warping of the moral rule, occurs in various languages; σκολιός, and ὀρθός, εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς, Solon ap. Dem. de F. L. p. 423, σκολιαῖς ὁδοῖς πατῶν, Pind. Pyth. II 156, Pl. Theaet. 173 A &c. &c. So ἑλικτός, Eur. Androm. 448 ἑλικτὰ κοὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ἀλλὰ πᾶν πέριξ φρονοῦντες. So Plato of the good and bad horse in the human chariot, Phaedr. 253 D, ὁ μὲν...τό τε εἰδος ὀρθός...ὁ δ᾽ αὖ σκολιός κ.τ.λ. So also rectum and pravum or varum or curvum, right and wrong (wrung or twisted out of shape, distorted, similarly intortus) tort, Fr. (tortum), torto, Ital. Compare Lucretius, IV 516, denique ut in fabrica, si prava est fabrica prima Normaque si fallax rectis regionibus exit,—Omnia mendose fieri, &c. Cic. Acad. Pr. II 11, 33, interesse oportet, ut inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Hor. Ep. II 2, 44, curvo dignoscere rectum, (‘virtutem distinguere a vitio’. Orelli). Pers. Sat. III 52, haud tibi inexpertum curvos deprendere mores. IV 11, rectum discernis ubi inter curva subit, vel cum fallit pede regula varo. V 38, apposita intortos extendit regula mores. ‘Crooked’ for perverse, immoral, wrong, is very common in the earlier writers of our own language. Deut. xxxii 5, a perverse and crooked generation. Ps. cxxv 5, Prov. ii 15, whose ways are crooked, and they froward in their paths. Ep. ad Phil. ii 15, and in many other places and authors. For examples of the latter, see Richardson's Dict. Art. ‘crooked’. Very different to this are the principles laid down by the author of the Π̔ητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον as a guide to the practice of the rhetorician, c. 36 (37) § 4. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς ἐπαίνῳ θεραπεῦσαι, ὡς δικασταὶ δίκαιοι καὶ δεινοί εἰσιν. συμπαραληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐλαττώσεις, εἴ που τῶν ἀντιδίκων καταδεεστέρως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τὸν ἀγῶνα. The judges are to be flattered, and the opponent represented in the darkest colours, whether his alleged defects have or have not any bearing upon the matter at issue. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐμβλητέον τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἀκόλουθα; which is the exact contradictory of the course prescribed by Aristotle in § 6 as alike fair and in accordance with the true principles of the art. προάγοντας εἰς] Comp. III 14, 7, and note. κἂν εἴ τις...ποιήσειε] The process by which ἄν in this and similar forms of expression—ὡς ἂν εἰ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ, καθάπερ ἂν εἰ, οἱόνπερ ἂν εἰ, and the like—has lost its force, become inactive, (consopitum, ‘gone to sleep’, Buttm.,) in the sentence, is explained by Buttmann in his note on Dem. Mid. § 15, p. 530. The conditional ἄν belongs to some verb in the apodosis, originally expressed, afterwards left to be understood, as in the clause before us. The expression at full length would be, κἂν, εἴ τις ποιήσειε, ποιήσειε, ‘as one would do, if he were to do’. Still, though the particle has lost its direct and active force in this sentence, some latent notion of conditionality always remains, even when the verb which ἂν supposes cannot actually be supplied. This is the case in such phrases as φοβούμενος ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ παῖς, Pl. Gorg. 479 A ‘fearing as a child would’: Ar. parva naturalia περὶ μαντικῆς I 2, 2 ὅσων ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ λάλος ἡ φύσις ἐστιν, ‘whose natural habit is, as it might be (ἄν), talkative’; de Anima I 5, 5, 409 b 27, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ πράγματα τιθέντες. In such cases the ἄν is retained by habit and association, when the sense no longer requires it. The phrase accordingly is not found in the earlier forms of the language, and does not become common till the time of Plato and Aristotle, with whom, the latter especially, it is very frequent. The association required time before it was established as a fixed habit. I believe that it does not occur in Thucydides, and that it makes its first appearance in Xenophon; that is, in the forms above given; for as an unnecessary appendage to a participle, or in cases analogous, ἄν is thus used by earlier writers. See Hermann on Soph. Phil. 491, and Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 430, I, for some instances [Kühner's Ausführliche Grammatik § 398 p. 209 sq. S.]. Aristotle seems to be the earliest writer who assumed the license of joining κἂν εἰ with the subjunctive mood, as in Pol. II 1 init. κἂν εἰ τυγχάνωσιν, c. 2, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμῆς πλεῖον ἑλκύσῃ, and III 8 κἂν εἰ συμβαίνῃ, also Poet. I 5, κἂν εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνωσιν. Κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκῇ is the MSS reading in Plat. Rep. IX 579 D, and defended by Schneider (not. ad loc.); but rejected by Ast, Bek., Stallb. and the Zurich Editors who substitute δοκεῖ. I subjoin a few examples of the usage in its various forms. Soph. Aj. 1078 δοκεῖν πεσεῖν ἂν κἂν (it might be even) ἀπὸ σμικροῦ κακοῦ. Xenophon, Symp. II 20, IX 4, Cyrop. I 3, 1, Memor. III 6, 4 and 10, 12. Plato, Apol. 23 B, Phaed. 72 C, 109 C, and elsewhere, Men. 97 B, Gorg. 479 A, Rep. VI 493 A, Isocr. Paneg. §§ 69, 148, Aristotle in addition to those already quoted, Rhet. II 20, 4, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις, Eth. N. v 7, 1132, II. Ib. V 12, 1137, 2; VI 13 sub. fin., 1145, 2 and 10; VII 8, 1150, 16, κἂν εἰ ῥέπουσι, Pol. III 6 (sub init.) κἂν εἰ πλείους, and several more: Hist. Anim. IV 2, 16, IV 11, 11, VIII 2, 10, de part. Anim. IV 5, 26, de Gen. Anim. III 9, 7. In Aristotle it has become habitual. The analogous use of ἂν with the participle is exemplified by Pol. II 2, 1261 b 4 ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι; and Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. I 5, 1, ὡς ἄν καθόλου λέγοντας, and I 6, 6, ὡς ἂν κατὰ λόγον, where ἄν may be considered as redundant. [Vahlen, Beiträge zu Ar. Poet. I p. 35—37; Eucken, de Ar. dicendi ratione I p. 61—64. S.]
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